
Condoleezza Rice: The Middle East, China, and the Case Against American Isolationism
What this covers
This is a single-speaker interview in which Condoleezza Rice, Hoover Institution director and former national security adviser and secretary of state under George W. Bush, is questioned about her Foreign Affairs essay. She draws on her time in office to read the present. She argues that today combines territorial competition (China in the South China Sea, Russia in Ukraine), the risk of accidental war as militaries press against each other, and a drift toward zero-sum economic thinking that erodes the postwar liberal order. Much of the conversation asks what an engaged strategy would require, including enough military, economic, and diplomatic assets to manage several crises at once.
The range is wide. On China, she describes integration as a calculated bet that economic opening might bring political opening, a bet Xi Jinping reversed. She frames policy in terms of George Kennan's containment: deny Beijing easy external expansion until it faces its own internal contradictions. She also expects technological decoupling to proceed and wants it managed deliberately. On Russia, she says Vladimir Putin has already lost the war he meant to fight, and she rejects the claim that NATO expansion drove the invasion, since he never raised it in her eight years alongside him. She wants Ukraine eventually in NATO, citing the Membership Action Plan fight at Bucharest in 2008, and offers South Korea as a model for a divided but secure country. She also suggests pushing the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis together so its internal frictions show.
The Middle East discussion is the most detailed. Rice recalls the 2006 war with Hezbollah, the diplomacy built on trust with Israel, and how Hezbollah later rearmed. She warns against a ground invasion of Lebanon but says such advice belongs in private channels, not newspapers. She also covers the 2006 Palestinian elections, Hamas's takeover of Gaza, and why she thinks rebuilding the Palestinian Authority must come before a two-state settlement. Closing sections look at populism as a response to real losses from globalization and at PEPFAR as an example of American leadership.
Condoleezza Rice argues that great powers cannot afford isolationism; the current period is more dangerous than the Cold War due to territorial competition, zero-sum economic thinking, and the rise of populism, requiring sustained U.S. engagement and strong alliances rather than withdrawal.
- The post-WWII liberal order of non-zero-sum economics and great-power restraint is eroding as China and Russia pursue territorial expansion and view international economy as zero-sum
- Populism, nativism, isolationism, and protectionism ride together and are driven by real losses from globalization for American workers, not just political demagogy
- U.S. strategic power depends on alliances and continuous engagement; China lacks genuine allies while the U.S. has NATO, Japan, South Korea, and India
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The current period is more dangerous than the Cold War because it combines territorial competition between great powers (China in South China Sea, Russia in Ukraine), the threat of accidental war from military forces bumping up against each other, and a shift toward zero-sum economic thinking that undermines the post-WWII liberal order.
“the current period is not cold war Redux it is more dangerous...territorial Wars between great Powers really didn't take place...a revolution is what happens when you didn't see an evolution coming”
The goal of China policy should be to deny China the easy course of external expansion until it has to deal with its own internal contradictions (a formulation derived from George Kennan's Cold War containment strategy), rather than explicitly stating that the U.S. aim is to weaken or change Chinese leadership.
“I go back to deny them the easy course of external expansion till they have to deal with their own internal contradictions right so it doesn't become our policy actually to change China it becomes our policy to deny China external expansion until they have to change policy so I don't think we have to be explicit about what we think the inst State ought to be”
Private conversations between the U.S. and Israel about military objectives and end-states should not be conducted on the front pages of the New York Times, both because Israel faces existential threats (requiring discretion) and because public debates can undermine trust and negotiating leverage.
“I would just ask that the Israelis start to think about when they think they have achieved their objectives Visa Hamas but also Visa V Hezbollah that is a conversation that Americans can have with them but not on the front pages of the New York Times you asked me what I would be doing I would be talking about how a ground Invasion would be devastating in Lebanon as I did in 2006 but the Israelis have to trust that we're not going to have that debate in public because they are facing existential threats”
In 2006, the U.S. successfully leveraged a strong relationship of trust with Israel to pressure for significant Hezbollah damage while also moving the Lebanese Army into southern Lebanon and creating international support (through the UN Quartet: EU, UN, Russia, U.S.) for stability, achieving temporary success in Resolution 1701 that lasted until Hezbollah rearmed with 150,000 high-performance rockets supplied by Iran.
“we had a very good relationship of trust with the Israelis so we could have those discussions the piece that was probably most important was that we really did understand that they had to do significant damage to Hezbollah we did understand that driving them back across Lani was a big step we worked very hard to get the Lebanese Army into the South...so we tried to create a more stable situation it lasted for a period of time although there were rocket exchanges between Hezbollah and Israel it really started to fall apart over the last year or two years as Hezbollah was rearmed by Iran to get to the place that they had 150,000 high performance Rockets aimed at Israel”
The 2006 Palestinian elections were problematic because the Palestinian Authority made them conditional on participation (giving Hamas legitimacy) rather than on Hamas disarming first (Sinn Féin model); while the U.S. later got the Quartet to impose conditions on Hamas (recognizing Israel, renouncing violence), this isolation drove Hamas to take over Gaza rather than accept restraint.
“the Palestinian Authority said if Hamas did not participate in the elections they wouldn't be legitimate now at the time I remember asking whether or not we should tell them they had to disarm first in other words kind of shen Fain Ira style that you could be in in the political process but you couldn't be in the political process as a militia and again abas and others were concerned that if you demanded that Hamas would not be in the elections and they wouldn't be legitimate so we went through with it”
The relationship with India is an important strategic pillar because India wants strategic autonomy but is basically moving in the U.S. direction; the U.S. should not require loyalty tests (voting alignment with the U.S. at the UN) but rather build relationships based on common interests moving forward.
“the relationship with India is really an important pillar of a relationship with countries that will want to have strategic autonomy but are basically going in our Direction you know we don't have to have loyalty test for every time you vote with us in the UN we just have to have common enough interests moving forward”
PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) exemplifies how the U.S. can lead from principle, power, and compassion; it also demonstrates that helping other countries build health systems creates spillover benefits for the U.S., not just altruistic outcomes.
“the United States has always been best when it led from principle and power and not to mention compassion and I think pepar is an example of that compassion but it's also an example of having use that program to to empower African countries in the building of Health Care Systems that actually serve them very well through Co and so we do ourselves a favor not just them when we Outreach to the rest of the world to address poverty and disease and the like”
American candidates on both sides of the political spectrum increasingly oppose trade without immediately following with tariffs and sanctions, suggesting loss of belief in the integrationist narrative about free trade's benefits; this rhetorical shift reflects deeper erosion of consensus on open economics.
“when is the last time you heard an American candidate on either side of theis talk about the importance of trade for instance without following it with Terrace Andor sanctions”
A ground invasion of Lebanon would be devastating, and the U.S. should communicate this private concern to Israel without publicizing it, allowing Israel to trust that strategic advice is confidential.
“I would be talking about how a ground Invasion would be devastating in Lebanon as I did in 2006 but the Israelis have to trust that we're not going to have that debate in public”
Authoritarian regimes can push their countries toward catastrophe when the leader concentrates power around himself and eliminates alternative voices; Putin exemplifies this dynamic—his isolation from diverse counsel enabled miscalculation and reckless invasion.
“I do think in authoritarian regimes a single strong man can push a country toward the precipice as Vladimir Putin has done we saw a million Russians leave the country so not that popular a thing to do but when you begin to limit so completely the circle around you when you begin to make your voice the only one that matters yes you can change the course of human events”
Putin has already lost the war he intended to fight: he failed to reach Kyiv, failed to extinguish Ukraine (instead emboldened it), lost the Black Sea Fleet from Sebastopol (a naval base central to Russian power since Catherine the Great), was defeated by a country without a navy, and crippled Russia's energy sector through loss of major companies (BP, Shell, Exxon) that extracted hard-to-access oil fields requiring foreign technology.
“Vladimir Putin is already lost the war that he intended to fight he intended to be in ke he's not he intended to extinguish the Ukrainian Nation he's embolden it and strengthen it his Navy the vaunted Black Sea fleet has been basically pushed out of Sebastapol which has been the central part of the Russian Navy since Catherine the Great and was done by a country that doesn't even have a Navy”
A two-state solution between Israel and Palestinians remains necessary for long-term Middle East stability and Israeli security, but is currently far away because the Palestinian Authority lacks leadership and institutional capacity; rebuilding the Palestinian Authority (including professional security forces) must precede negotiation of final status.
“we have to get there eventually because I think ultimately Palestinians as Ariel Chiron said Palestinians need to govern themselves Israel shouldn't rule over Palestinians and we know some of the elements of that and what it's going to look like but it does seem pretty far away right now seems pretty far away because first and foremost the Palestinians don't have the leadership that they need and the refurbishing of the Palestinian Authority is something I think we ought to be spending a lot of time thinking about”
The post-WWII liberal order rested on an assumption that international economy was not zero-sum and that free movement of goods and capital would grow the total pie such that all parties could benefit simultaneously; this assumption enabled cooperation and restraint among great powers.
“the idea that through trade and free movement of goods and free movement of capital we would be able to grow the international economy so that my gain didn't come as your law was at the base of the way the international economic system was designed after World War II”
The rise of populism and isolationism in the United States is substantially explained by real economic losses from globalization experienced by working-class Americans (loss of $18/hour unskilled jobs, displacement of coal miners and steel workers) combined with failure of educational and institutional systems to provide alternative paths to upward mobility, creating 'politics of jealousy' rather than 'politics of opportunity.'
“the integrationist narrative about the international economy is a good one and that explains to me some of the rise of populism because if you look back to Bear any burden pay any price of John F Kennedy it was an American middle class that was growing...we still had the $18 an hour unskilled labor job that's now gone...there are winners and losers out of this period of intense globalization”
The claim that NATO expansion caused Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine is Putin's own narrative and should not be repeated by Western observers; Rice was with Putin and President Bush for eight years without Putin ever raising NATO expansion as a concern, suggesting it was not his primary driver.
“people say oh well you expanded NATO and that's what caused Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine no that is Vladimir Putin's narrative and I wish westerners would stop saying it because I was with Putin and President Bush was for eight years I don't think he ever mentioned NATO expansion and so I guess it didn't bother him enough to bring it up”
South Korea, despite lacking territorial integrity (divided peninsula), is doing very well economically and securely because it has an American security guarantee; this model suggests that a prosperous, stable Ukraine could similarly survive territorial incompleteness with an American guarantee, though Ukraine's preferences may differ.
“there are countries like South Korea that still don't have territorial Integrity that are doing very well but they do have an American Security guarantee”
Great powers historically do not get to 'mind their own business'—they either shape the world according to their interests and values, or other great powers will shape it according to theirs; isolationism is not a viable strategy for great powers.
“great Powers don't get to just mind their own business they try to shape the world and either we shape it or those who wouldn't share our interest and values do”
U.S. strategy during the Cold War (especially after 1946-1949 Chinese Communist victory and Korean War) was to deny the Soviet Union the easy course of external expansion until it dealt with internal contradictions, a strategy that took 50 years but ultimately succeeded without direct U.S.-Soviet war.
“I would ask people actually to look back at 1946 and 48 and 49 when Chinese Communists triumphed to look back the unresolved Korean war...it's not as if we just woke up in 1989 1990 1991 and delivered Eastern Europe the unification of Germany on Western terms and the collapse of the Soviet Union that was a story of almost 50 years of attention and American engagement”
China's decoupling from the U.S. in technology is likely to proceed, representing a break from post-WWII assumptions about integration; this decoupling is not inherently bad but has costs and should be managed consciously rather than allowed to happen chaotically.
“we are decoupling from China we probably will talk about that later in technology”
Despite mistakes in the post-Cold War era (Iraq, Afghanistan), the United States achieved substantive strategic successes that are often overlooked: Ukraine remains independent and strengthened; Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, and NATO with Sweden/Finland now as members exist due to sustained American engagement; Iraq no longer massacres its citizens; Afghanistan's outcome was not inevitable—the U.S. should have kept strategic bases like Bagram.
“despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine there is an independent Ukraine that fought back despite what we have seen in Hungary there is a Poland there's a Romania there's a Czech Republic despite the challenge to Nato there's a NATO that has Sweden and Finland in it today”
Ukraine should eventually be a NATO member to prevent the creation of a power vacuum in Europe like 2008 Bucharest, where the Bush Administration argued for a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine but failed to deliver it, leaving instability that Russia exploited.
“my own view is that we really should look to Ukraine eventually as a member of NATO I don't want to leave a vacuum in the middle of Europe again which is what we essentially did in 2008 at Bucharest the Bush Administration had argued for a membership action plan for Ukraine I do think that was the right answer”
Integration of China into the global economy was a calculated risk based on the possibility that economic liberalization might eventually produce political liberalization, evidence of which appeared (private sector growth, companies like Tencent and Alibaba, intellectual property discussions with leaders), but Xi Jinping chose to reverse this trajectory by restoring imperial ambitions and suppressing internal plurality.
“we took something of a risk could you fully integrate into the international economy a country that had a completely different political value system that would become the second largest economy in the world...for a while it looked like the maximum that you can't have economic liberalization and political control was kind of working in China...you were seeing over the next couple of decades the growth of a private sector that was changing the face of China the 10 cents and the alib Babas of the world”
The United States has the capacity and should pursue multitasking in foreign policy (managing multiple challenges simultaneously: China, Russia, Middle East, etc.) but this requires having sufficient assets (military, economic, diplomatic) to sustain multiple engagements.
“I am one who believes that the United States of America is capable of multitasking and has to multitask but that goes back to you have to have the assets from which to do it and that's where I worry”
Rather than trying to split the Russia-China-North Korea-Iran axis, the U.S. should 'slam them together' and force them to deal with internal contradictions: Russian xenophobia about Asian dominance in Central Asia conflicts with Chinese interests; China becomes secondary to Putin's imperial ambitions; Iran's proxy threats (Houthis) disrupt shipping that harms Chinese interests; none of them trust Kim Jong-un.
“may be a little counterintuitive but my view is we ought to slam them together not try to pull them apart and make them have to deal with the internal contradictions in their little axis you know if you are a Russian xenophobe which they tend to be about Asians what's going in Central Asia could not be heartwarming as the Chinese are beginning to dominate in that region”
A revolution (sudden upheaval) is what happens when you didn't see an evolution (gradual change) coming; the current dangerous international environment resulted from decades of gradual erosion of the post-WWII order that Western policymakers did not adequately recognize.
“and I'm often asked is this a revolution or an evolution and I say A revolution is what happens when you didn't see an evolution coming and I think we've been getting there for a while”
The United States should invest more in the Global South (Africa, Latin America, India) as a matter of principle and strategic interest: not only to improve lives in these regions but to engage them in solving global challenges (technology, climate) and to counter Chinese influence there; the current U.S. focus seems limited to blocking Chinese interests rather than pursuing affirmative engagement.
“the modern day or the today version of that is the global South we sometimes only seem to be interested in the global South if the Chinese seem to be interested in the global South and there's so much that we could be doing and you know we haven't talked much about the relationship with India but I think the relationship with India is really an important pillar”
The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—populism, nativism, isolationism, and protectionism—tend to ride together, meaning they are structurally linked phenomena that emerge simultaneously rather than independently.
“what I've called The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse populism nativism isolationism and protectionism tend to ride together”
U.S. policy toward China should rest on three principles: (1) avoid shooting war through strong deterrence and freedom of navigation challenges; (2) strengthen alliances with India and other partners because China lacks real allies while the U.S. alliance network is a competitive advantage; (3) maintain sophisticated communication channels on accidental war (like U.S.-Russia had) and stay open to Chinese people and students to avoid giving up on the next generation even as current leadership has lost youth trust.
“I would have really kind of three principles the first is let's try to avoid a shooting war with China and let's be strong enough and our deterrent and that means also that sometimes you will have to challenge China on things like freedom of navigation...keep strengthening the alliance relationships the friendships with countries like India we need to get out of our own way on providing military equipment to India”
After 9/11, the U.S. could not simply ignore the terrorism threat; policy decisions must be made with the knowledge available at the time, not judged by later evidence (you cannot undo the past with future information); on China and Russia specifically, the U.S. was not on the wrong course but these countries changed, requiring new strategic visions.
“when you're in those positions you don't get to choose your battles it's not as if after 9/11 we could say oh well we're just not going to worry about that terrorism problem and so we had to deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan had we known about the state of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would we have done that well you know what you know today can affect what you do tomorrow but not what you did yesterday”
Iran's position in the Middle East is not as strong as commonly assessed; Iran sits on 'a very thin blade' between proxy forces it arms (but doesn't fully control) and limited direct power; Iran's proxies (Houthis) are causing shipping disruptions; Israeli strikes on Iran were limited but signaled Israeli capability and knowledge; the Iranian regime has lost confidence and trust of its young people, making it internally vulnerable.
“I don't think the Iranians are in a stronger position I think they're on a kind of a very thin blade actually I say that as a former figure skater on the one hand they have these proxies out there which you know they arm and equip I'm not sure how well they control them but they're doing all kinds of things out there they struck at Israel fortunately ineffectively the Israelis struck back just very limited but said we know where nans is and I think the Iranians are not as in strong a position as we sometimes assess them to be”
Israel has undertaken to damage Hezbollah significantly, which is necessary and good; the 2006 War demonstrated that pager and walkie-talkie sabotage operations are clever statecraft that creates Hezbollah disarray; but the war must not end with Hezbollah still capable of threatening Israel or having repositioned across the Litani River, as that would mean nothing was achieved.
“Israel has undertaken to really damage Hezbollah and that's a good thing I understand the toll on civilians...eventually this war will have to end but if it ends with Hezbollah still capable of threatening the Israeli State and keeping Israelis out of their homes and Hezbollah having violated the 1701 so that they're back across the Lani then we haven't achieved anything from this”
Maximum pressure on the Iranian regime should include never returning frozen assets to Iran, because the regime is unpopular and asset returns would only fund destabilization without gaining legitimacy or behavioral change.
“I do believe that you should never give them a penny again back from frozen assets because that is a very unpopular regime”
Becoming too comfortable with the post-WWII liberal order prevented Western policymakers from seeing the erosion happening; comfort with stability bred complacency about decline.
“we've become very comfortable with the postor War II order...if you become too comfortable you don't see the erosion that's happening”
Vladimir Putin's ambition to restore Russian imperial greatness (as opposed to Soviet power) was longstanding and known to Rice, but the transformation from ambition to active military plan depended on contingent triggers: Afghan withdrawal loss of credibility, Ukraine's accelerating move toward Europe, and Putin's miscalculation that the West would not respond (evidenced by Russian forces carrying five-day provisions and dress uniforms for the Kyiv parade).
“I knew him and because despite the fact that I always knew first of all that he believed in the Russian Empire not the Soviet Union he told me Russia's only been great when it's been ruled by great men like Alexander II and Peter the Great...I knew that the ambition was there”
The Annapolis Conference (late 2007) produced a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace plan from Ehud Olmert that Abbas could have negotiated with; instead of submitting it for negotiation, Abbas deposited it with Bush without publishing it, and Rice wishes the U.S. had published it to give the Obama Administration a better starting point.
“we did get the Annapolis process started in the end of 2007 by the end of 2008 when we were about to leave office ahood had put a good plan on the table which was a comprehensive plan I wish now that a boss had been willing to come to Washington withart just deposit it with George W bush he could have handed it to Barack Obama and you could have been off and running from that purpose but he felt he couldn't do it”
Israel, as a technological and economic powerhouse, must consider the 'day after' of conflicts; companies will be reluctant to invest in Israel if it appears to be in perpetual war; Israel was on track to normalize relations with Gulf Arab states (Abraham Accords), and should work to restore those relationships after achieving military objectives.
“Israel is a technological and economic Powerhouse it needs to be one after this is over where company's not afraid to invest in Israel it's also the case that Israel was well on the way to ending the state of war with the gulf Arabs it's going to be important to get back to that at some point”
Killing of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani was a good decision from a counter-terrorism and strategic perspective, removing a significant threat and operational leader.
“I thought that the killing of kasum salamani was a good thing”