What this covers

David Kennedy of Stanford University discusses the Great Depression and New Deal with economist Russ Roberts, challenging the familiar narrative that pits a passive Hoover against a transformative Roosevelt. Kennedy argues that both parts of this story—Hoover as a do-nothing laissez-faire conservative, and Roosevelt as the economy's savior—distort the historical record. Hoover, a progressive who grasped the crisis's international dimensions, pursued aggressive policies that nonetheless failed. Roosevelt, for his part, never fully ended the Depression before World War II arrived; unemployment remained around 15% after eight years of his presidency, down from 25% but far from recovery. Kennedy traces how this popular morality tale took shape through Democratic campaign messaging, revisionist histories written in service of postwar political agendas, and Hoover's own curmudgeonly later pronouncements.

The conversation ranges across the economic policies of both presidencies, the competing diagnoses of what caused the slump, and the deep institutional reforms that actually consumed Roosevelt's energy and attention. Kennedy explains that Roosevelt's overriding priority was not rapid economic recovery but the permanent reshaping of American life around a principle of "security"—embodied in Social Security, the SEC, the FHA, Fannie Mae, and a host of other institutions designed to remove risk from unemployment, old age, lending, and securities trading. He shows how these reforms, along with Roosevelt's shrewd mobilization of immigrant communities and labor unions, built a political coalition that dominated for thirty years. Kennedy also examines how postwar institutions like the IMF and World Bank vindicated Hoover's insight that the Depression was fundamentally a global crisis requiring international remedy—a dimension that purely domestic explanations of the slump had obscured. Throughout, he reflects on how historians construct narratives, how societies lose perspective without historical memory, and why competing stories about economic crisis remain so politically charged.

Sharpest takeaway

Kennedy argues the popular morality tale of the Great Depression (do-nothing Hoover vs. savior Roosevelt) is distorted: Hoover acted aggressively and grasped the crisis's international nature, while Roosevelt's overriding priority was not rapid economic recovery but a permanent reform agenda built around 'security' that reshaped American institutions and the political coalition for a generation.

  • Hoover was a progressive who acted aggressively but failed; Roosevelt never fully ended the Depression before WWII either
  • Roosevelt's true priority was institutionalizing 'security' (Social Security, SEC, FHA, Fannie Mae), not ending the slump quickly
  • Explanations confined to within the US miss that the Depression was a global crisis requiring international remedies

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0.86

The task of the historian is not to recite 'one damn thing after another' but to craft artful, persuasive narratives that map onto known reality and find patterns, chains of causation and consequence, and the best explanatory context; an account that claims to be the unimpeachable last word is rare and should be regarded with suspicion.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Kennedy

“crafting artful narratives that are persuasive, that map onto the reality as we know it and that strike us as being plausible and even at the end of the day common sensical... that's the task of the historian.”

0.86

Nobody recognized in the first two years that they were witnessing the capital-G Great Depression; contemporaries like Hoover believed it was another cyclical downturn similar to the brief 1920-21 recession, which Hoover had helped reverse as Commerce Secretary by persuading employers to maintain payrolls—so applying those proven methods seemed reasonable because history is lived forward, not backward.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Kennedy

“nobody, and I mean nobody, in the first months or even I would say the first almost 2 years of that event, knew that what they were witnessing was what we know as the capital G, capital D Great Depression.”

0.84

Universal health care was longstanding unfinished business of the progressive tradition—part of the 1912 Bull Moose platform and in the original drafting brief for the 1935 Social Security Act—but Roosevelt excised the health provisions before the bill went to Congress because he concluded keeping them risked sinking the whole bill; LBJ's Medicare and Medicaid only partly completed this agenda.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“In the original instructions to the drafting team that came up with the Social Security Act 1935, their original brief included instructions to come up with a plan for old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and universal health care. And Roosevelt, fairly early on, concluded that if he kept the health care provisions in it, he risked sinking the whole bill.”

0.82

Roosevelt's top priority was not ending the Depression as quickly as possible but using the moment of ideological malleability to accomplish reforms—summed up in the word 'security'—aimed at taking risk out of unemployment, old age, mortgage lending, and securities trading to make American life more predictable and stable; his 1937 second inaugural, warning that 'these signs of returning prosperity could be portents of political disaster,' reveals he feared too-swift recovery would prevent finishing his deeper reform agenda for the bottom third of the nation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“I can make a case that Roosevelt's top priority was not ending the depression as soon as possible. That his top priority was to use this moment of great political, social, cultural, ideological disruption, malleability to accomplish reforms”

0.81

The repeal of Prohibition succeeded through a convergence of interests: ethnic immigrant communities resented Prohibition on cultural grounds as a WASP conspiracy depriving them of inherited drinking practices, while the business wing of the Democratic Party wanted alcohol excise taxes restored to reduce pressure for higher marginal income-tax rates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“there was a kind of convergence of interest here, cultural grounds on the part of one community and economic tax revenue fiscal grounds on the part of the other community. That adds up to a sufficiently large block that we get rid of prohibition.”

0.81

Roosevelt strengthened the trade-union movement (backing leaders like John L. Lewis), helping non-farm unionization rise from under 10% before the Depression to a 37-38% peak by the 1950s, deliberately attaching labor's interests to the Democratic Party as a major constituency overlapping with the ethnic communities.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“by the 1950s, the non-farm workforce is about 37 or 8% unionized. That's the high point. That's a development that really begins in the 1930s.”

0.81

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was enacted by a runaway Congress and signed by Hoover despite his dislike of it; it cut against his own belief that the root cause of the Depression was the disruption of international trade, capital markets, and currency exchange rates in the aftermath of World War I.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“that same Congress ran away with the agenda and enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which Hoover, to his discredit, did sign, but he didn't like it... it cut across the grain of what he believed was the root cause of the depression itself.”

0.81

Roosevelt's charmed presidential popularity began its significant decline immediately after his 1937 court-packing plan, which gave an emerging conservative congressional bloc a convenient rallying point against further New Deal experimentation; absent the WWII crisis and France's 1940 surrender, polling suggests Roosevelt might not have won a third term.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“the the significant decline of of Roosevelt's rather charmed presidential popularity occurred almost immediately after his second inaugural in early 19 January 1937 when he announced his plan to augment the membership of the Supreme Court, the so-called court-packing plan.”

0.81

Hoover's lasting reputation as a do-nothing laissez-faire conservative stems partly from his genuinely failed presidency, partly from Democratic publicist Charles Michelson's highly effective negative campaign in 1932 demonizing him, and partly from Hoover's own increasingly curmudgeonly and self-contradictory statements in later years.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“The Democratic Party National Party hired a publicist in uh, 1932, named Charles Michelson, whose job it was to demonize Hoover in the course of the campaign... it forever left this impression in the popular memory of Hoover as this mossback, do-nothing, laissez-faire conservative”

0.81

Unlike the 1930s, when the gold standard—the one thin, poorly understood mechanism integrating the world economy—was abandoned (Britain in 1931, the US shortly after), today's world is densely populated with functioning international institutions and habits of cooperation (G8, G20, daily central-bank consultation), so national economies stay better synchronized and the world understands its interdependence far better.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“what passed for a mechanism of international economic and monetary regulation or or equilibration in the 1930s was the gold standard and virtually everybody abandoned it... Today, we have a much denser an international environment that is much more densely populated with functioning institutions”

0.81

A systematic intellectual critique of Rooseveltian policy did not crystallize until the immediate postwar period (Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, later Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom); 1930s opposition to Roosevelt was an inchoate, ineffective minority that lacked a solid intellectual rationale, and modern anti-big-government conservatism only crystallized in the 1930s as government grew.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“the really systematic articulation of a critique of Roosevelt and Rooseveltian policies really awaited the end of World War II in the immediate post-war period. Works like Friedrich Hayek's The Road to Serfdom and later Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom”

0.81

The fabled New Deal coalition—built on labor unions and the new ethnic immigrant communities entering politics in the 1930s—dominated national politics for at least a 30-year cycle into the 1960s, with the Catholic and Jewish vote moving solidly Democratic until George W. Bush became the first Republican to win a majority of the Catholic vote since Roosevelt's day in 2004.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“That's the core of the fabled New Deal coalition that dominates national politics well into the 1960s. It's a 30-year-long political cycle, at least.”

0.80

Roosevelt deliberately and shrewdly mobilized the new southern- and eastern-European immigrant communities—whose political loyalties were previously up for grabs—into a durable Democratic coalition, evidenced by his appointing over 50 Catholics to the federal bench in his first eight years versus only eight by Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover combined over their 12 years.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“The three Republican presidents who preceded Roosevelt... over their 12 years in office, appointed exactly eight Catholics to the federal bench in 12 years. In Roosevelt's first eight years in office... he appointed over 50 Catholics to the federal bench.”

0.79

A society whose members don't know their own history is like an individual who has lost their memory—unable to know who they are; and since the past is the only sector of human activity from which we have any data, studying human behavior at all requires looking to the past.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Kennedy

“a society who whose members don't know their own history is like an individual loses his or her memory. You really don't know who you are unless you have some memory of who you've been”

0.78

Humans are hardwired to understand the world through comprehensible stories, so a contest over the narrative of what caused the current crisis—whether responsibility lies with private-sector abuses or public-sector meddling—is a natural and understandable struggle whose outcome is not yet clear.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Kennedy

“I do think that we are hardwired to understand the world in terms of comprehensible stories. I just think that's part of human psychology.”

0.75

The folkloric view that Hoover did nothing out of free-market paralysis while Roosevelt's New Deal saved the economy is distorted on both sides: Hoover took strong initiatives for his day, and Roosevelt never fully pulled the country out of the Depression—unemployment was still about 15% eight years into his presidency, down from 25%, but full recovery awaited World War II.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“the standard history of Hoover as a failure and Roosevelt as a great success on strictly economic grounds... is distorted on both sides. Hoover did indeed take some pretty strong initiatives, and Roosevelt, for his part, never did fully pull the country out of the depression.”

0.75

LBJ knew, as Roosevelt did, that attaching the Democratic Party to racial equality would cost it the South; upon signing the 1964 Civil Rights Act he reportedly told an aide 'I believe we have just lost the South for at least the next generation,' a prediction that proved accurate as the South went Republican.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“when Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he turned to one of his aides and said, 'I believe we have just lost the South for at least the next generation.' Well, that proved to be absolutely accurate.”

0.75

It has been understood clearly since the 1930s among historians that the New Deal did not end the Great Depression and that World War II did; the recent punditry presenting this as a newly revealed secret badly mistakes the public for being more ignorant than is justified.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“amongst historians there's no headline in the statement that the New Deal did not end the Great Depression that it took World War II to do that. This this has been understood clearly since the 1930s.”

0.75

The New Deal began turning the small black electorate toward the Democratic Party—a great historical reversal from the black vote's Republican allegiance as the party of Lincoln and emancipation—culminating in roughly 90% of blacks voting Democratic since World War II.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“it starts to turn the black vote to the Democratic Party, where it remains ever since. I mean, since World War II, 90% or so of blacks have voted for the Democratic Party. That's a great historical reversal.”

0.74

A responsible historical comparison between the 1930s and the current crisis should match comparable points in the economic cycle: dating the Depression's onset to October 1929 and the current crisis to Lehman Brothers' September 2008 collapse means today (August 2010) is analogous not to spring 1933 (Roosevelt's inauguration) but to roughly 1931—before the real descent—so it remains unknown whether the downward slide has been arrested or a second catastrophic round lies ahead.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“if we date the onset of the Great Depression from October of 1929... and if we date the onset of this crisis from... the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008... then the proper point of comparison is not now and the spring of 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt became president. It's someday in 1931”

0.74

Hoover was a product of the early 20th-century progressive tradition—he voted for Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party in 1912 and served in Wilson's wartime cabinet—and instinctively wanted to use federal power to address economic problems, evidenced by his calling an emergency session of Congress in 1929 to address the chronic agricultural depression that had persisted since World War I.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“Herbert Hoover was the legatee of of the old early 20th century progressive tradition. He cast his first presidential ballot for the Bull Moose Party of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.”

0.73

The fundamental difference between Hoover and Roosevelt was their causal analysis: Roosevelt treated the Depression as an all-American crisis to be solved domestically, while Hoover (with whom most economic historians would agree) saw it as a global crisis requiring an international remedy; Hoover repeatedly tried and failed to persuade Roosevelt of this during the five-month interregnum.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“Roosevelt apparently chose to believe that this was an all-American crisis and it should be addressed exclusively within an American context. Hoover believed that I think most economic historians would probably agree with him on balance that this was a global crisis”

0.73

The theory that inequality or 'imbalance' was the root cause of the Depression gained currency in the 1950s through writers like Galbraith and Schlesinger who were using a narrative about the Depression to advance their own 1950s-60s political agenda around the war on poverty; while real inequality existed and underlay farm-relief thinking, overemphasizing it misses that the Depression was fundamentally a global event.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“is a theory that was given a lot of currency in the 1950s especially by writers like John Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger... how those writers were trying to use a certain narrative about the depression and the New Deal to make to establish their own political agenda in the 1950s and 1960s”

0.71

After 1945 the United States consciously created a new international order—the IMF, World Bank, and GATT (later the WTO)—reflecting a deep recognition by policymakers that the international economic environment had to be better integrated and institutionally managed than in the 1930s to prevent another global downturn, which vindicates Hoover's view that the crisis was international.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“It steps forward and creates a new international order with institutions in it that didn't exist in the pre-war world like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which becomes the World Trade Organization eventually.”

0.69

Lamentations about lost American historical memory are partly overstated: the publishing 'founder chic' of best-selling books on 18th-century politicians is unmatched by any other society, and Advanced Placement US History exam takers have grown from over 100,000 in the early 1990s to close to 400,000-500,000, evidencing serious history teaching at the high school level.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“the number of students who took the Advanced Placement US History exam every year topped 100,000. Today it's close to 400,000. In fact, it may even be 500,000.”

0.69

John Taylor's argument is that the original sin of the crisis was the Fed under Alan Greenspan commodifying credit—making credit so easy for so long that it became just another commodity—so the crisis can be read as another in a familiar history of commodity crises, the commodity this time being credit.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“the original sin, the first crime, was the action of the Fed under Alan Greenspan in commodifying credit, making credit so easy for so long that it became just another commodity and you could argue that what we're witnessing is yet another in a familiar history of commodity crises, except the commodity this time happened to be credit.”

0.68

Hoover encouraged private banks to form a pool to bail out their weaker members, a relatively well-proven method drawn from J.P. Morgan's lead in the 1890s and early 1900s, treating the crisis as an ordinary business-cycle downturn.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“he encouraged private banks to come together and create a pool to bail out their weaker sisters... JP Morgan had led the initiatives of that kind in the 1890s and the early 1900s.”

0.68

Since Roosevelt, the Democratic Party has held that the economic system carries so much potential volatility that government's job is to stabilize and buffer people against the unbridled market, whereas the Republican Party by and large seeks to unlock entrepreneurial energy and is less concerned with stability and security.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“the Democratic Party, Democratic leaders since Roosevelt's time at least have been of the belief that there is so much potential volatility in our economic system that it is the job of government to stabilize things and buffer people against the workings of the free and unbridled market, whereas the Republican Party by and large is the party that wants to unlock and release entrepreneurial energy”

0.68

Roosevelt was a 'great communicator' who mastered radio—especially the fireside chats—to cultivate intimacy with the public, exemplified by the mourner at his 1945 funeral who said 'I didn't know him, but he knew me,' a skill earlier presidents like Hoover, Coolidge, and Harding never figured out.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“the so-called fireside chats were just a stroke of political and communications and public relations genius to use this new medium of the radio to cultivate a sense of intimacy with the public at large.”

0.66

All developed societies have arguably overcommitted to entitlement programs, but the United States is in relatively better shape than its peer societies: US public expenditure (taxes at all levels) is about 30% of GDP versus 40-50% in most Western European countries, so American entitlement problems are probably more soluble and of lesser scale than in Germany, France, Italy, or Britain.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“the percentage of our GDP that goes to public expenditure... is about 30%. Then most of the West European countries it's in the 40 to 50% range. So we to this day we have a much smaller public sector than most of the advanced industrial societies”

0.63

A key difference from the 1930s is that today's policymakers, having learned from history, counterpunched early and hard—TARP, the bank bailouts, the rescues of Freddie, Fannie, and GM—whereas the disastrous wave of bank collapses at the end of 1931 set the earlier spiral in motion; this makes a comparably catastrophic downturn less likely now.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“both administrations, outgoing Bush and incoming Obama, recognized the necessity, given the historical lessons of the 1930s, that government had to counterpunch early and hard against this thing if there was going to be any possibility of avoiding a truly catastrophic downturn.”

0.57

In writing Freedom from Fear, Kennedy made a conscious practice of always reaching for metaphors and analogies from the American historical inventory rather than from other societies, to subtly make the point that American history has deep structures and recurring (though not identically repetitive) streams of behavior characteristic of the society over time.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“whatever I reached for a metaphor or an analogy I always reached for one out of the American inventory... I was trying by that means subtly to make the point that there were deep structures to American history and that there were repetitive events”

0.56

The institutions Roosevelt created to deliver 'security'—the Securities and Exchange Commission, unemployment insurance, the Federal Housing Authority, and Fannie Mae—worked very well for two or three generations before lately serving the country poorly.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“He created Fannie Mae, created the Federal Housing Authority, which those things worked very well for half a century. They lately haven't served us too well, but they worked very well for two or three generations.”

0.52

Kennedy structured Freedom from Fear by deliberately focusing on what endured and had lasting consequence—giving more space to the Social Security Act and WWII grand strategy than to short-shelf-life programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps or the NRA, and largely shunning colorful popular culture—because the goal was to capture what affected the lives of the next several generations.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Kennedy

“I was going to focus on those things that endured beyond the 1930s and the 1940s, those things that had consequence in history... there's a lot less in my book than in some traditional accounts about things like the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Recovery Act, and so on, which have a very short shelf life.”

0.30

The Great Depression remains regarded as a singularity in economic history—the biggest 'black swan' ever—with nothing really approaching it.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· David Kennedy

“the Great Depression was the biggest and baddest black swan ever. To this day, it's regarded as a singularity in economic history, nothing really approaching it.”

0.25

Texas requires at least one year of American history to earn a degree from its public post-secondary institutions, including community colleges—a policy Kennedy suggests other states might emulate.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· David Kennedy

“In Texas, I believe, you cannot get a degree from a post-secondary institution without having taken at least 1 year of American history.”