
The West's Three Blind Spots when Dealing with China's Tech - Pascal Coppens, China Expert
What this covers
This is a four-minute set of opening remarks by Pascal Coppens for a panel on China's innovation model and philosophy, part of the Global Institute For Tomorrow's virtual conference "From Silk to Silicon." The transcript attributes the speech to an unidentified speaker, but the speaker describes 35 years of involvement with China, 20 of them living there, including early participation in Shanghai's innovation ecosystem. He frames Western perception as having moved from hubris to fear without passing through understanding. Europeans and Silicon Valley once treated innovation as a Western product, and many accepted otherwise only when Chinese competitors went global, something he says he knew two decades earlier.
The three blind spots each get a short treatment. The first is that global media usually present innovation as top-down innovation driven by Beijing and the Party. He argues this follows from a Western belief, drawn from its own experience, that top-down efforts never break through into society, and that it hides grassroots innovation that has been strong in China for over twenty years. The second concerns overcapacity. He says the dumping narrative misreads a business logic that runs in a quantity-to-quality direction, raising quality from high volume, whereas Western firms perfect a product before scaling. Capacity without quality, he adds, is only a transient price war that harms everyone.
The third blind spot is the focus on China's economic, societal, systemic and geopolitical challenges, which have intensified over the last five to ten years. He says this obscures a deliberate strategy: placing innovation at the center of the master economic plan through new quality productive forces. He compresses the point into an image: observers are watching a closing door, slowing growth, when they should be looking at the key. The remarks are programmatic rather than evidenced with cases, so they work best as a framing of the debate.
Western observers suffer from three critical blind spots in understanding Chinese innovation: overemphasis on top-down Beijing-driven narratives while ignoring grassroots innovation, misunderstanding the Chinese quantity-to-quality business model as mere overcapacity, and failing to recognize that China has deliberately positioned innovation as the centerpiece of economic strategy to address systemic challenges.
- Grassroots, bottom-up innovation has been powerful in China for 20+ years but is systematically disregarded in Western media narratives
- Chinese firms build quality incrementally from scale (quantity-to-quality), not quality-first like Western firms, making capacity-focused criticism miss the strategic intent
- China's 'new quality productive forces' framework shows deliberate innovation-centered economic restructuring, not chaotic overcapacity or failing economy
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Western perception shifted from hubris (dismissing Chinese innovation) to fear, now worried about Chinese innovation without understanding how it actually works.
“it went more into fear rather then into hubris meaning that we're now worried about this Chinese Innovation and we can't put our hand around it and we or our head around it and we don't really understand how it works”
Western observers, particularly in Europe and Silicon Valley, have historically viewed innovation as something created primarily in the West, not in China, reflecting hubris about where breakthrough ideas originate.
“most of the people looked at at China uh specifically from Europe people that I know very well uh with kind of a hubris and a feeling that Innovation is really something that has been created very much in Europe in America in Silicon Valley this is where the crad of innovation is”
China proved that it can innovate, something the speaker knew 20 years ago but took most Western observers much longer to recognize, only accepting it when confronted with Chinese competitors going global.
“China proved us wrong they can actually innovate uh this is something that I know knew 20 years ago uh it took most people a lot longer to figure that out and mostly when they were confronted with the competition of Chinese Going Global at one point”
Western observers, particularly in Europe and Silicon Valley, have historically viewed innovation as exclusively European and American in origin, exemplified by Silicon Valley's dominance as the 'cradle of innovation,' but this hubris has been disproven by China's demonstrated capacity to innovate.
“most of the people looked at at China uh specifically from Europe people that I know very well uh with kind of a hubris and a feeling that Innovation is really something that has been created very much in Europe in America in Silicon Valley this is where the crad of innovation is it's about finding new ideas being very creative and ultimately coming up with breakthrough things that can change the world and so this is a huis way that we've been looking at it but China proved us wrong they can actually innovate”
The speaker has been involved in China for 35 years and lived there for 20 years, giving them direct experience with the evolution of Chinese innovation from early stages onward.
“I I've been in China for a long time for 35 years I've been uh involved in China 20 years lived there and and I've been part of the Innovation train of China from the early days uh myself being an innovator at that point in in Shanghai”
China has explicitly adopted 'new quality productive forces' as a strategic framework within its master economic plan to drive growth through innovation.
“they've put Innovation at the center uh of their master plan plan to ultimately increase the growth of the economy moving forward with new drivers of the economic growth and and that's called the new quality productive forces”
Second blind spot: Western narratives emphasize Chinese overcapacity being dumped on European and American markets, leading to the false conclusion that capacity is good and can scale; this ignores that quality must precede capacity and that without quality, capacity is merely a price war that harms everyone.
“the second one I see is that we have more and more of this narrative about quantity or capacity or overc capacity being driven uh towards the European and and American markets towards the developed countries and the result of that is that we're thinking that capacity is something that that is good in a way that it it can scale But first you need quality and if you don't have the quality the capacity and the quality and the the it's not it's just a price war and it doesn't really help anyone”
Chinese business model operates on quantity-to-quality direction, deliberately increasing quality over time through high-volume production, whereas Western innovation models are quality-to-quantity, prioritizing perfection before scaling.
“the Chinese business model and we can talk about that later uh is is very much a quantity to Quality Direction rather than a quality to quantity which is very much a western driven uh Innovation model uh and the Chinese increase the quality over time”
Third blind spot: Western discourse focuses on China's economic, societal, systemic, and geopolitical challenges as sources of disruption, but overlooks that China has deliberately positioned innovation at the center of its economic strategy—what China calls 'new quality productive forces'—to overcome these challenges and create new drivers of growth.
“the last blind spot I want to talk about is is that most of the topics we we are addressing with when it comes to China is the economic challenges that China has societal uh systemic challenges geopolitical challenges all these huge disruptions that are happening that we didn't have like five or 10 years ago as much is now creating a narrative in my view where we totally forgetting that actually China is very much aware of of the the challenges that they have and it's not about solving these challenges it's actually that they've put Innovation at the center uh of their master plan plan to ultimately increase the growth of the economy moving forward with new drivers of the economic growth and and that's called the new quality productive forces”
The second blind spot is mischaracterizing the Chinese business model as simple overcapacity dumping on Western markets, when the actual model is quantity-to-quality (building quality incrementally from scale) rather than quality-to-quantity (the Western model of achieving scale from pre-existing quality), and this distinction means capacity without quality is a transient price war, not a sustainable strategy.
“the second one I see is that we have more and more of this narrative about quantity or capacity or overc capacity being driven uh towards the European and and American markets towards the developed countries and the result of that is that we're thinking that capacity is something that that is good in a way that it it can scale But first you need quality and if you don't have the quality the capacity and the quality and the the it's not it's just a price war and it doesn't really help anyone and so what we're forgetting in my view is that the Chinese business model and we can talk about that later uh is is very much a quantity to Quality Direction rather than a quality to quantity which is very much a western driven uh Innovation model uh and the Chinese increase the quality over time”
The third blind spot is focusing on China's economic, societal, systemic, and geopolitical challenges (which have intensified in the last 5-10 years) in a way that obscures the fact that China has deliberately placed innovation at the center of its strategy ('new quality productive forces') to drive economic growth through new drivers, not to directly solve those challenges.
“most of the topics we we are addressing with when it comes to China is the economic challenges that China has societal uh systemic challenges geopolitical challenges all these huge disruptions that are happening that we didn't have like five or 10 years ago as much is now creating a narrative in my view where we totally forgetting that actually China is very much aware of of the the challenges that they have and it's not about solving these challenges it's actually that they've put Innovation at the center uh of their master plan plan to ultimately increase the growth of the economy moving forward with new drivers of the economic growth and and that's called the new quality productive forces”
Western observers cannot believe top-down innovation works effectively because their own experience shows that it never breaks through into society; however, this assumption blinds them to the reality of Chinese grassroots innovation.
“we in in Europe in in Silicon Valley we don't believe that top- down Innovation can work uh it never breaks through really into society this is how we view it very often”
Western perception of Chinese innovation has shifted from hubris (dismissing it as impossible) to fear (worry about competition and incomprehension of how it works), rather than evolving toward genuine understanding.
“so this is a huis way that we've been looking at it but China proved us wrong they can actually innovate uh this is something that I know knew 20 years ago uh it took most people a lot longer to figure that out and mostly when they were confronted with the competition of Chinese Going Global at one point and so I feel that then it went more into fear rather then into hubris meaning that we're now worried about this Chinese Innovation and we can't put our hand around it and we or our head around it and we don't really understand how it works”
First blind spot: most global media narratives about China present innovation as top-down, driven by Beijing and the party, when in fact grassroots, bottom-up innovation has been powerful and sustained in China for 20+ years but is systematically disregarded.
“the first one is that that most of the narratives that I have followed in in the media globally is pretty much a top- down narrative it's it's always Beijing it's it's the party it's it's basically driven Innovation and we in in Europe in in Silicon Valley we don't believe that top- down Innovation can work uh it never breaks through really into society this is how we view it very often because of that my experience is that we are disregarding the Grassroots up Innovation that is so powerful in China that I've been part of for 20 plus years”
The first blind spot in Western narratives about China is systematic disregard of grassroots, bottom-up innovation that has been powerful in China for 20+ years, because Western media narratives default to top-down framing (Beijing, the Party) which aligns with Western skepticism that top-down innovation cannot break through into society.
“the first one is that that most of the narratives that I have followed in in the media globally is pretty much a top- down narrative it's it's always Beijing it's it's the party it's it's basically driven Innovation and we in in Europe in in Silicon Valley we don't believe that top- down Innovation can work uh it never breaks through really into society this is how we view it very often because of that my experience is that we are disregarding the Grassroots up Innovation that is so powerful in China that I've been part of for 20 plus years”
Western observers are looking at a 'closing door' with the Chinese economy (declining growth) when they should be looking at the 'key' (innovation) to open a new door, meaning the focus on economic decline obscures the strategic repositioning underway.
“we're looking at a door that is closing with the economy we're looking at peing at failing economy and we should look at the key rather at the door and I think that's my opening statement”
Western observers are metaphorically looking at a closing door (China's economic problems) rather than the key (innovation-driven solutions) that China is actually using.
“we're looking at a door that is closing with the economy we're looking at peing at failing economy and we should look at the key rather at the door”
It took most Western observers much longer than 20 years ago to recognize that China could innovate; they only did so when confronted with the reality of Chinese companies competing globally.
“this is something that I know knew 20 years ago uh it took most people a lot longer to figure that out and mostly when they were confronted with the competition of Chinese Going Global at one point”
The speaker has lived in China for 20 years and been involved with China for 35 years, including participation in China's innovation ecosystem from early stages in Shanghai.
“I've been in China for a long time for 35 years I've been uh involved in China 20 years lived there and and I've been part of the Innovation train of China from the early days uh myself being an innovator at that point in in Shanghai”