
Lyn Alden (Macro Expert/FinTwit Rockstar!) Rebel Capitalist Show Ep. 35!
What this covers
This is a one-on-one interview in which the host, George Gammon, questions Lynn Alden about the dollar, framed by the public argument between the dollar-bull and dollar-bear camps. Alden starts with mechanics. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)) counts $12-13 trillion of dollar debt outside the US, and that debt feeds a dollar shortage. She follows the DXY (Dollar Index)) through the repo market episode in late 2019, the pause in January 2020, and the March spike. She also covers how the Federal Reserve (Fed)) uses swaps and repo facilities to supply dollars without forcing foreign holders to dump Treasuries, and how foreigners sold more than $100 billion of them in March anyway.
The second strand is structural. Alden separates creditor nation from debtor nation status and traces the US from the world's largest creditor to a net international investment position below negative 50% of GDP. She argues that currencies drift toward an equilibrium value (currency)) set by trade balances, using Turkey as an example, and that reserve status only delays this for the US. She also argues that the strong dollar has hurt American industry. Her contested long-run forecast puts the dollar's natural level at a DXY of 60-70.
The remaining ground is about inflation and policy. She asks why post-2008 QE produced little consumer inflation, noting that reserves are not cash in households' hands. She looks at Japan's yen devaluation as a non-inflationary devaluation. She examines the 1940s episode of yield curve control, which was followed by double-digit inflation. She considers whether stimulus checks used to pay down debt would offset inflation, and whether reshoring could produce stagflation. More speculative and disputed points include Russia-led efforts to price oil in other currencies, China's dollar-denominated Belt and Road lending, and the claim that a DXY spike to 110-120 would badly damage US assets.
Alden argues that the US faces a structural dollar dilemma: the global dollar shortage (driven by $12-13 trillion in offshore dollar-denominated debt) currently props up an overvalued dollar, but once that shortage is resolved through Fed liquidity provision, the dollar's natural equilibrium value is significantly lower due to persistent trade deficits and the US's deep debtor status, making currency devaluation and eventual inflation likely outcomes.
- Global dollar shortage keeps the dollar artificially strong despite structural weaknesses (persistent trade deficits, negative net international investment position of -$11 trillion)
- Fed's balance sheet expansion to address liquidity crisis creates conditions for future dollar weakness and inflation once shortage is relieved
- US is worst among G7 in twin deficits and international investment position, making lower equilibrium dollar value inevitable over multi-year horizon
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There are $12-13 trillion in dollar-denominated debts outside the United States, as stated by the Bank for International Settlements, which creates a global dollar shortage where non-US entities earning revenue in local currencies struggle to obtain dollars to service these debts.
“the BIS states it's it's twelve or thirteen trillion dollars in dollar denominated debts outside of the US so in addition to all the dollar deaths inside the United States there's that large shortage like that large debt outside the United States”
In the 1940s during World War II, when US debt-to-GDP reached similar levels to today (~120%), the Fed implemented yield curve control, locking short-term rates at 0.38% and long-term rates at 2.5%, but this resulted in double-digit inflation in 1942 and 1947, causing Treasuries to lose significant real (inflation-adjusted) value despite nominal gains.
“that's that's the last time that US debt to GDP got this high... it was actually slightly higher back then... what the Fed did was they did yield curve control so they worked with the Treasury and then they basically said like we'll buy any Treasury we need to at 2.5% so they locked the yield curve the t-bill was it something like 0.38 percent and then the long duration stuff was at two and a half percent... inflation actually in 1942 and then again in 1947 inflation got into the double digits 70s... Treasuries lost a lot of value on a real basis even though they they made money nominally”
The dollar index fell from ~99 to ~96 in late 2019 through early January 2020 when the Fed began printing money to backstop the repo market, but resumed strengthening after the Fed stopped printing in January 2020, then spiked to ~103 in March 2020 when the pandemic crisis erupted and exacerbated the dollar shortage.
“starting with the repo spike in September of 2019 the Fed started printing money to basically backstop the repo market expanding his balance sheet and that helped in the short-term alleviate the dollar shortage so we started to see the Dollar Index fall from about 99 to about 96 and then it stopped they stopped printing around right at the turn of the year in January 2020 so we started to have the dollar strengthened again and then of course it all blew up when we had this this virus it shut everything down we had the dollar breakout you know Dixie got up to about 103”
Foreigners sold over $100 billion in Treasuries in a very short period of time in March 2020, causing Treasury prices to crash approximately 16% from their highs (TLT down ~16%), driven by both foreign entities needing dollars and domestic hedge funds being net sellers due to leverage.
“foreigners specifically sold over a hundred billion dollars worth of Treasuries in a very short period of time... there was so much foreign selling pressure and some domestic hedge funds and other institutions also were net sellers due to leverage... all those long bonds crash pretty hard... it was down about 16% from its highs”
Dollar-denominated debt outside the U.S. includes both short-term (rolled over every 2-3 years) and longer-term debt across a spectrum of maturities; a significant portion has shifted from loans to bonds over time.
“there's a big spectrum of it a lot of it short term a lot of its medium longer-term also the BIS has a breakdown of how much of it is loans versus bonds so over time more of it is shifted towards bonds I don't know the exact maturity profile offhand but it's it's a pretty broad maturities”
The Fed's recent balance sheet expansion (through quantitative easing, currency swaps, and international repo facilities) aims to provide dollar liquidity without forcing foreign entities to sell Treasuries outright, preferring to lend dollars via swaps and accepting Treasuries as collateral rather than purchasing them directly on secondary markets.
“they're doing currency swaps so they can they can give dollars without necessarily exchanging Treasuries it's a loan and then they also now have an international repo so foreign central banks can loan their Treasuries back to the Fed rather than sell Treasuries on the open market in order to get dollars temporarily so the Fed would would prefer that than all this outright hard selling of Treasuries”
If consumers use government stimulus checks to pay down existing debt rather than spend, it reduces money supply and counteracts inflation pressure, because debt payoff extinguishes asset-backed money in the system.
“if you pay off a debt you're paying your if you if you eliminate debt you're basically also taking away an asset so someone else's asset... if you have a reduction in stock prices or home equity and then also you have consumers that are suddenly more fearful about losing their income... they can spend less and they can leverage less and they can even you know reduce existing leverage so you could see that near-term deflation if people aren't confident to spend”
Households and companies derive consumer spending power not only from cash on hand but from the wealth effects of stock portfolios, home equity, and availability of credit through home equity loans and other leveraged instruments, so reductions in these collateral values reduce spending power and can create deflationary spirals.
“people there are confidence in spending parsley comes from how much money they have in the bank account but also comes from what are their stock and bond portfolio worth what is their home equity worth that can all influence consumer behavior... you can extract a lot of spending power from these non money assets you can you can monetize them”
Creditor nations (Japan, Germany, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan) own more foreign assets than foreigners own of their assets, while debtor nations (US, Spain, etc.) have more foreign ownership of their assets than they own abroad, creating structural asymmetries in how countries respond to financial stress.
“creditor nations that's measured as the net international investment... the net international investment position is the difference between how much they own from other countries versus how much country's own of their assets... a creditor nation owns more foreign assets than foreigners own of their assets and a debtor nation is vice-versa so some of the largest credit Asians are Japan Germany Singapore Switzerland Norway Saudi Arabia Taiwan and then some of the biggest debtor nations the United States is the largest absolute debtor nation”
Currencies eventually find equilibrium values around trade balances; when countries run persistent trade deficits, they experience currency weakness and shrinking imports until equilibrium is restored, as demonstrated by Turkey's experience with currency depreciation forcing import reduction.
“the trade balance is kind of at the heart of it because in a normal system currencies eventually find an equilibrium around trade so if a country runs a persistent trade deficit generally what happens is there's some sort of financial crisis or some sort of shock it happens and something they're forced to reduce their consumption of imports and their currency generally weekends... turkey was running a big deficit trade deficit and then when their currency had this big weakening suddenly that kind of was a self-reinforcing cycle so they now are importing less because they have to because they have a weakening currency”
Most currencies eventually find equilibrium around trade balance, though for some this takes years; the U.S. is structurally different because it is the global reserve currency, which creates extra demand for dollars beyond trade fundamentals.
“most currencies eventually sometimes they find it quickly sometimes they can take years to find that equilibrium but they generally find an equilibrium around trade now the u.s. is a little bit different because we have the global reserve currency so we have this kind of extra layer of demand for the dollar over the past several decades”
The overvalued dollar (maintained by global dollar demand for trade and commodities) has harmed the US industrial base and manufacturing competitiveness, with 50-70% of Americans experiencing harm from deindustrialization driven by an uncompetitive exchange rate, while the US consumes German, Japanese, and European cars but those regions do not consume American cars.
“we've we've exported a lot of our industrial base to foreign markets especially China but even Europe especially in this in this five year strong dollar environment from 2014 to present Europe has a very large trade surplus with the United States... there's a reason we drive German cars and Japanese cars and they don't really drive American cars because our currency is just always too strong in order to make our products as competitive as they could be in the global market right now so you know this this this whole process of the industrialization it benefits some people but it's about say 50 or 70 percent of the country that's this you know more harmed by it”
If the Fed continues to buy the entire Treasury market to suppress interest rates, the long-run consequence will be currency devaluation of the dollar because the Fed cannot maintain both low yields and a strong currency; the release valve must be currency weakness.
“the long run that's it's resulting currency devaluation most likely because the dollar actually has a lot of fundamental problems with it at the moment... the limit ends up being that the currency weakens so they can technically set the yield at whatever they want to set it at... but they can't just they can't override that and maintain currency strength so the release valve would be you can't you lower the yields but then you lose value for the dollar”
Over the past decade, inflation has appeared primarily in financial assets (stocks, bonds), healthcare, and luxury goods, while consumer prices for most goods have remained stable due to deflationary forces from technology and outsourcing offsetting monetary expansion.
“over the past ten years in this cycle we have seen inflation in financial assets we've seen inflation in healthcare we've seen inflation in luxury goods but due to the combination of technology which is generally deflationary especially for consumer goods electronics because it makes things more efficient and outsourcing these are been deflationary forces for consumer prices”
Japan's central bank printed aggressively starting in late 2012, expanding its balance sheet to over 100% of GDP, which caused the yen to devalue significantly (from ~74 yen/dollar in 2012 to ~120 yen/dollar by 2015), but this produced a 'non-inflationary devaluation' with minimal domestic consumer price inflation.
“they really started ramping up printing in late 2012... the yen was like 70 something... maybe 74 yen to the dollar and then by 2015 three years later that it was like 120 yen to the dollar so that a very significant yen devaluation... they didn't experience any domestic inflation they didn't have a lot of price inflation at the consumer level”
After the 2008 financial crisis, quantitative easing did not produce significant consumer price inflation because the Fed expanded bank reserves (balance sheet liability) rather than distributing cash directly to households, so the money did not circulate in the real economy with velocity; consumer price inflation requires fiscal transfers that put money into household hands.
“after 2008 as you point out they did a lot of QE but it's it's bank reserves so they weren't they weren't sending out cheque cuz everyone it wasn't getting down to the everyday buying level... we had an expansion the monetary base we had you know balance sheet went up but we didn't have the average person didn't have more money so they were there wasn't a lot of money chasing the same level of products so we didn't have consumer price inflation”
Countries are actively seeking to de-dollarize their debt and commodity pricing, with Russia spearheading efforts to price oil in non-dollar terms (euros, rubles) with China, Europe, and India, making multi-currency commodity pricing increasingly likely over the medium to long term.
“Russia has been kind of spearheading that where they've been trying to do deals with China and Europe to price oil in non dollar terms and they've had some arms deals with India where they priced it in rubles... if especially in Eurasia especially if Russia China Europe has an interest in being ordered by oil with euros if we start to see Multi Korean - oil pricing”
After World War II, the US transitioned from the world's largest creditor nation to debtor status by 1985, and by 2008 was at negative 10% of GDP in net international investment position; by 2020 this has deteriorated to below negative 50% of GDP due to persistent large trade deficits over 12 years.
“after World War one war two we were the world's largest creditor nation so you know we we had more foreign assets than foreigners own of our assets and then that slowly deteriorated so by 1985 we hit we went into debtor status slightly and then during the previous recession in 2007-2008 our net international investment position was negative ten percent of our GDP... since then in just that 12 years 2020 we're now down to below negative 50 percent of GDP”
If the US attempts to reduce imports and increase domestic production through tariffs or reshoring, this will exacerbate inflation because US labor costs are higher than outsourced labor pools, eliminating deflationary benefits of offshoring while the Fed simultaneously must print money to manage deficits, creating a stagflationary scenario.
“if we try to start buying u.s. so no more imports from China or India or Europe isn't that going to create another problem in the sense that it's going to exacerbate inflation because we don't have any of those supply chains set up we have a higher cost of labor instead of outsourcing to a lower cost labor pool”
China's Belt and Road lending initiative has generally been denominated in dollars, not in other currencies, despite China's role as the world's largest oil importer, suggesting that global dollar hegemony for trade financing remains entrenched even in non-Western lending programs.
“China's been active in in lending but they have generally been lending in dollars to okay you know for their Dalton Road initiative”
Once the Fed expands its balance sheet to $20-30 trillion in size, it cannot easily contract it (as proven by the failed taper post-2015); this locks the Fed into permanently holding massive assets, essentially preventing the central bank from ever unwinding stimulus.
“and also too that once the Fed takes their balance sheet up to 20 or 30 trillion who knows what they have to it's not like they can take that money out of circulation I can't let wine that balance sheet look what happened when they tried to do cutie from what call it 4.5 down to 3.8 and the whole thing blows up yeah repo market”
Even when dollars flow to foreign countries, they may not reach the right countries or companies that need them; simultaneously, a drop in oil prices from $100/barrel to $10/barrel dramatically reduces the dollar inflow to oil-producing nations.
“even if they get outside that states and I can necessarily getting to the right countries so they could still be getting to Saudi Arabia they still could be getting to China but they're not necessarily getting to another country that needs them or specific companies that need them and does the price of oil make it even worse because I would assume that like a country that produced a lot of oil that would be great for them because they're getting revenue in dollars but if the price of oil goes from a hundred a barrel down to ten then they're getting a lot fewer dollars coming in”
A sharp dollar spike (to DXY 110-120 as some bull cases predict) would be extremely damaging for the US economy and asset prices, coinciding with stock market downturns as occurred in 2008-2009, and creating multi-year headwinds for US corporate profits due to reduced competitiveness.
“it's possible a spike of that magnitude one thing I've always viewed is that some of the dollar bowls underestimate how damaging that spike would be for the u.s. including us historically US asset prices so for example when the dollar spiked in 2008 it this the spike of the dollar coincided almost perfectly with the bottom in the US stock market... if you also look at US corporate profits over the past you know 50 60 years the three major dollar spikes that we had in 1985 and then 2001 and then currently these like you know each one last like roughly five years US corporate profits go flatline”
The natural long-term equilibrium value of the dollar is significantly lower than current levels, potentially at DXY of 60-70 rather than the post-2008 range of 75-80, because historical precedent (the 2008 crisis with DXY below 80) still did not achieve equilibrium and the US structural deficits have only widened since then.
“if we look at what happened in 2008 the dollar like our imports fell pretty considerably and we our trade deficit narrowed a little bit but even that wasn't quite enough... Dixie was down below 80 and even that wasn't quite enough... probably equilibrium values below 80 on the dollar index so what happened with our trade when we were down at 70 on the DXY in 2011 or 12... our trade deficit narrowed significantly... it still remained even with a dollar index below 80... it might be equilibrium may be 60 or 55 something like that”
Switzerland, with one of the highest creditor nation status and massive current account surplus, also has some of the world's most negative interest rates and a central bank balance sheet at ~100% of GDP, showing that managing a structurally strong currency requires extraordinary monetary accommodation.
“they have their some of the most negative interest rates in the world and then they also are printing just huge amounts of money like their balance sheet last I checked is kind of like Japan where it's like it's like a hundred percent of their GDP”
Fiscal stimulus through direct payments to consumers (checks) is a mechanism to get money into the real economy and could drive consumer price inflation; whether this becomes permanent risk depends on how long the stimulus continues and whether it becomes a permanent program (MMT).
“in order to see that inflation on the consumer level it has to be a mechanism to get money into the hands of people and that's what you could find that really causes that inflation get out of control so the part that I definitely agree with is the the fiscal side or the MMT side”
The host and Alden differ in their assessment of inflation timing: the host believes MMT and stimulus checks + supply chain disruption will lead to near-term inflation, while Alden believes near-term forces are deflationary (demand destruction, confidence shock) but inflation risk increases on the 'other side' of the crisis if government continues stimulus and capital flows reverse.
“George... I see mmt as a way of increasing the deposits... you might have fewer goods and services because of D globalization... you have more money chasing the same amount of fewer amount of goods... Alden: that's certainly possible there are parts of that that I would totally agree with and then the other parts that while they could happen they're not in my base case”
The Fed has become the 'buyer of last resort' and now the 'only major buyer at scale' of Treasuries, having to purchase hundreds of billions per week because there are not enough private buyers to absorb the supply of Treasuries being offered by both foreign and domestic sellers.
“there's not enough buyers for all the sellers both internationally and domestically so the feds find themselves is you know instead of the buyer of last resort they're becoming like the only major buyer Treasuries... some traders are of course buying but the only buyer at scale right now is the Fed... they're buying their major buyer and they have to do that because there's just not enough dollars not enough fires to to buy all those Treasuries”
The United States is the largest absolute debtor nation, and as a percentage of GDP it is among the worst; Spain is deeper in the debtor hole than even the U.S.
“some of the biggest debtor nations the United States is the largest absolute debtor nation but then there's also as a percentage of GDP we're one of the worst but there are some that are even worse such as Spain which is deeper in the the deader hole”
The IMF received approximately 80 requests for dollar liquidity assistance in a single week (vs. typical monthly rate of ~1 request), indicating that multiple countries are either defaulting or facing acute currency weakness from inability to service dollar debts.
“they're the most vulnerable currently... the IMF went up like two it's just to some astronomical number like they generally get one request a month and they got 80 requests in the last week or something like that just multiple countries or either have defaulted or at risk of default or at risk of major currency weakness”
Historical precedent shows that when debt reaches very high levels, most regimes respond by devaluing their currency either intentionally or unintentionally; the U.S. faces the same choice.
“that's that's generally the release valve how this works and if you look at the long-term debt cycle that's normally how debt cycles play out whenever you get to debt just this high most regimes end up devaluing their currency either intentionally or unintentionally”
It is theoretically possible to have consumer price inflation while the dollar strengthens if there is sufficient inflation in other countries, but Lynn considers this outcome unlikely in the current environment.
“could we have the opposite could we have consumer price inflation when the CPI but yet the dollar getting quote-unquote strong you could if there's if there's inflation in other countries in addition to United States you could have inflation what the dollars were still retaining strength vers other currencies now I don't consider that as probable in this environment but it's definitely like in the realm of things that mathematically can happen”
The US structural budget deficit was 5% of GDP prior to the 2020 crisis, driven by entitlement spending (healthcare, Social Security), military spending, and the permanent budget structure, meaning the US will face large deficits indefinitely even after the temporary pandemic stimulus ends.
“we ran into this crisis with the Chilean dollar deficit the United States so it was five percent of GDP and it was structural it's based on you know our current plan of entitlement spending health care military spending like the whole kind of permanent financial budget we have in place it's just it's out of whack... for the next year or two years we're gonna have very large deficits but that's on top of a structural deficit so even after that's all over we're still looking at nothing but deficits”
Lynn is now more bullish on Bitcoin (as of 2020) than her 2017 neutral stance because there are now catalysts: post-dollar-shortage, likely weaker dollar, more liquidity, and Bitcoin benefits from the same forces that benefit gold and silver as a liquidity/diversification play.
“now that we've had two and a half years or so I am now more bullish on Bitcoin going forward because it's more catalyst now there's more you know now we're actually at the phase where postdoc post this shortage were likely to see a weaker dollar we're likely to see more liquidity so Bitcoin is a strong liquidity play that benefits from a lot of the same forces that are beneficial to gold and silver and it's you know it's a form of diversification”
Host argues that every central bank is technically a currency manipulator by controlling interest rates artificially, and that the US with its deficit spending is no exception to this general practice.
“if this is kind of a joking question but if if interest rates are the price of money or the currency and the central banks especially the Fed is manipulating artificially the interest rate isn't every single country a currency manipulator especially the United States”
Alden is bullish on gold and silver for the long term, has been investing in precious metals since the late 1990s, sold her holdings in 2011 near the peak, and has been buying back significant physical positions since 2018 in addition to miner companies and royalty companies.
“I'm bullish on gold and silver for the long term... I started adding them to my portfolio in 2008... I've actually been investing in precious metals since the late 1990s but I originally sold my collection back in 2011... it's been since dozen 18 that I've been buying back pretty sizable physical positions in addition to miners royalty companies”
Historical context: The Plaza Accord (1985) involved coordinated central bank intervention to weaken the dollar, suggesting that coordinated international monetary intervention is possible and has precedent, though Alden does not explicitly predict a 'Plaza Accord 2.0'.
“so it sounds like a weaker dollar is beneficial for all parties involved which was which will bring me kind of my last question here I really appreciate your time and that's if the DXY and that's the the measurement of the dollar... if that gets up to 110 120... do we have a plaza Accord 2.0 type of thing or how do you see that being resolved”
Alden wrote a neutral-to-cautiously-bullish article on Bitcoin in 2017, arguing Bitcoin's value depends entirely on network effects and continued confidence, creating binary risk (potential zero if adoption reverses, or potential 10-100x if adoption accelerates), but was more pessimistic relative to gold/silver at that time.
“back in 2017 I wrote this long article and my I had a pretty neutral outlook on it that it really comes down to the network effect... if people lose interest in the Bitcoin network there is a risk that it could go to zero... if the Bitcoin network continues to be popular... you could have a tenfold or a hundredfold increase... back then I had a pretty neutral outlook... you know it might be suitable for a small position but that I heard gold silver”
The gold-to-S&P 500 ratio (measuring relative value of gold vs. equities) bottomed in 2018 (not at the 2015-2016 absolute price low), meaning Alden caught a meaningful turn-around point in the relative valuation metric even if not the absolute low.
“in this recent turn I didn't buy it the low was back in 2015-2016... if you look at the goal to SB 500 Rea shio the low for like we're s PFF underpricing gold that actually bottom din 2018 started turning up so it managed to kind of catch that low”