
This Is How Compounding With Low Risk Works | Chuck Akre | Stocks | Investment
What this covers
This is a nine-minute talk by Chuck Akre, the only speaker, on how he tries to compound client capital at an above-average rate while taking below-average risk. He frames the task as finding businesses with higher growth, stronger balance sheets, and often lower valuations than the market. He then reduces that to three traits: high return on capital, an attractive valuation that serves as a margin of safety, and heavy owner-operator ownership that aligns management with shareholders. He also argues that compounding cannot be learned from other people's lessons. It has to be experienced, and he says Warren Buffett was wrong to claim you either get it or you don't.
The middle of the talk is a critique of financial media and short-term trading. Akre says business television, sponsored by brokerages that profit from transactions, manufactures false expectations by treating a one-penny earnings beat or miss as a signal to act. He adds that retail traders also compete against algorithms with proprietary information. He also rejects volatility as a measure of risk over horizons of three to five years or more, saying it matters only when a short-term obligation looms. On returns, he expects average market results to sit at the low end of high single digits, far below the rates of 1981, and says outperformance should be judged over rolling five-to-ten-year windows. He admits trailing the S&P 500 in about a third of the last 25 years.
Two case studies carry the argument. International Speedway in the 1980s and 90s combined a valuation of about 12 times earnings, a 25-26% return on equity, and Bill France owning 60% of the stock. Akre says it became less attractive after France died and his daughter took over. Penn National Gaming began with a handful of off-track betting parlors limited by state licensing. Its CEO, a real estate developer, later turned a West Virginia racetrack into a large casino. Akre reports 10-20x returns on both investments.
Chuck Akre argues that superior long-term investment returns with below-average risk come from identifying businesses with three specific characteristics: high returns on capital, attractive valuations, and significant promoter ownership, and that this requires learning from personal mistakes rather than others' lessons.
- Compounding works powerfully when applied to businesses with these characteristics, but requires experiencing the principle firsthand to truly understand it
- Media-driven trading advice (beating by a penny, miss by a penny) creates false expectations and reliably loses money for retail investors
- Businesses with owner-operators who have major personal wealth at stake systematically make better long-term decisions than those run by managers without significant ownership
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The core investment goal should be to compound client capital at an above-average rate while incurring below-average risk, which requires identifying businesses with higher growth, higher returns on capital, stronger balance sheets, and frequently lower valuations than the market.
“We try very hard to be um investors in the value of businesses as opposed to speculators in the price of shares. We tell our our clients and our prospective clients that our goal is to compound their capital at an above average rate while incurring a below average level of risk.”
Financial media (Squawk Box and similar programs) have a business model fundamentally opposed to individual investor success: they are sponsored by financial institutions and brokerages whose business depends on creating transactions, which they do by manufacturing false expectations about earnings beats and misses.
“Contrary to that is everything you see on the TV in the morning on Squawk Box or all those things. And they have a different business model. And their business model is mostly supported by financial institutions and other inst- consumer institutions who want your eyeballs. And if it's a if it's a brokerage firm that's sponsoring it, the definition of a broker is to create transactions, right?”
High promoter/owner involvement in shareholding (the third key characteristic) aligns management with shareholders because when promoters have a large portion of their own wealth invested in the company, they are far more likely to make decisions that create long-term value rather than chase short-term gains or take actions that could harm the business.
“And finally, high promoter ownership aligns management with shareholders. When promoters have a large portion of their own wealth invested in the company, they are far more likely to make decisions that create long-term value rather than chase short-term gains, or take actions that could harm the business.”
Volatility is not a measure of risk on time horizons of 3-5 years or longer; it is only a risk when you have a short-term obligation (such as buying a house in a year), and even then volatility risk is time-dependent rather than an inherent property of the investment.
“our belief is volatility is a risk only in the short run. If you have an obligation in a year to buy a house or to do something like that, you know, you probably don't want to speculate with that that cash that you have set aside for that. But if it's 5 years or 3 years, you know, you have the ability put that money at work and and have it work for you. So, volatility is not in our lexicon basically in terms of risk.”
False expectations are created in financial media through the mechanism of treating earnings beats and misses by a single penny as actionable buy/sell signals (e.g., 'earned $1.38 vs $1.37 expected, beat by a penny, you better buy it').
“And the false expectations are in the notion that that XYZ company earns a dollar 37 cents in the quarter. And the first thing that happens when they release their their their quarterly reports is everybody comes out and says, 'Oh, they earned a dollar 38, they beat by a penny. You better buy it.' Or they earned a dollar 36, they missed by a penny, you better buy it.”
Trading the market on a daily basis based on penny earnings beats or misses is a sure loser for retail investors unless they are very adept at trading, and this trading approach is bad for economic health.
“Well, if you stop and think about it, unless you're very adept at trading the market on a daily basis, it it's a sure loser for you. It's bad for your economic health.”
Very powerful computer algorithms using proprietary information not available to retail investors are competing in short-term trading, making daily market trading systematically disadvantageous for retail investors.
“And as it relates to trading the market on a daily basis, you know, there are very powerful computer algorithms out there using all kinds of information not available to most of us that are competing against you.”
Compounding creates exponential returns where if a stock goes up 10 times, the next time it doubles it goes up 20 times, and the next doubling takes it to 40 times, creating staggering cumulative effects over time.
“if you have a stock that's going up 10 times, the next time it doubles, it's going up 20. And then, you know, the next time it doubles, it's going up 40 times. What? You know, compounding compound interest and compound return is just it's it's staggering.”
High return on capital (the first key characteristic) indicates that a business is incredibly efficient because it can generate more profits from every dollar invested, allowing earnings to compound year after year without constantly requiring fresh capital injections.
“A high return on capital tells you the business is incredibly efficient. It can generate more profits from every dollar invested, allowing earnings to compound year after year without constantly needing fresh capital.”
An attractive valuation (the second key characteristic) provides margin of safety because when you buy a great business at a reasonable or low price, the downside during market corrections is often limited while long-term upside remains substantial.
“An attractive valuation provides a margin of safety. When you buy a great business at a reasonable or low price, your downside during the market correction is often limited, while your long-term upside remains substantial.”
Average investment returns have fallen significantly from the 1981 high-rate environment (when 30-year Treasury yielded 15.375% and prime rate was 21.5%) to the current low-rate environment, and current average returns are now likely at the low end of high single digits rather than double digits.
“And we've already talked about what average is and we think average is roughly high single digits, maybe low double digits. And it has to do with what the overall interest rate environment is. And so, there are lots of investors, Michael Steinhardt and people like that, who retired with records of very high rates of returns. But that was against the backdrop that that in January of 1981, the the long bond, the 30-year Treasury, yielded 15 and 3/8%. And prime rate was 21 and 1/2%. So it was in a backdrop in which rates were much higher than they are currently. So returns in all businesses are lower these days.”
Understanding compounding cannot be learned from others' lessons but must be experienced personally; Warren Buffett was incorrect that you either get it or you don't—people must first experience compounding to truly grasp it.
“I have a correspondence with Warren Buffett about this. And he always has said, as it relates to compounding, either you get it or you don't. And I wrote him a letter and I said, you know, that was not my experience. My experience was I didn't get it until I experienced it.”
The CEO of Penn National Gaming (whose name is not specified) was a real estate developer by background with a father who controlled the original racetrack that received off-track betting licenses, and he demonstrated risk awareness by managing his personal finances such that he never required his wife to co-sign a loan throughout his lifetime.
“He was a real estate developer by background. His father had control of this old racetrack, Penn National Gaming, that had because of Pennsylvania they'd given the licenses for the off-track betting to the legalized gambling arena that the racetrack, the horse racetrack business. And he was ambitious. And as a as a builder and developer, he borrowed a lot of money in his lifetime and he told me that he had been able to avoid ever having his wife sign co-sign a loan. That's a really important measure of risk understanding.”
The three investment characteristics (high return on capital, attractive valuation, high promoter ownership) together form a framework for identifying businesses that can compound capital at exceptional rates while keeping risk under control—combining efficient capital deployment, downside protection, and aligned incentives.
“Put these three factors together and you have a framework for identifying businesses that can compound capital at exceptional rate while keeping risk under control.”
Penn National Gaming started as a company operating five off-track betting parlors in Pennsylvania limited by state licensing (only 23 total licenses in the state), with the fifth location costing $2 million to build and generating $1.6 million of operating income in the first 12-14 months, creating a high-margin, capital-efficient business.
“Penn Gaming at the time in Pennsylvania, sort of was in Philadelphia there, uh, in Pennsylvania had five off-track betting parlors in Pennsylvania. And they were limited by licenses in the state. There were only a total of 23 in the state. So, you had a high barrier to entry because of a regulatory issue. And what was interesting in this in this 10-Q was the fifth off-track betting location that they built cost them $2 million to build it out. And they had you know, $1.6 million of operating income in the first 12 or 14 months.”
Both the International Speedway and Penn National Gaming investments shared common characteristics: high returns on capital, low valuations relative to earnings, major shareholder/owner-operator involvement, and significant growth opportunities.
“Again, this this was a situation of high returns on capital, low valuation, major shareholder owner and operator, and and a low valuation with a huge opportunity for growth going forward.”
International Speedway became a less attractive business after Bill France (original owner-operator) passed away and his daughter took over, as she did not have the same skill set, demonstrating how management quality and owner-operator alignment directly impact business quality.
“It's not a very attractive business in my mind today for a bunch of reasons. Man who ran it, Bill France, passed away. His daughter's taken it over. Sh- She She doesn't have the same skill set that he had.”
Approximately one-third of years over the past 25 years, Akre's investment results underperformed the S&P 500, but he does not focus on index comparisons and uses the S&P only because it is available as a reference point.
“But I would say if observably, maybe a third of the years in the last 25, we maybe have done less well than the than the S&P, which is We We use that simply because it's available. We don't care what indices people want to compare us to. That's their choice. We We spend no time thinking about that.”
The Penn National Gaming CEO later purchased a racetrack in West Virginia (about 1.5 hours from Washington and Baltimore) and converted it into a casino with 5,000 slot machines, eventually becoming the largest non-Las Vegas, non-Atlantic City casino operator in the country.
“he bought another racetrack in West Virginia, about an hour and a half from Washington and Baltimore, and converted that into a casino that now has 5,000 slot machines. And he went on to become the largest non-Las Vegas, non-Atlantic City casino operator in the country.”
Average market returns in the current environment are probably at the low end of high single digits (around 8-9%), and above-average returns should be measured over 5-10 year periods, not annual returns, with above-average results likely in most rolling 5-10 year windows.
“And my guess is average these days would probably be at the low end of that sort of high single-digits number. Um and and and because it's an average we're talking about, it does not mean that we will have a return on any given year that's better than that. It means to us over a period of 5 years or 10 years, our returns are very likely to be well above that number.”
International Speedway Corporation in the 1980s-90s was an attractive investment because it was valued at 12x earnings, had 25-26% return on equity, had an owner-operator (Bill France) who owned 60% of the stock, and had significant growth ahead due to dominance in NASCAR racing and ownership of multiple major tracks (International Speedway, Darlington, Talladega).
“International Speedway had the characteristics of of It was 12 times earnings. It was a 25 26% return on equity. Uh It had an owner-operator who owned 60% of the stock. And it had a lot of growth in front of it because it was the dominant race track owner in NASCAR racing. And they owned International Speedway and Darlington and Talladega.”
Akre made 10-20x returns on Penn National Gaming investment, demonstrating another successful application of his three-criteria framework (high returns on capital, reasonable valuation, owner-operator alignment with growth optionality).
“it was another case where we made 10 to 20 times our money in in our accounts.”
Akre made 10-20x returns on International Speedway investment over more than 10 years, demonstrating the power of identifying and holding businesses with the three key characteristics (high returns on capital, reasonable valuation, owner-operator alignment).
“during that period of time, we made 10 to 20 times our money on that business over more than 10 years.”