
China, India and the Global Order (or Disorder)
What this covers
This LSE School of Public Policy panel brings together Vince Cable, Niall Ferguson, China specialist Rebecca Neilson and Dean Andres Vasco, with audience questions. Its starting point is the publisher's claim that the liberal postwar order is dying, and it asks how China, India and the interaction between them fit into what replaces it. Ferguson argues for a "Cold War II" in which economic coercion (financial sanctions, export controls and secondary sanctions) is the real substructure of power. On his account, countries that depend on US security have no real option to stay non-aligned. Neilson pushes back on the "disorder" framing, noting that order depends on where one stands, and on the idea that Xi's agenda is new. She traces National Rejuvenation to 1997 and China's South-South engagement to Bandung in 1955.
The range is wide. On Russia, Cable argues that the oil price cap has been undermined by shadow fleets, Chinese and Indian among them, while Ferguson says Chinese exports of semiconductors and dual-use goods keep Russia in the war. Cable sets out the alternative institutions: the AIIB, which he calls effective and professional, and the trade blocs. He notes that the CPTPP) was conceived under President Obama to keep China out, yet the US is now outside it and China wants in. India has declined to join RCEP. Neilson covers Beijing's tension between connectivity and self-reliance, including a near 50% rise in chip funding, and its contradictory treatment of private and foreign capital.
The sharpest disagreements concern money and India. Ferguson holds that in currency terms there is only one superpower, citing wealth flowing from BRICS countries to the G7) as revealed preference. Vasco recalls Larry Summers's quip that you cannot replace something with nothing. Cable counters that sanctions are unsettling wealthy holders of assets, and that China is running a parallel system of debt relief tied to the RMB). On India, Cable contests the view that it is being drawn into an American alliance, pointing to convergence with China on Russia, climate justice and strongman governance, alongside friction with the US over human rights. Ferguson adds a caution about trend extrapolation, citing the Samuelson textbook's repeated forecasts that the USSR would overtake the US.
The world is experiencing a bipolar great power competition between the US and China despite surface multipolar complexity, with the dollar's dominance proving more resilient than many predict, while India's potential role remains dangerously underestimated by Western policymakers.
- Manufacturing capacity has completely reversed: US led 2x China in 2000, now China leads 2x the US; China dominates BRICS despite its multipolar appearance
- Dollar remains unchallenged as reserve currency and medium of exchange despite RMB efforts; wealthy investors flee BRICS for G7 rule of law protections
- India's compound growth trajectory and 1.4B population position it as potentially the second global economy within decades, yet it remains systematically overlooked by Western strategic analysis
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China's engagement with the Global South is not new, dating back to 1955 at the Bandung Conference, with China providing aid to Vietnam and other countries even during the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward, establishing a continuous 70-year track record of south-south cooperation.
“and so China's actually quite clear it's about growing and building um building up um the country and to do that it emphasizes strongly this cooperation with developing countries so this is now why we see um a lot of talk about China's engagement with the global South but again this is not new engagement so China and the global South go back to 1955 to the Bandung conference we have um China delivering um Aid to Vietnam and other countries even during um the period of great turmoil in China such as Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward”
Disinformation and misinformation are increasingly challenging, especially as technology evolves with artificial intelligence and deep fakes, requiring strategic attention to information environment in Cold War II context.
“so this is a a a challenge I mean and the issue of um disinformation misinformation um particularly as technology evolves um artificial intelligence and deep fakes um this is increasingly um a challenge”
Countries dependent on US security have no real option to be non-aligned in a US-China conflict because the US can use secondary sanctions and financial weapons to coerce them; this economic coercion (financial sanctions, export controls) is the true substructure of Cold War II power, not multilateral institutions.
“if you are Reliance on the United States for a significant part of your security and that is essentially being a NATO country or being an ally of the United States elsewhere in the world uh it doesn't matter how much trade you're doing with China in the event of a crunch you are not going to be able to be non-aligned and the reason is uh secondary sanctions one has to bear in mind that in Cold War I because of the high level of economic interdependence uh the United States can engage uh in purely economic uh forms of what might be called Warfare uh and sanctions Financial sanctions in particular are pretty good example of this uh the United States in the last 22 years has developed a whole range of new forms of economic coercion uh Financial sanctions are one and now export uh controls uh are the other”
The US-India relationship contains areas of potential tension (human rights, extrajudicial assassinations of diaspora activists) that are often misrepresented in the West as India being 'coopted' into an American alliance, when in reality India maintains significant areas of convergence with China, including on Russia, secessionist terror groups, climate justice, and strongman governance models.
“I worry a little bit that this is now being misrepresented in the west and me the um American view I is a little bit like the old John Foster dullis uh saying you know he may be a son of a but he's our son of a that somehow the India has been coopted into our side in this sort of geopolitical struggle but actually I don't think that's the way the Indians see it and there is potentially quite a lot of areas of difference it's human rights issues you read the papers today about um the attempted assassination extr territorial assassination of kistan activists um China India the there are difficult issues around the Border but there's um China China is the biggest trade partner in volume terms anyway and they're both active in the bricks group”
When asked if China wants to be in the driver's seat of the IMF, the real answer is that China wants neither to be marginalized nor to be constrained by the baggage of existing Western-dominated systems; China is operating a parallel system through debt relief (postponing rather than writing off) tied to RMB currency use.
“yeah well on on the first point yeah you know the real world is that lenders will tend to dominate banking institutions um but as you say you know China isn't a borrower um but the main problem is countries like India right in the Asian infrastructure Bank India has been allowed a disproportionately big role right right um but but I think the the key point is your your second one which is that if you're wanting to be part of the system um how does this play out with things like debt relief I mean my sense is that uh although the Chinese haven't signed up to institutions like the Paris Club um they are operating a parallel system they did through the pandemic roll over a lot of African debt uh they are current Curr uh writing off um or postponing not writing off they're currently postponing a lot of debt for countries that are critical”
In Cold Wars, the proxy war phenomenon ensures wars keep going because superpowers provide resources that would otherwise be unavailable; without external support the Ukraine war would be hard to sustain due to its destructiveness, but US-EU support for Ukraine and Chinese support for Russia mean the war will continue.
“so I mean I think that that's a really important point about this war the US and the European Union and a few others keep Ukraine in the war but China to a large extent keeps Russia in the war and that's why the war will keep going notice in cold Wars the proxy war phenomenon ensures that Wars keep going because the superpowers provide resources that otherwise wouldn't be available and it's hard to keep a war like this going without those outside resources because it's a very destructive War”
The CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership) was originally proposed by President Obama as a mechanism to keep America in and China out, but ironically the US is now out and China is attempting to join, representing a failure of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific.
“the cgtp which is um originally proposed by President Obama was probably best described as something to keep America in and the Chinese out in relation to the Asia specific but ironically the Americans are out and the Chinese are trying to get in”
The RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is a China-dominated group in Southeast Asia with less deep integration than CPTPP but nonetheless important and making progress, though India has declined to join due to concerns about over-commitment to breaking down trade barriers.
“the rce which is mostly a rather than the American side of the Pacific um in some ways a China dominated group less deep integration but nonetheless important and making some Headway um but India despite being Asia South Asia has declined to join it um the Indians thought it was too uh committed to breaking down trade barriers”
The Biden Administration's sanctions regime against Russia, promoted through Janet Yellen's scheme involving oil price caps, has not worked because shadow vessels (Chinese and Indian fleets) are circumventing it, and the administration cannot fully bottle up Russian oil without spiking prices and harming its own domestic interests.
“they've they' now have access to a lot of cheaper oil and as far as one can see the very complex uh model for um dealing with oil supplies which the Americans Dred up through Janet Yellen scheme is simply not working uh and it's mainly because of you know Shadow vessels you know which the Chinese fleets and Indian fleets are are taking full advantage of I mean part of the problem is that if you're if you're the Biden Administration you can't really do anything that uh fully bottles up Russian oil because you don't really want to spike oil prices so the there there always was a contradiction at the heart of the sanctions regime”
China's fundamental strategy involves delivering two centenary goals: a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and building an advanced modernist socialist country by 2049, with four key operational areas: managing great power relations, securing China's periphery, building new development models, and engaging the global South through strategic initiatives.
“at the the the clear message from the government is it's about delivering the two Centenary goals so those are to deliver um a moderately prosperous Society by 2021 um and to build a advanced modernist socialist country by 2049 and how China then approaches um what it to achieve that um it sees and articulates for us um four kind of key areas one is the management of great power relations and we can talk a bit later about how successful um that has been in in terms of us Russia Etc secondly is about securing China's periphery so periphery diplomacy or China's near abroad is absolutely fundamentally important”
The UK joined the AIIB as a founding member despite strong opposition from the Obama administration, which sent messages to British leadership that the US did not want Britain to participate, illustrating Britain's willingness to defy US preferences on multilateral institutions.
“I was approached when I was in the government together with George Osborne and dar Alexander to uh whether we Britain wanted to be a founding member we're very strongly opposed by the us we got messages from President Obama that this was not something the Americans wanted us to do but I think with one of the relatively few cases where the British kicked over the traces and we decided to join anyway”
In currency terms, there is only one superpower: the US; wealth consistently flows out of BRICS and into G7 countries, showing that wealthy people in emerging markets prefer to invest in countries with rule of law and property rights, which BRICS countries lack or have weakly.
“in currency terms there's only one superpower I'm nearly done remember there's a huge difference that emerges if you measure gross domestic product in current dollar terms rather than on a PPP basis if you use the PPP basis then it looks like China is already the biggest economy if you use the current dollar basis which is the Lower Blue Line here you can see that China actually reached to Peak and has somewhat retreated uh and that that's of course reflecting the fact that the the Chinese currency has in fact been somewhat weak uh in recent uh times”
Unlike Cold War I, the two superpowers of Cold War II are economically intertwined in a globalized world order that remains remarkably resilient despite predictions of 'deglobalization'; globalization has reached a plateau rather than being in crisis.
“what is interesting about the two power two superpower world of of our time which I've been inclined to call Cold War II some of you may have heard me make this argument at a an event earlier this term is that unlike in Cold War I the two super passs are economically intertwined in a globalized world order that remains remarkably resilient the standard story which you've probably read in the financial times or The Economist is that globalization is in crisis at the world economic Forum back in January I was on a panel with Adam TW and others to debate this and my point was that globalization's not really in crisis it's reached a plateau perhaps but the idea that it's somehow falling apart or dying is really not borne out by the data”
Policies attributed to Xi Jinping's leadership, including the Belt and Road Initiative and National Rejuvenation, are not new to him; they are party-level ambitions that predate him, with BRI emerging from outward investment strategies developed over decades and National Rejuvenation first appearing in 1997 under Jiang Zemin.
“I sort of push back a little bit when I hear people say China's rise kind of started in 2012 with Xi Jinping coming to power and you know the B R is is is kind of China's um you know big initiative to sort of take over the world well actually um if we think and take a step back we can see that many of um the policies particularly um in terms of BR it's about outward investment and this is not new this has been going on um for some time and when we talk about um or when the the government talks about um the importance of national Rejuvenation which has been often attributed to Xi Jinping um this actually appears for the first time in 1997 actually Jang zamin talks about this”
Russian sanctions have shaken confidence of wealthy people in maintaining assets in particular baskets; Chinese individuals have rethought whether holding money and property in the UK is safe given sanctions risks, and Saudis are diversifying transactions into Chinese currency to reduce US exclusivity.
“the third thing that was crucial was the way in which the sanctions Financial sanctions against Russia have really shaken the confidence of rich people in having their Assets in a particular basket and lot of Chinese people have rethought whether put you know having money and property in the UK isn't such a good idea there's sanctions coming on the road and it's not just Rich individuals I if you're Saudi Arabia very rich player do you really want to be tied exclusively to the US and the Saudis have been of course diversifying their transactions into Chinese currency”
Larry Summers quipped that you can't replace something with nothing when asked about dollar alternatives: 'you can't replace something with nothing—what are you going to do if Europe's a museum, Japan's an elderly care home, China is a jail, and bitcoin's an experiment?'
“and I quote the Larry summers's aphorism on the dollar just because it's fun and maybe not everybody knows it so a couple of years ago Larry was asked a question about the dollar and the challenges to it and he uh he said you can't replace I won't do the accent you can't replace something with nothing what are you going to do if Europe's a museum Japan's an elderly care home China is a jail and bitcoin's an experiment”
Whether something is disorderly or orderly in the international system depends entirely on one's perspective - it may appear ordered to some actors and disorderly to others - suggesting that framing the current system as 'global disorder' reflects Western/liberal institutional perspective rather than objective description.
“disorder is a bit is this is sort of um it's it's one of perspective so for some things might seem very ordered for others um disorder and I want to talk a little bit about um you know where where China sees things...going back to my earlier Point whether something is disorderly or orderly really does depend where you are where you are sitting”
When drawing trend lines into the future (as investment banks do), one is almost certainly going to be wrong; the Samuelson macro textbook repeatedly predicted USSR would overtake the US in GNP, edition after edition into the 1980s, a cautionary tale about extrapolating past trends.
“but the thing about lines like that is if you draw them forward into the future which is what people love to do at investment Banks you are almost certainly going to be wrong uh just as the Samuelson macro text Book used to reject the Soviet Union overtaking the United States and gross national product in addition after addition after addition right the way into the 1980s”
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China positioned itself as a champion of the developing world, arguing that the Ukraine crisis is a European issue while Africa and Pakistan are being victimized, using this narrative to strengthen South-South positioning.
“we saw um in the post uh just after the Ukraine Russian invasion of Ukraine was that China was strongly POS positioning itself um as a champion um of the developing world so it was positioning itself wangi saying you know the Ukraine um crisis this is a something that's happening in Europe but actually it's Africa um that's being victimized here and we should not forget Africa and we shouldn't forget um Pakistan um and other countries”
China faces internal challenges of contracting private sector and mounting new legislation that makes it difficult to attract foreign investment, creating a contradiction between government policies encouraging the private sector and policies restricting foreign inflow.
“I mean I agree with now in terms of which is why I mentioned it earlier in terms of the provincial um debt and as as now says the the issues of the real estate I think the other challenge as well is that you know whilst there is lots of government policies coming out at the moment about encouraging the um private sector and liang's really kind of pushing this at the same time you've got this um contraction and and and all of these um New pieces of legislation that make it very difficult to attract foreign um investment as well”
China is managing tensions between comprehensive connectivity (globalization) and self-reliance, with the 2023 Two Sessions showing very strong focus on self-reliance in food, energy, and technology, including near 50% increase in chip development funding, reflecting anxieties about US technology competition.
“China is is struggling if we think about sort of globalization it's at the moment struggling with this concept of comprehensive um connectivity um versus self-reliance and that came through quite clearly I think in the two sessions um theang which happened in March of this year and we could see the really strong focus on the need for self-reliance in terms of food and energy and Tech so here there was a big EV emphasis on um increasing um um funding for chip development so again here we you know you see the sort of tensions with the us there um so China committed um an increase of nearly 50% to 13.3 billion um RnB in 2023 up from in 2022”
China has avoided the full economic pain that sanctions were supposed to inflict on Russia partly because Chinese exports to Russia have greatly increased, especially of semiconductors and dual-use technology, much of which actually reaches the battlefield, effectively keeping Russia in the war.
“I think it illustrates very well my bipolar world that ultimately Russia's been able to avoid uh the economic pain that was supposed to be inflicted partly because China's exports to Russia have greatly increased especially of things like semiconductors and dual use technology much of which does actually make it to the battlefield and the US has decided to have a very tight definition of what constitutes lethal aid but actually a lot of what comes from China to Russia does end up contributing to the war effort”
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initially opposed by the US and boycotted by Japan, has become a very effective functioning institution under Chinese indirect guidance, operating professionally as an independent body and collaborating with the World Bank while innovating in areas like climate finance.
“China and India now had the two biggest sh shareholders and I'm to understand certainly from Danny Alexander as now Vice President and Eric beof was a former LSC Professor colleague here who's the chief Economist that this is now a very effective functioning institution very much under Chinese indirect guidance but operating as an independent professional body uh trying to collaborate with the World Bank uh trying to be you know good team player but trying to do Innovative stuff around climate Finance”
Sanctions have had secondary effects in Central Asia by weakening Russia diplomatically, allowing countries like Tajikistan to extract concessions they wouldn't have obtained otherwise, such as getting Russia to finally label the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist organization.
“I think what the sanctions have done as well particularly like in Central Asia um so as Russia has become more diplomatic diplomatically isolated I think you can see some of the Central Asian countries of course they're trying to balance you know this this position but you know countries such as T Tajikistan have been able to get some concessions out of the Russians that they perhaps wouldn't have been able to get beforehand so I think one of those has been able to um get the Russians to finally label the um Islamic reason's um party as a terrorist organization”
It is hazardous to test US economic coercion; if the US says a Dutch company cannot sell to China, testing that is a bad idea; similarly, banks cannot test financial sanctions without risking being put out of business by the US government.
“it's very very hazardous to get on the wrong side of the US if it says you're a Dutch company and asml says you can't sell your technology to China don't test that in the same way that if you're a bank and the US government says you you mustn't engage in transactions with this entity it's a bad idea to say we're going to do it anyway because they can put you out of business”
There is a significant gap between the economic share of major emerging markets like China (getting on for 20% of world economy) and India (8% of world economy) and their voting power in IMF and World Bank institutions (China 6%, India 3%), because voting shares were largely determined when these bodies were established post-WWII and have barely been adapted.
“what I've done here is just put down one side uh the share of the world economy on the left purchasing power based and in Brackets based on nominal current GMP and contrasted that with the voting within the IMF and the World Bank and you'll see that because the the voting shares were largely determined there's been some adaptation but were largely determined by the relative importance of countries when these bodies were established there's now quite a big gap opened up between the role of the big emerging markets and their share of of voting in in the institutions so China and India you see the figures there um something like getting on for 20% of the world economy but 6% of voting within the Breton Woods institutions India similarly um getting on for 8% of the world economy but three in the ifis”
The US has an unsustainable fiscal trajectory that has gotten worse since Ferguson published 'Colossus' 20 years ago; defense spending is now exceeded by debt service for the first time in a long time, debt-to-GDP is shockingly high, and Congressional Budget Office projections show an appalling trajectory with no obvious political path to fiscal reform.
“the US has been an unsustainable fiscal trajectory for a long time it's 20 years since I published a book called Colossus warning about this it's only got worse uh and you now have the the reality that defense spending is exceeded by Debt Service I think that's that's for the first time in a long time this this quarter uh that that's not a great situation to be in uh the debt to GDP ratio is shockingly high it's the trajectory is appalling if you look at the most recent Congressional budget office projections”
During the Great Financial Crisis, there was a widespread perception in China that the US 'emperor had no clothes' and that American credibility was permanently damaged, but the US subsequently recovered and even out-performed European economies.
“there was a perception particularly I think in China the financial crisis was the moment that the emperor turned out to have no clothes on and that this was going to be a kind of decisive Blow To The credibility of the United States uh as a leader I remember those conversations when I was visiting singua and it's turned out not to be true I mean the financial crisis was very problematic and challenging but the United States overcame it uh and it's outperformed the European economies uh in a really dramatic fashion since then”
The world is more fundamentally bipolar than multipolar: behind the complex governance diagrams lies a stark reality of two superpowers (US and China), with the real question for other nations being whether to align with one or the other or attempt non-alignment.
“what I'm going to suggest is that behind the open AI diagram the the flowchart of bewildering complexity is a stark reality that there are two superpowers and uh the real question for everybody else is are you going to align yourself with one or the other or try uh to remain non-aligned”
China is increasingly proposing a new model of international relations based on different understandings of global governance and the rules-based international order, which generates Western nervousness and requires better understanding of what China means by these concepts rather than assuming Western definitions.
“but then also we hear now increasingly discussions around building a new model um of international relations and I think it's this that gets um Western analysts um and Western governance government quite um nervous and I think that's where we need to have a better understanding of what we mean by global governments or the rules-based international order and what China um means by that”
If China had a fully convertible currency, capital outflows from China to the US and UK would be so massive that it would destabilize the global economy, which is why China cannot allow full currency convertibility and must maintain capital controls.
“if China had a truly convertible currency the flows from China uh to the US and I suspect to the UK would be on such a scale that it would hugely destabilize the global economy which is why China cannot in fact have a convertible uh currency”
The term 'Global South' is itself problematic because it includes countries that are geographically in the north (China, India, Iran), and African and Latin American perspectives show skepticism about China or India speaking for them—when asked who speaks for the Global South, the answer is not Beijing or Delhi.
“um haven't had a chance to talk about this and there's presumably going to be another session when you can but this is really not how the world looks to Africa I mean if you if you actually ask Africans uh is China speaking for the global South is is India they they will not give you the answer Beijing or Delhi actually where where I come from you say Global South and people get the Jitters because um first of all all these countries are in the north um and secondly you know as Latin Americans China and India or Iran for that matter speaking for us oh God forbid”
Middle powers like India, Singapore, and Brazil are pursuing 'polyamorous Cold War' strategies where they show up to both BRICS and Washington meetings, join NATO-adjacent arrangements, and hedge all sides simultaneously - this is possible while the chips are down but would collapse in a Taiwan crisis.
“Jared Cohen did for Goldman a couple of months ago uh he gives the answer that there'll be lots of uh hedging go to Singapore I was there three weeks ago and you talk to the government there that the whole strategy is to try to have it both ways it's not so much non-alignment as polyamorous Cold War where you kind of go one way one week and this is India's strategy it's like show up to the bricks show up in Washington get fated like you just join NATO and it's kind of uh fascinating to watch that that you can get away with this now you can get away with it when the chips aren't down”
If you measure AI compute capacity, artificial intelligence represents another domain where there are two superpowers and all others are essentially invisible, similar to the manufacturing story.
“suppose we looked at artificial intelligence compute there would be two superpowers and the others would be essentially invisible”
Polling data from several years ago by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation revealed that a large proportion of Germans would rather align with China than the US in a US-China conflict, which is shocking given Germany's complete strategic dependence on the US since its founding - illustrating vulnerability of traditional alignments.
“if you take for example Germany uh opinion polls that were done a couple of years ago uh by the Kerber shti revealed somewhat shockingly that a large proportion of Germans in the event of a us China conflict would rather be aligned with China this is a bizarre thing for any German to believe considering the heavy Reliance the federal republic has had on the United States for its security since its Inception”
The political problem in the United States is the inability of the political class to pass straightforward reforms on immigration and entitlements that would set the fiscal house in order; it's not a problem of Wall Street's mighty power but of political parties unable to do necessary reform.
“the problem in the United States is really not the mighty power of Wall Street the problem is the inability of people in the political class to pass the very straightforward reforms of immigration and entitlements that would set the fiscal house in order that's the problem in the United States it's not a problem of fincial interests it's a problem of of political parties”
The global governance landscape has become messily fragmented, with apex bodies (UN, Bretton Woods, WTO) losing clear authority, the G20 breaking apart into polarized G7 vs BRICS clusters, and numerous regional groupings (CPTPP, RCEP, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) competing without a clear center of power.
“I'm trying to show here the sort of sheer messiness of what's now beginning to emerge in terms of governance structures uh we've got the the Apex bodies here you could say that lying behind this is of course the hegemonic role of the United States in establishing the post-war order but at the top you have you know of course the UN the Britain Woods bodies and the World Trade Organization which is now effectively morban be because of the Trump um boycotting of the appelate body um but if if you wanted to ask the question who runs the world who runs the world economy it's not terribly clear who it is but you know the G20 would have a reasonable claim to be at the center of it”
The G7's share of global output has declined significantly since the Cold War ended, from about half to roughly one-third, while BRICS share has risen massively from 10-15% to approaching one-third, but within each grouping there is one dominant power: the US dominates the G7 and China overwhelmingly dominates BRICS.
“the share of the G7 countries a a grouping that came into existence at French initiative in the 1970s has declined quite significantly uh since the end of the Cold War so that it's no longer half it's now more more like a third slightly less of a global uh output and if you then look at the bricks countries Brazil China uh India Russia and South Africa their share has gone up massively from uh somewhere between 10 and 15% to approaching a third but but the second point that you're supposed to notice uh is that in each of these charts there is one dominant power uh if you just look there the US is the dominant member of the G7 still as it was at the beginning of the time series and if you look here China is overwhelmingly the most important member of the bricks”
The real story of the global order is a massive shift in manufacturing value added from the United States to China: 20 years ago US manufacturing was twice China's, today China's is twice the US, representing the 'great reversal' in global manufacturing capacity.
“to understand the extent to which it's really a two superow world let's look at manufacturing value added the real story of the GL that's not me the real story of the global uh order is a massive shift uh in manufacturing capacity from the United States to China this occurred after China was admitted to the World Trade Organization because in the early 2000 20 years ago manufacturing value added in the US was two times that of China today the China's is two times that of the United States that's the great reversal that's occurred uh in the global economy”
In global transactions measured by Bank for International Settlements data, the dollar constitutes roughly 90% of transactions, while the euro is the only real contender; the Chinese RMB share has grown but remains single digits, showing China's effort to increase RMB use still has a very long way to go.
“the the zoomar uh confuses this uh and other charts by concealing the Legend but obviously the dollar uh and Euro are the the lines that that are largest here and the Yen share is really much smaller if one looks at transaction volumes not reserves but transactions the dollars dominance is even more striking so if these These are bank for international settlements data and the blue bars here show the massive 90% share of global transactions that are still dollar denominated and the only real Contender the dark blue bars uh is the Euro it's true the orange bars of the Chinese share that that's gone up but it's still single digits as a share of uh of global transactions”
China exercises huge amounts of influence through social media and technology platforms like TikTok, and has invested heavily in influencing narratives in Africa through media exchanges that include traditional media training and social media coordination, plus efforts to counter Western narratives on COVID and vaccines.
“um yes I mean absolutely I mean there is a huge amount of um influenced by China in terms of uh yeah social media um Tik Tok as you say um also so um the the amount of investment um that China has undertaken particularly um let's say in in Africa which is why I um drew attention to the various media um exchanges by that I mean not just um you know traditional media which includes the training of journalists um Etc but also um on on social media and we saw um the huge um efforts that were um undertak by China around countering some of the narratives on on covid on vaccines um Etc”
India has been one of the most overhyped countries in the 21st century, with every year being 'India's year' and every decade being 'India's decade,' yet India's economic and geopolitical performance has not lived up to these predictions.
“India and I hope this doesn't offend anyone is uh has been one of the most overhyped countries in the 21st century and every year has been India's year and every decade's been India's decade uh so with India moddeling through especially in you know from from an economic perspective and not just a geopolitical perspective how do you think that's going to contribute or not contribute at all to the the global order or disorder”
The Ukraine war is not terribly helpful to China because it has indirectly led to alienating much of Western Europe, but it has been of considerable benefit to India through access to cheaper Russian oil and transactional advantage.
“the Ukraine war has um I don't think was is terribly helpful to China because it's it's indirectly led to alienating much of Western Europe but it's but it's been of considerable benefit to India uh which has a purely transactional approach to this they got very good uh traditional relationship with Russia they've they' now have access to a lot of cheaper oil”
Chinese are improving the functional efficiency of their electronic RMB currency through provincial piloting, using methods common to Chinese governance; they may produce a system that works better and is cheaper and more efficient than anything the West can produce.
“of course the Chinese themselves are improving the functional efficiency of their electronic uh R&B currency they're doing it on a piloting basis in the provinces I think there've been all kind of that they may well produce a system and we know the Chinese are very good at this producing A system that actually works and works well and is cheaper and more efficient than anything anybody else can produce”
The opacity of Chinese lending in developing and frontier markets is extreme; Carmen Reinhardt's research shows Chinese loan terms are significantly less attractive than Western restructuring terms, but the lack of public data prevents full assessment of the true impact.
“I think I I just add that I I kind of agree with you on the opacity of Chinese lending uh in developing and Frontier markets Carman Reinhardt has done the best work on this and if you look at carman's most recent research it's pretty clear that the terms are a good deal less attractive than the kind of terms that these countries are getting when they restructure uh uh their debts with the Western institutions”
Sanctions on Russia have been less effective than casual reading of media suggests; IMF-caliber economic modeling by scholars like Dimitri Mukhin shows sanctions have bitten more than appears, even if the ruble appreciated despite binding constraints.
“one word on behalf of the LSC I was at a conference in Abu Dhabi two days ago an NLC Professor man called Dimitri mukin from the Department of Economics presented a paper arguing that in fact the sanctions have been lot more effective than it seemed I mean there are good reasons I won't go into the details of a very sophisticated model he presented why even though the sanctions may be binding the Russian rubal may still have appreciated but he was his view was that they have bitten more than say a casual reading of the Ft would suggest”
Despite shocks including a global financial crisis, a populist US president imposing tariffs on China (not removed by Biden), and a bipartisan campaign to reduce US strategic reliance on Chinese supply chains after COVID-19, decoupling remains very limited; Apple production is down from 100% to only 90% from China, and US trade deficit share with China is down from half to only one-third.
“the extent of decoupling is really quite limited and that is despite a global financial crisis a populist uh president who imposed tariffs on China tariffs which have not been removed by the Biden Administration and a concerted bipartisan campaign in the United States to reduce America's strategic Reliance on Chinese Supply chains that followed the covid-19 pandemic it's astonishing how little these various shocks have affected the relationship bottom line there are two superpowers measured by manufacturing or AI or for that matter Quantum Computing and they exist unlike in the first Cold War in a highly globalized World economy and it's very hard to decouple them which is why Jake solivan Now talks about drisking because they figured out they can't really decouple”
China's public finances are actually worse than the US when including local government liabilities; aggregate debt-to-GDP is about the same as US but the deficit including local governments is much larger, making China's problem more structural than US's political problem.
“I'll add one tiny point which maybe Rebecca can comment on the public finances of China are actually worse uh because if you do what the IM F has done recently and you look at the local government liabilities and you actually do a proper calculation of public sector debt the aggregate debt to GDP numbers about the same as the us but the deficit if you include the the local governments is much larger uh and in a way China's problem which I think is the problem i' I'd rather not have I mean us problem is essentially a political problem China's problem is a structural problem”
There is a tendency to underestimate India's role, and Western analysts and policymakers fundamentally underestimate the role India could play internationally in 5-10 years given compound interest on growth and India's large population, investment potential, and economic interconnections.
“there's a tendency I think just to write it off I I was at a seminar earlier this week in China and the the only area of descent on the platform because was everybody was reciting familiar lines uh was around India where an Indian representative stood up and started attacking the Chinese very pacifer usly for saying well why do you ignore us you know we we you don't send any visitors we have no exchanges of students you have a lot of soft power but you're not show no interest in India whatever why why do you ignore us and focus entirely on the US relationship and um I think the answer that is partly well you know this is the arguably the third economy in the world potentially the second um why do we underestimate the role that inia can play I mean uh now charts at the beginning were kind of descriptions of past Trends and if you know compound interest is quite a powerful phenomenon and if if you do extrapolate right um based on the kind of growth assumptions that we you know are very plausible India becomes a very big player in terms of the impact on global demand potentially as an investment destination and all the interconnections that come with that and I think both you know we as an audience and most of our um countries you know are just fundamentally underestimating the role that India could be playing internationally in 5 10 years time”
US interest rates are at the top of the tightening cycle and may make significant difference once they unwind; a dysfunctional US democracy could re-elect Trump or do something stupid like actually defaulting on debt, which would shake confidence in dollar holders.
“I mean you you've set that position very clearly the dollar dominance I mean there are several things well he may well be right I mean I'm not going to move my Pension funds into R&B but um there are several reasons for I think doubting first of all we're at the top of the interest rate tightening cycle in the US uh and that may make a significant difference once it unwinds I think secondly the capacity of a dysfunctional Democracy in America to do something stupid is not to be underestimated they may uh reelect president Trump uh and you know the Congress May well you know having gone to the brink on default may actually do something uh and that will really shake confidence in dollar holders”
The Chinese share of currency transactions has doubled from 3% to 6% in recent months, partly because China is insisting that countries with deep relationships and those that borrowed under the Belt and Road initiative settle transactions in Chinese currency (RMB), which helps these debtor countries while increasing RMB importance.
“within the last few months uh the Chinese currency share of transactions has doubled from 3 to 6% and this is partly because the Chinese are now insisting that um relationships with countries which they have a deep relationship and there I think two-thirds of the countries of the world now trade more with them than the United States or countries that have borrowed heavily under the belt and Road initiative should settle their transactions in Chinese currency which actually in some ways is a help to the countries that are borrowed and indebted but it also means that the use of the Chinese currency is becoming increasingly important”
In current-dollar GDP terms (rather than PPP), China has peaked and has somewhat retreated, reflecting weakness in the Chinese currency, and this metric matters more than PPP for understanding actual global economic power and international trade.
“there's a huge difference that emerges if you measure gross domestic product in current dollar terms rather than on a PPP basis if you use the PPP basis then it looks like China is already the biggest economy if you use the current dollar basis which is the Lower Blue Line here you can see that China actually reached to Peak and has somewhat retreated uh and that that's of course reflecting the fact that the the Chinese currency has in fact been somewhat weak uh in recent uh times”
Every time the US comes to the edge of default or the Congress refuses to raise the debt ceiling, the dollar appreciates, showing a paradoxical pattern where US dysfunction strengthens rather than weakens the dollar, contradicting predictions of dollar decline.
“the extraordinary thing is that every time that the United States Congress uh refuses to move the debt ceiling and every time the US comes to the edge of default the dollar appreciates the remarkable thing about the dollar is when the world is going south the dollar appreciates when the world is booming the dollar appreciates too um you know uh no matter what happens the dollar appreciates”
Edward Prasad (Cornell professor) argues in Finance and Development magazine that 'we are stuck with a dollar for a very long time,' providing academic support for the thesis that dollar dominance is durable despite structural challenges to the US.
“for good academic um reference on this my favorite expert on the subject a guy called esward prad professor at Cornell in the US a lovely piece in finance and development the magazine published by the IMF in which he says we are stuck with a dollar for a very long time”
The world remains a very US-dominated world technologically, in currency terms, and geopolitically; behind the complex global governance charts, the US maintains fundamental structural dominance that is often obscured by discussions of economic growth rates.
“it it's still a very us dominated World technologically in currency terms uh and geopolitically behind the open AI Global governance chart uh that Vince showed us”
Xi Jinping chose the BRICS forum to deliver his first speech on the Israel-Hamas conflict, signaling the importance China attaches to BRICS as a platform for making major geopolitical statements beyond what it is formally meant to do.
“the fact that this week Xi Jinping delivered a speech um virtually to the bricks and it was the first speech that she he gave on um Israel Hamas Israel Gaza so he's he chooses the bricks to deliver this spe”
If there is no concurrent crisis in other regions, Cold War II will probably go the way of the West over a 10-20 year horizon; however, if there is a showdown over Taiwan and the US/Biden bungle it, then all bets are off and the dollar faces existential risk.
“I think it means that over the 10 to 20 year time Horizon Cold War II will probably go the way of the west but if there's a showdown over Taiwan and the US and Biden and Company flunk it then all bets are off and you're away to the races with the dollar”
The G7 was an intelligent way to get capitalist democracies to coordinate economic policy after the 1973 oil shock, and the BRICS grouping was invented by Goldman Sachs as a marketing tool by Jim O'Neill to encourage clients to invest in emerging markets but no longer serves that function and has become an instrument of mostly Chinese propaganda.
“The Group of Seven was uh uh jards idea and it was quite an intelligent way to get uh the principle uh capitalist democracies to talk about economic issues in the wake of the great oil price shock of 50 years ago 1973 and the the G7 is is really a legacy of the 1970s energy crisis the bricks grouping was invented by Goldman Sachs as a marketing tool Jim O'Neal thought it would be a great way to get Goldman clients to invest in certain Emerging Markets uh in many ways it no longer serves that function at all and has become an instrument of I think mostly Chinese propaganda”
China and India, as economic superstates, now represent the second and fifth biggest economies in the world by nominal GDP, or the first and third by purchasing power parity, with China expected to pass the US in nominal GDP by the end of this decade while India will likely become number two within 20-30 years.
“the basis of the discussion tonight is is really about the significance of the emergence of China and India as sort of economic superstates call them that uh depending on how it's measured the second and fifth biggest economies in the world or the first and the third”
The dollar dominates international transactions at roughly 90% and remains the dominant reserve currency, with only marginal changes over decades; people have predicted dollar decline for 20+ years and it has never happened, with the dollar appreciating in both booms and crises.
“the Dollar's remarkably steadily the dominant currency in foreign exchange reserves you can see that in the chart here there hasn't really been any significant change uh in the US dollar share of uh of international reserves it's down a tiny fr action relative to where it was uh 20 years ago but actually if you go further back to the 1990s it's it's up relative to the mid 1990s if you take this very long-term perspective it's essentially uh a Dollar World in which the Euro has become a significant currency and the other currencies really don't play a significant role”
Rating India as a democracy deeply divides the political science community; some indices rate India today roughly where it was during Indira Gandhi's emergency, while others rate it differently, creating huge disagreement about India's democratic character.
“I mean it's interesting actually from an Indian perspective that rating India as a as a democracy is something that hugely divides the political science Community I mean there are some of these indices of uh liberal democracy that that rate India Today roughly where it was during Indira Gandhi's emergency and there are others that look away but this is a huge question for policy makers in the west when Joe Biden talks about some Alliance of democracies it's not liberal democracies if India is going to be really a big passp”
Macroeconomic management in India, viewed from outside, does not look too stellar, yet the mood among economists and major investment banks in India is jubilant with very bullish projections.
“for the record I was in Delhi two weeks ago at a conference of economists and from the outside macromanagement in India does not look too Stellar but I have to report the mood was jubilant um it was very bullish you know the the local JP Morgan and the local Goldman Sachs types uh were all making pretty optimistic projections”
Ferguson predicted in 2008 in Delhi that India would overtake China like the tortoise and the hare fable, which seemed outlandish then but is now less outlandish given structural problems developing in China, particularly demographics.
“I'd just like to go on the record say that in 2008 in Delhi I predicted that India would overtake China and that it would be like the tortoise and the hair in the in the Fable and this seemed like an outlandish thing to say uh but it was already obvious to me that there were serious stru Ral problems developing in the Chinese economy particularly in the demography that would not be such a handicap to India”
Vince Cable is not willing to commit on whether the US will face an Argentine-style financial crisis soon, but acknowledges it is a real risk if fiscal policy doesn't change.
“I think at this point we um are aware that there's wine somewhere in this building and we would like to consume large amounts of it but before we do that we are going to give our panel a big round of applause”
China released a proposal on global governance reform in September positioning itself as champion of the Global South, while India asserted a rival claim to lead the Global South through its history with the Non-Aligned Movement, creating competition for that mantle.
“in in September as I say China released this this paper this position on the reform of the development of global governance and at the same time Lee Chang was giving a speech in the UN secretary uh General assembly yeah Security Council and you know it was like you China you know we are we are the champions of the global South We are the champions of the developing world we are a you know the the the the world's sort of greatest developing country Etc and then the sort of the the Indian media was like well no actually you know we we lead the global South and you know it was those who came up with a non- align movement and so there's there's this sort of strange comp ition for that mantle”
The hypothetical scenario of China imposing a blockade on Taiwan would change geopolitics fundamentally by forcing middle powers to stop hedging and actually choose sides, converting the Cold War rhetorical structure into real strategic crisis.
“let's just ask the question hypothetical question what if uh after the Taiwanese election in January uh China imposes a blockade on Taiwan what then and that will change everything because at that point you will enter a much much larger scale crisis than anything we've seen with Ukraine or Israel and I think at that point the hedging and and and fluffing will have to stop”
The UK has reclassified itself as an Indo-Pacific nation and joined the CPTPP, with some speculation that the US encouraged this participation so the UK could veto Chinese applications, though this remains unconfirmed.
“you see that one of its members is the UK they the UK has reclassified itself as an naian country uh and has joined this uh cgtp the the conspiracy theorists think that the Americans in encouraged us to join so that we could then veto Chinese application um I don't know that's a bit wild”