What this covers

This is a Talks at Google session with Howard Marks, co-chairman of Oaktree Capital, built around his book The Most Important Thing and the thinkers behind it. He answers audience questions and works through the book's ideas, taking investing to be counter-intuitive, something that "turns back on itself," and resistant to any formula that works consistently. The talk keeps returning to the point that risk means more things can happen than will happen. A single most-likely outcome is far from certain, which is why Should Does Not Equal Will comes up as a rule of conduct. Marks also argues that an outcome cannot tell you whether a decision was good, because randomness shapes results.

The middle of the talk covers his intellectual debts. He cites John Kenneth Galbraith's two kinds of forecasters, those who don't know and those who don't know they don't know, and a Mark Twain line on the danger of what you know for certain. From Charlie Ellis he takes the idea of a losers game, won by avoiding mistakes rather than hitting winners. He sets out Second-Level Thinking with a contrast between buying a good company and buying a good company at the right price. He also argues that bond investing is a negative art: among bonds that pay, one can only add value by excluding the ones that don't. Rating-based examples compare AAA bonds, which can only disappoint, with single-B bonds, which can improve.

The talk turns concrete and contentious in a few places. One example is a pension fund that sat at roughly the 37th percentile for 14 years yet finished in the 4th percentile overall. Another is a drowned six-foot man who had crossed a stream averaging five feet deep. Marks ties this to a reluctance to rely on expected-value arithmetic when some outcomes can't be survived. He is sceptical of mortgage lending standards and of investors who ignore valuation, and says index investing suits average amateurs but is not risk-free. He also speaks about why small investors can stay nimble, how to raise capital for contrarian strategies, and why Oaktree wrote down its six tenets in 1995 and never changed a word.

Sharpest takeaway

Marks argues that successful investing requires risk control and avoiding losers rather than seeking winners, grounded in understanding randomness, the limits of forecasting, and the importance of buying assets below intrinsic value—a philosophy shaped by Taleb, Galbraith, Ellis, and Milken.

  • Randomness and luck play enormous roles in investment outcomes, making forecasting unreliable and ex-post outcomes poor guides to decision quality
  • The key to outperformance is identifying mispriced assets through second-level thinking and avoiding defaults, not predicting macro trends
  • Defensive investing and consistency matter more than chasing top-quartile returns, especially in uncertain environments with wide ranges of possible outcomes

The claims · ranked64 claims · weighted by value

This asset isn't compiled yet

You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.

0.80

Small investors have the advantage of staying small: they can manage less capital per opportunity, but many are seduced by the lure of fees from larger assets under management.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“The little guy has an advantage as long as he's willing to stay small... In the short run, the more money you manage when you get fees, it's a great lure to take on more money. But you have to stop it at a point before it starts running your performance.”

0.80

Investing is very difficult because it is counter-intuitive and turns back on itself all the time, with no formulas that work consistently.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Investing is very difficult because it's, kind of, counter intuitive. And it, kind of, turns back on itself all the time. And there are no formulas that work.”

0.80

Expected value calculations, while rational in theory, may not guide decisions when the course of action contains some outcomes that one cannot withstand—rational decision-making must account for tail risk tolerance.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“And that sounds like a totally rational thing. But what if the course of action that you're considering has some outcomes that you absolutely can't withstand? Then you may not do it. You may not do the highest expected value course of action because it has some you can't live with.”

0.80

A pension fund that stayed between the 27th and 47th percentile (37th percentile average) every year for 14 years ended up in the 4th percentile overall because when people blow up, they really blow up.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“His pension fund had never been above the 27th percentile or below the 47th percentile. So it was solidly in the second quartile every year for 14 years... What percentile do you think that fund was in for the whole 14 years? Four. And the answer is that when people blow up, they really blow up.”

0.79

You cannot tell from an outcome whether a decision was good or bad because outcomes are influenced by randomness; good decisions can fail and bad decisions can succeed.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“You can't tell from an outcome whether a decision was good or bad. It's very important. Most people don't understand this. Totally counter intuitive. But the truth is, in the real world where there's randomness at work... good decisions fail to work all the time. Bad decisions work all the time.”

0.78

To raise capital for contrarian strategies, you must find a few people and convince them to do things nobody else is doing because what's unloved is cheap—eventually if results prove out, others follow, but initially only contrarians will invest.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“But what you have to do is you have to find a few people. You see, you have to find a few people. You have to go say to them you should do this because nobody else is. Because nobody else is doing it, it's languishing cheap. You make no money doing the things that everybody wants to do. You make money by doing the things that nobody wants to do who then turn out to have value.”

0.75

John Kenneth Galbraith distinguished two classes of forecasters: those who don't know and those who don't know they don't know, illustrating the futility of macro forecasting.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“One of the things he says is we have two classes of forecasters. The ones who don't know and the ones who don't know they don't know.”

0.75

Charlie Ellis wrote that investing is a 'losers game' in the sense that it is won by avoiding losers rather than hitting winners, because the best way to win is to avoid being the one who makes the losing mistake.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Charlie Ellis wrote an article called The Losers Game. And he said he thought that investing—so championship tennis is a winners game. It's won by winners. He thought amateur tennis is a losers game. It's won by the people who avoid being losers. Charlie thinks or thought that investing is a losers game. So the best way to win at investing is by not hitting losers.”

0.75

If you buy AAA bonds that everyone thinks are great, there's only one way for them to go—worse—because perfection cannot improve; conversely, if you buy single-B bonds that survive, they can only improve through upgrades and favorable surprises.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“If you buy AAA bonds, there's only one way to go. AAA bonds are bonds that everybody thinks a great. There companies are making a lot of money. They have prudent balance sheets. The outlook is good. Everything's perfect. So if everything's perfect, that means it can't get better. And if it can't get better, that means it can only get worse. On the other hand, he said, if you buy single-B bonds and they survive, there's only one way for them to go, which is upgrade.”

0.75

When people are eager to invest and not sufficiently risk-conscious, they do risky things; when people do risky things, the market becomes a risky place, requiring greater defensive measures from prudent investors.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I wrote one in March of '07 called The Race To The Bottom. And I talked about the fact that when people are, number one, eager to invest and, number two, not sufficiently risk conscious they do risky things. And when people do risky things, the market becomes a risky place.”

0.75

Second-level thinking is the most important thing in investing—the first-level thinker naively buys good companies, while the second-level thinker knows the company is good but it's not as good as everyone thinks, so sells or avoids buying.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“The first chapter of the book says the most important thing is second level thinking. Most people think on the first level. To be a superior investor, you must think on the second level. You have to think different from everybody else. But in being different, you have to be better. So the first level thinker is naive. He says, this is a great company, let's buy the stock. The second level thinker says it's a great company, but it's not as great as everybody thinks it is. We better sell the stock.”

0.74

Mark Twain's saying 'it's not what you don't know that gets you into trouble, it's what you know for certain that just ain't true' encapsulates why holding strongly to macro opinions is dangerous.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“And I think this is very important. You know, Mark Twain said, 'it's not what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for certain that just ain't true.' So we try to avoid holding strongly to those macro opinions.”

0.74

The secret to success in investing is buying things for less than they're worth, not buying good assets—what matters is the relationship between price and value, not the quality of the asset itself.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“How do you make money as an investor? The people who don't know think the way you do it is by buying good assets, a good building, stock in a good company, or something like that. That is not the secret for success. The secret for success in investing is buying things for less than they're worth.”

0.74

Bond investing is a negative art—a promise to pay fixed returns, so all bonds paying at a given rate will pay the same amount; one cannot hero-ize by choosing among bonds that pay, only by excluding the ones that don't.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“And one of the things he says is bond investing is a negative art. What does that mean? A bond is a promise to pay. You give me $100, and I promise to give you 5% interest every year, and then give your money back in 20 years. Fixed income it's called because all the events are fixed. The contract is fixed. The return is fixed, assuming the promise is kept. So all 5% bonds that pay will pay 5%. None will pay six. None will pay four. All the ones that pay will pay 5%. What does that mean? It means of the ones that pay, it doesn't matter which ones you buy. You're not going to be a hero by choosing among the bonds that pay. The only thing that matters is to exclude the ones that don't pay.”

0.74

When Oaktree Capital was started in April 1995, the firm published six tenets of its investment philosophy and never changed a word since, signaling to clients their commitment to a consistent roadmap.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“When we started Oak Tree April 10 of 1995 almost exactly 20 years ago, we wrote down our investment philosophy. And here it is. We published it. We were a bunch of guys who had been working together for most of the previous 10 years at a different employer. And we left there as a group. And we started Oak Tree. So for a philosophy, I believe in writing things down. And like learning at the [INAUDIBLE] says today right them down, right. So we wrote down our philosophy. We published it. We never changed a word since. And the clients like knowing what our roadmap is.”

0.74

The six-foot-tall man who drowned in a stream averaging five feet deep illustrates that survival depends on conditions at the bad times, not average conditions—portfolios must be structured to survive downside scenarios.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Never forget the six foot tall man who drowned crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average. Kind of like that skydiver who's right 98% of the time. It's not sufficient, depending on how you want to live your life, to survive on average. We have to survive on the bad days. So we have to be able to survive the low spots in the stream. Your portfolio has to be set up to survive on the bad days so you won't be shaken out of your investments.”

0.74

Index investing is fine for the average amateur investor because the average investor can't beat the market and can't find or hire anyone who can, but investors shouldn't think it's a risk-less trade.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Index investing is a fine thing for the average amateur investor because the average amateur investor, number one, can't beat the market and, number two, can't find anybody or hire anybody who can beat the market. But the only thing is he shouldn't think that it's a risk-less trade.”

0.74

One's thinking should still be alive and should evolve, as demonstrated by how some things in Marks' list of important investment principles changed between 2003 and 2011.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Interestingly, some of the things are different. That goes to show you that one's thinking should still be alive and should still evolve.”

0.74

Writing things down formally is important for investing success because it forces clarity, commitment, and consistency, preventing drift and allowing clients to understand the roadmap rather than being subject to the manager's changing moods.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“for a philosophy, I believe in writing things down... So we wrote down our philosophy. We published it... The clients like knowing what our roadmap is.”

0.73

Risk means more things can happen than will happen—there is always a range of possible outcomes, and the most likely single outcome is far from sure to happen.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“There's a professor at the London Business School who put it so simply. He said risk means more things can happen than will happen. And again, this is profound in my opinion.”

0.73

These three adages convey something about modesty and humility of belief rather than cock-sureness, which Marks considers the greatest risk in investing.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“So all of these things, I think, say something about modesty and humility of belief rather than cock sureness, which I think is the greatest risk.”

0.73

You should not act as if the things that should happen are the things that will happen; in the investment world, unlike physics, you cannot depend on deterministic outcomes.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“You should not act as if the things that should happen are the things that will happen. Again, in the world of the physical sciences, you could probably bet that that's true... Not in the world of investing.”

0.69

Oaktree does not do a lot of market timing because it is very hard to do—instead they do long-term investing in assets they think are underpriced.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“And finally, we don't do a lot of market timing, which is very, very hard to do. We do long term investing in assets that we think are underpriced.”

0.69

The wise man buys a cheap asset first; when others discover the value, the price rises and more people buy; eventually the fool is the last to buy at peak prices—the same asset at different points in a trend, with first buyers wise and last buyers fools.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“In every trend in investing, it eventually becomes overdone. If you find an asset which is cheap and buy it, that's great. If everybody else figures it out that it's cheap, then it will go up. Then people see that it's rising. And more people jump on the band wagon and it goes up, up, up. And the last person to buy it is a fool. And the first person to buy it is a wise man. It's the same asset. Just at different prices. And as people say, first the innovator, then the imitator, then the idiot.”

0.69

In 1978, when starting in high-yield bonds, 90% of investment organizations had concrete rules against investing in bonds below A or below investment grade (BBB), and Moody's said such bonds were imprudent investments.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“But when I started raising money for our strategies—1978 junk bonds—90% of investment organizations like Google had a rule, a concrete rule, against any bond investing below A or below investment grade, which is BBB. And of course, Moody said it's an imprudent investment.”

0.69

Investors who bought stocks of America's best companies (Hewlett Packard, Perkin Elmer, Texas Instruments, Merck, Lilly, Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, AIG, Coca Cola, Procter & Gamble) in 1968 and held through 1973 lost 90% of their money because these were trading at 80-90x earnings—overpriced despite being great companies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“If you bought the bonds of Hewlett Packard, Perkin Elmer, Texas Instruments, Merk Lilly Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, AIG, Coca Cola, and Procter & Gamble, and if you bought them all in '68 and you held them until '73, you lost 90% of your money. Why? Because they were overpriced. The average stock since the postwar has traded at 16 times its next year's earnings. These were trading at 80 and 90 times.”

0.69

Many investors setting prices in today's markets don't care about valuation and cannot imagine prices at which large-cap growth stocks and internet high-flyers would be mere holds or sells.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“The bottom line is that many of the investors setting the prices in today's markets don't care about valuation. I get no sense, at all, that the analysts and portfolio managers backing the large cap growth stocks and internet high flyers can imagine prices at which they would be mere holds or, heaven forbid, sells.”

0.69

Overpriced is not the same as going down tomorrow—prices can remain disconnected from value for extended periods, making timing-based bets on mean reversion dangerous.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I always remind people overpriced is not the same as going down tomorrow. And if you bear that simple truth in mind, I think it helps.”

0.69

Mortgage lending standards dropped in recent years and risk increased because buyers took out the biggest mortgages possible given their incomes and prevailing interest rates, making them vulnerable when conditions deteriorated.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“In the end, buyers took out the biggest mortgage possible given their incomes and prevailing interest rates. Such mortgages would land them in the houses of their dreams and would leave them there as long as conditions did not deteriorate, which they invariably do. Anyway you slice it, standards for mortgage loans have dropped in recent years and risk has increased.”

0.69

Moody's definition of B-rated bonds as 'failing to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment' shows that agencies rate bonds without reference to price, making low-quality bonds bad investments at any price—but price determines whether they're actually bad buys.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“In the Moody's guide to bonds in those years, what was the definition of a B rated bond? Quote, fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment. In other words, it's a bad investment. Now, I drove here from the airport in my car. And if I take you outside to look at my car and I offer it to you for sale because I don't need that car anymore. When I'm done here, I'm not coming back. If I say to you, would you like to buy my car, what is the one question you must ask me before saying yes or no? Price.”

0.69

Through experience, Marks learned that if you invest in the best companies in America when they're overpriced, you lose a lot of money, but if you invest in the worst companies in America (high-yield bonds) when they're cheap, you make most of the money.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“So here we are, in my experience—again, experience as a teacher—you invest in the best companies in America, you lose a lot of money. Then you go to the high yield bond business, you invest in the worst companies in America, you make most money. So it's an instructive lesson if you have your eyes open and you learn from experience, which I did.”

0.69

In a 'race to the bottom,' investors bidding in reverse auction push returns lower and covenants looser as capital seeks returns—bond issuers offer lower rates with fewer protections as competitive demand drives pricing lower.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“So there's a bond that's going to be issued by a company. I say I demand 7% interest. And this fellow says, no, I'll take six. And that guy says, I'll take five. I say I want protective covenants to make sure that the company can't do things that ruins its own credit worthiness. He says I'll do it with less covenants. And that guy says, I'll do it with no covenants. What happens? The bond is issued at 5% with no covenants. And that's the race to the bottom.”

0.69

A catalyst is an event that forces the convergence of price to intrinsic value—examples include the maturity date of a bond or activist investors taking board seats and forcing management changes.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“On occasion, there are what we call catalysts. And one catalyst would be the pending maturity of a bond. If a bond is going to mature in 2012 and it's selling at 60 because most people think it's going to go bankrupt but we think it's going to pay off at maturity, then the existence of the maturity date is going to force the convergence of price to value. Another catalyst today is all these activist investors. They find the company. It's selling. They think the interesting value is here. It's selling here because the management is sub par and they're not doing the right strategy. So they go in. They foment trouble. They try to get a board seat. They try to force the management to do the right thing to course, to cause, the price to converge with the value.”

0.69

Most stocks never get catalyzed—there aren't enough activist investors to move prices, so most stock positions must hope for convergence without relying on catalysts.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“There aren't enough. I mean, it happens. Most of what we do is in the fixed income world. And there are more catalysts in the fixed income world than in the equity world. You find a stock. How many stocks you think the activist investors go after a year? 10? 20? 50? 100? No more. There are thousands of stocks. So most stocks are never going to get catalyzed.”

0.69

Oaktree has made about 23% a year for 28 years investing in distressed debt before fees without any leverage, which is astronomical return performance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“And we've made about 23% a year for 28 years investing in distressed debt before fees without any leverage. So that's pretty astronomical.”

0.69

From time to time in distressed debt, you get to buy things for less than they're worth, and often you get them for much less than their worth because other investors are fleeing bankruptcy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Why? Because from time to time in distress debt you get to buy things for less than they're worth. And in fact because other people are fleeing from the bankruptcy, maybe you get them to buy them for a lot less than they're worth.”

0.69

If you can get accounts and show good performance, you'll get more money, but the person managing growth must halt it before scale destroys returns—you have to stop before running into the wall.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“So you have to halt that. But the truth of the matter is that the little guy has an advantage as long as he's willing to stay small. Many people are not because in the short run, the more money you manage when you get fees, it's a great lure to take on more money. But you have to stop it at a point before it starts running your performance.”

0.69

A person with a big brain, a little money, a lot of time, and exceptional insight can find great bargains, but that's a daunting list and Buffett's guarantee of beating the market likely doesn't extend to everyone.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“So I believe that the person who has a big brain, and a little money, and a lot of time, and exceptional insight can find great bargains. But that's a pretty daunting list. And I don't think that Buffett's guarantee necessarily extents to everybody in this room.”

0.68

Marks explains the creditor recovery process in bankruptcy: creditors of a company have claims against the company's value, which they exercise in bankruptcy, typically wiping out old owners and making creditors the new owners.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“And we had to explain to them that if a creditor of a company doesn't get paid the interest in principle as promised, they have a claim against the value of the company. And they exert that claim in a process called bankruptcy. And in bankruptcy, to oversimplify and over generalize, the old owners are wiped out. And the old creditors become the new owners.”

0.68

Extrapolation in economic forecasting works most of the time because the future usually resembles the recent past, but extrapolative forecasts don't make money because expected outcomes are already priced into securities.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Usually, in economics, extrapolation works. Usually, the future looks like the recent past. So usually, the people who forecast a continuation of the current are right. The only problem is they don't make any money. Because let's take the economy—most people forecast two something for this year. A growth rate of two something is cooked into the prices of securities today. If the growth rate turns out to be two something, everybody who forecasted that would be right. But security prices will not change much because that two something growth was anticipated and discounted a year or two ago.”

0.68

Marks believes investing is a losers game, but not because the market is perfectly efficient (he believes there are inefficiencies); rather because it is hard to consistently exploit inefficiencies and requires exceptional ability to do so.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Now I believe also that it's a losers game. Not as much as Charlie believes and not for the same reason. Charlie believes that investing is a losers game because the market is efficient and securities are priced right. I believe there are inefficiencies. I just think it's hard to consistently take advantage of them. And you have to be an exceptional person to take advantage of them on a consistent basis.”

0.68

Index funds guarantee performance in line with the index but eliminate both the likelihood of underperforming and the possibility of outperforming the market.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“What an index fund does is it guarantees you performance in line with the index. So the point is because of the operation of what's called the efficient market, not many people can beat the market. It's true. Most mutual funds do not beat the market.”

0.68

The reason for market efficiency is the concerted efforts of thousands of investors trying to find bargains—but if active investment interest declines and analysts stop studying companies, prices will resume deviating from intrinsic value and it becomes possible to beat the market again.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“So the reason for the inability to beat the market is the markets efficiency. The markets efficiency comes from the concerted efforts of thousands of investors who are trying to find the bargains. What happens when they stop trying? So when the interest in active investment declines because people give up on it and turn to passive investing and all the analysts quick studying the companies, then prices resume their deviation from intrinsic value. Then it becomes possible to beat the market again.”

0.66

The bottom line on forecasting is that forecasting is not valuable because randomness will play a big role in what happens, and randomness is by definition unpredictable.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“So the bottom line for me is their forecasting is not valuable. And that's something that my experience has told me. So we don't know what's going to happen and randomness will play a big role in what happens. And randomness is, by definition, unpredictable.”

0.66

As managers get more capital under management, the challenge is that more money eventually leads to bad performance if unchecked; because the greater the assets under management, the less flexibility and ability to find sufficient opportunities, there is an optimal asset size beyond which returns deteriorate.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“if you get some accounts and you have good performance, you'll get more accounts... what I really say is that if you have good performance, you'll get more money. And eventually, if you let that process become unchecked, if you get more money, you'll have bad performance... So you have to halt that.”

0.64

Today, safe instruments like money market funds and short/intermediate treasuries yield zero after fees and expenses, forcing investors who want returns to chase risky assets mindlessly.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“And you'll see that for money market and short term treasuries, and maybe intermediate treasury, the yield is zero. So just think. The guy is watching the Super Bowl in his undershirt. He gets a statement from Fidelity. He opens it up, and it says the yield on your fund is now zero. He grabs the phone. He calls the 800 number. He says get me out of that fund that yields zero, and put me in the one that yields six. And he becomes a high yield bond investor.”

0.64

The capital market line—which extends from the risk-free rate through various asset classes based on their risk—has had a parallel downward shift because the risk-free rate has gone from 6.5% to zero.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“What we call the capital market line extends from what's called the risk free rate. The risk free rate is the rate, generally speaking, on the 30 day treasury bill. And of course, if you can get 3% on the risk free rate, then in order to tie up your money for five years in a five year treasury you want four. And to get it 10 years, you want five. And if you can get 10 years on a government security of 5%, then in order to go into a corporate security, which has some credit risk, you would demand six. And to go into a high yield bond, you demand 12 and so forth. So there's a kind of a process called equilibration, which makes things line up in terms of relative risk and return but always pegged from the risk free rate. Today, the risk free rate is zero. So everything that I just named, this capital market line, has had a parallel downward shift.”

0.63

Most mutual funds do not beat the market, and most active investment schemes impose fees they don't earn, which is a major reason most active investment schemes perform below average.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Most mutual funds do not beat the market. Most mutual fund investors would be better off just to be in an index fund. And in fact, most active investment schemes impose fees that they don't earn. And that is one of the major reasons that most active investment schemes perform below average.”

0.62

Marks does not believe in macro forecasts of interest rates, economic performance, or stock market performance, and does not think such forecasts aid superior investment performance.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Now I don't believe in forecasts, macro forecasts. People who forecast interest rates, performance of economies, and performance of stock markets. And I don't think that my efforts to be a superior investor and most other people's are aided by macro forecasts.”

0.61

Championship tennis players win by hitting winners—shots the opponent cannot return—while amateur players win by avoiding errors and letting opponents make mistakes.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“There are two kinds of winning tennis players. If you look at Pete Sampras, or Nadal, or Djokovic, how do they win? The winning champion tennis player wins by hitting winning shots. Hits shots that the opponent can't return. They're either so well placed, or so strategic, or so fast and hard that the opponent can't return them.”

0.61

The high-yield bond industry started very hard because people didn't understand it, but once results proved out, money followed—showing the importance of being able to articulate the thesis clearly to early adopters.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“And then, if you get good results, then you get more clients. So that goes a little further because what I really say is that if you have good performance, you'll get more money.”

0.57

Before the crisis, Marks had all his money outside Oaktree in Treasury bonds earning 6.5% for 1-6 year maturities, providing both income and safety simultaneously—a choice no longer available at zero rates.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“Before the crisis, [I] was getting 6 1/2% for one, two, three, four, five, six year maturities. I was getting income and safety. Today, you have a choice. Income or safety because the things today that are highly safe pay no income.”

0.56

Marks responds that human nature makes it unlikely that everyone will become too prudent—most people are motivated by desire for wealth through genius or luck rather than through caution, so prudence remains rare.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Well, number one, I don't think that we have to worry about everybody becoming to prudent or to wise because we're talking about human nature. Charlie Munger—the boys went to see Charlie Munger this week. One of the great quotes that Charlie gave me was from the philosopher Demosthenes, who said for that which a man wishes that he will believe. What do most people want more anything else? They want to get rich. Very few people think that the secret to their happiness comes from prudence and caution. Most people think it comes from that stroke of genius, which will put them on easy street.”

0.56

Investment philosophy is not something one is born with, but develops through the combination of what one has been taught by teachers and parents, one's experiences, and how those experiences modify what was taught.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Your philosophy will come from the combination of what you have been taught by your teachers and parents and your experiences and what your experiences tell you about the things you were taught and how they have to be modified.”

0.52

Review of the Wall Street Journal's polls of economists shows that when someone makes a radically correct forecast, that person typically makes radical forecasts all the time and is wrong on other occasions—their track record provides no basis for trusting future forecasts.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Once in awhile, something changes radically. And invariably, somebody predicted it. But the problem is, if you look at that person's other forecasts over the years, you see that that person always made radical forecasts and never was right any other time.”

0.52

An audience question raises the possibility that if everyone becomes too prudent and avoids losers, the wise strategy should flip to going for winners—a self-correcting mechanism.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Audience Member)

“But if everybody in the world is trying to avoid losers, maybe the wise investor now shoots for the winners, do you know what I mean? Sort of self-balancing.”

0.51

Should does not equal will—things that should happen often fail to happen, and even when they do happen, they frequently fail to happen on schedule, requiring decision-makers to survive the interim period.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“So the point is as I lived my life from learning about [Taleb], from learning from my own experience, I realized that should does not equal will. Lots of things that should happen fail to happen. And even if they don't fail to happen, they fail to happen on schedule. So the thing that the economist or the financier thinks should happen this year may happen in three years. And you got to live three years to see it happen.”

0.51

The most important thing in investing is controlling risk, but five minutes later the most important thing is buying at a low price, and five minutes later the most important thing is acting as a contrarian—there are multiple important things, not just one.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I would find myself in my client's office. And I would say the most important thing in investing is controlling risk. And then five minutes later, I would say the most important thing is to buy at a low price. And five minutes later, I would say the most important thing is to act as a contrarian.”

0.48

As an investor with clients and fiduciary responsibility, you can't do 'destructive testing' by running into the wall to find your capacity limit; you must stop before the wall, meaning you never discover your true capacity limit.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“But as an investor with clients and a fiduciary responsibility, I don't have the luxury of doing destructive testing. So I can't add more. People always say to me, well, what's the limit on how much money you can invest well? And I can't find out by running into the wall. I have to stop this side of the wall. One of the interesting lessons is that if you stop this side of the wall then you never find out where the wall really is.”

0.46

The most important tenet of Oaktree's investment philosophy is risk control—the firm's goal is not making a lot of money, beating the market, or being in the top quartile, but controlling risk.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“So the first one says that the most important thing is risk control. And we tell the clients we think that for excellence in investing, the most important thing is not making a lot of money. It's not beating the market. It's not being in the top quartile. The most important thing is controlling risk. That's our job. That's what we'll do for you.”

0.45

Oaktree's current model for the past 3.5 years has been 'move forward but with caution,' with caution as a very important component of everyone's actions today.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“Oak Tree's model for the last 3 and 1/2 years has been move forward but with caution. Caution has to be a very important component of everybody's actions today.”

0.43

Oaktree's core operational model is: if they avoid the losers, the winners take care of themselves, and if they can weed out problems from a large number of investments, they'll achieve a bell-shaped curve with few exceptional performers and no terrible outcomes.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“And in fact, it's all distilled in our model, which says that if we avoid the losers, the winners take care of themselves. And if we can make a large number of investors and just weed out the problems, then we'll have—just think of the bell shaped curve. We'll have a lot to do OK and an occasional one, which is exceptional if we can weed these out.”

0.33

Americans semi-intuitively understand the value of contrarianism and being a maverick, but in many other countries, contrarian approaches are not understood or accepted.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I think that Americans semi intuitively understand the value of contrarianism and of being a maverick. But in many countries, they just don't get it.”

0.17

Nassim Taleb's 'Fooled by Randomness' is either the most important badly written book or the worst written very important book ever, containing profound ideas that are not presented clearly.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“I tell all the people I speak to that it is either the most important badly written book or the worst written very important book that you'll ever read. I think it's not very clear.”