What this covers

Ezra Klein talks with the Republican pollster Patrick Ruffini, whose 2023 book Party of the People anticipated the nonwhite working-class drift toward Donald Trump. The conversation reads the 2024 results through 2020. Ruffini points to Miami-Dade's 22-point swing, Rio Grande Valley counties flipping, and Asian American voters moving right in Orange County's Little Saigon. Klein recalls that Democratic analysts treated those shifts as a pandemic-era aberration that would reverse once Trump returned to immigration. They discuss why it did not, and Ruffini notes that Trump may have won a record Hispanic share on a mass-deportation platform. Klein also argues for a plainer explanation: an incumbent penalty visible across wealthy democracies, and a county swing map that is almost uniformly red.

The range is wide. Ruffini argues that there is no pan-Latino identity comparable to a pan-Black one, so Cuban, Puerto Rican and Colombian voters behave differently, and that Barone's The New Americans shows immigrant groups drifting toward the center as they rise economically. They draw on The Real Majority and its "machinist's wife from Dayton" for an earlier version of the class-and-education divide, and they date the modern college/non-college split to the mid-1990s. Bill Clinton appears as a brief exception and as the model for a Sister Souljah-style signal. The conversation also covers young men moving right, and the claim that special elections mislead Democrats about low-turnout voters.

The more contested turns concern Kamala Harris. Ruffini calls her media strategy cautious and her Ellipse rally a cosmopolitan image. He also notes that abortion ranked behind the economy, and he questions whether her campaign broke from the "democracy and Dobbs" wing at all. He further argues that Trump's brand mattered more than policy.

Sharpest takeaway

Patrick Ruffini argues that the 2024 election represents not a new electoral shock but a continuation of a multi-racial working-class realignment that began in 2020, driven primarily by ideological sorting and economic messaging rather than demographic inevitability, and that Democrats' focus on high-education, high-income voters and abstract democracy arguments cost them the working-class coalition they once dominated.

  • The 2024 election shows the same coalition shape as 2020 with a uniform swing explained by incumbent penalty, not realignment acceleration
  • Hispanic and non-white voters shifted right due to ideological resorting (conservative-identifying minorities moving toward Republicans) not racism concerns, and legal immigrants resented illegal immigration and welfare perception
  • Democrats lost working-class voters by focusing on 'democracy and dobbs' messaging that appeals to college-educated suburbanites while ignoring material economic concerns that dominate non-college voter priorities

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0.84

In the 2020 election, Miami-Dade County Florida, a 68% Hispanic county with many Cuban Americans, Venezuelans, and Colombians, showed a 22-point shift toward Trump compared to 2016, and the Rio Grande Valley showed some counties flipping to Trump, while Little Saigon in Orange County California showed Asian voters moving toward Trump, collectively demonstrating the makings of a shift from a 2016 white working-class coalition to a more multi-racial working-class coalition defined by class identity rather than racial identity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“in 2020 you have more or less a shape of the coalitions that we see now but one thing that happened very early on Election night was the results from Miami Dade County FL Florida showing an absolute sea change in that county that is a 68% Hispanic County obviously a lot of Cuban Americans a lot of Venezuelans a lot of Colombians I'm showing a 22o shift in his Direction in the Rio Grand Valley you saw some counties flip to Donald Trump and then you go out west to places like Little Saigon in Orange County California you had Asian voters moving towards Donald Trump”

0.80

In 2016, Trump won white working-class voters in the Upper Midwest by a large margin while simultaneously doing things that seemingly alienated Hispanic voters with rhetoric about Mexican border-crossers being rapists, yet there is no strong evidence that Hispanics moved strongly against him in 2016—the results showed either a draw or slight gains for Trump.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“in 2016 where obviously Trump aims squarely at the white working class in the Upper Midwest and wins them over at the same time you know he did seemingly did a lot in that election to alienate Hispanic voters from the very beginning of his campaign walking down the golden escalator and calling Mexicans crossing the borders many of them are rapists and whatnot a bunch of things and yet there's really no strong evidence coming out of the 2016 election results that Hispanics really moved strongly against him in fact it was either a draw or he made slight gains there”

0.80

The Republican party is adapting and responding to changes in the electorate that became apparent during the Obama years, when there was rising share of non-white electorate and growing Democratic margins among those groups, but demography is not destiny and no party has an enduring advantage; entrenched competitive two-party politics in America means both parties face accountability for failures on their watch.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I think the Republican Party adapting and responding to changes in the electorate that certainly during the Obama years were put into Focus where you had a rising share of the electorate that was non-white on top of that you had growing margin for Democrats in in those groups and a lot of democratic optimism that demography was Destiny and Democrats are going to win elections from here on out and I just don't think that describes reality it never describes reality no matter what the coalitions look like and no matter what they are the shape of you know what the Coalition will look like in the future will be very different and I think we can say that with more certainty now now that we've seen these election result but that doesn't mean any party right has an advantage moving forward we have entrenched competitive two-party politics in America you've written about this at length and I don't think that either party can ever escape accountability for bad things that happen on their watch you know this was an example 2024 was an example of it 2020 was an example of it”

0.78

The core identity of the Democratic party in the 20th century was 'we are the party of The Working Man, we are the party of the Union member,' and the Republican party represented the rich people and CEOs, but this identity began to shift in the 1960s and 1970s with realignments around Vietnam War protests and civil rights that drove white working-class people away from the Democratic party.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“the core identity of the democratic party in the 20th century was really we are the party of The Working Man we are the party of the Union member you know and the Republican are the party of the rich people of CEOs but I do think the story really starts in the 1960s and 1970s with the realignments that happen around the Vietnam War protests and civil rights and where you have a lot of white Working Class People in cities break away from the Democratic party”

0.76

Donald Trump will have 'run a record share of the Hispanic vote running on a platform of mass deportation,' which Raffini describes as 'a remarkable sentence'—highlighting the unprecedented nature of this outcome.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Patrick Raffini

“Donald Trump will have run a record share of the Hispanic vote running on a plat form of mass deportation it's a remarkable sentence”

0.75

Democrats have moved relentlessly left on economics since Bill Clinton, with Barack Obama further left than Clinton, Hillary Clinton further left than Obama, Joe Biden far left of Obama, and Harris continuing this trend on economic promises and policy, yet voters did not perceive these moves as benefiting them despite Democratic moves toward their stated preferences.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“I'm actually an economic policy reporter by trade and I can tell you that since Bill Clinton the Democratic party in part because of this critique has been moving relentlessly left on economics Barack Obama was way to Bill Clinton's left on economics Hillary Clinton was to Barack Obama's left on at least economic promises and policy Joe Biden was very far to Barack Obama's left on on economics and and policy Harris was no break from that at least in terms of what she was promising”

0.75

Exit polls should be approached carefully, but triangulation with polling data, focus groups, and county-level shifts (particularly among young men moving right more than young women, with Millennials and Gen Z now within 10 points of Republicans compared to 33-point Democratic leads in 2008) suggests young voters, especially young men, shifted significantly right.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I have a lot of people warning me off of saying things like that so I'm curious as a pollster how you think about it well I think you have to triangulate this right you have to kind of look at the things we've been seeing and reading in polling and in focus groups throughout the election it really is a shift among younger voters because the shift among young men to the right seems to have been much greater at least than the exit poles right so it's not necessarily that there was a unique shift among young women to the right but there was a shift among young voters generally to the right where you had Millennials and jenz who are now within 10 points for Republicans which is stunning the same generational cohort back in 2008 was voting for Democrats by 33 points and in every election since practically they've been winning the youngest voters in the electorate by 20 points”

0.75

Democratic analysts believed the 2020 shift toward Trump among Hispanic voters was an aberration caused by unusual pandemic conditions and lockdowns, predicting that when Trump ran his 2024 campaign back on immigration (as he had in 2016), there would be pushback from Hispanic voters, but this prediction did not materialize and Trump ran his best-ever share of the Hispanic vote.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“something you bring up there reflects what I heard from a number of democratic analysts of the Hispanic vote after 2020 where they said look what what we think explains this is that the pandemic created unusual Ripples and and and divides in the electorate uh Hispanic voters really did suffer particularly from lockdowns but also because of the pandemic Donald Trump shut up more or less about immigration not completely but he didn't run his 2020 campaign on immigration the way he ran his 2016 campaign on immigration and so there was a view I think in Democratic circles that 2020 was aberant but then in 2024 Donald Trump does run his campaign on immigration...and the I think predicted push back that would create for Hispanic voters didn't happen”

0.75

Klein's incumbent penalty explanation is consistent with international data showing virtually every wealthy democracy incumbent party (both left and right) lost significantly in recent elections, and the Democratic loss is not unusual or particularly large when plotted internationally, suggesting the 2024 results require no extraordinary explanation beyond incumbent penalty and environment

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“we know looking at international data that this is a very bad environment for incumbents basically every in every wealthy democracy that we have seen in election in the past couple of years in nearly everyone the incumbent party be it a leftwing party or right-wing party has lost and lost big right the Democratic loss is actually not unusual or even particularly large if you plot it internationally”

0.75

The voters who don't turn out in special elections or midterms (lower-turnout elections) are voters who are disproportionately concerned about the state of the economy and inflation rather than highly partisan issues like democracy and abortion, and these are the voters who are crucial to presidential elections but whom special election analysis mislead Democrats about.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“when we're talking about special elections that electorate is a fraction of what a presidential election would be it is much higher in socioeconomic status it is much higher also in the depth of partisanship and sentiment and the voters who don't turn out in special elections but will turn out in the presidentials are disproportionately voters who are not activated by issues that are exclusively the domain of the right or the left and on the left it's obviously these issues of democracy and abortion that really are highly motivating to partisan Democrats on the right I would say the issue of immigration is one that is highly motivating to partisan conservative Republicans that is not necessarily motivating to voters who are both in the middle ideologically and politically but are also the voters who are the ones who show up in midterms and specials the voters who don't show up in midterms and specials are voters who are primarily concerned about the state of the economy about things um you know have been affected by inflation”

0.74

Any president who wins a second term in office faces the reality that it 'never gets as good' as the election in which they've won, and Richard Nixon's example (winning a landslide in 1972 and leaving office in disgrace two years later) is a well-established pattern in American political history.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I think that look I do I think that's an accurate assessment in the sense of like you know any president who wins a second term right basically it never gets as good right as the election in which they've won and then I look at what happened in 1972 right Richard Nixon wins a thumping majority and two years later he leaves the White House in disgrace so um certainly that is well established throughout American political history that is a wellestablished pattern”

0.74

Bill Clinton's 'Sister Souljah moment' (criticizing a rap artist's anti-white comments at a Black church event) is offered as a model of how Democrats need to signal to middle-of-the-road voters that the party has changed its relationship to identity politics, by doing something controversial and bold.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Ezra Klein

“if you're a Democrat now something you might want to be be looking at is the example of Bill Clinton who had that sister Soldier moment you had a a rap singer here last night named sister Soldier I defend her right to express herself through music but her comments before and after Los Angeles were filled with a kind of hatred that you do not honor today and tonight”

0.74

Looking at the New York Times county-level map of the 2020-to-2024 swing, it is very hard to find any blue (Democratic gains), instead showing a uniform red (Republican) swing across the country, which supports the simple incumbent-penalty explanation rather than indicating fundamental realignment.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“there is that Absolute Uniform swing just look at the New York Times map the swing by counties you find it very very hard to find any blue on that map it is a uniform red Se change from 2020 to 2024 which does I think lend itself to that exp very simple and clear explanation that look it was the economy stupid the underlying environment for the incumbent party was just a bad environment for them to be running in”

0.74

'The Real Majority' (1970, by Scammon and Wattenberg) identified the 'median voter' of that era as the 'machinist's wife from Dayton' who doesn't work and didn't graduate from college, contrasting with the counterculture's focus on valorizing student protesters and rising college-educated demographics, and the book contemplated whether Democrats might win back Wallace voters or whether the trend would continue.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“the second one is a book that was written in the early 1970s called the real majority by Richard scaman and Ben wattenberg this was a Nixon era book that really had been looking at what seemed like the changes in the electorate then among white working class voters moving into the Republican party for Richard Nixon this backlash politics that was happening around the Vietnam war that was happening around civil rights and talking about both the possibility that this could continue and it did in fact continue or the possibility that they contemplated that Democrats at the time might actually pivot and win back you know kind of that Wallace voter in 1968 but the really pivotal thing I think is the um example that they give of the median voter in the electorate in 1970 being The Machinist wife from Dayton who doesn't work and didn't graduate um from from college or didn't actually even go to college as compared to I think what the focus was at in the time during the counterculture and the anti-war protests on valorizing right the role of the student protester or this Rising demographic group of people who were going to college and had more liberal Politics”

0.74

'The New Americans' (20 years ago, by Michael Barone) traces the history of immigrant groups (Italians, Irish, Jews) and finds analogues in newer groups (Hispanics, Asian voters), showing that groups typically start politically on the Democratic side and gradually migrate toward the center as they move up the economic ladder and become more embedded in American mainstream society.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“the third book is one from 20 years ago called the new Americans by Michael Baron which um looks at the history of immigrant groups in the United States from the Italians to the Irish to uh the Jews and really finds analogues in sort of newer groups in the electorate um like Hispanics or Asian voters and it really re drove home for me that we have seen a lot of these Trends before in terms of groups that started out politically very usually very far in the Democratic side and have gradually migrated towards the center as they move up the economic ladder and become more in meshed in the mainstream of American society”

0.73

The educational divide between college and non-college voters was not stark in the modern era until the mid to late 1990s, when the lines between them in voting behavior began to diverge sharply, with Bill Clinton in 1996 seeing relatively similar support across both groups compared to the stark separation visible in more recent elections.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Ezra Klein

“you have a striking chart early in the book and it shows that the college and non-college voters vote very similarly really up until the mid to late 90s and then non-college and college voters really shift you have this you know the the the lines race away from each other so this non-college college divide was not always so Stark and we're talking here in the modern era it was not so Stark with Bill Clinton in '96”

0.73

There is no pan-Latino or pan-Hispanic identity analogous to a pan-African-American identity; Hispanic voters have very disparate interests based on national origin, with Cuban Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Colombians voting very differently, and these groups vote differently in different parts of the country (Texas, Florida, California), making immigration a unifying civil-rights-like issue for Democrats ineffective.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Patrick Ruffini

“the assumption was always flawed in a number of ways it was flawed in the sense that there really is no pan Latino panh Hispanic identity in the same way that there is a pan African-American identity that you have Hispanic voters who have very disperate interests based on their national origin so Cuban Americans vote very differently than Puerto Ricans vote differently than Colombians and various different groups and in different parts of the country these groups vote very differently from Texas to Florida to California”

0.69

There is a big difference between what politicians say or promise in policy and what voters perceive about the party and its politicians; voters pay attention to what politicians visibly care about and demonstrate concern for, and this perception differs from stated policy positions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“there's a big difference between what a politician says or even the policies they enact and what voters perceive and hear about the party about the politicians right I think policy actually played relatively little role in voters gravitating towards Trump I think a lot of this is his unique brand his Unique Style his unique aesthetic”

0.69

Bill Clinton was 'a master at connecting to the working and middle-class voter regardless of race' through charisma and rhetoric, which represented a brief interruption in the Democratic defection of working-class voters, but this strategy was largely abandoned after his presidency.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Patrick Raffini

“then you end up in this era with Bill Clinton who was just a master at connecting to the working in Middle Class voter regardless of race and that was really Central to his appeal and his Charisma and his rhetoric but I think that changes in the 2000 election”

0.68

Harris's media strategy was notably cautious and she was uncomfortable in off-the-cuff settings throughout the campaign, unlike what would have been required to break through the perception of the Democratic party as motivated by woke ideology (which would require dramatic, bold, controversial actions).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“at the same time KL Harris are self in her communication style was a very cautious a uniquely so cautious figure in terms of her media strategy you know when you mentioned this idea of you know her going on Jo Rogan right I mean that idea is sort of Unthinkable right for a Comm Harris who I think was very uncomfortable in sort of these off-the-cuff settings throughout the course of the campaign”

0.68

Trump's 2024 win, while significant in the popular vote (1-2 points), does not necessarily indicate the GOP is particularly strong because one-to-two-point margins in bad incumbent environments are historically normal globally, and Trump's governance history suggests he may lack the discipline needed to consolidate a durable realignment.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“Trump's win because it's so different than what we've seen from his past elections in the popular vote feels really big and on the other hand it seems very explainable to me you know if he's at a one point or two point popular vote margin in an environment that's very bad for incumbents that actually this doesn't mean that GOP is all that strong at all right this was not like what happened to the Tories in the UK where they had the worst outcome in in their history and you know now Donald Trump is going to be president I would say he's not that good or disciplined at being president his ability to offer this blueco collar aesthetic and then actually govern on it are different he's got much more ideological people around him now than he has at other times and sort of JD Vance and and Elon Musk and and others and that this is pretty thin that if they wanted to build on this they would have to be very disciplined in a way that I've not seen them be”

0.68

Policy has played relatively little role in voters gravitating toward Trump compared to Trump's unique brand, style, and aesthetic, and when looking at where the biggest shifts have occurred among Latino voters (a very economically focused electorate), policy was not the primary driver.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I think policy actually played relatively little role in voters gravitating towards Trump I think a lot of this is his unique brand his Unique Style his unique aesthetic and if you look particularly where we've seen the biggest shifts among Latino voters that is a very economically focused electorate”

0.68

Abortion was cited as the number one issue by only single-digit to low-double-digit percentages of voters across all groups consistently, and was behind the economy in voter priorities, suggesting that Harris's closing pivot to emphasize abortion did not reflect voter priority ranking.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“they were the first in to Harris when the candidate switch happened and she had her search and they were the first out so in the end the election became a little bit more of a realignment election than we were maybe thinking about in August and September so what you're seeing is you know just in general younger voters tend to be more diverse diverse voters have shifted towards the Republican party but particularly those voters who are lower in socioeconomic status in general which tends to include frankly a lot of people who are younger voters who were hit hardest by inflation so I think it's just a complete undervaluing by the Democrats of the material explanations for why this electorate was going to act the way it did...High single digits or low double digits of Voters who said abortion was their number one issue consistently with every group it was behind the economy”

0.68

Democrats believe Kamala Harris's campaign represented a break from identity politics and a pivot toward immigration moderation, but if one views the campaign as coming from the 'democracy and dobbs wing' of the party and maintaining focus on reproductive rights messaging, it represents continuity rather than a fundamental reorientation.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“something you might want to be be looking at is the example of Bill Clinton who had that sister Soldier moment...I think the democrat's solution to this was at the convention you had so much talk about oh we're weaving flags and we're putting out Tim Walls as this sort of Exemplar of this wholesome Midwestern Father Figure right and that that was going to solve the problem for them at the same time KL Harris are self in her communication style was a very cautious a uniquely so cautious figure in terms of her media strategy...I don't think voters even if that perception right of the democratic party as uniquely motivated by woke ideology is an unfair perception you still have to do something to break it right if to accept that it's a problem you have to do something dramatic and bold and controversial that's going to get attention to break it and I just don't think K Harris was that kind of candidate”

0.68

Harris's rally at the Ellipse in Washington DC in the final weeks of the campaign, with attendees flooding in from Northern Virginia (government employees), represented a final visual that reinforced the cosmopolitan and pro-establishment positioning, contrasting with Trump's blue-collar aesthetic.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“Harris giving that speech at the Ellipsis in in Washington DC...striking too to see Harris making her real closing argument there in Washington DC right people flooding in from Northern Virginia probably who work for the government...Trump has what I think to many people look like you know this disastrous rally at Madison Square Garden with this insult comic who you know calls Puerto Rico a garbage island...you know on Joe Rogan...driving a garbage truck around...what visuals...at least in a high you know in a post- inflation environment like that did not rebound to Democrats Advantage”

0.68

Democrats embraced Dick and Liz Cheney's endorsement trying to show how 'wide this Coalition stretches from Liz Cheney on one side to Elizabeth Warren on the other,' but this misidentified the actual divide in American politics, which is not the traditional red-blue/left-right divide but the educational/class divide that cuts across traditional ideological lines.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“that's not the Divide right the sort of red blue divide of Obama's 2004 speech isn't the Divide it's more this educational divide and so in a way it would have been much more and I've been a little bit of a broken record on this all season it would have been much more relevant to the divide that Harris and the Democrats actually face for Harris to have gone on Joe Rogan and theovon and and shows like that that are much more cultural environments that Democrats have become increasingly distant from”

0.64

The 2022 midterm election was a disaster for Democrats because it did not produce the red wave many expected, which created a false theory that an 'anti-MAGA coalition' motivated by fear of Trump, hatred of him, and desire to protect democracy (particularly after January 6) would show up repeatedly across elections

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“one place that's led me is to the view that it was a bit of a disaster for the Democrats that the Red Wave didn't hit in 2022 because that created this alternative theory of the electorate which was that there was a a MAA Coalition and an anti-a Coalition and the anti-a Coalition was motivated by fear of Donald Trump hatred of him by desire to protect democracy particularly after January 6”

0.61

'Steadfast Democrats' (by Ismail White and Cheryl L) documents how Black voters have remained solidly in the Democratic Coalition not because of policy agreement but because of social pressure and shared community institutions (particularly the Black church), which enforce a voting norm toward the Democratic party.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“one is one I've already mentioned steadfast Democrats by Ismail white and Cheryl L looking at the history of black politics in the modern era and specifically focusing on why black voters have been so solidly in the Democratic Coalition for so long the importance there of social pressure the importance of a sense of shared community and uh some being something that enforces is um you know a norm towards voting towards the Democratic party”

0.61

Klein argues that if Trump had remained president or if Biden had run a poor campaign, Democrats could have faced a much worse outcome with losses in key Senate and House races; Harris's campaign was strong enough relative to Biden to 'hold down the erosion,' preventing an even worse defeat

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“I think there's a a very good chance that Biden due to his age and the way he was campaigning could have genuinely collapsed in the election right if you saw more things like that first debate I think that the Democratic Wipeout could have been I mean look we're we're on track right now I think for Donald Trump to win the popular vote by one to two points somewhere in that range you can tell me if you think that's wrong and you look around particularly in the bler states at how bad the erosion was and Harris and her campaign were really capable they really proved able to hold down the erosion in the Battleground so I think you really could have seen that Michigan senate seat go right right now it looks likely the Democrats will keep the Nevada senate seat I'm not sure that would have been true under Biden right”

0.61

The 'cosmopolitan trap' describes how Democrats in high-income suburbs (particularly in 2020) adopted progressive cultural symbols ('In This House We Believe' signs listing liberal totems) and how the Democratic party became increasingly focused on issues important to high-income, high-status, college-educated voters who live in the same communities as Democratic operatives, implicitly valuing those voters more highly than the 62% of Americans without college degrees.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“tell me about what you call the Cosmopolitan trap sure in 2020 you know I read about the sign that was all pervasive that in this house we believe and you know really um listing out a bunch of liberal cultural totems um that was popular during the covid pandemic this is the science is real no human being is illegal kindness everything yes and that's uh and you saw this in terms of rising Democrats obviously doing better and better in high income suburbs and doing better and better in particularly very very high income suburbs you go to a place like wika outside Chicago you know those are places that have moved shifted 40 points to the left under the elections in which Donald Trump has been a candidate and Democratic politics right it's not again exclusively oriented towards that high income High status high education voter but I think the version of that sign was the focus on both the issues of abortion and democracy the sort of Sid stepping of what seemed like the main issue of the election which is the state of the economy and inflation that Democrats and particularly in the closing stretches of the Harris campaign really pivoted back to this democracy abortion message and really putting a lot of stock in this idea that if we do rallies with Liz Cheney we're going to move even more Republicans from those High income suburbs”

0.59

Changes in voting behavior are not necessarily linear flows in response to economic changes but can be sudden cascade effects where groups with solid political identity (reinforced by political machines and local norms) experience a tipping point, after which enough people move that others feel permission to be vocal about their political shift.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“there is not necessar sea change in economic condition but there's a social component to this as well it's sort of a Cascade effect right when you have groups that have this just this solid Democratic group identity that is reinforced by political machines and then it just seems like there's a Tipping Point at some point where gradually people are moving and then enough people move to where people kind of start looking around and saying well maybe I'm not alone maybe I can be more vocal about this and you really saw that in 2020 uh you saw demonstrations prot Trump activity in a lot of these places where people would have been ostracized for saying they supported a Republican”

0.59

In a poll of Texas Hispanics, when asked about the number one problem with the Democratic party, respondents answered that they perceive the Democratic party as being the party of welfare benefits for people who don't work, a response not seen with virtually any other group polled, contrasting sharply with the expected 'woke' or 'socialism' complaints.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I did a poll in Texas of Hispanics in Texas where I asked them what is the number one problem that you see today with the Democratic party the answer they gave wasn't was too woke or the buzzword of socialism the answer was very interesting and it's something you don't see come up with virtually any other group you talk to and that is they perceive the Democratic party as being the party of welfare benefits for people who don't work”

0.57

In a stark reversal of alignment, Kamala Harris and Liz Cheney (and Mitt Romney) have become more aligned with each other and on the same side of the national divide than Harris is with cultural figures like Joe Rogan and Tomi Lahren, who represent the cultural environments that Democrats have become increasingly distant from.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“it's like a crazy way to think about how the system has changed that K Harris and Liz Cheney are in some ways and Mitt Romney are more on the same side closer together more arm in-arm than kamla Harrison Sports Talk Radio and Joe Rogan but that feels true”

0.55

Trump's phrase 'the poor man's idea of what a rich man should be' captures why his wealth appeals to working-class voters—his aesthetic and self-presentation as a successful businessman differs markedly from old-money Republican wealth figures like Mitt Romney or George H.W. Bush, who presented a different ideal of wealth that seemed out-of-touch.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“the phrase I hear often uh used to describe this As Trump is the poor man's idea of what a rich man should be and I think that probably redounded to his benefit in these elections that he's running you know Democrats have haltingly right tried to make Trump's wealth an issue you know make you know the fact that he can't possibly care about you because his life experiences are it's just so different than yours and it's never really landed such that I don't think anybody tries that anymore you look at the difference between Trump and somebody like Mitt Romney who presented a very different idea of wealth who kind of represented this old school Republican ideal that you saw with George H W bush of no Bless obl but he seemed like a little bit more of a blue blood outof touch Country Club Republican and Trump could not be stylistically more different than that”

0.52

Harris and her campaign team 'knew perfectly well' that 'inflation and the economy were huge issues for voters' and that these were 'huge vulnerability for Joe Biden,' and she came out immediately with economic plans (home buyer credit, family tax credits), but 'you can always tell when Donald Trump talks about immigration he really cares' while 'Harris has just never been a politician associated with economic policy fights,' suggesting authenticity/personal commitment matters more than policy platforms.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ezra Klein

“you can always tell and voters can always tell and it really comes through and how politicians speak what concerns are deep and driving for candidates right you can tell when Donald Trump talks about immigration he really cares like he really cares about it and when he talks about Healthcare he does not Donald Trump talks about Healthcare policy like a guy who has never thought about Healthcare policy for 2 minutes in his entire life and Harris has just never been a politician associated with economic policy fights”

0.52

When Harris was campaigning strongly on the home buyer credit and opportunity economy messaging early in her campaign, she was outperforming Biden's polling, particularly in Nevada (a working-class, economically downscale state with a large Latino population), but as the campaign went on and she lost altitude, she reverted to the Biden-Trump coalition shape with weak working-class support.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“there was a period in time when she was really consciously foregrounding those positions around the home buyer credit that was something by the way that came up a lot in open-ends um when we asked people what one policy proposal do you most associate with the candidates the home buyer credit really Shone through brightly for Harris right so there was a period in her campaign where I kind of joked man I really this is she would be the dream client for a poster like me because she is executing what seems like almost flawlessly on what the sort of democratic pollster messaging memos would say because these are the exact same things that I'm finding in my focus groups as she lost a little bit of altitude you know she was up you know at some point in the polling average by about three to four points as she lost altitude you could kind of see that initial Biden Trump election pattern reemerging and again not saying anything about Biden's ultimate support level but but in the sense of Hispanics coming in weaker I think a proxy for this was Nevada so um it's a much more working class state”

0.52

In the Rio Grande Valley research, voters who grew up hearing 'we support the Democratic party because they're the party of the poor, just like us' shifted toward Republicans with the rationale 'what if we don't want to be poor—we want to be with those people who are going to create policies that enable us to move up the economic ladder through private sector success, not government benefits.'

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“something else I heard constantly traveling throughout the Rio Grand Valley in research for a book was you have people saying and this was a part of the country a part of Texas that had voted Democratic by margins of either 75 to 25 or 8020 I mean it was very strongly Democratic the Democratic identity ran stronger here than virtually anywhere in the country and they're saying you know how when we grew up around the dinner table your parents told you we support the Democratic party because we they're the party of the poor just like us and the response of the people who became Republicans in that area was what if we don't want to be poor we want to be with those people right who are going to create policies that are you know going to benefit us because uh they're going to enable us to move up the economic ladder and doing that through private sector success not not necessarily through a government benefits program”

0.50

Polling defenders of late-campaign strategic choices often claim candidates have 'polling and focus groups you don't have,' but as a pollster, Raffini can attest they 'most likely do not' or at least are not acting on it, suggesting campaign decisions are often driven by personal instinct rather than data

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Raffini

“I think that look a big Trope towards the end of the campaign is when a candidate does something that seems strategically questionable for them that their def Enders will immediately step into the breach and say they know things you don't they have polling and focus groups that you don't have and as a pollster I can tell you they most likely do not or they at least are not acting on it”

0.50

Americans dislike Washington DC intensely, and Harris's decision to give her major closing speech at the Ellipse in Washington DC created a symbolic problem for a candidate trying to appeal to low-propensity voters who are cynical about democracy and distrust politicians as 'corrupt animals'

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Raffini

“I think it's been something that is true about American politics is Americans don't like Washington DC and I think Americans and voters could have very easily looked at that and looked at her campaign in the final weeks and people who are particularly low propensity voters who don't always vote in elections who are cynical about democracy who are cynical about the political systems who really dislike intensely politicians and think they're corrupt animals and and that is that is sort of an entrenched belief and I kind of asked myself watching that speech what is KLA Harris offering those people”

0.47

If Democrats had been 'wiped out' in 2022 as expected, the pressure on Joe Biden not to run again would have been very high, and the administration would have done a midterm pivot toward addressing the concerns of voters who had turned against it rather than focusing on the voters who supported them, potentially leading to a different strategic approach in 2024.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“I think that if Democrats had lost in 2022 they would have been thinking about well what is motivating these voters who don't like us anymore and instead they came into 2024 thinking what motivates these voters who do like us yeah I can't disagree with any of that right and I think to some extent look the election that we saw was almost very much of the election that we would have had had Joe Biden ran in terms of some of the subgroup shifts...if Democrats had been wiped out in 2022 to the Red Wave many of them thought was coming because you go back to 1994 when Democrats get wiped out you go back to 2010 when Democrats get wiped out what tends to happen after that is the administration the party gets very focused on the voters who have turned on it the people it has lost what do they want to hear what do they need what is motivating them”

0.45

The 2024 election became more of a 'realignment election' than the August-September period suggested, with working-class voters more responsive to the underlying realignment trends toward Republicans than to Harris's specific candidacy or messaging.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Patrick Raffini

“so in the end the election became a little bit more of a realignment election than we were maybe thinking about in August and September”

0.45

Trump's visual of driving a garbage truck and working at McDonald's in the final weeks of the 2024 campaign crystallized a 'blue collar aesthetic' that resonated with working-class voters, and this was the number one event people reported remembering from the campaign according to polling.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Patrick Raffini

“we asked a poll question right what are the events of the campaign that you most remember things that happened in the last month of the campaign the number one thing by far that people said they read or heard a lot about was the picture of trump at McDonald's right I mean that was a visual that really just crystallized you know as you call it that kind of blue collar aesthetic that he was trying to really drive home in the last closing weeks of the election”

0.43

The home buyer credit was a policy proposal that resonated with voters in open-ended survey responses when asked which proposal they most associated with the candidates, suggesting it was a compelling and memorable economic message.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Patrick Ruffini

“that was something by the way that came up a lot in open-ends um when we asked people what one policy proposal do you most associate with the candidates the home buyer credit really Shone through brightly for Harris”