What this covers

This is a single-speaker interview in which Gary Stevenson describes his years as an interest rates trader at Citibank in London and Tokyo. It follows the chapters of a banker's career: the Canary Wharf lifestyle, brokers, bosses, bonuses, recruitment, the money floor, the daily job, and the difficulty of getting out. The publisher notes that Business Insider could not substantiate his claim to have been Citibank's most profitable trader.

On the mechanics, he explains that his work was quoting forward rates to corporations, pension funds, and hedge funds, and that his real role was being the risk holder who absorbs the loss when a call is wrong. He argues that most trading income comes from customer flow and the bid-ask spread, not from dramatic bets. The desk) ran on a published P&L spreadsheet that ranked every trader, which fed a self-reinforcing status hierarchy. He also describes the shift from ex-rugby-player traders to maths and physics graduates, with the same incentives underneath. Other topics include four-year deferred bonuses, the effect of EU bonus caps on salaries, a recruitment process that began with a card game, and a classist bias in CV-based hiring.

The more contested material concerns power and responsibility. He recounts a dinner at which his boss told a story about a Deutsche Bank trader ruined by litigation and warned that life could be made difficult for him, and he generalises this into a claim that banks use the law selectively. He says compound interest concentrates assets with the rich without any malice on their part, and that politicians, academics, and media each have incentives not to fix the problem. He tells of a junior who answered his worry about a collapsing economy by saying they had already bought the green euro dollars. He also covers his depression after leaving, and three unpaid years of media work in which his COVID predictions were ignored. He grants that trading is unusually meritocratic for someone from a poor background.

Sharpest takeaway

Stevenson argues that elite finance operates as a power structure indistinguishable from organized crime, where traders profit from systemic collapse while institutional gatekeepers (politicians, economists, media) abdicate responsibility for fixing cascading inequality.

  • Banks threaten legal action against departing employees to suppress dissent, using law as an instrument of power rather than justice
  • The best-paid economists in the world are traders betting against ordinary people, creating perverse incentives that reward predicting societal breakdown
  • Compound interest concentrates wealth exponentially, guaranteeing the middle class will be 'eaten alive' as the rich capture assets ordinary families need

The claims · ranked57 claims · weighted by value

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0.69

The shift from manual trading (ex-rugby players) to mathematical/computational trading (LSE, Harvard, math, physics graduates) between 2000-2010 represented a cultural change from physically aggressive personalities to intellectually sophisticated ones, but with identical underlying incentives toward profit and dominance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Trading sort of changed in the sort of early 2000s, 2000 to 2010. It became a lot more mathematical. There's this cultural shift where it goes away from being these kind of guys, ex-rugby players, of which there used to be a lot of that kind of thing in banking, towards, you know, LSE graduates, Harvard graduates, you know, maths graduates, physics graduates who are very like honorable with maths.”

0.69

Management at Citibank implicitly encouraged rule-breaking and dodgy trading because if traders were profitable, management benefited from bonuses and preferred not to investigate the methods, as long as the activity wasn't exposed.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Because the truth is, a lot of people do do dodgy s---. A lot people get away with it, because if you're making money on it, management, maybe it's changed, but management, they're not going to ask. I was making a ton of f---ing money, tons of money. Nobody ever asked how I was making it. Management never asked how I was making it, because if you're doing something dodgy, they would rather that just slide. They're going to get paid on it rather than to find out.”

0.69

The trading desk culture at Citibank was explicitly hierarchical and based on daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly P&L calculations published on a spreadsheet that ranked every trader, creating a system where success or failure was absolutely transparent and comparability was constant.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“P&L is profit and loss, and it's the only thing that matters in the world if you're a trader, basically. And every single day, every week, every month, every year, your individual P&L is calculated. Everyone's individual P&L is calculated. And it goes around on a spreadsheet every day. So every day you get a spreadsheet that tells you every single trader's P&L, which obviously means like if you're the best trader, you're the best trader. But if you're losing money, everybody can see. It's very clear who the best is, and it's very clear who the worst is.”

0.69

In 2011, Gary Stevenson was Citibank's most profitable trader in the world, having become successful by betting that the economy would collapse due to growing inequality that would never be resolved.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“by the end of that year, 2011, I've become Citibank's most profitable trader in the whole world by this bet that society would collapse”

0.68

Traders are not primarily profitable through risky 'betting' positions but through customer flow; most of their P&L comes from the bid-ask spread and customer relationships, and they make money 'from betting' only conceptually, as a matter of prestige and self-image.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Most of the traders, in my opinion, we're not making huge amounts of money from taking risky positions, speculative positions. They're making most of their money from the customers, but they're kind of trying to pretend they're making it from their bets. But most traders want to be making money from betting because that's sort of the glamorous side of it, you know?”

0.68

Stevenson was an interest rates trader who borrowed and lent money by offering forward interest rates to corporations, pension funds, and hedge funds that had loans rolling over—the business was built on predicting economic strength to quote appropriate rates.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was an interest rates trader. It means I was borrowing and lending money. And the idea is quite simple. You want to borrow at a low interest rate, and you want to lend at a high interest rate. So a lot of what is done on that desk, the STIRT desk, the short-term interest rates trading desk, is one-day loans. Corporations, pension funds, hedge funds that have loans running out will come to people like me and say, 'We've got a loan in six months. What interest rate will you give us for a loan starting in six months' time?'”

0.68

When Stevenson told his boss he wanted to leave Citibank to work for charity, the boss took him to dinner, told a story about a Deutsche Bank trader who was bankrupted through litigation for trying to leave, and explicitly threatened: 'I like you, I think you're a good person, but sometimes bad things happen to good people. We can make life very difficult for you.'

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Towards the end of my career, I decide I want to leave, and I tell my boss I want to leave. And my boss takes me out for this dinner, and he told me a story about a trader, a young trader at Deutsche Bank who, you know, nice guy, good trader, wanted to leave. The only problem is Deutsche didn't really want him to leave, you know, so they went through all of his, looked through some of his past trades and his emails, you know. There wasn't really anything in there, but there was enough, you know. You know what I mean? Enough to take him to court. And he rolled through court for years and years, and eventually the guy was bankrupted. And then he literally said to me, you know, 'I like you, I think you're a good person, but sometimes bad things happen to good people. We can make life very difficult for you. You're going to find out about that.'”

0.66

Stevenson's role as a trader was fundamentally about 'being the risk holder'—the person who makes decisions, takes risk, and suffers the losses if wrong, rather than executing orders or managing customer relationships.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Gary Stevenson

“What you really were at the time, you were the risk holder. You were the risk holder. Your job was to be the person who made the decisions and took the risk and who took the hit if you were wrong.”

0.65

Compound interest ensures that wealthy individuals earning passive income will use that capital to buy the assets (housing, education, healthcare) that ordinary families need, guaranteeing the dissolution of the middle class over time.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“If you are a guy who's worth $100 million, you're going to make $5 million a year passive income, and you are going to use that money to buy the assets that ordinary families, kids need. That is the direction of travel. That is we're heading up. We will lose the middle class.”

0.64

Banks use litigation strategically not against employees who actually committed wrongdoing, but against employees who 'piss off the wrong people'—those who threaten institutional interests—making law itself an instrument of power rather than justice.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I suspect that a lot of the people who get actually sued by banks are not the people who did bad s---. They're the people who pissed off the wrong people.”

0.64

The payment structure in banking—deferred bonuses paid over 4 years—was designed to incentivize risk-taking by allowing immediate spending on future uncertain income, and EU bonus caps that limited bonuses as a multiple of salary replaced this with massive salary increases that decreased risk-taking incentives and increased the incentive to 'sit around and take the money.'

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“The payment structure is very weird, or at least it was back then. You would get paid a lot of money in a bonus, but it would be like deferred. So you get this money in four years.”

0.62

Politicians, academics, and media figures all have structural incentives to avoid fixing systemic economic problems: politicians want to win elections, academics want to publish papers, media wants clicks, and traders want to profit from decline—so nobody is actually trying to solve the crisis.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“The traders don't think it's their job, because they're trying to do trades to make money. The politicians are trying to win elections. The academics are trying to write fancy papers. The guys in media are trying to get clicks and get views and, you know. Actually, nobody's trying to fix it.”

0.62

Traditional hiring by CV/cover letter contains massive classism because it privileges extracurriculars (concertino, founding clubs) that correlate with wealth and leisure rather than innate ability, and kids from poor backgrounds with strong grades are systematically disadvantaged.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“This CV cover letter, there's a massive amount of classism in that. Because everyone has the top grade. Basically, it's based on extracurriculars. It's based on how good you are at like f---ing clarinet, basically. But then, you know, kids like me will poke holes in your objective methods, but they're probably going to be the best traders, really.”

0.61

The 'best-paid 10,000 economists in the world' are traders, not academic economists, meaning the financial incentive structure pools the most talented economic forecasters into trading rather than policy or research.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I think it's worth realizing, right? The best-paid 10,000 economists in the world are all traders.”

0.59

Finance is fundamentally 'a big power game' where you can get away with almost anything as long as it's not in the bank's interest to go after you, and the entire system is structured such that the rich and powerful can evade consequences.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“It's all a big game. It's all a big game. It's all a big power game. And like, you can kind of get away with whatever you want, as long as it's not in the bank's interest to go for you. You know, and it's horrible, but, you know, this is the world that we've built, you know, where if you're very, very rich and very, very powerful, you can get away with a f---ing lot.”

0.59

Stevenson does not hate rich people and does not blame rich people for wealth concentration; rather, wealth concentration is a mathematical consequence of compound interest that operates amorphously, not through malice.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I don't hate rich people. I am a rich people. I don't blame rich people. I'm an economist that makes millions of pounds by predicting the f---ing future and I've got a f---ing good track record. These guys will get richer and richer, and they will eat the middle class alive. And it's not because they're bad, and it's not because they're evil, it's because that's what f---ing compound interest does.”

0.55

Stevenson assumed that politicians, economists at universities, Fed economists, Bank of England economists, and media economists all had the job of 'looking after the world,' but became clear that they do not and will not fix systemic problems.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“You don't go into trading to save the world, but you kind of assume that there are people whose job it is to look after the world. You know, like politicians most obviously, economists at universities, economists at central banks, like the Fed, like the Bank of England, economists in the media. You kind of think these guys, their job is to look after it. But what was becoming increasingly clear to me was, well, our job is not to fix it. Those guys whose job is to fix it, they're definitely not going to fix it.”

0.55

The desk environment was designed to prevent emotional control—traders were regularly subjected to high-stress situations, aggressive behavior from colleagues, and public humiliation—which Stevenson interprets as deliberate training to select for sociopathic or emotionally unresponsive individuals.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“There was a lot of that kind of nonsense going on, and there was a lot of people getting taken out to expensive restaurants and clubs and taken out to holidays... There's a lot of guys getting incredibly drunk, doing incredibly mad things, treating people disrespectfully.”

0.48

Middle management at investment banks consists mainly of people who 'couldn't cut it as traders' and who make money through internal politics, and they are 'usually a bit of a ----' because political maneuvering requires character traits different from trading ability.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“These guys are mainly people who couldn't cut it as traders. So they tried to like climb the greasy pole. And what they make their money on is basically internal politics. The kind of person who decides to make their money managing internal politics at an investment bank is usually a bit of a ----. The management is just like, it's just an absolute cesspool, really.”

0.48

Brokers had a sophisticated skill of understanding each trader's preferences (restaurants, nightclubs, sports events, holidays) and offering precisely targeted hospitality in order to manipulate trading behavior through relationship-building and quid pro quo.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“They had this kind of really interesting skill. They know what you're like. So, you know, one of the guys wanted to go to like fancy restaurants and drink red wine, another guy wants to get like VIP tables at fancy nightclubs, and another guy wants to get taken on holidays, another guy wants to go to sports events.”

0.48

The trading environment is unique (like football) in that a person from a poor background can compete directly with multimillionaires from rich families on an objective basis and win based purely on trading performance, creating real meritocratic fairness despite its psychological toll.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“There's this kind of beautiful fairness to it in a weird way. And I think there's not a lot of places in the world other than sort of the football pitch where a kid like me from nowhere can come in and compete with all of these multimillionaires from rich families and be like the guy at 24.”

0.48

Stevenson published a book (implied to be a bestseller) telling his story from expulsion from school → winning job in card game → top trader → bank's attempt to prevent his exit, using this narrative to demonstrate that societal collapse is inevitable and to persuade audiences to prevent it.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Somebody called me up and, 'I've read one your articles. You've thought about writing a book?' And I was like, 'No, not really.' But then I thought, you know, if I could use this story, this f---ing good story, you know. Expelled from school, wins a job in a card game, top trader the world by betting on the collapse of society, you know, bank tries to stop him from leaving. It's a good story. I thought, if I could tell that story well, then hopefully you'll know with the confidence I have that this is going to go down the toilet. And if enough people know that, then we can stop it.”

0.48

Stevenson's psychological experience of leaving banking was marked by severe difficulty because he had become 'dehumanized' and deeply adapted to a 'hothouse environment' where anything less than 120% effort felt like complete idleness, causing depression and emptiness upon departure despite making millions.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was in a situation towards the end of my career where I was trying to get fired. I was a very successful trader, but for a very short time, and I quit when I was like 27, I think. I was just so in the game, and I was kind of, I was quite dehumanized in a way.”

0.48

The P&L ranking system creates a self-reinforcing status hierarchy where 'the best trader is the best trader' and 'the worst is the worst,' meaning traders with high status are given better capital, better clients, and better conditions, while low-performing traders spiral.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“And that starts to become how you interact with other people and it starts to become how you see other people.”

0.48

Elite institutions and films like 'American Psycho' that depict corrupt but physically attractive, rich, successful men inadvertently socialize young men to aspire to those traits, and the fact that the character is 'clearly a dickhead' does not undermine the aspiration created.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I think 'American Psycho' is very good, actually. You know, it shows this guy's in banking, and he becomes a murderer, and he's really clearly a dickhead. But I knew people at LSE that would memorize all of his lines by heart. And they loved him, and the reason is because he's really handsome, he's really rich, he's in great shape, he's got a really beautiful girlfriend, he's got a really expensive flat. And I think no matter how much you try to say, but he's a dickhead. If you've put that in front of a 18-, 19-year-old boy, you're going to f--- a lot of 18-, 19-year-old boys up.”

0.48

When Stevenson asked his junior (a 'very posh, very rich, very smart Australian kid') whether they should 'do something' about the collapsing global economy, the junior didn't understand the question and responded that 'we put that trade on. We bought the green euro dollars.'

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“And I said to him, 'You know, do you think we should do something?' And he was like, 'About what?' And I was like, 'You know, about like a collapsing global economy.' And he was like, 'Yeah, we put that trade on. We bought the green euro dollars.' And I was like, 'Well, yeah, yes, but, you know, do you think we should do something?' And he was like, 'I don't understand what you mean.'”

0.48

After leaving banking, Stevenson worked for free in media (YouTube, written articles) for 3 years, making predictions about COVID-19 that were accurate, but nobody listened because he lacked institutional credibility despite having the track record and credentials to be believed.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“My free market rate is $2 million a year. For three years, I was out here in the media on YouTube for free, telling people exactly what was going to happen in COVID. You can go back and look at my early videos, my early articles in 2020 predicting COVID. Everything I said was going to happen exactly happened. Nobody's f---ing listening.”

0.47

The traders who profit from predicting economic weakness bear the same psychological and behavioral traits as drug dealers: both are motivated by profit and power, and both would likely have switched roles if they had grown up in different socioeconomic circumstances.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I can't help but think that a lot of the guys who become traders, if they grew up on the street I grew up on, would've been drug dealers. And a lot of the kids selling drugs in Elford, if they went to the same boarding school as Rupert and if they went to LSE, they would've become traders. Really. Because it's the exact same personality type.”

0.45

A loss-limiting mechanism in trading ensures that if traders lose money, they are removed from trading and forced to sit out—this is more punitive to traders than financial consequences, since traders define their identity and value through trading.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“When you lose money, a lot of stress gets placed on you. The worst thing from my perspective and from the perspective of many traders is that you get, you're no longer allowed to trade. And that's what traders want to do. They want to trade.”

0.45

After leaving banking, Stevenson wanted to work for charity, but senior management strongly implied they would sue him if he did, making him sit in a corner of the Tokyo office for 18 months studying Japanese and drawing instead of working.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Like, I want to leave and work for charity. And the banks are just, you know, the senior management is just very strongly implying, 'Well, we're going to sue you.' And at that point, they have no reason to sue you. They're just going to like, 'Well, you do that, we're going to sue you.' So I get 18 months like wandering around Tokyo, like studying Japanese and like learning to draw. They make me sit in the corner. So I'm just sitting in the corner of the office like studying Japanese and drawing pictures of the Beatles and stuff.”

0.45

A colleague named Rupert (from a wealthy background) sponsored Stevenson's career and took him to expensive clubs and restaurants, but deliberately kept him out late to build social bonds and dependency, eventually pressuring him to stay at his house until Stevenson became physically ill.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“He really like sponsored my career, drove me through, and he would take me out like with all of his mates. And he lived in Clapper, and I lived in Milford, which is like totally opposite ends of London. And he'd take me out with all his Clapper mates and we'd be going to f---ing Movida, which is a big, expensive club, and, like, expensive restaurants and, you know. He'd normally let me go like around midnight, because otherwise I'd missed the last train and he'd have to pay for a taxi. But it was like, 'No, stay.' He kept me out later and later. In the end, I stayed around, ended up staying around his place. I woke up, I felt like s---. I went into the office, I just threw up.”

0.45

During early COVID, Stevenson resumed trading because there was 'a lot of money on the table,' indicating that despite his philosophical critiques of finance, the incentives and practices still exert pull on him.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“In the beginning of COVID, I picked up trading again, because there was a lot of money on the table. So I still do do a bit of trading. It just sits in investments, you know.”

0.45

Stevenson became the Swiss franc trader at age 22 after his boss quit, and the replacement boss was passively incompetent, allowing Stevenson to essentially take the role without resistance through a confused conversation where the boss didn't understand or wasn't paying attention.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Gary Stevenson

“So I became the Swiss franc trader when I was 22, which is really, really young. And the way it happened was my boss, who was a Swiss franc trader, quit, and a new boss got put in, and he was a really nice guy, but he seemed a little bit kind of like dopey in a way.”

0.45

Stevenson won a job at Citibank by winning a 'trading game' card game that was deliberately rigged against him in the final round, but he was awarded the position anyway because judges wanted to test whether he would 'back himself' when everything was against him—revealing that hiring is based on personality and confidence rather than merit.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Gary Stevenson

“And he announced that I was the winner, even though my actual score in the final, the final was like negative. And he said, Gary's scores in the, like the warmups were so good, we wanted to test him in the final to see what he did if everything was against him, to see if he would like really back himself. And he did back himself, and that's what we like to see. So we decided he's the winner of the game. Even though I actually lost.”

0.44

After the boss mentioned that Rupert had taken Stevenson out, the boss publicly announced it to Rupert, which put Stevenson in a situation where he felt extremely anxious about Rupert's potential retaliation.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Next day, I came in early and the boss was like, 'Oh, did Rupert do that to you?' And I just laughed, you know. Then when Rupert came in, the boss goes to him. Gary said, 'You did that to him.' And I knew that he'd be furious, right?”

0.44

Rupert responded by growling and gnashing his teeth at Stevenson for approximately 10 seconds in front of the entire trading floor, then kicking computer station doors, demonstrating violent rage in a public setting.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“And then I hear like, this bang, this big bang, right? And then I think like f---, I better turn around now because like what the f--- has he done? We used to have like all the computing stations were like behind these doors, and he'd kicked the door so it like smashed into the brackets, and he was just kicking like that. And he was turned around in his chair, like leaning over towards me like that like that 'grr,' like gnashing his teeth like a f---ing dog at me and growling at me, like 'grr.' And I just looked at him, and he did it for about, it must've been at least 10 seconds, just like growling, gnashing his teeth at me in front of everyone.”

0.44

Stevenson's second boss threw a phone at a colleague's head because the colleague was frustrated with his trading screens, illustrating how violence is normalized and tolerated in the trading environment.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Another time, my boss threw a phone at my colleague's head because my colleague had got angry, and he'd thrown his phone at his screens. But obviously, like now with these LCD screens, they don't like smash. So he was like, it didn't really, it just go ... So he picked up the phone, smashing it on the desk. And then he started trying to trade through the same phone. So he was like hitting these like, 'Johnny, what's three months?' But it wasn't working. He was just shouting, and then he just banging his phone. So then my boss shouted over to him like, 'What's wrong?' And he obviously wasn't listening. And then he asked me what's wrong. And I said, 'I think JB's phone's broken.' So this boss just went over to the end, just picked up a phone and just like lobbed it in the air, landed on this guy's head.”

0.43

By 2011, Citibank had a strategic goal to become the biggest bank in the world in terms of volumes traded, which meant Stevenson was asked to maximize trading volumes in one-day loans, eventually trading approximately a trillion dollars per day across various currencies.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“In 2011, by the time I become a really profitable trader, Citibank for some reason had this big thing where they wanted to become the biggest bank in the world in terms of volumes traded. And because we're doing one-day loans, it's massive volume. Because if you borrow money for a day, you have to come back every day. It's stupid, but it looks like really big volume. And it meant that senior management had asked me to try to do as much trades as I could. So I was probably lending and borrowing between currencies, probably not far off a trillion dollars a day of a variety of currencies, which was ridiculous.”

0.43

Traders were paid approximately 7% of their P&L as bonuses, and Stevenson received nearly 400,000 pounds (approximately $700,000) as his first year bonus, which was far more than expected and caused a psychological shift where he became focused solely on making money.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Traders in my department were getting paid about 7% of their P&L”

0.43

Stevenson became deeply uncomfortable with the 'quid pro quo' system where brokers took him to expensive events and then immediately asked for trading favors, so he established a 'Nando's only' rule: meetings only at Nando's chicken restaurant where each person paid for themselves.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“there's a kind of f---ing like hidden little quid pro quo here, which I wasn't really comfortable with. So eventually, like I started to just like say, 'Look, I don't meet no brokers, I don't go for no dinners.' I instituted 'Nando's only' rule. So for Americans who don't know what Nando's is, Nando's is a popular grilled chicken chain. I said, if you want to meet Gary, you go to Nando's Canary Wharf. I pay for me, you pay for you. That's the rule.”

0.43

The actual hours of hard work on the trading desk were only 3-4 hours per day, primarily concentrated in the morning rush, making the job less time-intensive than perceived despite requiring a 5:30 a.m. wake-up.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“The thing is, even when you're there, really, there's only sort of three or four hours of hard work. And that was because I was the Euro trader, which was like, that was definitely the most work of anyone.”

0.43

The trading game selection mechanism (used to hire Stevenson and others) selected for traders who could succeed in the game but also selected for a particular personality type that becomes very good at the job—the people who came through the game tended to be the best traders.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“The guys who did come into the card game tended to end up being really good traders at the bank.”

0.43

Stevenson's second boss was 'totally insane'—he apologized for Stevenson's lack of salary increase despite having never asked for one and seeming genuinely worried Stevenson couldn't survive on 400,000 pounds, illustrating severe disconnection from normal human reality.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I loved my second boss, but he was totally insane. I remember once he sat me down just like, 'Gary, I really do apologize.' And I was like, 'What for?' And he was like, 'We can't give you a salary increase.' And I'd never even asked one. And the previous year, I'd been paid 400,000 pounds, and he seemed genuinely worried about whether I could survive on it, you know?”

0.41

After being forced to sit idle for 18 months, Stevenson began sending 'mad emails every day' to the CEO and global head of HR, and simultaneously one senior executive was fired; Stevenson was then released from the bank but doesn't know whether he was fired because of his emails or the executive's departure.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“And I got them into a position where, I think, first of all, I think they thought, because I was kind of a young kid from kind of a rough background making a lot of money, I think they thought that if they dug far enough, they'd find some dodgy s--- in there. But really, I was just betting on like the world collapsing every single year. That's what I was f---ing doing. And in the end, two things happened simultaneously, which is I start sending these mad emails every day to like the CEO and the global head of HR. And one guy got fired, and then I get let out. So I didn't really know whether it was because I started getting mental and causing big problems or if it was because this guy got fired. And I'll never know which one of those things. But eventually, I got out, which is why I'm here and not stuck in a skyscraper.”

0.39

Stevenson lost $8 million in a single week in 2010 when the Swiss central bank cut rates to negative 4.5% specifically targeting the product he was betting on, but he was not allowed to hold the position to recover, forcing him into a $4 million net loss despite the underlying bet being correct.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was 23. I'd put a big bet on which had some risk to Swiss interest rates. And the Swiss central bank suddenly cut rates to negative 4.5% for some crazy reason, specifically using the product that I was betting on. I lost $8 million in a week. The maddest thing about it was, it was the right bet. If I was allowed to keep that position, I would've made it all back. I wasn't allowed to keep that position, so you end up $4 million in the red.”

0.39

The only matter escalated to HR on Stevenson's desk was a case of theft, but even that escalation was controversial because there was consensus that it should have been 'dealt with between us' rather than involve HR.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“The only thing I ever saw get escalated to HR was the guy who stole money from another trader. And even that, there was a general consensus on the desk that he shouldn't have escalated to HR, that we should've dealt with it between us.”

0.39

Stevenson's current work is educational, attempting to explain the importance of inequality to audiences, and he funds himself primarily through trading rather than through paid media or educational work.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“Obviously, I quit my job, and the work I do now, it's educational work, trying to explain to people the importance of inequality. I don't get paid a lot of money for it. You know, in fact, very often, I get paid no money for it. So it funds my work, it funds my life.”

0.39

Stevenson made money from the 2011 Japanese earthquake and nuclear disaster (which killed ~20,000 people) not by predicting the disaster but by betting on economic weakness, and he does not believe he bears moral responsibility for profiting from the deaths.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“in 2011, the Japanese nuclear disaster. I made a ton of money on the Japanese nuclear disaster, not because I'd been expecting it to be a Japanese nuclear disaster, but because I was betting on economic weakness.”

0.32

Young people entering elite universities like LSE are heavily socialized into banking and trading culture because it is the default aspirational career, and everyone assumes that if you study economics or math, you will become a trader or investment banker.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was at LSE, the London School of Economics, before I went into banking. Everyone at LSE is obsessed with banking, obsessed with trading. So you get a good sense of what everybody wants.”

0.26

Stevenson came from a poor background and was involved in grime music and a sofa shop job before banking, making him radically different from his elite peers whose entire social world was organized around elite institutions and leisure.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was like working in a sofa shop and like trying to become like a grime rapper when I was a kid.”

0.20

Stevenson's desk had approximately 10 traders, each trading a different currency, with promotion through ranks from desk junior to New Zealand dollar trader to Swiss franc trader to euro trader to yen trader.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“In my desk, there were about 10 traders, and each trader's job was to look at a different currency and you kind of get promoted through the ranks. First, I was, you know, desk junior, buying the coffees. Then I was New Zealand dollar trader, then I was Swiss franc trader, then eventually I was euro trader, then I moved to Japan and I was the yen trader.”

0.20

The foreign exchange trading desk at Citibank London had a 'boisterous laddish atmosphere' where suits and ties were explicitly forbidden, in contrast to European banks like Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank that required formal dress.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“My trading desk was in the foreign exchange department, which back then had the very sort of boisterous laddish atmosphere. I came in first day in a suit and the guys were like, 'No suits, no ties.' Whereas I think the European banks like Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank, they like you to wear suits.”

0.20

A typical trading day involved a rush from 8 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. handling customer flows, then a period of rest and relaxation as trading shifted to New York, then evening chill time reviewing positions, completing by 5 p.m., requiring a 5:30 a.m. wake-up.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I'd be checking my positions, you know, there was a really big rush in the morning from sort of 8 a.m. to about 10:30 a.m. dealing with all the customers. So between 8 and sort of 10:30, 11, would just be a mad rush. By then, I'd be knackered. I'd go and get massive Nando's, sit there, smash my Nando's down. Then in the afternoon, it's actually quite chill, because Citibank offers a 24-hour pricing service, which means there's a period where if you call up, you get the London trader, there's a period where you get the New York trader, and there's a period where you get the Sydney trader. By our afternoon, we've handed over to New York, they're doing the business. So we're sitting around, reading the newspaper, sort of chatting.”

0.20

Stevenson was expelled from school for selling 3 pounds' worth of cannabis at age 16 but subsequently adopted an absolute position of no drug use, and never used cocaine despite it being endemic in the banking culture.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“I was expelled from school for selling 3 pounds' worth of cannabis when I just turned 16, and I was like, that's it. No more drugs. I'm off drugs. No more drugs ever again. So I've never taken cocaine in my life”

0.20

One colleague spent 80,000 pounds per year on cocaine, which Stevenson didn't realize until later because he had misattributed the colleague's behavior to alcoholism.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Gary Stevenson

“And then since then, one of my colleagues who is very upset about the book came out and said he spent, I think he said he was spending 80,000 pounds a year on cocaine. Yeah, which is ... But the funniest thing is like, I had no idea what was happening. I had no idea what was happening. I thought he was an alcoholic.”

0.19

Stevenson's first boss quit and was replaced by a new boss who introduced himself to Stevenson by showing him Sports Illustrated magazine without saying his name, suggesting the new boss was either unintelligent, had an unusual communication style, or was deliberately dismissive.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Gary Stevenson

“And the way it happened was my boss, who was a Swiss franc trader, quit, and a new boss got put in, and he was a really nice guy, but he seemed a little bit kind of like dopey in a way. And he come over once to introduce himself to me, and the way he introduced himself to me was he just sat down next to me and he pulled out a copy of Sports Illustrated and he flicked through the magazine. He opens it like that, like that to me. And he's like, 'Do you like that?'”

0.17

Stevenson's boss (called 'the Slug' in his book) was so incompetent that Stevenson's peer said to him, 'if he was your intern, you wouldn't hire him,' suggesting that people fundamentally unsuited for the role were placed in management positions.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Gary Stevenson

“I remember talking my manager's manager who in the book we called the Slug. I remember talking to like one of my mates on another trading desk, and he was like, 'I'll tell you what, if he was your intern, you wouldn't hire him, would you?'”