
One Hour of Macro Episode 1 - Louis Vincent Gave - CEO of Gavekal
What this covers
This is the first episode of the "One Hour of Macro" series, in which Zoltan Szelyes and Martin Tixier interview Louis-Vincent Gave of Gavekal. It begins in China and moves to Japan, sovereign debt, and portfolio construction. The China segment sets a puzzle: after twenty years of investment the country has the world's cheapest electricity, falling capital costs and, adjusted for productivity, the cheapest labor, yet its domestic economy is weak. Gave argues China has leapfrogged the West in electricity, telecoms, factory automation and most transport, and points to BYD cars on foreign streets as the visible proof. He treats dewesternization of supply chains as a ten-year project, noting that about 45% of COMAC aircraft parts still come from the West. He reads policy through social stability, which he traces to 125 years of invasion and famine, and he argues that immigration cannot offset the collapse in births.
The market-facing material is more specific. Hardware is beating software in both countries: Shenzhen and Shanghai are rising while Hong Kong lags. Alibaba is designing RISC-V chips to rival Nvidia. Chinese tech firms are shrinking their share counts while US counterparts issue stock. China also fined brokers for moving capital offshore, but not enough to close them.
The final third turns to debt. Gave contends that repatriation by Japanese savers, with the GPIF at the center, is now lifting Treasury yields even when CPI surprises to the downside. The discussion also raises UK linker convexity and the US net international investment position, which one host puts at 90% of GDP, a figure marked as contested. On portfolios, Gave notes that the S&P 500 is about 40% tech and 3% energy, and that gold is too volatile to replace bonds one for one. He also presents Brazil's roughly 5% real yield as an alternative, and the talk briefly touches on Milan's gain from the UK non-dom change.
Louis Vans argues that China faces demographic collapse and policy-driven consumer confidence destruction despite competitive cost advantages, Japan's pension fund repatriation will be the primary driver of global bond volatility and yield spikes, and traditional bond-equity portfolio construction is obsolete in the current inflationary environment, requiring reallocation to equities, energy, and metals.
- Chinese millennials have absorbed both real estate losses and dewesternization supply-chain costs, destroying marriage and birth rates; this demographic trend now dominates policy makers' concerns over US containment
- Japan's Ministry of Finance has ordered GPIF to repatriate foreign holdings and buy JGBs, which will force yen appreciation, make Japanese imports expensive globally, and is already driving US Treasury yields higher independent of inflation data
- Bonds have ceased their 40-year role as portfolio diversifiers; the 60/40 equity-bond allocation must shift to 60% equities, 20% energy, 20% metals in an inflationary regime
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Bonds have failed to perform their core diversification function for the past 5 years; in every 10% equity drawdown since COVID, bonds have declined alongside equities rather than rising, destroying the fundamental 60/40 portfolio premise that bonds hedge equity risk.
“Bonds have always been the prop of a portfolio. uh they're there to protect you when everything goes wrong. Uh they're they're the foundation on which you build the rest of the team. And what's been fascinating to me in the past five years is that bond bonds have essentially stopped doing their job. The bonds number one job is to diversify your equity risk. When equities go down 10 20%, you want your bonds to go up. I mean that's that's their number one job. And the reality is that if you look at the past in the since co every 10% draw down bonds go down as well.”
Western central banks (Fed, ECB) explicitly stated they wanted higher inflation post-COVID, causing bond holders to rationally exit those currencies; emerging market central banks maintained inflation-fighting stances, making their currencies and bonds attractive to holders seeking real yield preservation.
“when co came even through co even afterwards you had the fed the ECB saying oh we want more inflation oh we want uh you know we we need to have more inflation and if you're a bond holder like why would you stay there like if the central banker if the central banker of the currency that I own tells me I want more inflation I'm like thank you for check please I'm out like no interest thank you what's my answer”
Chinese tech companies (Alibaba, Tencent) are shrinking share counts through buybacks and share consolidation, while US tech giants (Oracle, Salesforce, Google, Meta) have stopped shrinking share counts and are now issuing significant new stock (Google issued $85 billion), creating a structural divergence in capital allocation between China and US tech.
“there is one massive difference between uh I would say the Hong Kong listed tech and the US tech that has been doing badly. um and that is that the US tech that has been doing badly, the Oracle, the Salesforce, etc. These guys for years were shrinking their share count, but they're no longer shrinking their share count. They're now actually increasing their share count. We just saw uh Google issue $85 billion of stock and uh Meta is look going to be doing the same and so on. Um in China, you look at Baba, you look at 10 cents, they've now started to shrink their share counts.”
China cannot solve demographic decline through mass immigration because: (1) East Asian languages are difficult for immigrants to learn, creating a high hurdle; (2) China's scale is so vast that solving demographic decline would require importing 100 million people, a number equivalent to a city China has never heard of, making immigration numerically infeasible as a solution.
“so I think migration in uh in just in East Asia in general is is very hard. First, there's a huge language barrier. Um, and learning Japanese, learning Chinese is hard. Uh, so for for immigrants, that that's the first hurdle.”
Passive ETF investing creates procyclical flows where everyone follows the same trend, holding the same stocks and weights, amplifying index concentration and creating systemic fragility from herd behavior.
“the rise in active management with all passive management sorry with all these ETF and everyone is following the same trend following the same stocks following the same exposure”
Gold has higher volatility than bonds and larger downside risk (as seen in the past 6 months), and is not perfectly negatively correlated with equities, making it an imperfect replacement for bonds as a diversifier; a multiple-asset approach combining equities, metals, and energy is required rather than a 1:1 substitution.
“gold is a tricky one because you know everybody says yeah gold sure but it has a much higher volatility. Uh it has much bigger downside. We just saw this in the past 6 months, right? It has much bigger downside than bonds. It adds volatility to my portfolio. It's not perfectly negatively correlated to u to to equities.”
Buying the S&P 500 is not equivalent to buying a diversified portfolio; investors believe they are holding diversified exposure when they are actually holding a concentrated portfolio dominated by tech (40%) with minimal energy exposure (3%).
“I think the perception of everyone out there is I'll buy the S&P 500 and I'm buying a uh diversified portfolio. But you're not you're not buying a diversified portfolio.”
The US net investment position (negative net international investment position) is now 90% of GDP, representing a fragile structural imbalance; combined with massive concentration in equities (40% tech, 3% energy) and exodus of bond flows, the US market structure is vulnerable.
“when you think about the the net investment position of the US which is now 90% of GDP. uh it's very fragile because if no one goes into bonds and all the flows are going into equities and you have such a concentration in the markets now in the US which are similar to what you're seeing sometimes in emerging markets like Brazil when you have high level of concentration in in emerging market indices”
Hong Kong stock market has been a poor performer and the Hang Seng index down year-over-year, while Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets have powered ahead, because hardware-linked stocks (semiconductors, EVs, factory automation) have outperformed software and internet platform stocks; this mirrors the US tech divergence where hardware companies outperform software.
“What's fascinating this year has been the divergence between Hong Kong on the one hand shenzen stock market and Shanghai stock market. Um, Hong Kong has been a dog with fleas and Shenzhen and Shanghai have just powered ahead. And I think what you're witnessing in China and tech is actually not that dissimilar to what you've witnessed in um in the United States this year. And that anything linked to hardware uh has really crushed it in China just like anything linked to hardware in the US has also crushed it. Meanwhile, if you take anything like the software in the United States or even the big internet platforms, etc., it really hasn't done that great.”
Alibaba is developing its own chips using RISC-V architecture designed to compete directly with Nvidia, representing a strategic move up the value chain into semiconductor design.
“Alibaba has been really restructuring its own its own uh its own labyrinth of all ownership of all uh of all participations and and a lot of companies and and I think something which is a little bit missing out of the the perspective of the investors when looking at Alibaba is the fact that they're creating uh they're looking at creating their own chips like Risk V uh which will be in direct competition with the likes of Nvidia.”
China's COMAC aircraft program is moving up the value chain from single-aisle to wide-body planes; however, approximately 45% of COMAC parts still come from the West, indicating the Western aerospace industry (particularly in large-plane manufacturing) retains strong comparative advantage in this sector due to the extreme difficulty and safety criticality of large-aircraft design.
“China, the Comarmac, China is now doing single lane airplanes, um, and sort of, you know, short to mid-range. The ability to do a a a two two-lane airplane, the bigger airplanes that can go 15 hours, um, that's extremely challenging. And it al it should also be highlighted that when you look at the comarmac, I think almost 50% I think it's like 45% of the parts still come from the west.”
China today has the lowest cost of electricity in the world after 20 years of investments, the lowest cost of capital as bond yields continue to fall while global yields rise, and adjusted for productivity the lowest cost of labor in the world, yet the economy is not performing well domestically despite these competitive advantages.
“China right now should be going gang busters because China today has the lowest cost of electricity in the world uh after all the investments they made over 20 years. They have the lowest cost of capital. Um even as bond yields today before we started Ma and I were talking about bond yields are breaking 470 etc. China is the one place in the world where bond yields continue to go down. Cost of capital is the lowest in the world. And then finally if you adjust it for productivity the cost of labor is the lowest in the world as well.”
The market perceives AI capex requirements to persist for 5+ years, making hardware scarce and expensive, so semiconductor and chip manufacturers (TSMC, Samsung, SK Hynix, Nvidia) see valuations rise while the companies that must buy expensive chips at scale (Microsoft, Salesforce, Alibaba, Tencent) are perceived as 'victims' facing margin compression, driving capital flows from software/platform stocks into semiconductor stocks.
“I think right now the perception of the markets has been look this AI is going to increase capex massively for years to come. I don't know if that's true by the way, but I'm just saying that's the market's perception. Um AI is going to increase capex in uh hardware for for massively for the next 5 years. there's not enough capacity of producing discs and producing semiconductors and producing you know so on and so forth. Um and that therefore um you know all these guys get bit up on like oh my god there's not going to be enough for everyone and the prices go up you know semi prices have gone through the roof and then the guys who actually have to buy this stuff i.e the, you know, the Microsoft, the Salesforce.com, the Inuit, the Alibabas, the 10 cents, they're perceived as the victims. It's like, oh, they're going to have to pay more to get less.”
Japan has a deeply undervalued yen (trading at 162-163) and Japanese savings outside Japan are at $3.6-3.7 trillion, representing 82% of Japanese GDP; when the yen depreciates, foreign assets held by Japanese savers rise in yen-denominated value, creating a natural hedge where yen weakness benefits Japanese wealth.
“You have a yen at you know above we're what 162 163. um a yen that is deeply deeply undervalued... Japan is sort of this odd country where because Japanese savings outside of Japan uh are at this stage I think 3.6 3.7 trillion US. It's 82% of Japanese GDP. When the yen goes down their wealth goes up because they own so like they own so much abroad.”
Brazil offers a compelling real yield opportunity with inflation around 4.5-5% and bond yields around 10%, providing approximately 5% real yield that allows investors to 'sleep at night' with confidence in purchasing power protection.
“in terms of real yields it's fantastic what you're getting out of Brazil because you have inflation around four and a half 5% and you have like uh you have like yield around 10% you can sleep at night with this you can sleep no problem”
Italy has benefited from the UK's non-dom rule change, as wealth managers and private equity asset managers have relocated offices to Milan for tax purposes, attracted by Milan's improved real estate market, excellent location, and superior Italian lifestyle compared to UK weather.
“Italy has capitalized a lot on on this because the real estate prices Milano for example have gone through the roof and you had like a lot of private equity asset managers relocating their their offices for tax purposes uh in Milan. So they have the the best of of of the world. They have a great location, amazing Italian lifestyle, much better than the the British weather.”
Emerging market equities and emerging market local currency bonds have outperformed US equities and US Treasuries since Trump's election, with US equities underperforming Europe by 12%, Japan by 17%, and emerging markets by 22%, and US Treasuries underperforming every other bond market globally.
“if you look at since Trump was elected, US since Trump was sworn in, US equities have underperformed Europe by 12%. They've underperformed Japan by 17. They've underperformed emerging markets by like 22. Um and and the on the bond side, US treasuries have underperformed every other bond every bond market like every single one they've underperformed.”
China has leapfrogged the Western world (not merely caught up) in transportation outside jet planes, electricity generation and transmission, telecoms, and factory automation/robotics, and this advantage is now visible to Western consumers through Chinese vehicles (BYD) arriving on streets globally.
“when it came to essentially anything linked to transportation outside of jet planes, anything linked to electricity generation, transmission, anything linked to telecoms, and anything linked to factory automation and robotics, it's not that China was catching up with the Western world. It's they've actually leaprogged the Western world uh and they're now they're now ahead and and people are starting to realize it as they see the Chinese cars arrive on their streets and they see they see the BYDs and they're like, "Wait, what what happened here?" Like this car is actually pretty sweet.”
US Treasury yields have risen from 450 to 470 basis points despite the biggest negative surprise in CPI (excluding COVID) since 2011, indicating that traditional inflation-data-driven bond market dynamics are no longer the primary driver; instead, Japan's repatriation is the key driver of global bond weakness.
“We just went from 4750 to 470 with even though we just had a CPI print. What was it a week ago? The CPI print. Um, we had a CPI print that was I think the biggest surprise, negative downside surprise uh in CPI if you exclude the COVID period, which is like where the data got all funky. uh if you exclude the COVID period, I think it was the biggest downside surprise since 2011. Um so you would think that the bond markets would be like, okay, uh you know, inflation's rolling over, happy days, let's buy bonds. Uh and boom, you move from 450 to 470.”
The UK is particularly concerning because 25% of UK debt is in linkers (inflation-linked bonds) creating high convexity risk, and the duration of UK debt is approximately double that of French debt; in a rising inflation environment, linker convexity creates significant losses for debt holders.
“And when talking about the UK, I would be a little bit more more uh more scared than France because of the fact that 25% of the the UK depth is is uh is linkers. So they have a lot of convexity. what saved their their their what saves their position until now. The fact that the duration of uh United Kingdom debt is about the double of of that of France. So but but but but the convexity issues coming from linkers is a very big very big sword of doclass in a in a inflationary environment to to the like we're seeing right now with with rising oil prices again.”
China's birth rates have fallen off a cliff in the past 5 years at a pace unique compared to other developed nations experiencing demographic decline (Korea, Western Europe), where the downward trend was more gradual.
“everybody was sort of on the same downward slide more or less. Uh and then in China it just went it fell off a cliff. Uh it absolutely fell off a cliff in the past 5 years.”
China's Ministry of Finance fined local brokers (Tiger Global, Futu) for helping Chinese investors circumvent capital controls by moving money into Hong Kong and then into US equities; the fines were large enough to hurt ($100-200 million) but not large enough to kill the businesses or revoke licenses, signaling a controlled warning rather than a prohibition.
“China turns around and slaps not massive, not like fines that are going to kill him, but big enough fines on a bunch of the small local brokers, people like Tiger Global, people like Futu. Uh uh they slap big fines um because those guys were essentially helping Chinese people circumvent capital controls, uh get their money into Hong Kong and then from Hong Kong into uh into US equities”
The US, France, and UK have structural assets (real estate, world-class companies) that provide some protection against debt crises; foreigners will continue to demand these assets if they become cheap enough, providing an 'escape valve' that prevents catastrophic debt crises.
“I think in fairness all three of these countries have a sort of saving card in that uh when you hit a a debt crisis people wake up and say you know why why do I want to own Greece you know forget Greece forget Argentina forget Thailand nobody's ever going to wake up and say forget America right because well they can't but also America has a lot of assets where if the dollar gets cheap enough uh people will want to buy them. Like if the dollar gets cheap enough, hey, I'll I want a nice apartment on Central Park in New York or I'll buy a condo in Miami or whatever else.”
China's true north star policy goal is social stability, not GDP growth maximization; this reflects China's historical experience of 125 years of foreign invasion, famines, and anarchy (1850-1975), which created a deep institutional preference for stability over growth.
“Their true north star remains always social stability. You know, the the Chinese leadership uh is first most people think they're in the game of maximizing GDP growth or No, no, no, no. They're in the game of ensuring social stability.”
Chinese millennials have borne the burden of both the real estate adjustment (balance sheets destroyed by 30-50% price declines) and the dewesternization supply chain effort (no wage growth for 10 years), and are now being told they will lose jobs to AI, leading to plummeting marriage and birth rates which have become the primary concern of Chinese policy makers more pressing than US containment.
“If you look at the millennials, um, and to somewhat of a lesser extent, the Gen Z, those guys are obviously the ones whose balance sheets got totally destroyed by real estate going down 30 to 50%. Uh and at the same time, those guys typically haven't had a wag for for 10 years. Um and they're the guys who are now being told, look, your job is going to be lost to AI at the same time. So if you think of these three messages together, first my balance sheet get destroyed. Second, I have no wage increase. Third, I'm being told uh I'm going to lose my job. Uh none of that is very conducive to uh to booing consumer confidence.”
Japan's Ministry of Finance has instructed the GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund) to repatriate foreign holdings and shift from US Treasuries into 10-year Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) at current yield levels; this repatriation will require selling yen-denominated foreign assets and buying yen, creating a fundamental scarcity of yen sellers in the market.
“You now have the Ministry of Finance saying, "Look, we don't want the yen to fall anymore. We want the yen to start coming back up. Uh we have all these things to fund at home. We want to refund uh an army. We want to refund a domestic supply chain in a number of industries. Uh and all this is going to cost a lot a lot of money. Uh so pension funds, GPIF, all you guys, please start bringing the money back. start buying our bonds and bring the money back into yen.”
Jeffrey Gundlach of DoubleLine recommends 100% equity allocation to non-US markets, a counterintuitive stance for a US portfolio manager that reflects the past two years of outperformance by non-US equities.
“he said okay if you if you want to in your in your equities allocation you have to be 100% outside the US that's what he was recommending I was like wow this guy is a US portfolio manager he has like global asset allocation mandates and he's recommending and he's saying online 100% of your equity exposure needs to be outside the US.”
China subsequently increased the southbound Connect quota (the legal channel for money to flow from mainland China to Hong Kong) approximately two weeks before the interview, and since that increase the Hong Kong stock market has bounced back significantly with stocks like Alibaba gaining 25%.
“now they now turn around and they say, you know what, we're going to increase the southbound connect. The southbound connect is essentially the legal way um through which um the money can flow from north to to south. Uh and since they've done that about two weeks ago, the Hong Kong stock market has been bouncing back.”
Energy has outperformed bonds as a portfolio diversifier over the past 5 years and is underweighted in portfolios relative to its value; energy stocks provide both inflation protection and diversification benefits.
“And I think the other part to be honest is energy. Uh which incidentally has been a better portfolio diversifier in the past 5 years than gold.”
Japan's housing affordability has reverted to 20-year-ago levels, creating optimal conditions for consumption growth when combined with declining energy costs, yet consumption has not rebounded due to demographic and confidence factors.
“when we look at housing affordability for China, it's gone back 20 years uh 20 years back. So housing afford affordability in China is again at the right level it seems. Uh so uh because of and if you add to the to this the factor that as you mentioned like the cost of the energy is has come down drastically it should it should create additional boost for for the Chinese consumers”
France has not had a budget surplus in 50+ years (last surplus in 1972), and an increasing share of French debt is held by foreigners, placing France among the three countries (along with UK and US) most vulnerable to debt crises.
“I think there was this feeling of and especially after Trump's visit of oh you know they got Black Rockck in like you said and they got Blackstone and they got like oh all the boys came in... France. Um uh for sure where where the the debt accumulation is um and it's uh so France hasn't uh had a budget surplus in uh in my whole lifetime. The last time it had a budget surplus was in 1972 uh and I was born in 1974.”
China is now performing well in real estate stabilization in major cities (Shanghai, Hong Kong) with high-end market recovery and middle-end stabilization, but third-tier cities with 5 million people still have excess capacity to work through, creating divergent regional recovery dynamics.
“I think there's increasing signs of stabilization in in real estate not really rebound but at least uh in the major cities you are seeing you've seen the high-end come back in places like Shanghai uh Hongjo you've seen the high-end come back um the low and the middle end stabilize um this is true for the big cities it's a lot less true for your third tier cities, you know, cities with 5 million people that you and I have never heard of. And in those cities, you still left with probably excess capacity that has yet to be rot through.”
Chinese diaspora scientists and scholars are relocating back to China because they can earn almost as much money as in the US while enjoying vastly lower cost of living (perhaps one-tenth the US cost), making the economics of relocation favorable for high-skill talent.
“if you're an American-born Chinese, a Canadian-born Chinese, you uh or a Chinese that was born in China, moved to the US for job opportunities, for studies, you got a PhD in, you know, biochemistry or or whatever, you worked at a at a Chinese at a US firm, you can now move back to China and make almost as much money, but your cost of living is really a fraction of of what it is in uh in the US.”
China's leadership has spent the past 8 years redirecting all bank lending toward dewesternization of supply chains following the 2018 US semiconductor blockade, which destroyed consumer credit access and consumer confidence because China's enormous savings were mobilized away from consumer lending into building car, electricity, and chemical supply chains.
“I think the leadership was deeply deeply disturbed when in um in 2018 the US blocked semiconductor access uh to to China. I think this was a a huge uh uh scare for them. They thought if they can block semiconductors maybe the US tomorrow blocks I don't know chemical products or car tires or anything. Uh and they felt a need to become self-sufficient in everything. And so for really eight years, all of the bank lending went into that n national effort to become self-sufficient and everything.”
Xi Jinping's core governing philosophy is fundamentally about control—he is willing to deregulate financial markets and allow capital flows but wants to control where money goes, when it goes, who has it, and what it's doing; this control obsession applies especially to financial and monetary matters.
“that comes back, I think, to to what Cinping really is is that deep down he's a bit of a control freak. Uh and he wants to control things. Um and and this is especially true when it comes to financial matters and when it comes to the money. Uh they they might not be opposed per se to money leaving, but they want to know where it is, when it is, who has it, what it's doing. They want to know all these things.”
Japan's real estate market was historically attractive to Western Europeans seeking tax avoidance, particularly wealthy individuals moving to London; the UK government's elimination of the non-dom tax status has 'killed the golden goose' by removing the tax incentive that drove foreign demand for high-end London real estate.
“The UK uh also had the big comparative advantage of the UK was selling overpriced London real estate mostly to Western Europeans uh who were moving to the UK as a as a tax dodge or maybe a tax dodge is too strong a word, but I think if you were a rich European uh and you didn't want to pay high taxes in France or in Sweden uh or wherever else or Holland, you move to the UK to London... But I think by uh essentially by getting rid of the whole nonom rule uh they've they've now killed the high end of their real estate market in London um which was how they squared the books.”
Japan imports and exports many goods, so if GPIF repatriation causes the yen to appreciate significantly, this will create re-reflation globally as importers from Japan face higher yen prices and also importers from other countries see similar yen-driven price increases transmitted through global supply chains.
“because a reflating yen will be reflationary for everyone. By the way, if the yen goes up, the one will go up, the renmanb will go up. Um so whatever we import from Japan, whatever we import from Korea, whatever we import from the United from uh from China will also be getting more expensive.”
Germany's institutional preference for inflation-fighting traces to hyperinflation in the 1920s which enabled fascism; China similarly endured hyperinflation post-WWII which enabled the Communist Party to take over, making China as much an inflation hawk as Germany, and Chinese government bonds have become the equivalent of German bunds as central banks seek inflation-fighting credentials.
“If this has been in your history for, you know, we always go around saying, oh, you know, the Germans, they're always against inflation because of hyperinflation of the 1920s, which led to fascism, etc. Uh, China, incidentally, China also had a bout of uh hyperinflation uh post World War II. Uh, which allowed the Chinese Communist Party to take over. and and China is just as much of an inflation hawk as as Germany, which is why Chinese bonds do very well.”
Japanese investors hold approximately 12% of US credit markets according to a UBS survey, making Japanese pension fund (GPIF) repatriation signals a major threat to US credit market stability; if GPIF receives and follows Ministry of Finance directives to repatriate, this could trigger significant credit market dislocations.
“I was reading a couple of years ago was surveyed by UBS and and they were reconing that like something like 12% of uh US credit markets are have uh Japanese investors.”
Louis predicts the GPIF will comply with the Ministry of Finance directive to repatriate money because 'Japan is that kind of society' where government direction is followed, and the delay in repatriation reflects operational considerations about avoiding market disruption, not resistance to the directive; he interprets the recent US Treasury yield breakout to 4.70% as possibly coincidental to this repatriation signal, but likely related.
“if you ask me to to say, well, are they going to do it or not? I think they will. Uh, I think they will because Japan is that kind of society when if the Ministry of Finance tells the GPIF, hey, do this, they're probably going to do it. And the reason they haven't done it yet is they're studying how to do it without creating massive disruption in the markets.”
Michael Jordan's retirement from basketball provides an apt analogy: bonds were a generational diversification talent for 40 years and have now retired; the successor portfolio cannot be replaced by a single asset but rather requires multiple 'players' including equities, metals, and energy working together.
“it's a little bit like when Michael Jordan retired from the Chicago Bulls and you're like, "Yeah, you know what? that next guy who's taking his place, he's not as good. And it's like, yeah, you know what? You had a Michael Jordan. It's a generational talent and you were lucky. Um, and and it's it's very hard to replace. And Bonds were that generational talent for 40 years. Uh, and now they've retired. Um, and so you've got the choice of either playing Michael Jordan at age 45 years old, which doesn't work, uh, or or you got to look for something else. And you can't replace Michael Jordan with one player. I think you got to replace him with several players.”
Economic activity and inflation are the two factors that drive asset prices, creating a four-quadrant framework: deflationary boom, deflationary bust, inflationary boom, inflationary bust; the world is currently in the inflationary part of the quadrants (due to fiscal, monetary, trade, and war-related inflation), which changes the optimal asset allocation and portfolio construction strategy.
“Um because of fiscal policies, because of uh monetary policies, we are in the inflationary part of the because of trade policies, because of wars, we are in the inflationary part of the quadrant.”
The Chinese government in 2015, 2017, 2018, and recently cracked down on margin trading, stock market speculation, wealth management products, real estate speculation, and crypto—demonstrating a consistent pattern of control demolition whenever any asset class goes parabolic and threatens social stability, regardless of Western investor expectations of bailouts.
“yeah, look, the first time they really did it was in 2015 when the stock market went parabolic up and they absolutely st stepped on it and and brought it back down. Uh you know, they said, "Okay, no more margin trading accounts." Uh no more. So yeah, you're right. There was 2015, 2017, 2018.”
China's bond market has been the best performing bond market in the world for the past 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 2 years, 1 year, and 6 months—across every meaningful time frame except the past 24 hours—because yields are falling while Western yields are rising.
“they missed the best performing bond market in the world for the past 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 2 years, 1 year, 6 months, pick any meaningful time frame except for the past 24 hours. and China's been crushing every bond market in the world.”
Japan has a primary budget surplus now (unlike the 10-15 year historical narrative of perpetual deficits), making the old debt sustainability concerns outdated, and nearly all Japanese debt is held domestically (max 8% foreign ownership historically), meaning debt crises mechanics (foreign creditor exit) do not apply to Japan.
“you know Japan is essentially back into a primary surplus now so it's um the whole uns if you want to look for unsustainable debt accumulation it no longer is Japan now I never believed it was Japan in the first place because almost all of the Japanese debt was bought by Japanese savers.”
China's yen is deeply undervalued, though not as deeply as Chinese yuan; among Japan, Korea, and China, all currencies are cheap by purchasing power parity, but China is cheapest, Korea second, Japan third.
“You have a yen at you know above we're what 162 163. um a yen that is deeply deeply undervalued. Uh perhaps not as undervalued as the remn uh and perhaps not as undervalued as a Korean one when when you visit those three countries back to back to back. If China feels the cheapest now you could say this is anecdotal evidence but China feels the cheapest then Korea then then Japan”
Vans wrote a book in 2021 called 'Avoiding the Punch' that explains the inflationary boom/bust quadrant framework and portfolio construction in an inflationary environment; the book is available for free in PDF on his firm's website.
“I wrote a book about this in 2021 called um avoiding the punch uh which is available for free on our website. The e version is available for free on our website.”