What this covers

This is a conversation from April 2020 between Josh Brown and Rob Arnott of Research Affiliates, built around a recent Arnott presentation. It begins with the scale of the economic shock. Arnott describes a monthly payroll decline of roughly 20 million that would look like a typo on a post-war chart. He sets that beside an S&P 500 that was down about 19.6% for the year. He then turns to valuation, arguing that even after the crash U.S. large caps are not cheap. Their Shiller P/E ratio (Cape ratio)) of 24x is still in the top decile of history. Brown counters that if "normal" is the median of the last 25 years, 24x needs no further decline and 5-6% forward returns are adequate for index buyers.

The range is wide. Arnott covers oil's 57% fall, driven by demand collapse and a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, including the brief negative price for Wyoming crude under storage constraints. He recalls how earnings fell 90-100% in 2007-2009 while prices fell only 57%. He contrasts U.S. equities with emerging markets, which he calls near their cheapest ever, and he expects their economies to recover faster than America's.

The most contested material is about policy. Arnott calls the order of the U.S. response a Policy Sequencing Error. In his account, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan contained the virus first, while the U.S. began stimulus) before testing was sorted out. He estimates roughly 200,000 excess deaths from the shutdown itself and warns of inflationary pressure as money expands while supply is constrained. His main worry is the loss of 5-10 million small businesses.

The last stretch concerns value investing. Arnott argues that value's underperformance since 2007 reflects growing cheapness and not failure. He says a value trap can last at the sector level but hardly ever at the country level. He advises nibbling as a way of buying into fear, and Brown replies that oil investors have nibbled for 20 years with only losses.

Sharpest takeaway

Arnott argues that while labor market shock from COVID-19 is unprecedented in severity, equity market reaction has been surprisingly mild, suggesting either the market correctly prices a swift recovery or dangerously underestimates the risk of prolonged economic damage to small businesses; simultaneously, value stocks have become extraordinarily cheap relative to growth but remain shunned due to structural economic headwinds and narrative momentum.

  • Monthly payroll losses reached ~20 million (5-10x historical chart scale) while S&P 500 down only 19.6% YTD, showing asymmetric pricing of economic shock
  • Value stocks priced at 8:1 ratio to growth (nearly tech bubble peak) despite being cheaper relative to earnings, indicating valuation compression driven by narrative and sentiment rather than fundamentals
  • Risk of 5+ million small business failures over coming months could structurally impair economic restart even if large-cap S&P 500 survives largely intact

The claims · ranked28 claims · weighted by value

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0.74

Market takes a 'take-no-prisoners' approach in crashes where all risky assets are sold indiscriminately; the investment opportunity emerges in the aftermath by identifying which assets remain expensive vs which have become astonishingly cheap, with U.S. growth stocks showing as expensive post-crash and value stocks showing as cheap.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“when you have a take-no-prisoners market crash everything crashing doesn't matter what it is if it's not a Treasury bond get rid of it in that kind of market what you look for in the aftermath is which assets were not yet cheap even after a crash and which assets have astonishing cheap my cheapness after a market crash and we're seeing lots of examples US growth stocks not remotely cheap after the crash okay”

0.74

Monthly payroll decline of approximately 20 million (combining 10 million in weekly claims data through March 12 plus two additional weeks) will be 5 to 10 times larger than the entire scale of historical monthly payroll change charts going back to post-World War II, making it visually appear as a typo when plotted.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“the monthly drop in payroll was almost without precedent you had a handful of months during the financial crisis you had one month that was a big outlier almost 2 million job losses the month that World War two ended and the US government laid off two million defense related workers now take a look at the scale on the chart on the left goes to minus 2 million yep the next monthly change in payroll is going to be minus the 10 million that we've already seen in the those two weekly claims plus two additional weeks so you're going to be looking at a minus 15 or minus 20 million on a chart that currently has a scale that goes to minus 2 million”

0.69

The ups and downs of value performance (blue line) track almost perfectly with changes in value's relative cheapness (red line), showing that when value underperforms it's because it's getting cheaper, and when value outperforms it's because it's becoming more richly valued

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“the the ups and downs in the blue line track almost perfectly with the ups and downs in the red line when value is underperforming it's always because it's getting cheaper when values getting more richly priced it's always in a context of value winning handily”

0.68

Institutional investors systematically avoid cheap markets (bargains) due to a narrative that things will get worse before they get better; the solution is not to buy heavily at bottom, but to 'nibble' by averaging in gradually, which assures peak exposure comes when turning point occurs—buying when there is peak fear, not peak hope.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“when something is cheap there is always a narrative out there a predominant narrative that things are going to get worse before they get better so best not buy this so it makes it really hard to buy bargains my reaction to that is to say buying a bargain is really hard but nibbling at it averaging in buying a little bit buying a little more if it gets cheaper is something you can do and it's the only way to assure that you have peak exposure at a turn time to buy is when the good news is coming in the future and is not yet seen meaning you buy when there's peak fear”

0.68

WTI crude oil has declined 57% year-to-date through early April 2020, with the majority of that decline (two-thirds) occurring within four weeks, driven by combination of COVID demand destruction plus Saudi Arabia and Russia entering a price war to compete for market share in petroleum industry.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“Bloomberg WTI crude oil index this is on this is truly unprecedented falling by two-thirds year today with the lion's share of that drop in four weeks now this is a combination of coded plus Russia and Saudi Arabia going to war with one another over who controls market share in the oil industry”

0.66

The Fama-French value factor (long 30% cheapest stocks by price-to-book, short 30% most expensive) generated 5x wealth creation per dollar invested over 50 years; however, since 2007 (13-year period), value has underperformed growth by 50%, meaning a growth investor would have been 10x wealthier than a value investor had they simply stopped using value at end of 2007.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“what you see is that for every dollar you invested in value you wound up after 50 years with five times as much wealth as the personal investment growth so value has worked only thing is you would have been ten times as wealthy instead of five times had you just stopped using value at the end of 2007 so the takeaway here is we've had a 13 year drawdown in which value is underperformed growth by 50%”

0.65

The U.S. policy response prioritized monetary stimulus over virus containment, a sequencing error: other East Asian democracies (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan) contained COVID-19 within three weeks using mandatory masking, temperature checks, contact tracing, and isolation—demonstrating that virus control was achievable without stimulus if pursued first, whereas U.S. began stimulus before testing was even figured out.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“throwing money at a virus problem isn't nearly as effective as the East Asian economies including all the democracies Singapore Taiwan South Korea Japan they will have this under control and what they did is something very simple if you're outside you have to wear a mask if you don't you're gonna get arrested if you're one walking into an office tower somebody military or police is there taking temperatures remotely call you over if you've got a fever test you and if you test until the test result is back you're you're sequestered at home if you test positive they're gonna ask who you've seen they'll go test them Canio try tracing yeah mandatory and home quarantine for anyone who has it and within about three weeks they knew 99% of the people in the country who had it”

0.65

Identifying catalysts for market rotations is inherently difficult because by definition a catalyst surprises the market; Arnott was bearish for a while predicting a market breakdown before COVID but couldn't specify what shock would cause it—COVID itself was the 'ultimate Black Swan' that emerged from unpredictable sources rather than from expected recession narratives.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“a catalyst by definition is something that takes most of the market place by surprise I've been bearish for awhile thinking the market was very fully priced and often would get the question what's the catalyst that's going to cause the market to break down you wouldn't have guessed people eating bats exactly but I would always say look whatever it is it's going to be a surprise to most of the market and sure enough it was the ultimate Black Swan kovat”

0.64

During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, earnings fell by 90-100% at the peak, a complete wipeout, yet stock prices only fell 57%, meaning stocks did not follow earnings downward as fully as accounting would suggest

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“in the O 709 recession earnings actually fell 90% or 100% it was a complete wipeout at one point during that crisis I wouldn't be shocked if if we saw a big drop but a complete wipeout really only resulted in a 57 percent drop for the S&P so in other words stock prices didn't do what earnings did”

0.63

Value stocks' 'death' narrative is reversed when examined carefully: current underperformance is not evidence that value no longer works, but evidence that value is now extraordinarily cheap and likely to revert, with the only risk being if emerging markets or Europe truly remain permanently impaired (very rare at country level but possible).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“I do look at this chart and I say value isn't showing any signs of being dead it just shows tremendous signs of being an extraordinary bargain now”

0.63

Many investors saw financial crisis coming in advance by observing real estate and subprime deterioration, but majority did not see it coming, creating a situation where specific early-warning signals existed but were not widely recognized until crisis was obvious

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“dozens of personal friends saw what was happening in real estate and so forth and we're saying this is gonna end badly but hundreds of people I knew didn't see that I was kind of in the middle”

0.62

Stimulus magnitude (initially $2 trillion, with negotiations for another $1-2 trillion, potentially $5 trillion total over two quarters) creates inflationary pressure by expanding money supply precisely when supply of goods and services is being sharply constrained by lockdowns, directly counteracting the deflationary forces of pandemic-driven demand collapse.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“you've got a two trillion dollar stimulus you've got negotiations for another trillion behind that maybe two by the time this is all over it wouldn't shock me if we spend five trillion on stimulus and in two quarters how do we do that without creating some inflation you're creating five million in new spendable money at least hopefully spendable because that's the whole intent of the stimulus and you have supply and goods and services ramp down sharply because of the lockdown so if you have diminished goods and services available and more money looking to buy it then that creates inflation”

0.60

S&P 500 year-to-date return as of early April 2020 is -19.6%, representing a nasty market shock that occurred rapidly from all-time highs but is not unprecedented in terms of volatility or magnitude of decline when viewed against historical market corrections.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Josh Brown

“so we are gonna post these up on the YouTube channel as we go through them and I'll just kind of guide you through what I'm looking at let's talk about this monthly change in payrolls graph this is stunning not just for the depth that that we're seeing in the monthly change in payroll but how quickly the 700,000 job losses was as of as of March 12 those last two weekly unemployment claims were after March 12 so take a look at this chart the the monthly drop in payroll was almost without precedent you had a handful of months during the financial crisis you had one month that was a big outlier almost 2 million job losses the month that World War two ended and the US government laid off two million defense related workers now take a look at the scale on the chart on the left goes to minus 2 million yep the next monthly change in payroll is going to be minus the 10 million that we've already seen in the those two weekly claims plus two additional weeks so you're going to be looking at a minus 15 or minus 20 million on a chart that currently has a scale that goes to minus 2 million so imagine a spike that goes down 5 to 10 times as large as the entire scale on the left of that chart so this is going to look like a typo when when that next data point hits okay so we're looking at the unemployment rate overall 700,000 new new unemployed led to the spike you see on the far right and the severity of that spike on a one-month basis is almost without precedent on a graph that goes all the way back to just after World War Two it's a big step up in a single month now imagine the next monthly addition to that which will take it to somewhere in the neighborhood of 13 to 17 percent in a single month this line will go blow through the top of the chart several percentage points above the top of the chart in a single month what we're seeing is from the labor force side and from the economic side utterly without precedent which is an interesting contrast to the next three slides okay so we're talking about year-to-date total returns for the S&P 500 and you pegged this I guess as of the first week of April - 19.6% so far 2020”

0.60

Oil and commodities faced the most extreme shock during COVID crash: VIX +345%, oil -57%, with Wyoming crude briefly turning negative due to storage constraints, while bonds faced unprecedented (but not quite) volatility, stocks fell 22%—illustrating that commodity markets experienced supply-demand catastrophe more extreme than equity markets.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“the one market that really does show something truly without precedent is the oil graph which is the next graph yeah so this is you returns for the Bloomberg WTI crude oil index this is on this is truly unprecedented falling by two-thirds year today”

0.57

Breakthrough oil discovery and storage constraints: Wyoming crude (low-quality asphalt feedstock) briefly traded at negative prices in spring 2020 because physical supply exceeded pipeline and storage capacity—sellers had to pay buyers to take inventory off their hands to clear space for incoming new supply, a concrete example of how commodities can trade not just at zero but at negative prices under physical constraint.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“Wyoming crude which is used for asphalt it's not very high-quality has a price that briefly last week went negative the sellers had to pay people to take it off their hands because they had too much coming down the pipeline and had to clear space for the new supply to come through and had to pay people to take away the old oil so for anyone that says a commodity can't go can't go to zero actually you can get worse they can get worse”

0.57

Arnott's estimate: COVID-19 policy response (prioritizing stimulus over virus containment) will result in excess mortality from shutdown effects (suicide, depression, drug abuse, delayed healthcare for heart disease/cancer/lung disease) of approximately 200,000 deaths, potentially double the 50,000-250,000 projected COVID deaths, representing an avoidable toll from policy sequencing error.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“we could have saved lives by focusing on the virus earlier we could also lose more lives in the shutdown that are lost to kovat suicide depression and drug abuse people with heart disease lung conditions cancer who can't get their meds because of pharmaceutical supply chain breakdowns because they can't find the bed in the hospital etc so if we lose a hundred thousand to kovat it wouldn't shock me in the least if we lose two hundred thousand two other other reasons and that was avoidable”

0.56

Emerging markets and AOIFE (primarily Europe and Japan) equities are priced as 'cheap' relative to U.S. large-cap: AOIFE at 14x Shiller P/E (low by historic standards), emerging markets at 12x (near cheapest ever), and emerging market value at ~7x, creating stark valuation disparity that cannot be explained by fundamental differences alone—stimulus and policy expectations appear to be the primary driver.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“now Aoife is priced as base think of it as Europe and Japan because that's 95% of Aoife Europe and Japan is at a shore P ratio 14 times that's very low by its historic standards where we're still very high that's interesting emerging markets is very near the cheapest it's ever been 12 times and that doesn't even get to what's going on in emerging markets value where you're priced at about seven times”

0.56

Value traps can persist indefinitely at individual company and sector levels (e.g., oil investors nibbling for 20 years with nothing but losses), but cannot realistically occur at the country or aggregate world market level, because only total expropriation (as happened in USSR pre-WWII, Egypt under Nasser, China in 1949) can prevent eventual recovery—making country-level value inherently safer than sector-level value.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“the classic definition of value trap is something that looks cheap on its way to zero but that cannot happen to almost any country except if you get a total communist takeover an expropriation of all financial assets in the nation”

0.52

Arnott's key worry is not whether markets will eventually recover, but whether the prolonged shutdown will prevent enough businesses from surviving to serve as the foundation for economic restart, particularly the 30 million small businesses which lose 2-3 million annually in normal times but could lose 5-10 million in this scenario.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“my cautionary note here is this market reaction is consonant with the crisis passing quickly enough that the economy still has businesses to restart the risk is what if it's a much more grinding long-term process what if enough of the economy is shut down that's switching it back on is not flicking a light switch so that's my big worry putting aside the fortune 500 there are 30 million small businesses and I feel like with every month that we may remain and shut down it's less likely that all 30 million of them will make it to the other side yeah in an average year 2 or 3 million of the 30 million go bus so that's losing losing 3 million a year's worth would be unsurprising losing 10 million would be daunting”

0.51

S&P 500 forward-looking yield as of March 31, 2020 is 2.3%, which Arnott does not consider high (in absolute terms or relative to Treasury bonds), and if historical earnings growth of 1.25% above inflation continues with inflation of 1.8%, expected S&P return would be approximately 5.3% nominal, which is not compelling by historical standards.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“for us large cap using the S&P 500 as a as a benchmark the yield is now 2.3 percent is that a high yield I don't think so well hi-hi absolutely or hi relatively right isn't that the isn't that the game on a relative game do I think stocks are priced to beat Treasury bonds over the next five to ten years oh my goodness guests do I think their price to offer hefty stock market returns the likes of which people have gotten used to in the last decade heavens no historically real growth in earnings and dividends has been about one and a quarter percent above inflation that gets you to a three and a half percent real return over and above inflation inflation our expectation over the next ten years is 1.8 the market is expecting less than that and perhaps the market is right but if you get that you're looking at 5.3 percent return”

0.51

U.S. large-cap Shiller P/E ratio of 24x (post-crash) remains in the top 10% of historical experience; to reach even halfway to historical norms would require another 20% decline, but even this comparison understates valuation because the 10-year earnings window excludes the current recession and represents peak earnings without troughs, making the 24x actually cheaper in cyclical terms than it appears.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“the US stock market is a killer p/e ratio price relative to ten years smooth earnings of twenty four times the high was thirty two times just a couple months ago so you've gone from 32 to 24 after the crash is still in the top 10 percent of historical experience to get back halfway to historic norms just half way would be required another 20% drop”

0.49

Emerging markets forward economic outlook is more favorable than the U.S.: emerging economies will return to GDP growth within 2-3 years and reach new highs, whereas U.S. recovery will be slower due to structural shutdown damage, supply chain disruption, tourism collapse, and demand destruction—phenomena that are recurring crises for emerging economies but once-in-a-lifetime for the U.S.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“the emerging economies I think within two to three years we'll be back to new highs in GDP I'm less confident the US will get back on track that fast”

0.45

Josh Brown pushes back on Arnott's claim that value investors should buy cheap oil equities, noting that oil investors have been 'nibbling' for 20 years with nothing but losses, suggesting sector-level value traps do exist even for allegedly recovering industries

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Josh Brown

“can I push back a little bit on that I think you want to say that that's the case for let's say a country index but you definitely you definitely I don't I don't think you are you're not saying that for let's say an individual company or even a sector because the oil investor that's been nibbling at oil equities for the last 20 literally has nothing to show for it but losses”

0.43

If you define 'normal' Cape valuation as the median of the last 25 years (computer/internet era) rather than full history, the current 24x may not require further decline and would not be assumed to revert downward, implying stable valuations and 5-6% forward returns adequate for index buyers.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Josh Brown

“is it in that top decile though if we just start from 25 years ago if we start from the age if we start from the the microchip the computer the internet and instantaneous worldwide communication this is median over the last quarter century so thank me revert towards the quarter century medium then this doesn't cost to anything and you had up the other three and you get a five and a half percent return I'm not going to do cartwheels over a five and a half percent return”

0.42

Catalyst for value-to-growth rotation could emerge from earnings disruption to mega-cap growth companies (Facebook, Google) if advertising budgets are slashed during recession, reducing their core revenue drivers—a credible but non-obvious risk that could trigger value reassessment if it materializes.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“let's say what if Facebook and Google find the advertising budgets are being slashed and that's their that's their bread and butter that's how they make money so all of a sudden Google and Facebook see earnings crash could that happen of course it could is the market expecting it of course not”

0.39

As of early 2020 (before COVID crash), growth stocks were valued at 8:1 ratio to value stocks on a price-to-book basis, matching the peak valuation ratio of the 2000 tech bubble, despite growth stocks being less profitable now than at the tech bubble peak—making the current valuation premium even more extreme than the bubble on a profitability-adjusted basis.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rob Arnott

“before kovin struck we were at 8 to 1 very nearly as cheap as at the peak of the tech bubble after the kovat crisis hit and just devastated value stocks which are so reliant on supply chains were where the high fliers aren't value got crushed again to valuation relative valuation levels that are cheaper than at the peak of the tech bubble that's incredible”

0.20

Research Affiliates operates an 'asset allocation interactive' website estimating forward-looking returns across 130+ asset classes, updated through March 31, 2020, serving as the source for Arnott's specific valuation and return expectations cited throughout the presentation.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“we have an interactive website called asset allocation interactive which if you go to that website we have a hundred thirty different asset classes we estimate the forward-looking return my team worked massive overtime over the weekend to update it and as of Monday we have everything updated through March 31”

0.14

Josh Brown interviews Rob Arnott about market conditions and economic outlook, with emphasis on comparing valuations across US, international developed (EAFE), and emerging market equities

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 0/4· Josh Brown

“hi guys this is Josh Brown welcome to live from the compound I'm here with Rob Arnott who is the founding chairman of research affiliates”