
How Does China Want the War in Ukraine to End? | The Foreign Affairs Interview
What this covers
This Foreign Affairs interview pairs Bonny Lin, a CSIS fellow and former Pentagon country director for China, with Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, who moved to Berlin from Moscow when the war began. It was recorded as a Chinese special envoy, Ambassador Li Hui, toured Ukraine, Germany, France, Poland and finally Russia. Li is a fluent Russian speaker and a former ambassador to Moscow whom Putin decorated. The conversation uses the trip to ask what Beijing wants from the war, how far it will go to help Moscow, and what the personal bond between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin actually rests on.
Gabuev supplies the historical and structural background: the Sino-Soviet split and the old expectation of lasting friction, Russia's commercial turn toward China after 2008, and an asymmetry on steroids created by sanctions. He describes both leaders as products of a personalist system, united by suspicion of US-led regime change and by similar biographies. He also argues Beijing is agnostic about the contact line so long as Russia stays isolated and dependent. Pipeline deals due to be signed during a Russian prime minister's visit make that dependence concrete.
Lin covers the practical record: reported transfers of body armor, semiconductors, trucks and drones, plus leaked intelligence that Russia had asked for ammunition. She reads China's 12-principle peace paper as principles rather than a plan, useful for deflecting criticism and courting Europe. Gabuev adds that Biden's dismissal of it let Beijing claim Washington blocked a chance for talks. Diplomats like Qin Gang are also working to walk back the no limits partnership line in Europe. Lin says Chinese leverage there will fade if mediation stalls, and that the US is losing ground in the Global South. Near the end, Gabuev, who calls himself a Russian patriot, declines to offer policy advice and calls the war immoral.
China's deepening strategic alignment with Russia represents a fundamental geopolitical realignment that sidelines Western interests in the Global South, while Beijing attempts to simultaneously maintain neutrality on Ukraine and preserve European relations—a balancing act that is ultimately unsustainable and likely to force China into explicit support for Russia's position.
- China's 'no limits partnership' with Putin and subsequent support through energy purchases and technology transfers demonstrates a strategic choice to align with Russia despite the costs of appearing complicit in the invasion
- Beijing's peace proposal and mediation attempts are primarily designed to deflect criticism and gain leverage with Europe rather than genuinely resolve the conflict
- Russia has become economically and strategically dependent on China while retaining nationalist resentment, creating an asymmetrical vassal relationship that benefits Beijing long-term
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Since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, Russia began expanding commercial ties to China as Russian leadership awakened to the growth of the Chinese economy and realized they needed to build pipelines quickly; pre-sanctions Russia envisioned trade composition as 40% with the EU, 40% with China and Asia, and 20% with the rest of the world.
“since the global branch of 2008-2009 Russia was expanding this commercial ties to China really waking up to the growth of the Chinese economy like it was it took really the Global Credit Crunch and the knockdown in which the Russian economy found itself back in 2008 2009 to wake up and say like oh we have a giant prosperous neighbor that really requires all of this hydrocarbons that we have and we don't have a bloody pipeline so we should build that very fast”
An asymmetry in the Russia-China relationship was inbuilt from the start because China is a much bigger, much more technologically advanced, and much more rapidly growing economy while Russia is economically stagnant, creating an asymmetrical dynamic that has intensified with sanctions ('asymmetry on steroids').
“I think that a symmetry in this relationship was really inbuilt very early on because China is a much bigger much more technologically advanced and much more rapidly growing economy where Russia is stagnant now it's an asymmetry on steroids where China has just so much more leverage and Russia doesn't have that many options”
The historical conventional view held that Russia and China would experience long-term tensions due to their 1960s Sino-Soviet split, which resulted in tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers on the border prepared for tactical nuclear warfare, combined with China's future economic dominance in Central Asia through hydrocarbon imports starting in 1994 and Chinese military espionage against Russian technology suppliers during the 1990s embargo period.
“Soviet Union had uh tens of thousands of soldiers on this border the Border was fortified it was prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield and for China that was also the major conventional threat to the North and then sparsely populated Siberia and very Dynamic and very populated China seemed to be in a symmetry that's unsustainable”
Putin is not a president but rather a 'star' of Russia who rules through personalist authority and patronage, while Xi Jinping functions more like an emperor; both systems are characterized by policy driven by the ambitions, needs, paranoia, and whims of a single individual.
“Putin is not a president he's a star of Russia where XI jinpin is really more like an emperor now”
Russian Prime Minister Mishustin is scheduled to visit China by the end of the month to sign agreements for pipeline construction: one pipeline from Sakhalin Island to bring 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China, and a rerouting of the Yamal pipeline (formerly destined for the EU) to China instead.
“for example prime minister mashustan is going to China by the end of this month and they will sign an agreement to build a pipeline from sahelin Island bring in 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China they will talk about a new pipeline uh bringing gas from yamal that used to go to European Union to China”
China's February 2023 peace proposal is characterized as principles rather than a plan, consisting of 12 principles hierarchically ordered with sovereignty as the most important principle, followed by China designating a special representative to visit various countries; Ambassador Li Hui was selected as special envoy and is currently traveling to Europe this week, visiting Ukraine, Germany, France, Poland, and Russia (last), having served as China's longest-serving ambassador to Russia for 10 years and awarded a prestigious award by Putin for improving Sino-Russia relations and is fluent in Russian.
“I wouldn't characterize the February 2023 Chinese proposal for political assignment as a plan yet I would say that what China has laid out is 12 different principles and the principles to my understanding are based on the hierarchy of order so the first one sovereignty is the most important for China but since then we have seen China call President zielinski and since then uh designate a special representative to go to the various countries including this week right now Ambassador Lihue is currently in Europe this week to talk to Ukraine Germany France and then Poland going to all these countries”
There is reporting of Chinese military equipment transfers to Russia including assault rifles, body armor, semiconductor shipments (doubled from 2021 to 2022), heavy civilian trucks usable for military purposes, and drone shipments from approximately 70 different Chinese companies producing 26 different drone types; more recently, leaked US intelligence in early 2023 revealed Russia requested ammunition from China, which would constitute overt lethal aid.
“we've already seen reporting of Chinese assault rifles and body armor being delivered to Ukraine we've also seen reporting of China increasing I think doubling the semiconductor ships to Russia in 2022 versus 2021 more Chinese super heavy civilian trucks which could be used to you know move equipment could be used for military purpose and of course drone shipments I saw an interesting report by the Atlanta Council in which they tracked 70 different Chinese companies providing either drone equipment or parts 26 different types”
Chinese diplomatic officials, particularly Ambassador Qin Gang in Brussels, are deliberately attempting to walk back the 'no limits partnership' statement by explaining to European governments and media that China did not know about the invasion and is actually opposed to the war.
“we see that the Chinese diplomats are trying to walk this back very skillfully particular Ambassador for Tong in Brussels who works with the commission with various European governments with leading European media trying to explain that no no we didn't know we're not with these guys and we are actually very much opposed to this war and tinga when he still was Ambassador in DC try to do the same line but I think that the damage was done by then”
Among China's leading Russian experts before February 2022, Xi Jinping's commitment to a strategic partnership with Putin was widely unexpected and not something these experts had anticipated or advocated for in their pre-invasion writings.
“when Chinese Scholars writing even before February 2022 looked at the china-russia relationship many had echoed exactly what Sasha said the Deep distrust between the two countries the lingering historical anima City and that has persisted since the sign of Soviet split but generally I would say among the leading Scholars of Russia in China what uh president Xi Jinping agreed to with Vladimir Putin was a prized it was not something that China's leading Russian experts had anticipated”
Putin's initial reaction to China's peace plan was positive ('it's interesting, we are ready to talk'), and Zelenski's initial comment was also very positive, but President Biden later stated that the Chinese plan benefits only Russia and shouldn't be taken as a basis for anything, which actually represents a great outcome for China because it allows China to claim it nearly brought Putin and Zelenski to the negotiation table but the US killed the opportunity.
“the initial reaction of Putin and zelenski was very notable because the Russian side said oh it's interesting we are ready to talk so we might have our own opinion but this is a good base for kind of conversation initial comment from the landscape was very positive but then that night President Biden said that oh Chinese plan benefits only Russia so it shouldn't be taken as basis for anything and that also is a great outcome for China because they can say oh we not only produced a draft framework for how to think about those issues we nearly brought Vladimir Putin and zelenski to the negotiation group because they were open and then the opportunity was killed by the us”
China knows how to massage the Russian ego and present Russia as an equal partner; Xi Jinping was not forced to go to Moscow on his maiden post-election trip and could have chosen another country, but went on a state visit with all protocol, which is brilliant strategy by China to make Russia feel it is treated as a respected partner—something very important for Russian nationalist sentiment.
“I think that this understanding that China also knows how to massage the Russian ego and how to present Russia as an equal partner like XI jinpin was not forced to go to Moscow on his Maiden Trip after the so-called re-election you could chosen another country but he went to Moscow and not only did he went to mosque or did he go to Moscow but he went on a state visit like with all of this protocol so I think that on this channel is really brilliant to make Russia sure that no it's treated as a respected uh partner and that's what's very important for the Russians”
China's pragmatic short-term benefits from the Russia-China relationship include having a friendly regime to the north, access to cheap raw materials, and access to Russian military technology that Russia was not ready to provide before; the long-term trend that colors Chinese vision is that the conflict with the US will last a long time and China needs partners, so having a partner as obsessed about the US and as angry as Russia is worth pursuing.
“besides the very pragmatic short-term benefits like okay we still have a friendly regime to the north we get access to cheap raw materials and we get access to Russian military technology that we might need and Russia was not ready to provide before that the long-term Trend that colors Chinese vision is that hey this conflict with the US is there for quite a long time we need Partners we don't have the same align structure for sure we are a very lonely superpower but here if we have somebody who is as obsessed about the US and as angry and can bring capabilities to the an assets to the table that's definitely their partnership worth pursuing”
Sasha, as a Russian passport holder and self-described Russian patriot, declines to offer policy recommendations to the US; he considers the Ukraine war deeply immoral and unpatriotic, describing it as the cruelest war Russia, the Soviet Union, or the Russian Empire has ever fought against a neighbor with deep cultural and historical ties.
“I feel it's totally inappropriate for me to offer any policy options to the US not only as a Russian passport holder but as a die-hard a Russian patriot who thinks that this war is deeply immoral that's the cruelest war that Russia the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire has ever had because it's against our closest neighbor and against our very close country where like my mother was born”
China is agnostic about the contact line in Ukraine and does not need to overtly help Russia sustain military operations, as long as Russia remains isolated with Putin or someone like Putin in the Kremlin; the bottom line for Beijing is having a Russia dependent on China while the government structure remains similar.
“I agree with Bonnie and I think that China is also agnostic to the fact where the contact line is I think that really the bottom line is that China has Vladimir Putin or somebody like Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin that Russia remains isolated but the government structure is the same and the question mark for Beijing decision makers is like really do we need to be overtly involved to help Russia to sustain bahmoud probably not”
China never evacuated its citizens from Ukraine before the invasion, suggesting either that something less serious than a full invasion was expected, or that Xi Jinping's main focus was ensuring the invasion would not occur before the conclusion of the Chinese Winter Olympics.
“China never evacuated its citizens so probably if something has been discussed it was based on what I know more about nothing happening before their Olympics and then when the Olympics is over like small scale provocations maybe but nothing before the end of the Olympics that's where China was really focused”
The close partnership between Xi Jinping and Putin is primarily glued together by shared skepticism toward U.S. leadership and deep suspicions that the US is attempting regime change against both Russia and China, combined with similar biographical elements: both are age mates (Xi six months younger), both had fathers who fought in WWII, both experienced hardship in youth, and both climbed to supreme power with a shared worldview about needing to push back against U.S. hegemony.
“this is the glue that sticks them together and then also skepticism to put it mildly towards the U.S leadership and deep suspicions that the US is out to get them that it's out for regime change against both Russia and China is really a shared worldview”
While China is becoming more active diplomatically, over time if there is no much progress toward resolving the conflict, the hopes that some in Europe have that China can play a mediator role will probably be dashed and China will lose that leverage with Europe.
“so right now I actually think China is a slightly better position diplomatically speaking than say six months ago but again I think that's because China is becoming more active now but over time we don't see much progress the hopes that folks have that some folks in Europe have that China can play more of a mediator role will probably be Dash and China will lose that Leverage”
Sasha observed body language and public footage (including 'pancakes and stuff') indicating that Putin and Xi Jinping genuinely like each other and display authentic personal chemistry, not merely performative diplomacy.
“I have observed to twice only in person and of course they don't share a language but you see by the body language that they like each other and I think that the all the available footage with the pancakes and stuff is a testament to this”
Key lessons China is taking from Russia's experience in Ukraine include a better understanding of how complex it is to invade another country and how much Western countries can actually unite together and provide military aid while imposing significant economic sanctions.
“some of the key lessons learned that we're seeing that China take away from the Ukraine conflict is a better understanding of how complex it is to uh invade another country as well as the understanding of how much if the conditions are right Western countries could actually unite together and provide not only military aid but also significant economic sanctions”
The United States is losing more ground in the Global South than in other regions and needs to do much better at countering Chinese messaging and pointing out problematic Chinese activities; however, the US is not providing a clear narrative that is getting more Global South countries to support Ukraine.
“I think one of the areas in which we are probably the United States is probably losing more ground than others is in the global South I think the United States needs to do a much better effort in countering the various messaging that China is doing in the global South for pointing out how problematic Chinese activities are but I don't see as providing a clear narrative that's getting more countries in the global South to be willing to support Ukraine”
China recognized that the Ukraine conflict's impact on global supply chains, food production, and energy supplies created urgent pressures for China to seek conflict resolution, so Beijing became active in reaching out to the Global South to pressure the US and NATO to end the war in a shorter timeframe.
“China became very active in reaching out to the global South to make sure that the global South would be able to pressure the United States and NATO to try to end the war in a shorter time frame because China saw how much the impact of the Ukraine conflict wasn't just localized in Europe right it was impacting Global Supply chains it was very much disrupting also the production of food also disrupting energy supplies”
The positions of Russia and Ukraine are miles apart on all problematic issues including territory, reconstruction, reparations, and accountability for war criminals where Ukraine wants to see Putin prosecuted; therefore, any window of opportunity for diplomacy would only be about ceasefire, where China might play a role by pressuring Moscow to come to the negotiation table and respect ceasefire terms while the West pressures Kiev.
“the understanding is that right now the positions are miles apart and on all of the problematic issues about territory and reconstruction reparations accountability for war criminals where Ukraine wants to see Vladimir Putin persecuted like there will be no agreement on this so if window of opportunity for diplomacy opens it will be only about ceasefire and that's where actually China might play a role because if there is a push from the West on Kiev to sit down and agree to a ceasefire right now there needs to be some push coming on Moscow to bring them to negotiation table and then also respect the terms of ceasefire”
Putin is in an existential battle against the West that he didn't expect; he thought that after Americans withdrew from Afghanistan and Biden prioritized other issues, Ukraine would not be a priority and sanctions would follow but he could live with them; now it is a very different situation because of heroic Ukrainian resistance and massive Western support for Ukraine, making the situation existential for him personally, for his regime, and by extension for Russia as he sees it.
“Mr Putin is in this existential battle against the West that he didn't expect he thought that oh after watching Americans withdrawn from Afghanistan and Biden really trying to focus on priority issues well Ukraine is not a priority for the US so once I'm successful they will introduce some sanctions but they probably will live with that now it's a very different ball game first and foremost because of heroic Ukrainian resistance and then because of the massive support that the West is continuing to provide to Ukraine so this is existential for him personally for his regime and by extension he believes to his country”
Russia will remain a deeply aligned and sanctioned dictatorship that will bring a lot to the table for the US-China competition for years to come; around the corner nine months one year from now this issue will not go away, and this is a very powerful factor that every US policymaker should think about.
“I think that where we can play a role is really an analysis and I think that to understand that around the corner nine months one year from now this issue will not go away Russia deeply align and with China providing many resources still sustainable dictatorship that will bring a lot to the table for this competition is a very powerful factor that every U.S policy maker should think of”
China may not draw correct strategic lessons from Ukraine and instead may choose to further improve PLA capability rather than abandon military options, meaning if China were to invade Taiwan, it would likely deploy something much more dangerous, lethal, and forceful than Russia brought to Ukraine.
“I think as we as Sasha and I were talking about China is looking at how Russia engaged in the invasion of Ukraine and and they're noting that this is not how Russian textbooks say that it would actually invade another country right that is not how China would have made Taiwan I think they are learning that uh Beijing is learning that it needs to further improve the pla's capability so we should expect if China were to invade Taiwan I'm not saying China is going to do that anytime soon or the possibility of that is increasing that if China were to do so we would probably see something much more dangerous much more lethal and with significant more Force than what Russia brought to Ukraine”
Sasha received multiple calls from Chinese colleagues in Moscow asking whether US media reports of an imminent Russian invasion were credible or 'American hysteria'; he responded by vouching for the credibility of US intelligence based on his knowledge of CIA Director Bill Burns and the integrity of the US intelligence team, without confirming knowledge of Putin's specific invasion plans.
“I received multiple calls from Chinese colleagues with them asking like okay we are reading this stuff uh in the New York Times and other media and there is all of this American hysteria so tell us Sasha how should we read that like is it real and then you are part of Carnegie so many of your former colleagues including your former boss Bill Burns is now director of the CIA what does it mean and then I said well I have reasons to unfortunately believe that what we are reading is true precisely for the reason that I know these people a little bit and then there definitely is a team of tremendous Integrity they would not manipulate in intelligence”
China's response to Russia's 2008 Georgia invasion was not supportive, creating an early indicator that Beijing was uncomfortable with Russian military aggression and would not automatically align with Moscow over security matters.
“China's position on the Russia Georgia war in 2008 which was not exactly supportive”
Many Chinese experts publicly predicted early in the war that it would be short and that the implications for China would be minimal because Russia would quickly prevail, representing a widespread misreading of Russian military capability and conflict dynamics.
“early on many Chinese experts on the record publicly saying that the war will be short that the implications for China would be next to none because it would be over”
The recent analysis by Mike Kaufman and Rob Lee in Foreign Affairs shows that while Ukraine's counter-offensive might be very successful, there should be no expectation of outright Ukrainian victory, meaning Russia will likely remain capable of sustaining the conflict.
“I think that the recent piece by Mike Kaufman and Rob Lee in foreign affairs is really very clear died and instructive that yes the Ukrainian counter-offensive might be very successful but don't expect miracles don't expect outright victory in zelenski definition”