What this covers

This is a single-guest interview: Jack Farley of Forward Guidance talks with Lynn Alden, filmed on the afternoon of March 15, 2023, days after two large U.S. banks failed. It starts with the mechanics of the turmoil. Alden separates a credit event from a rate event. The problem is safe securities bought at low yields that now carry unrealized losses, made dangerous by a skittish deposit base concentrated in uninsured business accounts. She walks through the Silicon Valley Bank case, where a duration bet met an 87% uninsured deposit base, and notes that even Bank of America carries over $100 billion in securities losses but is too sticky and diversified to be a systemic worry.

The middle of the conversation covers bank health in more detail. Alden breaks it into solvency, liquidity and profitability, and says small and mid-sized banks face the last two. She qualifies the saying that rising rates are good for banks by separating the end state from the speed of the transition. She also looks at the Fed's new term funding facility, which helps liquidity more than profitability, and at the Fed's own accounting insolvency. The conversation then turns to what rational companies should do with deposits above FDIC limits, and to whether banks will pull back on lending.

The wider macro section is the most contested. Alden compares inflation in the 1970s, which she attributes to bank lending, with the 1940s and 2020s, which she attributes to fiscal deficits. On that reading, rate hikes work poorly against the current inflation. She discusses Treasury's short-maturity debt profile, demographics and MMT, and the lag in shelter CPI). She also forecasts that rates will become politicized, citing Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren, and that real rates will stay negative this decade. The closing segments cover recession risk, which sectors are most rate-sensitive (real estate and tech), how stocks might behave under financial repression, and the case for Narrow Banking (Full-Reserve Banking)) as an alternative to treating depositors' savings as a leveraged bond fund.

Sharpest takeaway

Banking crises result from interest rate risk rather than credit risk, and the Fed's rapid tightening has created a structural problem where raising rates further exacerbates fiscal inflation while threatening financial stability, necessitating a shift toward financial repression.

  • 2023 bank failures stem from unrealized losses on safe securities due to rapid rate increases, not bad loans like 2008
  • Raising rates worsens fiscal-driven inflation because government spending is politically locked in, making higher debt service costs not deterrent
  • The Fed faces a dilemma: continued tightening breaks the banking system and creates recession, while easing allows structural inflation to persist

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0.80

Shelter CPI operates on a lag, meaning early in inflation spikes it understates actual inflation because home prices and rents are higher than what shelter CPI captures. During disinflationary periods, shelter CPI can overstate inflation temporarily because home prices have already started falling but shelter CPI takes time to reflect it.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“the shelter component of CPI operates on a lag so early on in the inflation Spike that actually understated how much inflation was happening because home prices in rent prices were higher than shelters API whereas now shelter CPI is is still grinding higher while a lot of the a lot of those other uh the you know the actual things we're paying have already kind of flatlined or in some cases contracted a little bit”

0.80

There are three sources of broad money creation: bank lending, quantitative easing (purchases from non-banks), and large fiscal deficits monetized by the central bank or banking system. In the 1970s most money creation came from bank lending, so raising rates to slow lending made sense. But in the 1940s and 2020s, most comes from fiscal deficits, making rate increases ineffective against fiscal-driven inflation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“there's really three ways to make broad money one is Bank Lending so when Banks make loans they make deposits two is if QE happens and they buy assets from non-banks specifically um that that can increase the broad money supply that that's generally not a huge Factor um and then and then three if there's large fiscal deficits that are then monetized by either the central bank or the banking system um that increases money's broad money supply”

0.80

The 2023 banking crisis is fundamentally different from 2008 because it is not a credit event where bad loans are defaulting, but rather a rate event where very safe securities were bought at high prices and low yields and now have unrealized losses as rates rise, which becomes a problem when deposits run due to a skittish deposit base concentrated in uninsured large business accounts.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“that was largely a credit event uh basically Banks made a lot of bad loans that were defaulting um in this context it's not that bad loans are defaulting it's that actually very very safe Securities were bought at high prices low yields and as we've entered a higher inflation higher interest rate regime many of them have unrealized losses”

0.80

A Narrow Bank is a bank that takes deposits and puts the money directly in the Fed, functioning as a full-reserve bank tied to the central bank. If permitted, it would be one of the safest banks possible because there's no credit risk or duration risk. However, central banks generally don't allow them because they would attract deposits away from fractional-reserve banks, disrupting the traditional banking system.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“aerobank was proposed years ago uh you know it's a I believe it's a bank in Connecticut um but they they essentially wanted a business model of taking deposit cash and and putting it in the FED um and there's there's been a number of other banks that try to do something similar they're generally not allowed to do that um and essentially you know if allowed to exist to be among the safest Banks you can have because it's such a full Reserve Bank where it's it's just you know kind of tied right into the central bank”

0.75

For small and medium-sized banks, the current environment presents both a liquidity problem and a profitability problem because they must raise deposit rates to keep deposits, but this increases costs and reduces profitability. For larger banks, the liquidity issue is less acute due to their large liquid securities books and diversified deposit base, but they still face potential profitability challenges.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“for most banks solvency is less of a problem than the other two and that's what makes it different in 2008 um liquidity and profitability kind of go hand in hand because if a bank wants to keep its its deposits one it has to it has to you know deposits have to have confidence in it but then also if they want to avoid the long kind of drag of capital leaving them and going towards things like money markets they have to increase their deposit rates”

0.75

The Federal Reserve itself is now insolvent on an accounting basis, holding over a trillion dollars of unrealized losses on long-duration treasury and mortgage-backed securities. This demonstrates what happens when you raise deposit rates (reserve rates on Fed liabilities) while holding low-yielding assets—you generate operating losses.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“I mean I I think the overall unrealized fed losses were like you know something like a trillion dollars at the peak um you know probably now it's it's it's you know hundreds and hundreds of billions whereas even their even their operating profit has turned into an operating loss because and that's that kind of shows what happens if you actually do raise your deposit rate super high while you're holding um you know uh low yielding assets right”

0.75

Even if regional banks' solvency is fine, rational business decision-making dictates that companies holding deposits above FDIC insurance limits should diversify accounts, use larger banks, or sweep funds into money markets rather than assume the FDIC will back every deposit, which is not guaranteed and creates a defensive incentive structure that harms smaller and medium-sized banks.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“at this point if you're a business for example if you're if you're some sort of if you're operating a bank account that's a that's above the insurance limit you generally do want to take precautious actions because you can't assume necessarily that FDIC is going to back every deposit right”

0.75

The saying that 'rising rates are good for banks' requires separating the end state from the path to get there. While a normalized rate environment is better than artificially low rates, transitioning from zero rates to higher rates in one year—particularly when this is the biggest one-year move on a percentage basis in Fed history—is very problematic for banks because they locked in loans and securities at lower rates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“I think we have to separate the rate versus getting there um because on average if you have a super if you have like an artificially low rate uh that it's really hard for banks to make a profit because lending decisions don't really make sense um there's a very narrow spread whereas a more normalized rate environment is a better environment for banks but if you go from super low rate to to a high or normal rate in one year that's obviously very problematic”

0.75

The Federal Reserve's new Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) facility helps with liquidity by allowing banks to borrow against securities at par value even if they're underwater, but it helps less with solvency and profitability because banks with huge unrealized losses relative to capital still face challenges if they have to manage higher liability rates than asset rates for years to come.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“I think it helps with liquidity more that helps with solvency I mean Banks you know if they have huge unrealized losses relative to their Capital that's still going to be a challenging time to deal with for the next um you know few years because they have to manage their you know their liability rates compared to their asset rates”

0.74

Banks are essentially leveraged bond funds with payment services attached. The current system treats this as totally normal—the assumption is that an ordinary depositor should hold savings in a highly leveraged bond fund—but there's been a persistent minority view advocating for full-reserve banking or other alternatives like gold-backing or Bitcoin-style non-fractional systems.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“basically banks are basically leveraged bond funds with payment services attached and we treat it as totally normal to use this you know it's like where should Grandma hold her back her money in the in the highly leveraged bond fund like that's that's kind of how we treat it um and and there's always been some people that want to do full Reserve banking um yeah they've just generally not been allowed to operate because they're I think one of the risks there from kind of a policymaker perspective is if there's Banks where all they do is give you direct access to the essentially the central bank balance sheet then why wouldn't a very large percentage of deposits want to go there especially if if it's a positive rate environment”

0.74

Banks have relatively good lending standards in recent years and have plenty of cash and treasury securities (much more than before 2008), so the problem is not credit risk or insufficient liquidity buffers, but rather that the sheer speed of rate increases put their safe assets underwater through mark-to-market losses on longer-duration securities.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“they have plenty of of of very riskless types of assets and they've had they've been pretty uh good overall with their lending standards the problem is just the the sheer speed with which rates uh increased put a lot of their safe assets underwater”

0.74

Banks have three health metrics: solvency (assets exceed liabilities), liquidity (ease of converting assets and accessing deposits), and profitability (earning enough on assets to pay depositors and retain deposits). For most banks in the current environment, solvency is less of a problem than the other two, which is what makes this different from 2008.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“there's three things for banks there's solvency liquidity and then profitability solvency is do banks have more in assets than they have in liabilities if they don't that's a problem liability is the ease with which people can get money in and out of a bank”

0.74

The U.S. Treasury has a skewed debt maturity profile: roughly half of debt is very short-term while the other half is spread across various durations. Although the average duration is 5-6 years, the concentration of short-term debt means a large portion needs to be refinanced in the near term, creating exposure to higher rates in the next few years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“even though their average duration is like five or six years um there it's kind of skewed right so so something like half of their debt is is really short-term and then the other halves like spread out over a variety of durations”

0.74

The U.S. consumer and many corporations are protected from rising rates because they have long-duration fixed-rate debt. A 30-year mortgage locks in a low rate; a 20-year corporate bond is protected. But banks are vulnerable because deposits are instant-access liabilities that must be paid on demand, while their assets are longer-duration securities. This is a structural mismatch that rate rises expose.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“and that's because their liabilities in many cases deposits are instant they they have to you know Fork over the money uh but what are you think about the government and U.S corporations which you'll borrowed a 20-year issue a 20-year Bond or some people who have a 30-year mortgage who might be a little more immune from high interest rates uh than the banks so on a corporation basis it really varies on the company I mean I look at some of these energy pipelines for example and some of them have like 20-year average duration um fixed rate uh low low yielding debt and so they're sitting pretty well they're they're rather protected against industry increases”

0.74

If the Fed keeps raising rates, the interest rate differential between money markets (which can offer market rates) and bank deposits widens, pulling money out of banks and into money market funds. This creates deposit pressure on banks, forcing them to raise deposit rates to compete, which drains profitability. If the Fed eases off or pauses, this differential narrows, giving banks a reprieve.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“if the FED keeps raising rates the differential between what you can earn in a money market and what you can earn with a bank account that will widen so suck money out out of banks so there's an element of panic how uh concerns do you do you think that this issue of panic is where even if the regional banks are fine their sovereignty is fine but people fear sort of fee fear uh fear feeds on itself”

0.74

In a low-rate environment, a Narrow Bank faces challenges because depositors have no incentive to accept below-market returns, so the bank must charge fees for negative-yield deposits. In a positive-rate environment where the Fed pays interest on reserves, a Narrow Bank could operate profitably and pass along some of that interest to depositors at a margin above what the Fed pays.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“you know it's a I believe it's a bank in Connecticut um but they they essentially wanted a business model of taking deposit cash and and putting it in the FED um and there's there's been a number of other banks that try to do something similar they're generally not allowed to do that um and essentially you know if allowed to exist to be among the safest Banks you can have because it's such a full Reserve Bank where it's it's just you know kind of tied right into the central bank and you know that bank for depositors might be challenging a low interest rate environment because you know they can't earn a yield uh the bank can't earn a yield and so they have to you know charge fees or you know some sort of way to stay in business for their customers so it's essentially a bank for low risk um depositors that don't want to take on any sort of default risk on the other hand if you have a higher rate environment where the central bank is actually paying out interest on reserves then a type of Bank like that can and operate profitably”

0.74

A system without fractional-reserve banking would require an underlying hard monetary unit (historically gold, potentially something requiring energy to produce) that cannot be infinitely created, fundamentally changing how money creation works compared to the past 150 years of fiat systems.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“if if you have um you know if you have a bunch of either free Banks or or forwards or Banks you probably have some sort of underlying hard unit that requires energy to produce you know back in the day it used to be gold for example nobody could print gold miners could could expend energy to get more gold um and that that's how new money is created”

0.72

The 1970s inflation was driven primarily by excessive bank lending (responding to peak baby boomer demographics and home-buying demand), so raising rates to slow lending made sense. The 1940s inflation was driven by fiscal deficits related to war and rebuilding, and the 2020s inflation is driven by fiscal deficits related to entitlements, making rate policy an ineffective tool in both cases.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“you know in the 1970s most of the money supply growth the majority of it was from Bank lending that's because you had Peak demographics you know baby boomers were entering their home buying years and so a lot of monetary policy was focused on slowing down that lending growth especially because we also had a you know oil supply side problem uh whereas the inflation you saw in the 1940s and the inflation you saw in the 2020s was not because of excessive Bank lending so Banks didn't lend much in the 1940s uh Banks were not lending excessively”

0.71

Real estate and tech are the two most sensitive sectors to interest rates. Real estate is debt-focused, so rising rates directly impact viability. Tech became sensitive because low-rate environments allowed money-losing growth companies to fund losses through continuous equity issuance at high multiples. When real cost of capital emerges, companies can't rely on equity funding, must become profitable, which reduces growth and revealed that prior growth rates were partially an illusion from currency mispricing.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“the two sensitive sectors to interest rates are one obviously real estate because it's so debt focused and then two um Tech and that's because you know for a long time this is kind of the Assumption of of just zero yields and and money's cheap so hold anything other than money and so people monetize Equity right they're willing to pay these super high multiples and so the company doesn't have to worry about being profitable they can just keep issuing Equity to employees and and sharehold and investors and then that allows them to grow quicker because they're underpricing their product or service”

0.69

Silicon Valley Bank made a bad risk management bet on duration, overexposing itself to long-duration assets during the period when the Fed flooded the system with deposits in 2020-2021. The worst year ever for long-duration treasuries was 2022, so SVB faced unrealized losses that came close to or exceeded its bank capital, making it more exposed than diversified competitors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“if you put them primarily into long duration assets you know 2022 was like the worst year ever for a long duration treasuries it was like the worst year in like modern history and so if a bank was Overexposed basically bad risk management Overexposed to duration they can have these unrealized losses that that you know come close to or exceed their amount of Bank Capital”

0.69

Silicon Valley Bank's duration bet would not have been catastrophic if the deposit base had remained stable, even with the facility present. However, with the unusual concentration of uninsured business deposits (87% at year-end), the bank was extremely vulnerable to a deposit run, which is what occurred.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“do you think Silicon Valley Bank would have made it if the Federal Reserve facility the btfp had already been in place I mean it's possible they could have potentially sold them I mean they could have like loaned them out instead of um had to sell them and realize that loss uh you know their their particular case though they had such significant unrealized losses relative to their Capital um but they're they're kind of an outlier case um so I I do think this facility prevents other Banks from having a similar issue I'm not sure it would have been you know enough uh to help there”

0.69

Bank of America has over $100 billion in unrealized securities losses despite being the big four's most insulated bank (lowest percentage of uninsured deposits, highest customer inertia). Yet its scale makes a systemic failure implausible because deposits are geographically and economically sticky.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“Bank of America and again this is stated because it's got a huge huge huge bank but I think they've got over 100 billion dollars of uh unrealized Securities losses on their portfolio and money is is flowing in they have a incredibly low percentage of uninsured depositors as a percentage of the deposit base and there are many reasons why you know Bank of America is going to make it”

0.68

Inflation in 1970s came in waves as central banks and governments tried different approaches (tightening, controls), then eased, causing inflation to resurge. Similarly, current inflation is likely to come in waves due to temporary factors and policy interventions, not a clean linear decline.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“you know if you look back in the 40s and the 70s uh inflation Came In Waves um there are periods of of fighting back either either price and wage controls or Central Bank trying to tighten things up and so you know once once it was clear last year that the Fed was you know aggressively tightening my my uh stance shifted towards okay structural inflation but temporary disinflation”

0.68

If the Fed pushes very aggressively on quantitative tightening (shrinking the monetary base), it would likely result in more bank problems and heightened recession probability, but the treasury market probably wouldn't break immediately. However, any attempt to further draw liquidity out of bank reserves would likely trigger usage of Fed facilities, offsetting some of the tightening effect.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“it's it's it's currently not hitting the treasure market so if they want to tighten further they technically could it would come with probably a lot of Bank problems um and probably uh heightened the probability of recession so it's not like they it's not like it's an emergency where they have to stop right away but I did I do think that for for most practical purposes any attempts to further say draw liquidity out of out of Bank Reserves is probably going to result in more usage of those types of liquidity facilities and therefore offset some of their liquidity pull”

0.68

Large banks' deposit bases are sticky because they represent a large percentage of total system deposits, and deposits tend to move between banks rather than leaving the banking system entirely. It's hard for individual large banks to experience systemic deposit flight unless the bank has an extreme problem.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“um basically the large Banks basically if you if you think of deposit base as like a bunch of cups of water it's really hard to pull all that water out right I mean there's only so many places it can go into and so it's not like deposits can all just flow out of say JPMorgan Bank of America and just flow out of the whole system and Crush all the system instead it's like you know some deposits can leak out into things like money markets uh and treasuries um but most deposits are are you know kind of sticky”

0.68

Inflation is going to be a recurring problem likely for years, but not necessarily every year, and it is fundamentally a fiscal problem not a monetary problem that rates can solve. Raising rates doesn't address the real world structural issues creating inflation (energy constraints, infrastructure), so any reduction in inflation from rate hikes is temporary—when the economy accelerates out of recession, inflation returns because the underlying causes remain.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“it's really not something that monetary policy can address effectively because it's more about the fiscal issues and you know the the real world issues throughout the economy...and I think it's probably going to be a recurring problem and that it's really not something that monetary policy can address effectively”

0.68

Interest rates are increasingly being politicized. Previously, both Democratic and Republican presidents maintained Fed independence. But Trump openly criticized rate hikes, and now Democratic Congress members like Elizabeth Warren are questioning Jerome Powell's decisions. As financial pressure mounts, interest rates will become a political issue, making them harder to predict and suggesting ongoing negative real rates are likely this decade.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“if you look back in the in the 70s and 80s uh you know Jimmy Carter uh put volcker in um and that you know arguably that heard his re-election chances uh but he he viewed it as an important thing to do for disability and then and then Reagan also let let volcker um you know continue doing what he was was doing and so for for a long stretch of presidents both Democratic and Republican you had a high degree of Independence whereas you started seeing under Trump he was not happy with drone power raising rates and now you're seeing it from uh you know even though Biden hasn't really gone that route you've seen it among uh you know Democrats and in Congress”

0.68

A general framework for investors this decade is that persistent positive real rates (rates above inflation) are unlikely. There may be brief periods of positive real rates during recessions, but the structural environment of high debt and fiscal dominance makes sustained positive real rates impractical. This is unlike the 1980s-90s when positive real rates persisted for long stretches.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“this decade it's gonna be very hot hard to have positive real rates and any sort of normalized persistent basis there might be brief periods of time especially in recessions where you get the positive um real rates but the idea that we're just going to go back to this long period of positive rates like we had in the 80s and the 90s for example I think that's not going to happen”

0.68

Squeezing the banking sector through QT and rate hikes puts pressure on bank deposit base and asset sales. Eventually, if the Fed pushes hard enough, the pressure gets pushed down the chain to the sovereign level—banks can't fund themselves, so they stop buying treasuries, and the sovereign has to manage without that natural buyer. This is the ultimate limit on how much tightening is feasible.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“if you squeeze Banks hard enough and they have to start getting rid of their Securities to you know support their deposit base then who becomes a buyer of treasuries um and so I think that you know if you were to squeeze the banking sector hard enough uh that eventually gets pushed into the Sovereign level and that's where they have to reverse”

0.68

The real issue is liquidity rather than credit events. While commercial real estate may still experience credit events, the banking crisis is primarily about liquidity—sovereign debt was an issue last year, now it's the banking system. The path to the end game of financial repression involves watching what breaks, and it's been a progression of liquidity crunches rather than defaults.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“a lot of people are looking for credit events um which you know I still think there might be credit events especially in say commercial real estate um but but credit events are largely not the problem it's about basically liquidity um you know uh sovereign debt that was that was like I said the issue or last year and then this time it turned out in the banking system”

0.66

High interest rates can actually exacerbate fiscal inflation because when rates rise, the government's interest costs increase, forcing larger deficits if spending and revenues remain constant. Since the government's deficit choices are gridlocked and unlikely to be cut (entitlements, military spending are politically protected), higher rates mean more money pouring into the economy from government, not less, offsetting any contractionary effect on the private sector.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“if you increase interest rates like let's say we just jack up to 10 percent this you know this is you know go super highly the Taylor rule says we should do well then those fiscal deficits are going to get even bigger and when you have gridlock around what to do about it it's you know you're not going to cut entitlements you're not going to cut military spending you're not going to materially raise taxes most likely unless you had a massive change in the voter base and and you know politicians so those deficits just get bigger and it's actually just more money pouring into the economy”

0.66

The current situation resembles a 1940s financial repression scenario more than a 1970s inflation scenario. In the 1970s, banks lent excessively to respond to peak demographics (baby boomer home buying), so raising rates controlled that lending. But in the 1940s and 2020s, inflation comes from fiscal deficits, not excessive bank lending, making monetary policy an ineffective tool and necessitating financial repression—essentially making banks into utilities.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“I keep bringing up the 1940s and you know when you have a period of financial oppression um Banks essentially become utilities and it it's really offensive to like um kind of our capitalist view of the world um but that's kind of the incentive structure they've set up when they've gotten in such a high depth position so you know a lot of people are treating this like the 1970s where okay there's inflation let's raise rates whereas in many cases is more like 1940s because we have fiscal driven inflation we have very high debt levels”

0.66

When you have very high fiscal deficits in a politically gridlocked environment, neither raising rates nor lowering rates solves the problem of fiscal-driven inflation. Raising rates exacerbates deficits by increasing interest costs; lowering rates encourages currency flight and capital flight. The only solution is financial repression—keeping rates low while imposing capital controls and restrictions on borrowing and asset purchases to prevent capital flight.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“normally in these types of high debt scenarios that's why you get Capital controls and financial oppression because the answer of raising rates doesn't work and the answer of holding rates low doesn't work because if you raise rates too high you exacerbate fiscal driven inflation and if you cut rates low you encourage massive money creation through borrowing because the the currency is not keeping up with with inflation and so normally what they do is they try to end up holding rates low but then blocking various things that you can you you can borrow money to buy”

0.64

Alden does not believe that currency must depreciate over time or that constantly increasing leverage is an inevitable feature of economic systems. She views these as artifacts of the past 150 years (fiat plus fractional-reserve) rather than fundamental laws, and questions whether the next 150 years will follow the same pattern.

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“I I don't really buy into the economic view that that currency has to depreciate and that we have to use constantly increasing leverage uh I think that's a that's an artifact of this kind of past Century and a half um and I'm not really sure that the next inch and a half is going to look like that”

0.64

Banks may become more conservative with dividends and share buybacks going forward in order to preserve capital to withstand liquidity shocks and unrealized losses. This is a profitability sink that could persist for a period of time.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I think partially it's going to come down to being more conservative uh with lending as well as things like dividends and share BuyBacks because you want to have plenty of capital on hand to to withstand any sort of liquidity shocks or you know unrealized losses relative to your Capital”

0.63

The large mega-cap U.S. stock market is probably not well positioned for a 5-10 year period when priced in inflation-adjusted terms or in real terms relative to commodities or gold. There's a likely 'lost decade' for inflation-adjusted S&P 500 returns, though select value sectors and emerging markets could perform better.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I think that we're basically probably looking at a lost decade uh in inflation-adjusted S P 500 for example now I do think that there's there's value sectors that could do well there's certain Emerging Market sectors that could do well um but I think that the large Mega cap you know American Stock Market is is probably not very well positioned for a five to ten year period especially when you price it either in CPI or gold”

0.63

Banking breakage has already occurred: cracks appeared in autumn 2022 in the treasury market (illiquidity), the UK gilt market did break requiring intervention, and now the U.S. banking system is breaking. The Fed has reached a practical ceiling where further tightening would result in more bank problems and higher recession probability, even though rates could technically go higher.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“we saw cracks last year with um you know in the Autumn of last year the treasury market was getting quite illiquid and then of course the UK you know the guilt Market did break they had they had to do some intervention um you know from there we saw basically a weaker dollar uh you know there was kind of a also the tragedy general account was was offsetting some of the FED uh quantitative tightening so a lot of measures of domestic liquidity started trending sideways um and and that kind of represented sort of a Line in the Sand and in in recent months as you've kind of gotten back down closer to that sand we did see this start to break”

0.63

A potential scenario is that the banking stress represents the ceiling for Fed tightening, after which liquidity flows back into the market, allowing a brief window where asset prices and economic indicators rebound (similar to post-2019 repo crisis). However, this depends on bank behavior—if banks tighten lending sharply, they could override the liquidity bounce.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“if this ends up being the ceiling for overall fed tightening uh roughly speaking um you know a and a liquidity floods back into the market um that can actually be attractive uh for the economy so for example look back at the repo Spike of 2019 uh in that few months that it you know happened after that in addition to getting rebounding and asset prices you actually had a minor Rebound in economic indicators”

0.61

Modern Monetary Theory's claim that a government printing its own currency cannot nominally default and can always pay its bills is technically accurate, but the real-world MMT policy proposals fail because they rely on political mechanisms (cutting fiscal deficits when inflation is high) that don't work in gridlocked democracies. Furthermore, cutting rates to zero when inflation is high encourages massive borrowing as actors rationally flee the currency.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lynn Alden

“the part that I think is is somewhat correct out of out of monitor modern monetary theories currently is that they point out that raising rates can actually exacerbate inflation and that's because you have a very fiscal driven inflation so that's the part we already agree with them on but if you look at their proposals they say okay we'll cut rates to zero it's like well I mean if inflation's running that hot and there's that much fiscal stimuli formulas and you cut rates to zero then it encourages massive borrowing you know people should should buy money and and buy almost anything else right”

0.60

When a 10-year treasury note yielding 1.5 percent is suddenly worth far less because new treasuries yield 4 percent, the older security must be discounted in price to have the same yield to maturity, meaning a bank holding the 1.5 percent note is sitting on a marked-to-market loss even though if it holds to maturity it will receive the full face value.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lynn Alden

“if you buy a 10-year treasury note that yields 1.5 percent and then higher inflation and higher interest rates come and now that now that's yielding four percent uh basically if you were to sell that onto the market you know no one's gonna buy it for 1.5 yield when they can buy current treasuries with a you know four percent yield”

0.56

The disinflation of late 2022 and early 2023 was temporary, not structural. It was driven by base effects (high comparisons from mid-2022 oil prices), energy price declines, and recession pressures, but the underlying sources of inflation (large structural deficits and real-world supply constraints) remain. Therefore, inflation will return as growth resumes unless those structural problems are solved.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I don't think it's false I just think it's temporary um you know if you look back in the 40s and the 70s uh inflation Came In Waves um there are periods of of fighting back either either price and wage controls or Central Bank trying to tighten things up”

0.56

The economy overall is decelerating but has been 'hanging in there' because there is so much money in the system from prior fiscal stimulus. This has created a recession-like dynamic without actually being in recession, but the banking stress catalyzed by recent tightening could push it into recession.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“the way I would describe the economy over the past year is it is decelerating but it's been hanging in there and it's large part because there's so much money in the system um and so it it was looking more recession-like without actually being a recession”

0.54

The general direction is toward recession, but it is likely to be mild, similar to the post-dot-com bubble recession of 2001, which was one of the mildest recessions on record. However, this depends on human policy decisions—the system is actively managed, and different choices will produce different outcomes.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I think we're regret you know the general direction is towards recession um I I doubt it'll be as severe as you know some people are concerned with I think it might be kind of like thepost.com uh bubble overseas session which was actually in many ways the mildest recession um you know of many recessions before or after it but again at large it depends on human decisions this is an actively managed system”

0.54

Sector allocation recommendations: avoid commercial real estate entirely, be highly selective in unprofitable tech. But healthcare, energy, and energy pipelines are resilient and interesting sectors that should perform relatively well even in a recession scenario.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I think that there are a number of sectors that are resilient uh things like healthcare energy pipelines um you know I think that there are a number of spaces that are interesting uh whereas I think commercial real estate I wouldn't really touch that on profitable Tech I'd be highly selective with what I'm interested in Touching there but I think other parts of the economy are fairly resilient”

0.51

In terms of the yield curve shape, Alden is highly uncertain about the next six months because it depends on what the market believes about long-term inflation. If the market recognizes that long-term inflation is a problem, it could drive long-end yields sharply higher (like the UK), requiring central bank intervention. Alternatively, the market could remain focused on recession risk and keep long rates subdued.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lynn Alden

“I'm honestly highly uncertain of the shape of the yield curve because there's so many human decisions that go into that I think I think if if more people like if you look at break evens the market does not expect long-term inflation right so if the market determines for one reason or another that long-term inflation is going to be a problem and then it very much might try to drive those long end yields higher”