
Justin Fox on the Rationality of Markets 07/13/2009
What this covers
Justin Fox, author of The Myth of the Rational Market, and host Russ Roberts trace the history of how mathematics and economics came to dominate finance, with particular focus on the efficient market hypothesis—the claim that markets price assets rationally. Their conversation spans the foundation of modern portfolio theory, the growth of index investing, and the 2008 financial crisis, examining where markets work as a powerful organizing tool and where they catastrophically fail. Fox's core argument is that efficiency breaks down most dangerously in rare, high-impact events, and that the very mathematical theories and investment strategies built on the assumption of rationality can undermine the conditions that made them true.
The discussion moves through distinct failure modes. A foundational flaw—the assumption that individual actors cannot move prices—destroyed Long-Term Capital Management and portfolio insurance. Beta, the volatility measure that predicted mutual fund performance brilliantly in the 1960s, began failing empirical tests in the 1990s partly because widespread adoption of index funds, inspired by efficient-market theory itself, distorted the risk relationships it was meant to describe. The 2008 crisis revealed how leverage and simultaneous exit strategies turned understood risks into cascading insolvency across Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG. The speakers also examine a crucial distinction: that markets may efficiently price individual stocks relative to each other—making index funds sensible for most investors—while the overall market level may remain disconnected from fundamentals during crises, a claim Fox notes was never empirically demonstrated. Broader policy questions emerge: whether government bailouts create moral hazard, and whether decentralized market-based solutions, despite their flaws, remain preferable to centralized regulatory control.
Fox argues that the efficient market hypothesis works well as a powerful organizing assumption most of the time—especially for individual investors—but breaks down precisely during rare, high-impact crises, and that the very success of finance theories like beta and index investing can undermine the conditions that made them true.
- The claim that the overall market level (not just relative prices) is rational was never empirically demonstrated and fails during crises
- Feedback loops from widely adopted strategies (portfolio insurance, leverage, arbitrage) destabilize markets when everyone does the same thing
- Behavioral finance and reflexivity show markets are productively-but-imperfectly rational, with implications for regulation
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A foundational flaw in financial economics from Markowitz's 1950s portfolio theory onward is the price-taker assumption—that prices are set by the market and your own actions don't move them—which failed catastrophically for portfolio insurance in 1987 and for LTCM, because their forced unwinding moved prices against themselves.
“all the theories of financial economics starting with Harry Markowitz and his portfolio theory in the early 50s we're all based on the idea that you're a price taker... and whatever you do won't drive the price and that seems to be that that was a flaw with portfolio insurance in 87 and it was a flog and it long-term capital”
Beta (the volatility of a stock relative to the overall market) predicted 1960s mutual fund results brilliantly—star managers like Gerald Tsai outperformed simply by loading up on high-beta stocks that fell harder when markets declined—but beta began failing empirical tests in the early 1990s, partly because the very success of finance professors preaching beta and efficient markets drove investors into S&P 500 index funds, skewing the returns of constituent stocks upward and distorting risk/reward relationships across the market.
“beta performed brilliantly in the 1960s in nine early 90s these new tests of beta were made and... it started failing them... part of it was just the success of all these finance professors preaching beta and efficient markets that had caused people to start buying SP 500 index funds... it skewed the returns of S&P 500 stock constituent stocks upward”
LTCM's collapse followed the same pattern as Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and AIG: a strategy thought to be well-understood and known to be capable of going down was unraveled by everyone making the same bet trying to exit simultaneously, driving prices down, which reverberated through capital requirements and lenders' willingness to lend, so that high leverage turned losses into outright insolvency.
“that's the reason I found that story so um relevant is it's really the Bear Stearns story right... it's the Lehman Brothers... the Merrill Lynch it's the AIG story... if it went down and everybody who had made that bet tried to unravel it at the same time the price consequence would be extremely unpleasant”
Sophisticated players failed to act on the simultaneity risk partly because they were paid well not to: JPMorgan Chase avoided the mortgage-derivatives vortex because Jamie Dimon's risk managers repeatedly concluded the risk-reward didn't work, but most banks couldn't resist the pressure of watching everyone else profit, and only Dimon's secure 'golden child' position let him underperform peers for years without being forced in.
“partly because they're getting paid well not to... JPMorgan Chase... they're people very early on said we don't actually know how... the risk-reward relationship work on mortgages and so we're staying out of it... Dimon was just rare among bank CEOs they got that and accepted it”
The George Mason / public-choice view (per Arnold Kling) is that Chicago says 'markets work, use the market,' MIT says 'markets fail, use government,' and George Mason says 'markets fail, use markets'—because politicians and bureaucrats suffer the same behavioral flaws as market actors, so decentralized power is preferable to centralized power.
“at the University of Chicago people say markets work well so you should use the market at MIT... they say markets fail use government and at George Mason we say markets fail use markets... politicians and bureaucrats suffer from the same behavioral challenges that we do and I rather have power decentralized”
The strongest argument for index funds is not that markets are efficient but that investors as a group earn the market return minus costs, so minimizing costs and holding a diversified portfolio is what gives index funds their edge—any attempt to do better usually wipes out the advantage through fees.
“their performance will equal the market minus costs and so you're basically starting the more you're paying for whatever mode of investing... no matter what you're doing with index funds you're keeping those costs as low as possible”
The intellectual underpinning of efficient markets traces back to Hayek's 1945 'Use of Knowledge in Society,' where prices are signals that incorporate dispersed knowledge—meaning the market has more knowledge than any individual, so you cannot outguess it.
“a lot of it goes back to Friedrich Hayek's 1945 article the use of knowledge in society which right we talk about a lot on this program the argument there is that prices are signals”
The financial system is fundamentally an important underpinning of prosperity—a middleman between savers who want to consume less now and borrowers who want to consume more—so smaller, less transparent capital markets would likely lower living standards; financial innovation that lowers the cost of capital is genuinely valuable, and there is a risk of overcorrecting against it.
“the financial system is really it's a Biddle man between people who have more than... they want to consume right now and those who would like to consume more than they have... it's an important underpinning of our prosperity and if we have smaller capital markets that are less transparent... I suspect we won't live as well”
Financial strategies exhibit reflexivity: a strategy works only as long as not everyone uses it, because the profit depends on others doing the arbitrage—if every investor adopted index funds, the underlying logic that makes them work would collapse since no one would be pricing securities.
“if no one is buying index funds and everyone's buying individual stocks... you're gonna do very well buying index funds but if every single investor finds it... attractive... the whole underlying logic of it doesn't work anymore”
You cannot combine a belief in efficient markets with a belief that it's the government's or central bank's job to stop financial crises without perpetually creating more crises—being hands-off while markets rise but hands-on when they fall is an asymmetric, flawed policy that incentivizes future bubbles.
“you can't combine that belief with a belief that it's the job of a central bank or the government to stop financial crises without creating the situation where you just keep creating more financial crises... if the idea is you're supposed to be hands-off while markets are going up and then very hands-on when they're going down that seems kind of asymmetrical and and flawed”
Thaler tells his students that everything Fama says about advice for individual investors is completely right, but that the more interesting question is how reliable financial markets are for broader questions of regulation, corporate governance, and how we organize society.
“everything fama says about advice for individual investors is completely right... but there's this more interesting intellectual question of how rational is the market... on broader questions of regulation how we organize our society how we govern our corporations”
The Value Line survey illustrates the limits of arbitrage: its fundamentals-based recommendations beat the market from the second they were published, but by the time subscribers received them in the mail the price had already moved, so outsiders couldn't profit—yet Value Line itself could have, demonstrating that information doesn't move infinitely fast and arbitrage opportunities exist for those positioned to act first.
“if you looked at those recommendations from the second they came out... it was a market beating strategy the problem was no one could act on them... markets would have started to move”
Long-Term Capital Management profited from arbitraging tiny pricing discrepancies (e.g., between newly auctioned and older Treasuries), but as competitors crowded into the same trades during the 1990s, shrinking margins forced them to lever up ever more to maintain returns—greatly increasing risk.
“they would find tiny discrepancies in pricing between like the new Treasury bills... and buy one and sell the other shorts and make money off it... as more and more people got into the same trades... the only way they could keep delivering the kind of returns... was to just keep levering up”
Convincing ourselves we had achieved a 'Great Moderation' in the economy turned out to be dangerous—a lesson about the hazards of believing volatility has been permanently tamed.
“by convincing ourselves that we had achieved this Great Moderation in the economy that turned out to be a very dangerous”
Market efficiency was classified at the University of Chicago into three forms: weak form (past price movements don't predict future movements), semi-strong (publicly available information can't help you outperform), and strong form (even private information is already reflected in prices).
“they talked about weak form efficiency semi strong efficiency and strong efficiency and and those were all about the kind of information you you were using to try to beat the market”
Portfolio insurance—a 1980s strategy of selling stocks quickly as the market falls—contained a built-in self-destruction mechanism: its inventor Hayne Leland knew that if everyone used it, mass simultaneous selling would itself drive markets down further and cause a disaster; it took about seven years to become large enough to do exactly that in the 1987 crash.
“if everybody were doing this it wouldn't work it would be a disaster because suddenly all these people selling quickly because the market was falling would... caused the market to fall even more... oh took seven years and that was the 1987 crash”
Fama argued that abandoning the efficient market assumption would make academic finance fall apart—you couldn't coherently talk about the cost of capital—and Thaler agreed that removing the rational/efficient starting point makes the elegance of finance disappear into 'a big mess.'
“he basically said you know if soon as you move away from the efficient market all that we've built in academic finance falls apart you can't talk about the cost of capital”
Two distinct ideas get confused in financial markets: the individual-investor lesson (knowledge is probably already in the price, so index funds beat stock-picking) versus the stronger claim that the overall aggregate market level reflects fundamentals.
“two ideas get confused and I want you to clarify because you just talked about them one is as an individual investor what should I think about... and the other... the overall price of the market”
The claim that the overall aggregate market level (not just relative prices) accurately reflects fundamentals was never demonstrated with the kind of empirical evidence that supported the claim that information is quickly reflected in individual prices.
“it had never really been demonstrated with anything like the sort of empirical evidence that... the information was quickly reflected in prices there was all sorts of empirical studies done that showed that... it never was any successful investigation that I know of that showed that the the overall level was was always right”
Tractability often drove finance theory: because economists are good at the normal distribution and find anything else 'messy,' models were chosen for their analytical convenience rather than realism, and it would be better to be agnostic and admit 'I don't know' than to claim false precision.
“how often tractability became the centerpiece because... the normal distribution is what we're really good at and anything other than that is quote messy”
Eugene Fama is intellectually admirable because, after authoring the efficient market hypothesis and devising its tests, he spent 15-20 years revisiting and demonstrating its failures (concluding in the late 80s/early 90s that it failed the test), which is rare in science—yet he still publicly defended the efficient-market worldview and criticized psychological explanations.
“he authored this hypothesis and said this is how you test it... and then he revisited it in the late 80s and early 90s and actually said no it failed the test... how many cases in science if somebody who's famous for one thing who then spends 15 or 20 years basically showing what was wrong with it”
The efficient market assumption works very well most of the time as a powerful organizing principle and may even be true, but rare events (crashes of 1987, the 2008-09 crisis) occur where it fails, and although rare, their impact is disproportionately large and unpleasant—so finance's tools are good at everyday activity but poor at the extremes.
“every once in a while it's not true and it's those rare events... although they're rare their impact is not is that small although they don't happen very often when they do happen it's pretty pretty unpleasant”
After the bailouts of 1987 and 1998, market participants could reasonably conclude that the Fed would prevent any disaster, creating a moral-hazard dynamic ('if everybody's dancing may as well join the party, and they can't arrest all of us for drunkenness') in which the expectation of rescue encouraged risk-taking.
“after 87 and in 98 you could reasonably come to the conclusion that oh you know it might cause some trouble but the Fed will figure out a way to keep it from being a disaster... if everybody's dancing may as well join the party and if all of us get can't arrest all of us for drunkenness”
Saying 'on average prices are right' is meaningless without specifying the averaging period: fluctuating around the correct price over a one-month period is vastly different from over a 30-year period—just as a two-foot-tall child can drown in water whose average depth is under two feet, the average isn't what matters.
“a small child who's two feet high can can swim safely as long as the average depth of the waters is less than two feet and the correct that's how you drown”
Warren Buffett's structural advantage is that he designed Berkshire Hathaway to avoid the agency problems that doom professional money managers: mutual fund managers are paid for gathering assets not performance, face redemptions at any time, and find size makes beating the market harder, whereas Buffett controls his portfolio size and invests permanent cash flow from operating businesses rather than redeemable investor capital.
“the managers are paid for gathering assets not for performance... people can pull their money in or pull money out... what Buffett has instead is this situation where it's all up to him what size his portfolio is and pretty much all is cash that he uses to invest... comes... from a cash flow of enterprises”
There must be a real link between investing skill and reward, because if there were none, markets could not be even close to efficient—someone must be succeeding for a reason, or else the whole enterprise would be purely random.
“if there were no link between skill and reward and investing then there's no way markets could be even close to efficient or rational so there have to be some people out there succeeding for a reason”
If left alone, the market would not 'solve' the broken securitization market for credit cards or mortgages—because it arguably shouldn't be solved: investors would rightly conclude these complex instruments are dangerous and poorly understood and stay away for a while, a healthy self-correction that interventionist policy is currently preventing.
“the market if left alone wouldn't solve that problem because it probably shouldn't get solved the market would say individuals in the market it would lead people to say this is a dangerous complex thing we didn't fully understand it before I'm going to stay away from it”
The single most reliable predictor of future mutual fund performance is cost—the lower the cost, the better the performance.
“the single would be one reliable predictor of future mutual fund performance is cost the lower the cost the better the performance”
The market-rationality debate is best seen as a half-full/half-empty question: people aren't fully rational and some aren't rational at all, yet assuming markets are rational is a very productive way to view the world—provided one acknowledges individuals make mistakes and things sometimes go wrong.
“it's really for me a half-full half-empty kind of debate... people aren't fully rational and some aren't rational at all and to assume they are... can be a very productive way to look at the world... but things can go wrong”
Even in the 19th century, with vastly less government involvement and no central bank for most of the century, the economy still produced bubbles and depressions comparable in severity (though not length) to the Great Depression; government responses developed because people found the prior outcomes unacceptable, and the 20th century saw fewer such nasty depressions.
“even back in a day in the in the 19th century when there were... vastly less government involvement in the economy and for most of the century there was no central bank we still had these bubbles and... really harsh... we developed these government responses in part because people beamed the way it worked before to be unacceptable”
Miller and Modigliani's papers (1958 and early 1960s) treated market price rationality as a useful simplifying assumption for corporate finance models—not a claim that prices are always rational—but the discipline of finance then drifted into treating this convenient assumption as reality, ignoring important aspects of how markets actually behave.
“they're talking about how yeah we know bubbles happen and crashes have happened but for the purposes of what we're doing here... it's fine to just assume that market prices are rational they weren't saying that they believed they were all the time”
Mathematical formalization in economics (per Samuelson) produces diminishing returns: up to a point it clarified the discipline and let economists with different politics find common ground, but pushed too far it becomes problematic—as shown by the crisis, where policymakers reverted to 50-year-old simple Keynesian models while top academics' micro-founded work contributed little to explaining or addressing the crisis.
“up to a point yes that was helpful it clarified the discipline... but obviously mning in that direction... I think it gets problematic”
Audiences and incentives reward false certainty: people want answers from economists, so those who give confident answers gain more influence, publications, and airtime than those who honestly say 'I don't know.'
“people want answers from economists and those who actually give answers ended up having more influence than the ones who said I don't know”
Value investing—buying stocks with low price-to-book or price-to-earnings ratios—has, in quantitative studies (especially 1990s), outperformed a market index even in a much less sophisticated form than Buffett's, indicating a real exception to strict efficiency.
“a lot of quantitative studies again especially in the 1990s have shown that even... simply buying stocks with low priced book value or price earnings ratios would outperform a market index”
Economics oscillates: a crisis makes the whole discipline focus on extreme outcomes rather than averages, then during calm periods everyone refocuses on the average—a cycle visible across the past 60 years of academic economics.
“they'll be a crisis and so everyone's focused on not on the average but on the extreme outcomes... and then things are calm for a while and everybody starts focusing on the average again”
A dogmatic assumption like perfect market rationality is a powerful way to organize thinking because it forces you to search for fundamental explanations (as analysts did when trying to explain the 1987 30% drop) and can uncover things you wouldn't otherwise notice—even though distinguishing a true fundamental cause from a post-hoc rationalization is very hard.
“it's a very powerful way to organize your thinking about things is to to have a dogmatic approach like that because it helps you uncover things you might not know about”
Some enthusiasm for behavioral finance theories is product differentiation—a way to gain attention and influence—since saying 'I don't know' or doing orthodox work attracts less airtime, publication, and TV exposure.
“I wonder whether people's passion for these behavioral theories which are intellectually interesting some of it is is product differentiation obviously”
Finance may be at a dead end where the risk-measurement and risk-management paradigm is in turmoil and cannot be taught the same way—possibly because rational-market questions are not a soluble problem, meaning the field may have figured out what it can figure out, which is hard for intellectual-market players to admit.
“I feel like parts of financier in this sort of dead end and I just don't know where finance is going”
Markets exist and are huge, transparent, and liquid.
“the United States stock market which is this huge pretty transparent liquid market”