What this covers

This is a recorded conversation at the CUNY Graduate Center in which Paul Krugman questions Henry Farrell and [Abraham Newman] about their book Underground Empire. The authors start from the Thomas Friedman-era story that global networks would push geopolitics aside. They set against it a picture of financial, information and manufacturing networks that are hub-and-spoke systems with a few critical nodes, and they describe how a state that controls those nodes can turn them into instruments of weaponized interdependence.

The middle of the talk is mechanism. Newman explains why every currency exchange effectively passes through US jurisdiction via the dollar clearing system. He recounts how the US, after 9/11, pressured SWIFT into handing over data by pointing to its Virginia backup site, and he describes how fiber-optic routing lets the NSA copy data flows, a topic tied to the Snowden revelations. Farrell adds the economic geography: server clusters in places like Ashburn, Virginia persist through path dependence, and latency matters enough to reinforce clustering. The Huawei and 5G campaign, and the US instruction to TSMC not to supply Huawei, show the same logic applied to technology.

The conversation turns contentious over how well this works and what it costs. Iran is treated as a case where financial pressure worked. For Russia, the speakers discuss the freezing of central bank assets, shadow-economy workarounds, and the limits of sanctions, which Newman frames as raising transaction costs rather than working miracles. They note that the US holds back partly out of fear of oil-driven inflation. Farrell argues semiconductor controls will prove less durable than financial ones because supply chains have more points of control and product codes can be relabeled. Newman raises the pre-WWII pressure on Japan as a precedent for coercion escalating into force. The discussion also covers Europe's energy costs, BASF's relocation, and the quick German-built LNG terminals.

Sharpest takeaway

Farrell and Newman argue that globalized economic networks, far from creating peace, have become weaponized tools of state power—centralized around US choke points—creating an 'underground empire' that generates escalatory geopolitical risks rather than harmony.

  • Global networks (financial, digital, manufacturing) are highly centralized with critical choke points, not decentralized webs as globalization theory suggested
  • The US has systematically weaponized control of these choke points (dollar clearing, internet infrastructure, semiconductor supply) to impose sanctions and coercive leverage on adversaries
  • This weaponization creates escalatory spirals as other states build workarounds and may resort to kinetic (military) responses when economic coercion intensifies

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0.80

Internet infrastructure, particularly fiber optic cables that transmit data at the speed of light, is routed in ways that create centralized chokepoints through US territory, allowing the NSA to intercept international data flows through optical splitters that copy data without disrupting transmission.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“data travels on a fiber optic cable...at the speed of light...if you're in a country like Brazil...it is faster for you to use a fiber optic cable that goes from Brazil to Miami then back to a different city in Brazil...international data because of the the way fiber optic cables are laid often routes through the United States”

0.80

The SWIFT system, based in Belgium but storing data backup in Virginia (on US territory), was initially unwilling to share data with the US government after 9/11, but the US government threatened to force access through its jurisdiction over the Virginia backup site, causing SWIFT to concede to secret subpoenas.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“these are like really geeky things that we discovered in this book...Swift...they mirror their data...in a site in Virginia and so originally after 911 the US asks secretly Swift to give them the data and Swift says no and then the US government says well we'll just go to Virginia...you know like we'll make them it's on US Territory and so then you know Swift uh concedes to this uh these secret subpoenas”

0.80

The US dollar clearing system requires that all international currency exchanges (e.g., Malaysian ringgit to US dollar to Bolivian boliviano) route through US jurisdiction and bank accounts, because virtual dollars only exist within US bank accounts, giving the US regulatory and enforcement power over all international banks seeking dollar access.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“if you're transforming you know transferring from ringot into dollars and then dollars into Euro this means that your money has to temporarily be uh dollars and uh dollars do not exist uh in you except you know physical $20 bills do exist but uh virtual dollars do not exist except outside of you except inside United States bank accounts and so this means then that you have to have a clearing Arrangement”

0.75

The SWIFT system is a cooperative of many banks, and heads of US banks sit on the SWIFT board, allowing the US to exert influence not just through territorial jurisdiction but through legal persons—US citizens in leadership positions at institutions—creating multiple channels for US power extension.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“Swift is a conglomeration of many banks it's a Cooperative amongst many banks and many of the people that sit as on the board of Swift are the the heads of US Banks and so it's another important kind of channel that of us power is through uh legal persons us legal persons”

0.75

Unlike financial systems with centralized dollar clearing, semiconductor supply chains have multiple points of control and are easier for other countries to develop independently over time, making US semiconductor sanctions less durable than financial sanctions.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“there's nothing which is as a centralized as the dollar clearing system which is incredibly centralized there are areas where the United States has immense power it has a lot of power over the uh for example the uh software that is used to uh design semiconductors but it doesn't have the same kind of ability to control it is easier for other countries uh over time to begin to build up their own independent ecosystems of manufacturer”

0.75

The US cannot easily track whether countries are circumventing semiconductor sanctions because companies can reclassify product codes (changing designation from product X to product Y) to obscure what they're shipping, making the information the US receives much messier and harder to trace than financial information.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“the final problem that the United States has when it comes to for example using these kinds of controls against countries like Russia is that uh it is really hard sometimes to figure out what companies are sending to Russia because they sometimes they uh change the multi-digit codes that indicate that you're uh sending product X they change it and say that they're sending product y instead they reclassify it and it's much much harder for the United States to keep track of what businesses are doing because there isn't the same degree of centralized uh information and coordination the information that they do get is much Messier and much murkier and more difficult to trace than financial information”

0.75

Higher energy costs in Europe compared to the United States are creating long-term competitive disadvantages for European manufacturers, causing companies like BASF (large chemicals manufacturer) to relocate to China where costs are lower, and energy-intensive businesses prefer moving to the US due to available subsidies.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“energy costs are now substantially higher in Europe than in the United States and they're not shifting anytime soon so this is a little bit like observe Iran and Russia suffering over the longer term from friction uh Germany is seeing uh you know BASF for example it's big uh chemicals manufacturer has basically moved Lock Stock and Barrel very nearly uh its key production facilities to China because China is a lot cheaper we see a lot of uh other businesses uh which are power intensive saying they want to go to the United States instead of Europe”

0.74

Being within a mile of another server complex is economically valuable in high-speed services like financial trading, because milliseconds of latency matter, creating strong geographic clustering incentives for data center location.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“as I understand it in a world where I never know my fractions but p a seconds or whatever matter actually being within a mile or so of of another server complex is actually worth something right absolutely i' I've just been reading uh today a uh a book on uh book on highspeed trading and I'm sort of very much the those it's not quite as important but the Dynamics uh if you're trying for example to uh trying trying to build up a uh Service Company such as spotifi it's really helpful for you to be able to collocate your uh servers in the same facility as uh Google”

0.74

Globalization depends profoundly on three types of networks: financial networks like SWIFT and the dollar clearing system through which money travels globally, information networks such as the internet, and manufacturing networks where complex products involve thousands of manufacturers across 20-50 different countries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“globalization the uh transformation of the world economy that's happened over the last few decades depends profoundly upon networks if you want a globalized economy to work you're going to need financial networks to ow money to uh travel around the world networks such as Swift or the do the dollar clearing system you're going to need also information networks such as the internet and you're going to need manufacturing networks”

0.74

Internet infrastructure (server clusters, fiber optic cables) exhibits path dependence and economic geography effects where initial clusters of activity in locations like Silicon Valley and Ashburn, Virginia attract further investment and self-perpetuate, creating persistent geographic concentration of digital infrastructure.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“this goes back to some of the arguments that you made in your earlier work on geography and trade in a complicated way in that there are certain kinds of Rich get richer phenomena that happen that accidental clusters of AC ity can lead others to uh dive in and others to dive in and others to dive in and this turns out to be a lot of the story of the internet”

0.74

The US government quickly built LNG (liquefied natural gas) import terminals in Europe, which was accomplished by public sector action (German government) not private market action, contradicting the view that markets solve supply problems without government.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“a lot of this has been uh liquefied natural gas from the United States basically Shi gas um which and the Europeans incredibly quickly built terminals to to bring it in and I'm pretty sure that was public sector not not private sector...that is absolutely fa that's not the market solving the problem exactly that is kind of the German government solving the problem”

0.70

Economic coercion in the runup to World War II, particularly against Japan, provoked Japan to become revanchist and resort to military means, providing a historical precedent for how sustained economic pressure without military dominance can escalate to kinetic conflict.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“there's a great book uh by somebody named Nichol Nicholas Moulder the economic weapon where he talks about how economic coercion in the runup to World War II too that that was something that provoked Japan to become revanchist to use military means”

0.69

The US and European Union have gone beyond excluding Russia from SWIFT to freezing the assets of the Russian Central Bank itself, representing a dramatically more severe form of financial weaponization where countries lose access to their own money rather than just the ability to communicate about financial transfers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“when you look at the Russia sanctions today we have blown way past that kind of effort the US government with the European Union they froze the assets of the Russian Central Bank so it's not saying the banks can't communicate with each other it's being you can't even have access to this money”

0.69

The US told TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world's primary manufacturer) not to send semiconductors to Huawei, demonstrating that the US can use export controls to prevent critical supply relationships between non-US companies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“the United States is able to use this for example to uh tell tsmc that it is not allowed to get send semiconductors to uh to Huawei”

0.69

Huawei was positioned to dominate global 5G deployment across the world due to its technological and price leadership, but the US government conducted a multi-year campaign to undermine Huawei's ability to provide 5G systems, successfully hindering Huawei among Western allies (UK, Germany, France).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“Huawei is a Chinese company uh it is the the kind of the price leader in this technology and what the US is worried about is that China will basically then do to us and our allies similarly to what we were using the fiber optic cable network to do...the US goes on a multi-year campaign to undermine huawei's ability to to do this...amongst particularly Western allies that the US government has has stopped or really hindered uh huawei's ability to do that um many countries the UK Germany uh France they had been more amenable to allowing Huawei products and now they're rolling back”

0.69

5G infrastructure is a transformative technology enabling ubiquitous connectivity where all inanimate objects (cars, refrigerators, thermostats, grocery stores) communicate with each other without user intervention, creating an Internet of Things with global consequences for surveillance and control capabilities.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“5G which is going to be the next generation of the internet and it is going to imagine a world where every inanimate object has a cell phone embedded in it your car your refrigerator your thermostat the the grocery store and basically they're all talking to each other without you maybe even talking to them”

0.69

Russia has adapted to US sanctions by creating shadow economy structures (shell companies, clandestine clearing houses) that are inefficient and clunky but allow Russia to maintain economic activity despite financial isolation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“once the Trump Administration came back in and reintroduced the Iran sanctions and it became clear that they were not going to be taken off again Iran started to create this uh Shadow economy which is messy which is clunky which doesn't work particularly well but it does work to some degree”

0.69

The US could push sanctions further against Russia but chooses not to because doing so would cause oil prices to rise excessively, creating inflation problems for the US domestic economy, showing that the US is constrained by its own economic interests.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“we could push the sanctions further but they have consequences for us too you know in the in the space of oil we we set a cap you know why did we set a cap because we don't want inflation you know we don't want the price of oil to go up so much”

0.69

Russian gas cutoffs to Western Europe, while predicted to cause severe economic damage, have been less catastrophic than feared because markets adapted quickly, Western Europe was lucky with a mild winter, and LNG (liquefied natural gas) from the US provided alternative supply.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Paul Krugman

“there's a lot of alarmism about what Russian cut off Russian gas would do to the uh to the European Union economy and that the actual consequences have been vastly smaller than that...Western Europe uh it dodged a bullet it was very very lucky in that it was an extremely mild winter”

0.68

Global financial, information, and manufacturing networks are surprisingly centralized with clear choke points and critical nodes (like hub-and-spoke airline systems), rather than being decentralized webs, and powerful governments like the United States that control these choke points can leverage them to impose vast economic consequences including sanctions, surveillance, and coercion on the rest of the global economy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“these Global networks turn out to be surprisingly centralized there are choke points there are Central nodes they are like the uh Hub and spoke system of an airline if you see this is is the Delta Hub and spoke system Atlanta is a key node in the uh system and if you see that you have storms in Atlanta suddenly Delta's entire system breaks down...similarly these networks these Global Financial networks these information networks they too turned out to have choke points and if you were a powerful government such as the United States and you are capable of actually seizing control of these choke points you could use these choke points to have vast consequences for the rest of the economy uh the global economy”

0.68

The Snowden revelations exposed NSA mass surveillance programs that most people have failed to fully unpack despite being public record, and this surveillance is a concrete example of how the US exploits network geography for intelligence gathering

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“that's what the snow uh revelation show and I think it's it's a larger point of one section of our book is just we really have failed to fully unpack that moment in our history what 911 how it transformed the way the US state [26:41] worked uh the the revelations that came out in the Snowden Revelation a lot of people read that part of our book and are kind of shocked by you know what the US government was doing but it's all public record it's not there's nothing classified that we're using”

0.65

US financial sanctions against Iran successfully kneecapped Iran's ability to participate in the global economy and forced Iranian concessions, demonstrating effective US financial weaponization in that case.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Paul Krugman

“the US basically kneecapped Iran with financial sanctions basically using its control of of a lot of international banking to to largely Force Iran to you know cut it off from the outside world and force the Iranians to make a bunch of concessions um which I thought was enormously persuasive”

0.65

Sanctions are not miracle workers; their effectiveness should be understood as raising transaction costs for the target regime (in Secretary Yellen's phrase 'raising the transaction cost'), limiting ability to restock military supplies and conduct war, but not eliminating it.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“I think that at the beginning when uh these sanctions were announced people had what I would say is naive expectations about what is motivating the Putin regime...secretary Yellen she just she described it as you know it raises the transaction cost through which he has to raise money and do the things that he wants to do so it's not a miracle but it is inflicting cost”

0.63

The prevailing globalization narrative, articulated most clearly by Thomas Friedman in 1999, predicted that global networks would move the world away from geopolitics toward a world of greater peace and economic cooperation where geopolitical struggle would become secondary or irrelevant, symbolized by the metaphor of replacing the Berlin Wall with a 'web' of interconnection.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“this story was uh most associated I think with the intellectual success of uh one of Paul's colleagues in the New York Times opad page Thomas fredman and fredman had a very very straightforward story about how these networks were going to uh transfer uh global politics...we were moving away from the world of geopolitics the world of the Cold War into a world of far greater peace and Harmony and uh cooperation and economic competition but none of the geopolitical struggles that we had seen before”

0.63

TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) is the world's dominant semiconductor manufacturer providing advanced chips to nearly every significant technology company, making it strategically critical to global electronics production.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Paul Krugman

“tsmc is Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer to the world basically absolutely critical to almost every everything”

0.61

The US cannot be easily displaced as the dominant currency because alternative currencies like the Chinese yuan and Euro both face significant problems: the yuan is not convertible and China's political constraints on Hong Kong limit confidence, while the Euro faced sovereign debt crises.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“there's just not a very good competitor to it so if you think about the you know the renman b or the Euro those both have basically had huge setbacks in the last few decades either the sovereign debt crisis in Europe or the you know the covid uh uh the the co policy in China the Crackdown on Hong Kong in general the renman be is not convertible there's all these reasons why there's no real alternative to the US dollar”

0.60

The book authors believe the US needs to develop new institutions, language, and norms to govern the responsible use of economic weapons, comparable to how nuclear policy developed concepts like mutually assured destruction and proportional response, because currently there is no framework for thinking about what constitutes proportional economic coercion.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“we sit at like an Oppenheimer moment it is a place where these weapons don't come with a rulebook we don't have things like mutually assured destruction to tell us how to use them or when not to use them and so it's really up to us and conversations like this to Think Through what are the new language what are the new principles that should be used to make sure that these economic weapons are being used responsibly...what is a proportional response in this world isn't uh well thought out”

0.59

Initial expectations about Russian sanctions were naively hyperbolic; they were much more extensive than previous sanctions but the US cannot have naive expectations about what economic measures alone can achieve against actors facing existential threats

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“there was a lot of uh very very hyperbolic commentary around the time [47:43] that the sanctions were first introduced because they really did go much much further than other sanctions or other measures had gone in the past uh but equally I think that the uh you know”

0.57

Huawei has shown some capability to adapt to US restrictions by upgrading existing semiconductor manufacturing equipment to produce more sophisticated semiconductors, but there is significant uncertainty about whether Huawei can do this at scale and with the quality necessary to remain globally competitive.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Henry Farrell

“China has shown that it is capable of effectively taking the semiconductor manufacturing uh equipment that it has and uh upgrading it sufficiently that they are able to produce more sophisticated uh semiconductors then the US would like them to be able to what is not clear is how well they are able to do this at scale how how much of their uh production runs Ober is in fact flawed”

0.57

While the dollar will not be dethroned, excessive use of financial sanctions and economic weaponization can create 'off-book dark spaces' in the global economy where transactions become hidden, harder to monitor, and more prone to accidents (underinsured ships, degraded infrastructure) because targets have no legitimate way to operate.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“what we've been very concerned about is the creation basically of kind of off book dark spaces in the global economy places where it's harder to see what's happening in those transactions...you might have these ships that are underinsured blow up in some place in the world because they're using old uh bad technology...so I think what we're worried about is that the lesson the US government has taken is that you can push these things as far as you want because the dollar won't be threatened but I think the lesson we're trying to say is that many other bad outcomes can happen when you push these things so hard”

0.56

The US government conducts National Security planning that increasingly involves detailed attention to infrastructure and supply chain issues, as evidenced by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's focus on topics his predecessors never had to address.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Henry Farrell

“policy makers really are doing this you know the uh the National Security adviser Jake Sullivan seems to spend half his life thinking about things which his predecessors never had to think about”

0.56

Science fiction writer Neal Stephenson observed in the 1990s, well before internet dominance became understood, that the internet is actually highly centralized rather than decentralized, but this observation failed to influence mainstream narratives and was forgotten, allowing political consequences to go unaddressed.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“we discovered this great article by the science fiction writer Neil Stevenson long before he was uh famous uh back in the 1990s where he observes you know he's talking to people who do these cables and the observation comes up well people say that the internet is decentralized it actually is highly centralized I'm sort of isn't that funny isn't that weird but then because it doesn't fit into the narratives that people have this just gets forgotten”

0.56

Scholars and policy makers have long assumed markets work through magical 'hayek-ian' mechanisms where you don't need to pay attention to manufacturing details because markets automatically allocate resources efficiently, but the reality is that geopolitics is entangled with these networks and markets cannot solve political problems.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“policy makers have assumed that markets work in some kind of magical hakan way I'm sort of like the way that Friedrich vanyek a famous economist argued you know that you really don't have to pay attention to the uh details of manufacturing because uh the uh Market can take care of it and I think the very clear message that you get uh from looking at this is that the market cannot take care about take care of it because these are not about sort traditional forms of Market competition much of the time geopolitics is getting entangled with them”

0.56

The 'plumbing' of infrastructure has become political, contrary to decades of assumption that infrastructure was merely technical and neutral, and policy makers must now pay attention to dense systems and understand where politics actually happens.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Henry Farrell

“the fundamental message that I think our book has is that the plumbing has become political and that you really need to understand all of these dense systems in order to really see where the politics are actually happening”

0.56

Universities like Georgetown and SAIS need to train students to think about economic and security issues together, because the new world is one where these domains cannot be separated, but currently curricula treat them as distinct.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“unfortunately we don't often train people to think about economic and security issues together and and that's what this new world is it's a world where you cannot separate uh the economic and the security”

0.52

The US government has progressively learned to weaponize control of global economic networks over time, not through grand strategic planning but through ad hoc responses to security problems (terrorism, proliferation, territorial conquest), incrementally discovering new tools and expanding their use against adversaries.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“the story We Tell is one about uh you know government agencies that are struggling with Wicked problems terrorism proliferation uh uh you know territorial conquest and that they inch by inch start to increasingly use these tools and so here is the warning is that this use of these tools is increasingly being used by the US government”

0.52

The US is concerned that China could use 5G dominance the same way the US uses fiber optic networks for surveillance and control, except without rule of law or legal constraints on government power, creating an asymmetric surveillance advantage for China over Western nations.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“what the US is worried about is that China will basically then do to us and our allies similarly to what we were using the fiber optic cable network to do when under the snow Revelations but China won't have a rule of law or like legal system you know like it would just be whatever the government is trying to accomplish”

0.52

Thomas Friedman's 'The World is Flat' metaphor suggested a level playing field where anything can be produced anywhere, but the actual world has centralized nodes controlled by the US government that can stop any transaction, creating a radically different vision of how the world works than the Friedman narrative.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Paul Krugman

“you cited haek but go back to Tom fredman you know the the web metaphor maybe the one that you site but everybody knows the World is Flat which was basically the idea you know it's this Level Playing Field and it doesn't matter anything can be produced anywhere and what you're telling us is actually uh there's a bunch of nodes there most of them controlled by the US government which can stop you that's a that's quite a different vision of how the world works”

0.52

Financial sanctions against Russia have been less effective than expected in stopping the war because Putin's regime is willing to sacrifice thousands of its own population to continue fighting, and for a dictator losing a war means personal death, so the threat of financial hardship is insufficient to change behavior.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“Putin is willing to sacrifice hundreds and thousands of his population to continue this war and so it's you know saying we're going to take away some of your money is is is is it is impactful uh in that it limits the ability of Putin to restock his army and to conduct the military that he wants wants to but it is not a miracle worker...basically if he loses this war it when dictators lose Wars they are often killed you know they there's a very high bar of consequence for him and so he's going to win you know fight and keep fighting no matter what”

0.52

The US government agencies are not thinking about second and third-order consequences of weaponizing networks, creating a major concern that escalatory spirals could spiral out of control.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“at least in our research many US government agencies are not thinking third line or second order consequences of using these tools and one of the biggest concerns we have is that actors will not just act economically build their own semiconductors but that it might also encourage them in a kinetic response to use military means”

0.52

The US-China semiconductor competition is an invisible great power confrontation happening below the surface of public awareness, with the US appearing to have won in the short run, yet this invisible underground war has shaped global technology markets.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Paul Krugman

“by the way just it you know you title of the book is underground Empire but here was a whole sort of underground war between the United States and China it you know effectively this was a a confrontation of great Powers invisible to everybody uh which at least in the short run the US appears to have won but it's kind of awesome to think that all of this is happening you know um below the surface”

0.52

The authors discovered this book while researching a different book about US-European negotiations over privacy issues around SWIFT, where they realized that centralized infrastructure that looks like points of efficiency are also points of control and power

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Abraham Newman

“we were researching a book about us and European negotiations over privacy [18:52] issues uh and in that there was a a conflict over the Swift system and we were researching this in like 2010 through 2015 it was before the Swift system had really become common parlance I think it was just like some little like nerds like us who sit in boxes think about um and in that Discovery we realize like hey here's this thing that people often think of as a point of centralization which is about efficiency it makes the world work these infrastructures these Plumbing that for [19:24] many economists are simply reducing transaction costs and that's where Henry and I were thinking about you know but in politics when things are centralized they're also a point of control and power uh and that was really the light that turned on”

0.50

Iran's difficulty in obtaining helicopter parts due to sanctions contributed to an aviation accident killing the Iranian president and minister, showing how sanctions create infrastructure fragility and may have long-term health and safety consequences even without direct intended targeting.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“what it suggested was that Iran had extraordinary difficulty in getting its hands on on new uh helicopter parts it has been scrapping and making do uh with uh Antiquated uh parts for decades and that this is more or less the kind of accident that sooner or later is going to happen and perhaps you know sort of this is you know it it's certainly not what the US wanted as its final thing but imposing those kinds of frictions on the Russian war machine could have some important consequences”

0.48

Geopolitics has returned as the dominant factor in global economics; the web of networks is no longer a producer of peace but has become a battlefield where states struggle to dominate or avoid domination by adversaries, with a spider (geopolitics) lurking at the heart of the web

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“we're in a world where this web which was supposed to unite the world together all of these networks which were supposed to provide us with the uh means for a peaceful and a harmonious coexistence these networks have been weapon [9:30] these networks have become new kinds of economic battlefields where people are effectively struggling governments are struggling over uh which manages to dominate and which instead finds itself being dominated by its adversaries”

0.48

Incidents such as ships exploding or being set on fire in the Straits of Hormuz are connected to Iran's lack of economic means to address its problems through normal commerce, suggesting these may be economic-to-kinetic escalations.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“if you look at the Straits of Hormuz today right outside of you know where Iran sits you know ships are being exploded or set on fire it's not random that is part of when you have no economic means to address your problems then kinetic means might be response”

0.43

Farrell's contribution came from reading David Graeber's critique of US Empire and realizing that while Graeber was wrong about US power being based on simple military coercion, something else was underlying the new form of US dominance that needed investigation

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“I had a a somewhat complimentary story which goes back some years uh before this which is uh David Graber uh who wrote a book called debt which got a lot of attention and where I [19:55] helped to run a uh a a seminar on crooked Timber a Blog that I used to be involved in that uh Paul I guess this is how you and I first came to know each other through uh grumpy uh leftwing blogging back in the early notes uh but Graber was invited to do the seminar uh I wrote a somewhat critical piece on graber's thesis which is more or less that US military power underlies this new form of Empire and he absolutely exploded at me told me that I was a liar trying to discredit him and all these [20:26] other things but uh the it wasn't a very Pleasant episode but it made me start to wonder there is some kind of a US Empire there it is not based on simple military coercion there has to be something else that is under ging it”

0.43

The metaphor of the Spider-Man principle—'with great power comes great responsibility'—applies to US control of global economic infrastructure, but the US has not yet developed adequate frameworks to apply this principle.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Abraham Newman

“Henry and I have a kind of a running gag about superheroes and of course the Spider-Man Trope uh plays heavy here of with great power comes great responsibility and unfortunately we don't really have that worked out yet”

0.29

The book was illustrated with AI-generated artwork from ChatGPT and large language models, which the authors note are themselves another topic of great interest to social scientists and technologists

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Henry Farrell

“so that was AI generated so that was uh thanks to uh chat gp4 large language models uh which are another topic of great interest to me and I think to everybody in the social [17:47] sciences right now okay that's a question”