What this covers

This is a conversation between Pyotr Kurzin and Mark Galeotti, who works through the pressures on the Russian state from several directions. The opening concerns the domestic mood: about 40% of an average household budget now goes to food, mortgage rates are punishing, and foreclosures are high. Galeotti separates a 2023-2024 phase, when defense spending put money in pockets and lifted consumption, from the weaker position that lies beneath it. He describes a split inside the elite, with pragmatists such as Sergey Kiriyenko openly talking about ending the war on the basis of the roughly 80% of Donbas Russia already holds, and hawks pushing the other way.

A long middle stretch asks why Russians do not protest. Galeotti argues that comparisons with Ukrainians are misleading, since Russian dissent meets harsh, performative repression and threats to family and livelihood. He also says the Kremlin is the largest consumer of Russian polling and that outsiders cannot know what Russians really think. He offers a distinction between "Putin the avatar" and "Putin the politician" to explain high approval alongside low trust, and he cites the Prigozhin mutiny and 1989 and 1991 as evidence that change comes quickly once security forces stop dispersing crowds.

The conversation then moves outward. Galeotti lists Russia's lost soft power and slipping hegemonic position: Tokayev in Kazakhstan speaking against the war, Armenia left to deal with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and setbacks in Venezuela, Cuba and Africa. He treats Europe as a co-belligerent and sets out Russian escalation options, including reflagging vessels, naval convoys, and further mobilization of about 150,000 untouched conscripts.

The most distinctive section covers the shadow fleet. Galeotti calls it a market phenomenon, with only about a quarter of the vessels Russian-controlled, and criticizes governments for treating it as a security problem. He prefers a market economics approach to sanctions, pointing to the roughly four extra days that avoiding the English Channel adds to a voyage.

Sharpest takeaway

Mark Galeotti argues that Russia faces a critical juncture where economic pressures and military stalemate are forcing a debate between pragmatists willing to freeze the war and hawks advocating escalation, while Putin's war has catastrophically undermined Russia's great power status despite his original intent to restore it.

  • Russian public is noticing severe economic strain (40% of budgets on food, high mortgage rates, foreclosures) but hopes the war will end soon allowing economic rebound
  • Internal Kremlin debate is shifting: pragmatists like Sergey Kiriyenko are now publicly advocating ending the war and accepting the 80% of Donbas already controlled, signaling a green light from Putin for this perspective
  • Russia's strategic position has deteriorated across Central Asia, South Caucasus, and globally—Kazakhstan's Tokayev speaks against the war despite owing his position to Russia, Armenia has abandoned Russian alliance, Turkey dominates South Caucasus, undermining Putin's goal of restoring Russian great power status

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0.75

The 'shadow fleet' is not primarily a Russian instrument but a market phenomenon reflecting supply and demand: people want cheap Russian oil, Russians want to sell it, and shippers use various vessels to move it, with only about a quarter of shadow fleet vessels actually Russian-owned or Russian-controlled.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“This shadow fleet, it's sometimes framed as if it's some kind of Russian instrument, which it's not. It's actually really a reflection of the workings of the market. There are people who want to buy cheap Russian oil and the Russians want to sell it. And therefore, there are people who have tankers that will try and find ways of of moving that oil...no only about a quarter of the shadow fleet is actually Russian owned or Russian controlled. The rest are all sorts of other different sort of shippers and such like.”

0.75

Russia has lost substantial soft power capacity and its hegemonic position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Kazakhstan's Tokayev (who owes his position to Putin) openly speaks against the war; Turkey is now the dominant regional power in the South Caucasus; Armenia, abandoned by Russia during Azerbaijan's attack, is forced to make deals with Azerbaijan and Turkey; and Russia is experiencing setbacks in Venezuela, Cuba, and Africa.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Where's its soft power? Um where is its old hegemonic position within Central Asia or the South Caucasus? You know, you've got Tokayev in Kazakhstan, a man who really, in many ways, owes his position to Putin and the intervention of Russian-led forces during a sort of a crisis in January 2022. But nonetheless, Tokayev is also willing to actually speak out against this war. In South Caucasus, I mean frankly Turkey is increasingly the sub-dominant hegemon. And even Armenia, which is smarting because the Russians basically abandoned it in the face of Azerbaijan's attack...are therefore thinking, well, we can't trust the Russians, so we're going to have to make some kind of a deal with the Azeris and more to the point with the Turks. Um let alone what's happened in Venezuela, what might happen in Cuba, the continuing travails and some limited successes of their activities in Africa.”

0.74

Putin's invasion of Ukraine was motivated by his determination to restore Russia as a great power and lift it 'off its knees,' but the war has instead led to serious disintegration of Russia's strategic positions, making the outcome catastrophic for Russia's longer-term interests.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Mark Galeotti

“Putin was so determined that he was going to be the leader who lifted Russia up off its knees. And he's presiding over the all in the name of of this this futile imperial war, he's presiding over the serious disintegration, frankly, of of of Russia's positions.”

0.70

Russia will not disappear or fragment, remains a nuclear power with permanent UN Security Council seat, and retains a 'perverse capacity' to be influential through causing mischief, but this is fundamentally different from the great power status Putin sought to restore.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Mark Galeotti

“Russia is not going anywhere. It's not going to fall fragment. It's still a nuclear power. For the moment, it still has its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It has a kind of perverse capacity to be influential by causing mischief. And we can't uh get away from the fact that actually being a being a troublemaker does give you some options.”

0.70

It is 'bloody hard to buck the market' and simple approaches like listing vessels as bad and saying they cannot operate will not solve the shadow fleet problem without actually changing the underlying economic incentives.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Mark Galeotti

“it's bloody hard to buck the market, and especially so when in a way I think too many governments are not thinking of this in economic terms.”

0.70

Russia still has military options available if it decides to escalate: it could flag shadow fleet vessels to gain immunity from boarding, it could convoy shadow fleet vessels with warships, or it could conduct further mobilization waves of the estimated 150,000 conscripts not yet deployed, though each option has costs.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“The Russians have options, too. They could, for example, flag these vessels themselves, which would mean that they were no longer so susceptible to being boarded as long as they weren't in territorial waters...they can convoy them...there's about 150,000 conscripts they could send in who up to now have not been sent in because again, it would be politically massively disruptive.”

0.70

Putin's approval ratings have declined from once being in the 80% range to now being only just over 50%, which by Western standards would be excellent but is significant given that this figure exists in an environment with no opposition and no alternative.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“it was once in the 80% now clearly it has fallen according to some it's only just over 50%. Now look by the standards of any Western politician a 50% approval rating is something that they they would be absolutely delighted with. Absolutely fine. Um but on the other hand it it's it's it's an environment where there is no opposition, there is no alternative.”

0.69

Europe is now a co-belligerent in the Ukraine war because it is bankrolling and arming Ukraine; without European support, Ukraine could not sustain its war effort at current intensity, making Europe a strategic concern for Putin.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Europe is a co-belligerent. After all, it it it's bankrolling, it's arming the Ukrainians. Without the European support, Ukraine could not sustain this this this war effort, certainly not at this pitch.”

0.69

The person asking questions believes that pro-Ukrainian voices often misunderstand or lack understanding of how entrenched Russia's authoritarian system is and what risks are involved in showing resistance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Interviewer)

“A lot of very uh pro-Ukrainian voices will argue that most Russians are pro it because they haven't done enough to stop it. But I think that that shows an under under a misunderstanding or lack of understanding of just how entrenched the system is and and and and the risks that are associated with showing any resistance.”

0.69

Russians protested against the war, especially at the beginning, but were dealt with very harshly and performatively so, whereas Ukrainians did not face equivalent state threats, making the comparison between Russian and Ukrainian protest willingness misleading.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Russians did protest. I mean, to to a degree still do, but certainly at at the beginning, fair number of Russians did protest. They were dealt with very, very harshly, performatively harshly. And it's all very well saying, 'Oh well, you know, Ukrainians went out and protested.' But again, they they did not face the kind of threats that Russian citizens do.”

0.69

It is exceedingly difficult to know what Russians are actually feeling, thinking, and believing, leaving scope for everyone to decide what they think Russians believe.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“It is exceedingly difficult to to know quite what the Russians are feeling and and and and thinking and therefore yes there is this scope for everyone to decide what they actually think.”

0.69

The Prigozhin mutiny demonstrated that people will protest or rebel up to the point where they think they can succeed, and that momentum and belief in success are critical for overcoming rational fear in authoritarian systems.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Up to the point where they think that they can get away with it. Up to they think there's a chance of success. And this is why I think that momentum is going to prove to be very important.”

0.69

If economic pressures push Russians into the streets and the police/National Guard do not disperse them, or even join the protests (as in 1989 Central/East Europe and 1991 Soviet Union), rapid change becomes possible and the regime loses control quickly.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“The prospect of let's say economic pressures pushing people out in the streets. If that is not dispersed, and especially if we see the police and the National Guard either just standing back or maybe even joining the protests. This is kind of thing we saw in 1989 across, you know, Central East Europe and then in 1991 in the Soviet Union. Well, then all of a sudden people think, 'Ah, okay. Times have changed.' And then things could change very very quickly.”

0.68

A Russian person in Russia faces severe risks for protesting: not only personal violence ('truncheon down') but also consequences for family, potentially including economic ruin or worse, which explains why protest rates are low in police states regardless of public opinion.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Mark Galeotti

“If I was a Russian in Russia not, you know, with of the sort of people who can, you know, have the opportunity to to flee the country or whatever, I'd be thinking twice and thrice before doing anything that's going to get me truncheon down and get my family potentially sort of if I'm lucky just simply in in penury, if I'm unlucky something worse. Um this this is why people tend not to protest in police states up to that point.”

0.65

The Kremlin government is the single largest consumer of Russian polling data, meaning they have better information about public opinion than Western observers, yet this data is not made public.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“If only we had access to the opinion polling dating data that the Kremlin has and because they are still government is still the single largest consumer of Russian polling data.”

0.64

About 40% of an average Russian's budget is now going to food, mortgage rates remain too high preventing new mortgages or making existing mortgages crippling, and there are high levels of foreclosures—all of which Russians are acutely aware of despite limited ability to protest.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“When 40% of the your average person's budget is going on food, when you can't get a mortgage because the interest rates remain too high or your existing mortgage is is is proving crippling and there's high levels of of foreclosures and the like. You know, all all of these these factors people of course are noticing.”

0.63

Russia has experienced two distinct phases of public sentiment under war: 2023-2024 saw artificial quality of life increases due to high defense spending that put money in people's pockets and increased consumption, but this temporary boost masks underlying economic deterioration and is not sustainable long-term.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“2023 and 2024 saw people's quality of life increase artificially because of high levels of defense spending, but nonetheless, people had more money in their pocket and were spending more. So, it's not like they're yet at a point where they think it's been 10 years now and nothing is getting better.”

0.63

Galeotti comments that slamming drones into kindergartens has notable effects on Ukrainian mindsets, implying this reality-checks Putin's assumptions about Ukrainian irrationality.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“It's amazing what slamming drones into kindergartens does to people's mindsets.”

0.61

Even if people are opposed to war, there is a natural patriotism that leads them to prefer their country to win the war rather than lose it, which provides a pretext or reason for not protesting against the war effort.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“there is also I think it's worth noting a considerable degree of just natural patriotism. You may not have wanted this war but if your country is in a war you'd rather it win the war rather than lose it. And that is a reason or for some people a pretext for not protesting right now.”

0.57

There exist two distinct Putins in Russian political consciousness: 'Putin the avatar'—the icon of the country to which approval questions implicitly ask if respondents are patriots—and 'Putin the politician' whose actual policies can be evaluated independently, explaining the paradox of high approval ratings coexisting with low trust ratings.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“There is Putin who's become the avatar, the icon of the country. And therefore being asked you approve of Putin is in some ways being asked are you a patriot or something. And then there's Putin the politician, Putin the person who actually enacts policies on which you could have specific practical opinions.”

0.55

Governments are thinking about shadow fleet sanctions in securitized terms (as a security threat to counter) rather than economic terms (as a market that needs to be made unprofitable), which explains why their enforcement is ineffective.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“I think too many governments are not thinking of this in economic terms. They're thinking of this essentially in a sort of securitized terms. Whereas, actually they just need to think, well, what is it that is going to change the market incentives for these shippers and these customers”

0.52

Putin views the world through great power politics and cares deeply about being treated with respect by other powers, associating how he is personally treated with whether Russia is being shown respect—this emotional dimension drives his foreign policy alongside geopolitical calculation.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“He looks through the world through geopolitics. He also looks through the world through a tremendously egotistical notion of Russia's honor and respect, and he very much in sort of associates how people treat him with with whether or not they're showing Russia respect. And from his point of view, Europe is not respecting Russia. And that's what I think does also seriously get under his skin. So, I think there is a strong emotional dimension here, too.”

0.52

Putin believes he needs someone else (originally Trump, now possibly Europe) to force Ukraine to the negotiating table because he has a bizarre and distorted notion of Ukrainians as not a real people/country, yet also deeply irrational and motivated by 'gut level Russophobia' rather than rational self-interest.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“He has a a bizarre and distorted notion of Ukrainians. I mean, largely he thinks they're they're not a real people or a real country, but he also regards them as deeply irrational, motivated by some kind of gut level Russophobia rather than anything else...he has been looking for for who can as it were, well, as he would think of it, you know, bring some sense to the Ukrainians.”

0.52

Russians can simultaneously oppose the war while also feeling that Ukrainian strikes making it important the war end quickly, and can feel angry at Ukrainian attacks killing civilians (some appearing to be targeted rather than collateral), without this contradicting their opposition to Russian expansion.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“You can on the one hand be opposed to the war. And at the same time also feel that these attacks make it all the more important that the war end as quickly as possible. And that Russia stop trying to sort of push further into Ukraine. And you can also be angry at the Ukrainians for their strikes which are killing civilians. And in some cases seem to seem to do so in ways that you know, certainly it's uh are regarded as actually potentially actually targeted strikes rather than just a you know, drone hit by electronic warfare and going and sort of going off off course.”

0.52

Dissuading shadow fleet vessels from using the English Channel adds approximately four days and fuel costs to their journey, which changes the economic calculus for some shippers and customers, making it a valid market-economics approach to sanctions rather than a security interdiction approach.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Taking for example the idea of trying to dissuade shadow fleet vessels from going through the English Channel. I mean, that will generally add about four days and a certain amount of fuel to any sort of journey, which changes the economics and maybe makes it for some shippers less worthwhile, for some customers, perhaps less less worthwhile.”

0.52

One or two seizures of shadow fleet vessels will not change the economic calculus because seized vessels have been impounded only temporarily, fined at roughly 10% of the oil value, and then released—a cost easily factored into shipping economics.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“If we look at the ships that the French and the Belgians boarded, they were impounded for a while, ended up just simply paying a fine that was worth about 10% of the value of the oil on board, and allowed on their way. So, you know, we I don't think we've quite cracked it yet...one or two instances are not going to do the trick.”

0.49

The massive Patriot missile demand from the Gulf War (described as 'extraordinarily foolish') has created such severe supply constraints that the United States will not have spare Patriot missiles available to provide to Ukraine for a considerable time, regardless of Trump's willingness.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“Frankly this this this extraordinary foolish Gulf War has led to such a Patriot hunger for the interceptor missiles that restocking American supplies and also the magazines of America's allies in the Gulf for whom they essentially regard this as a as a necessary demand for continued sort of willingness to work with with Washington means that actually this there's not going to be many patriots around for quite some time to come.”

0.49

There is a growing chorus of voices in Russia, now being articulated publicly (not just behind closed doors as before) and associated with prominent figures like Sergey Kiriyenko (First Deputy Head of Presidential Administration), arguing that Russia has reached a point of diminishing returns and should freeze the war, declare victory, and move on.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“A growing chorus of voices saying, 'Look, we've reached the point of of diminishing returns. Let's just stop the war, freeze it now, declare a triumph, and move on.' And this is something that is increasingly public in it being articulated in in the press by experts...it's being associated with people like Sergey Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the presidential administration, and by no means some kind of maverick voice.”

0.48

Trump's attitudes toward Ukraine are changing primarily because Trump likes winners and wants to associate himself with winners, not for principled reasons—he was previously brutal with Zelenskyy precisely because he thought Zelenskyy had no cards, but the military situation is now different.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“Trump essentially likes winners. He wants to associate himself with winners. This is one of the reasons why he was so brutal with Zelensky because precisely he thought that Zelensky didn't have any cards. Well now the situation is is rather different so his his attitudes are different.”

0.47

The British Navy's seizure of a shadow fleet tanker was a performative operation: the footage of Royal Marines rappelling was filmed after the event, not contemporaneously; legally it was justified because Cameroon had withdrawn the ship's flag registration making it unflagged, but then the same frigate later escorted other shadow fleet vessels through the English Channel unmolested.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“After all all that footage that we saw. I mean, that was staged after the event. Um it wasn't actually contemporaneous footage of those Royal Marines scrambling down there in their kit...it was legal under international law because Cameroon had actually withdrawn its flag registration for that ship...A few days later, it's worth noting that the same frigate that fired warning shots at uh a couple of pensioners in a yacht when they got a bit too close, then escorted shadow fleet tankers through the English Channel unmolested.”

0.45

The pragmatist position argues that Russia should end the war by ceasing operations and forgetting the remaining 20% of Donetsk because by the time it is taken, it would just be a rubble plain that would require expensive rebuilding.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“the pragmatists are saying, 'So, just end it. Just forget that last 20% of the Donbas. Who needs Sloviansk and so forth?' You know, especially because otherwise, by the time we we we took it, it would just be a rubble plain we'd have to rebuild anyway.”

0.45

Galeotti does not believe Russia will escalate to the level of using tactical nuclear weapons, despite nuclear threats being articulated by figures like Medvedev.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“Or again, I don't think we're going to go to the level of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.”

0.43

The Kremlin is gambling that the war will end before Russian economic strain becomes unbearable, specifically betting that Russia can capture the remaining 20% of Donetsk and declare victory by the end of the current year, then divert resources to domestic needs.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Mark Galeotti

“The Kremlin is gambling on the fact that this war will not go on forever...there is a certain perspective amongst a certain proportion of people in the Kremlin who genuinely believe that by the end of this year, they will have taken the last bits of Donbas, the remaining 20 or so percent of Donetsk Which gives them the opportunity to basically declare a win. And and sort of more or less try and fix fix the end to the war.”

0.43

In terms of the great power status that Putin felt was Russia's historic right and that he believed he would restore, historians will likely write very savage and critical interpretations of Putin's reign.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Galeotti

“But really in terms of that kind of great power status that Putin felt was Russia's historic right and that he was the guy who was going to bring it back. Well, now, I think when the historians write their their books, they're going to be very savage in their interpretation of of Putin's reign.”

0.42

Galeotti does not believe Trump will step in to prioritize Ukraine Patriot supplies over Israeli supplies, even if technically capable of doing so.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“He's not, I think, going to step in and say, 'Well, we're not going to let the Israelis have any.'”

0.39

Change in authoritarian regimes could happen quickly via black swan events ('all it takes is the right kind of black swan to flutter into a Kremlin tower'), even though current conditions do not yet support imminent upheaval.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“At the moment we're not yet there, but all it takes is the right kind of black swan to flutter into a Kremlin tower and things could happen quite quickly.”

0.39

Galeotti characterizes the Kremlin's optimism about rapid victory as 'whistling in the wind' and 'over optimism,' suggesting he believes the Kremlin's timeline expectations are unrealistic.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“to be honest, I think a lot of this is is is is whistling in the wind. It's over optimism.”

0.26

The term 'shadow fleet' was a mistake because it made the phenomenon sound far cooler and more menacing than it actually is, affecting how policymakers and public understand the issue.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Galeotti

“Whoever decided to call them the shadow fleet, that was a massive mistake. It made it sound way cooler than it really is.”