What this covers

Russ Roberts talks with Michael Munger about a puzzle: most employment in developed economies is directed by a boss rather than by prices. Inside a firm, accounting, legal and computer services are handed out by fiat, not sold. Munger works from Ronald Coase's 1937 article and the idea of transaction costs. He tests it on examples. Adam Smith's pin factory uses piecework to approximate prices. A shopping mall runs on rents while anchor tenants like Macy's are run from the top down. In a parable of outsourcing, a firm's stock rises 18 percent in six weeks before suppliers become strangers and deliveries stop.

The middle of the conversation turns to team production and monitoring, following Alchian and Demsetz's 1973 argument. Munger's illustration is a Yangtze River barge team that hires a monitor with a whip, and the ideal monitor never uses it. That example is flagged as contested. He also notes that smaller one-person barges would align incentives but carry less, so every arrangement trades one cost against another. Piece rates, he says, fail for most knowledge and service work, where output cannot be measured.

The last stretch asks what disciplines a firm's internal commands. Munger points to owners as residual claimants and to Alchian's survival argument. He describes internal budgets as decided by departmental politics rather than returns, and he sets wages by competition among firms for workers. He contrasts this with a socialist firm lacking such pressure, and he closes on whether a benevolent planner would beat self-interested butchers.

Sharpest takeaway

Munger argues firms exist because internal command allocation replaces the price system wherever using prices is too costly, so firms are rational islands of central direction that survive through competition among firms rather than through prices inside them.

  • Using the price system carries transaction costs (negotiating, monitoring, complying with contracts) that firms avoid by coordinating internally
  • Contracts cannot anticipate all contingencies, so internal authority and monitoring fill the gap
  • Firm-level inefficiencies are disciplined by competition and survival, as in Alchian's argument that surviving firms behave as if they optimize

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0.86

Wages inside a firm are not set by the boss's generosity; they are set by competition among firms for workers. A boss who pays above the market wage out of niceness will go bankrupt, and a socialist command economy lacks this discipline and can sustain pay and price distortions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“you don't really decide what to pay your employees it looks like you do but what really determines the salary of that pin sharpener is of course competition among firms”

0.86

Inside firms, budgets and resource allocations are decided by internal political competition, such as departments jostling and arguing with the chair or the boss, rather than by profitability or the return on assets a unit generates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“that gets decided by Fiat the IT people ... this internal tussle that's decided again not by market competition but by political competition”

0.86

Most internal business decisions use no profit centers, piecework, or contracts that reveal the marginal productivity of workers, so the only real market discipline on a firm's internal allocation is the blunt mechanism of hiring, firing, and going bankrupt.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“the only thing that disciplines a firm is the extremely blunt mechanisms of hiring and firing and going out of business”

0.86

Firms behave as if they maximize profits, not because managers can calculate optimal allocations without prices, but because attrition and expansion of successful firms weed out those that work poorly; the survivors are the ones that optimized, even if no individual manager did.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“it's not that everybody optimizes right but everybody that survives managed to optimize”

0.86

A shopping mall is a price-driven market: the mall owner rents square footage, and tenant shops thrive or get evicted based on whether revenue covers rent, yet anchor department stores like Macy's inside the mall run centralized top-down operations and coexist with the market.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“a mall is like a market oriented price driven set of economic activity and within the mall you've got these weird little islands the so called anchors”

0.86

Outsourcing janitorial, accounting, and computer maintenance can initially raise profits (the parable's stock price rises 18 percent in six weeks), but outsourcing everything fails because contracts cannot anticipate contingencies, and suppliers who were once colleagues become strangers and deliveries stop.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“six weeks later profits are up the stock price is up 18 percent what a genius I am”

0.86

Inside firms, bosses allocate headcount, budgets, and resources by fiat rather than by profitability or marginal productivity. Support functions such as accounting, legal, and IT are sized by the leader's judgment and given away to employees rather than priced.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“there are whole areas of corporations accounting the legal team the computing and information technology part of a firm where the size of that is totally decided by the wisdom of the leader”

0.83

In a Yangtze River barge-towing team, groups competing with other groups hire a monitor with a whip because shirking reduces the team's output; the monitor is paid well, and an ideal monitor never actually uses the whip because his presence makes workers pull hard.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“they found it to the to their advantage they can make more money if they hire this specialized person called the monitor and if they give him a whip”

0.83

A monitor who is diligent never needs to use the whip, so paying a monitor well can mean the monitor is never actually paid for punishing anyone, and the team's joint output more than covers the monitoring cost.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“if he really is diligent if he works hard he'll never use the whip yeah that's the irony”

0.80

People want a planner who has their interests at heart, but Adam Smith's butcher insight implies that a self-interested butcher serves you better than a benevolent one, and an aggregate economy is not obviously better served by a benevolent planner than by self-interested actors coordinated through markets.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“I don't necessarily want my butcher to care about what's best for me and ironically when the butcher cares mostly about the butcher I get better meat and better prices”

0.80

Consumers still get the benefits of the price system even though firms are internally command-based, because firms compete with each other for customers, so the price system operates at the level of final output.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“there's plenty of competition among these firms so consumers still get the benefits of the price system”

0.80

Most economic activity in developed economies, measured by employment, is not led by prices at all but by directions from a boss, so the paradox is why so much activity is organized through command rather than the price mechanism that markets use so well.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“most economic activity just in terms of numbers of employment in the least in developed economies is it led by price at all it's led by directions from some boss”

0.80

In an owner-managed firm, the owner is the residual claimant who keeps what is left after costs, so the owner has strong incentive to discover the right size of each department, and this incentive matters more than the owner's individual skill.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“the owner has the incentive to find and discover the right size of the shoe department”

0.80

When contracts cannot specify all contingencies, a firm writes simpler contracts that pay workers for hours and gives a foreman authority to direct them minute by minute, because the manager lacks the information to specify the work in advance.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“I write contracts that are of a much simpler simpler form by and large and that form is you come to work every day I'll pay you for the number of hours”

0.80

Ronald Coase's 1937 article showed that firms exist because it is costly to use the price system (transaction costs), so it can be efficient for some coordination to occur inside firms through command rather than prices, even though that looks inefficient.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“coast wrote an article that it said that it's actually efficient to be inefficient in the innocence dramatically more efficient”

0.80

Firms exist when the transaction costs of using the price system (negotiating, monitoring, complying with contracts) exceed the costs of internal command, and firms outsource or drop internal functions when market transactions become cheaper, such as when buying furniture is easier than making it.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“firms exist when it's too expensive to use the price system it would cost me much more to use the price system”

0.80

In Adam Smith's pin factory, a pure market among separate firms for each step of pin-making would be impractical because of transaction costs, so one firm organizes the steps internally and uses piecework, which approximates the price system without full market prices.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“suppose you had a pure market in pin factory so the first guy has this wire and what he could do is take bids from all the different people”

0.80

Team production, as Alchian and Demsetz argued in 1973, explains the firm: when individual contributions to joint output are hard to measure, a specialized monitor is needed, and only in that context does a firm form around the monitor role, an extension of the division of labor.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“their explanation for the existence of the firm in fact was that only in that context can you get people who specialized in monitoring”

0.80

Smaller one-person barges would align incentives perfectly and avoid the need for a monitor, but they are inefficient because they carry less and have separate costs, so economic life involves trading off the benefits of one incentive arrangement against the costs of another.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“a small barge is ineffective it's inefficient it has separate costs so a lot of economic activity that we're talking about today is about the tension”

0.80

The invisible-hand result is that people make choices in disparate circumstances without ex ante expectation of coordination, yet well-functioning markets make their individual choices add up to what they intended, which is the beautiful property that a central planner cannot reproduce.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“the beautiful thing about properly functioning markets is they do all add up that the aggregate consequence it often is just what the individuals intended”

0.80

Managers cannot maximize profits deliberately because they lack prices to guide them, but managers and owners are still incentivized to do so because they are residual claimants who capture the gains when the firm becomes more profitable, often through stock options and bonuses.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“they have stock options and other reasons that make them what economists call the residual claimant they get the excess if the company becomes more profitable”

0.80

Piece-rate pay cannot be used for most knowledge and service work because output is not measurable, so when workers are paid an annual salary they have freedom to shirk and must be monitored in some other way.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“most of us don't produce anything or nothing tangible we can pick up add something too and then pass it on to the next person can't do peace work”

0.80

In a socialist firm with no competitive discipline, a manager who pays workers above market rates would charge more for pens as a monopolist, so the absence of market discipline lets generosity be passed to consumers at higher prices.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“I'm the monopoly producer of pens because it I'm not disciplined by by the market”

0.80

Contracts cannot anticipate every contingency, and contingencies interact, so an outsourced supplier's failure to deliver can collapse a firm's production; this drives firms to replace arm's-length contracts with personal relationships and direct command.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“I can't write contracts that have all these contingencies in them so I go home after three or four days and none of the deliveries have taken place”

0.78

In a market system, planning is still done by individuals using prices, which signal relative scarcities now and forecasts of the future, so a coherent economic plan is only possible with prices; without them, central planning is not merely hard but impossible.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“only in a market system is it possible to plan is what Hayek and Mises were claiming you can actually have a plan it's not that it's hard it's impossible without the prices”

0.78

A typical mixed economy is one where government allocates some resources and markets allocate the rest, but the modern economy is a mixed economy of a different kind: numerous command-and-control organizations compete with each other, and that competition disciplines them to excel.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“here we're talking about a mixed economy where there are numerous organizations that use command and control and centralization and top-down decision-making”

0.78

Firms are not a departure from market logic but an extension of it: in competing economies the firm is an organization that uses centralized direction where prices are costly, and it survives only if its internal allocations are effective enough to beat rivals.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“so firms exist to overcome within the price system these little islands of centralized yeah they're actually responding to the price system in a sense”

0.75

Home repairs illustrate transaction costs: hourly billing motivates careful work but invites padding, flat-rate bids invite surprise charges, and the cost of getting, comparing, and monitoring bids is high, so homeowners rationally pay extra to avoid monitoring and choose the mean bid.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“I don't want to have to monitor and I want to when I when I take a bid to write a contract I'll pay a little bit more”

0.74

Munger claims that a manager with a strong preference for shoes can rationally run a large shoe section, and he judges such an arrangement correct by its survival rather than by a calculation he can present.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“Macy's clearly has the right answer is that they've survived and made money”

0.74

Prices coordinate the actions of many people who do not communicate and may not share goals; a farmer responds to a higher quoted corn price by planting more without needing to know why the price rose, such as a US ethanol policy change that raised Brazil's corn exports 40-50 percent.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“the farmer doesn't need to know what the reason is it could be because people suddenly decided they liked corn more”

0.73

A department store like Macy's could rent its shoe space to competing shoe sellers, but it instead runs an in-house shoe department; Munger claims Macy's choice is correct because firms that persist must be making the right choice, even without knowing the exact calculation.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“my claim and this is what infuriates many of my colleagues ... I say Macy's way is better because if it weren't they wouldn't be doing it”

0.56

Centralized planning appeals to people for three reasons: it seems better that someone intentionally acts than that outcomes emerge by chance, planning feels necessary for getting things done in individual life, and people want a planner who has their best interests at heart.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“one is the agency issue that it seems better on the surface that having someone intentionally do something is better than hoping it'll turn out okay”

0.48

Hayek and Mises argued that a socialist central planner could never mimic what the market does through prices, even with enormous computing power, while Lerner and others argued that the right equations could replicate the price allocation and even better serve social goals.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“Hayek arguing that a socialist calculation from the top down could never no matter how great computing power was”

0.44

In modern service economies, much work has no tangible output and is done in teams where individual contributions are very hard to measure, making team production a specialized challenge for firms and for economics.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Michael Munger

“a lot of what we're doing doesn't have a tangible visual representation and it's often done in teams like the manufacturing pens but in teams where the individual contribution of the various members is extremely difficult to measure”

0.43

The Soviet-style command economy attracted admirers in the 1930s because a central authority appeared to be in control, while the market's price-driven chaos seemed disorderly, but this appeal rested on a misreading of how coordination works.

normativeestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“people went to the soviet union visitors and they came back and said i've seen the future and it works”

0.43

Economists anthropomorphize the market, describing it as if it were a monarch or person who leads people, which makes the invisible-hand argument hard for non-economists to accept because it requires understanding that aggregate order can arise without any agent intending it.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“we as economists or we as pre market economists often kind of anthropomorphize the market”

0.43

Standing in a revolving door and pretending to push harder so that someone else does the work is a form of free riding, and it is understood as wrong in a civilized society.

normativeestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“you can definitely grimace and then you free ride on their hard work”

0.42

Economists understand the effects of changes in one economic variable on others better than they understand the causes of why a variable changed; a price change is often observed without knowledge of its origin, and the farmer does not need that knowledge.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“we understand in economics how the change in one thing can affect other things the reverse doesn't always hold true”

0.40

Dispersed individuals do not need to expect coordination in advance; spontaneous emergence of order works for market activities but not for everyday tasks like doing the dishes, which must be planned.

normativeestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“you really don't want to rely on the invisible hand to do the dishes it won't”

0.39

Many firms do introduce market-like internal mechanisms such as stock options, profit centers, and divisional profit-and-loss statements, but the vast majority of day-to-day economic decisions inside firms still do not use prices.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“they have stock options that send price signals they have profit centers as we've talked about”

0.34

Managers earn a premium because monitoring and motivating employees and designing compensation without prices is a scarce, difficult skill, and that is why competition among would-be owners and managers is intense.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“the people who are good at owning and starting businesses and managing employees are the people who are good at this slightly bizarre task”

0.34

Roberts' parable point that a manager's memory of a contact's name and lunch relationships replaces written contracts shows that when contracts are incomplete, the firm turns to personal relationships to direct people.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“so instead of writing little contracts now I'm trying to establish personal relationships where I can direct these guys to do what I want”

0.32

Munger rejects the lowest bid for home improvement work because low bids lead to regret and higher total spending through monitoring and disputes, so he pays more to avoid having to monitor a contractor.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“I don't take low bids for for home improvement I find that if I take low bids I end up regretting it and I find that I spend more”

0.32

A manager of a centralized department faces little discipline because salaried staff have near-tenure and monitoring is costly, so a manager would rather read the newspaper than watch them, which makes internal performance hard to correct.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“they've got tenure they're almost hardware oh but not just legally it's pretty much right”

0.30

Politicians exploit the public's desire for a benevolent leader by acting as if they care about citizens (for example, fireside chats), creating the illusion that a planning authority is watching out for individuals.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“the politician exploits that by trying to act as if he cares about you”

0.30

Family ties can solve the team shirking problem because members trust each other, but not all families internalize incentives perfectly, so family-based teams can still shirk, as the story of Cain shows.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“we're Munger and Sons barge pulling and we trust each other because we're all in the same family”

0.26

Roberts's Dilbert-principle claim that the least competent people are promoted into management is a joke about bosses, and Munger's reply that a chair is merely an honor implies that title does not confer real authority.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the Dilbert principle is that you should promote the least competent people into management where they can do the least harm”

0.25

Measuring a worker's output by the number of memos they write would be a poor incentive, because the number of memos has no reliable relationship to profitability.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“you know the relationship between the memos and the profitability so I shudder I shudder to think of business that paid people based on the number of memos they wrote”

0.25

Cable business television commentators who claim to explain why a stock or commodity price moved are offering confident explanations that nobody reliably knows, since price moves have many possible causes.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Munger

“in on MSNBC or those cable television program tell us why the price of some stock or some commodity went up nobody knows”

0.19

The Dilbert principle, which says organizations promote the least competent people into management where they can do the least harm, is a joke that reflects the difficulty of judging managerial competence.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“the Dilbert principle is that you should promote the least competent people into management where they can do the least harm”