
Bergson's Elan Vital and Vitalism
What this covers
This is a single-speaker lecture by Michael Sugrue on Henri Bergson. It treats him as a dualist whose thought runs on paired oppositions: matter and spirit, space and time, body and soul, analysis and intuition, intelligence and instinct. Because interior experience cannot be stated in literal public language, Bergson relies on metaphor and image. The lecture follows this through his account of lived time, his sense of what science can and cannot reach, and his late work on morality and religion. It also places him among other thinkers, such as Heraclitus on flux, René Descartes on the certainty of the self, William James on the stream of consciousness, and Alfred North Whitehead on process. Plotinus is cited for a shared method of moving from conceptual clarity into myth.
The treatment of duration (durée)) is the center of the lecture. Sugrue contrasts clock time with time as lived, using sugar dissolving in tea as the image. He argues that scientific time is spatial metaphor taken literally, and he works through Zeno's arrow to show where that leads. Bergson's answer is to separate space, which is homogeneous and reversible, from time, which is heterogeneous and irreversible. The Paris example makes a related point: no number of photographs substitutes for going there. That solution is marked as contested. The lecture also explains the distinction in Two Sources of Morality and Religion between open, creative religion and static, analytical religion.
The last stretch turns to Bergson's theory of comedy, which makes up a large share of the talk. Laughter is presented as a social corrective, and the comic is spirit acting like matter), as in the slip on a banana peel. Sugrue contrasts comedy's movement toward marriage and collectivity with tragedy's movement toward individuation and death. He discusses comic types in Molière, the interference of causal series in Oscar Wilde, the untranslatability of some verbal jokes, and the difference between comic and witty words.
Bergson's philosophy bridges poetry and systematic thought by grounding knowledge in direct intuitive experience rather than analytical concepts, offering a critique of scientism while maintaining respect for science through frameworks like élan vital, duration, and the distinction between static and dynamic religion.
- Bergson opposes the spatialization of time in scientific thought, arguing that duration (durée) as lived experience is fundamentally different from clock time
- Intuition provides unmediated access to reality that analysis and conceptual knowledge cannot capture, making it primary to metaphysics
- Dynamic religion and open morality emerge from mystical intuition rather than analytical reasoning, allowing for creativity and human freedom
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Bergson is a dualist whose philosophy rests on foundational distinctions between matter and élan vital (or spirit), operating homologously across multiple conceptual pairs: mind vs matter, accident vs essence, science vs metaphysics, space vs time, body vs soul, memory vs analysis, analysis vs intuition, and intelligence vs instinct.
“so like so many in the french intellectual tradition bergson is a duelist and there is dualisms particularly cartesian holdovers that run all through his philosophy and the distinction between matter and elon vittal or between uh orlando tommy take the place of spirit matter and spirit is the big breakthrough or the big distinction in bergson's work”
Bergson faces a characteristic problem: it is difficult to create literal speech about interiority and subjective experience that are not publicly accessible, so he resorts to metaphors, images, and analogies rather than literal propositions.
“the problem that brixton is going to characteristically run into is that it's very hard to create literal speech about the interiority about the things that are not publicly accessible but only accessible or only facts of individual personal experience he's going to have a hard time making the jump from these internal subjective facts of interiority and subjectivity towards the external world and what he will do in the process of trying to make references to interiority to subjectivity and to the content of experience he will give us metaphors images analogies anything but literal speech”
Laughter serves a social corrective function: it reminds people that they are souls rather than bodies and that they should not slip back into nature or forget their human essence.
“the imperfection of human beings their ability to forget themselves their ability to forget what they are demands a social corrective this social corrective is called comedy in other words we laugh at people to remind them that they're souls rather than bodies and when in other words remember if you know any of the the justifications for restoration comedy in england because the puritans didn't like comedy they thought that it was immoral and it led to uh you know moral depravity those who wanted to defend the comedy during the restoration said no comedy has a morally didactic purpose it allows it allows us to hold up vice to ridicule and improve the spectator well berickson's argument for comedy runs more or less along those lines he says that what it holds up is human deformity our tendency to slip back into nature slip back into the world of the object slip back into the world of matter and what laughter does is remind you that you shouldn't do that that that's not what you are”
Bergson says 'to think intuitively is to think in duration' and acknowledges the paradox that no image or concept is identical with duration, yet duration is 'after all the concept' and nothing is capable of getting that idea across—leaving us with poetic paradoxes where no concept is adequate to express duration.
“finally barrickson says to think intuitively is to think in duration and no image or concept is identical with duration and yet nonetheless barrackson will tell us that duration is after all the concept and that nothing is actually quite capable of getting that idea across to us so he leaves us with various kinds of poetic paradoxes telling us that no concept is adequate to express duration”
Intuition is an elemental, prior capacity common to all humans that does not require mediation by symbols; one can experience 15-20 minutes of time intuitively without consulting a clock, accessing duration directly.
“intuition is an entering into an object which does not need to be mediated by symbols in other words rather than have me explain to you what 15 minutes or 20 minutes of time is you can actually experience what that is intuitively without watching a clock so you can find out on the basis of the space of those hands how much time is elapsing all right intuition then is our direct apprehension of the world”
Descartes provides a foundational influence on Bergson through the principle of the certainty of the self as a starting point; this Cartesian move of grounding philosophy in subjective self-certainty appears throughout French philosophy including Bergson.
“another source would be descartes because of the foundational certainty of the self the self is the starting point for many of the great french philosophies um it'll certainly be the case for descartes but we're also going to find that with bergson”
Bergson's work is an homage to Heraclitus because both philosophers are interested in change and becoming (flux) rather than static, fixed being, and both ground their entire philosophy on the principle of dynamism.
“you could say that barrister's work is homage to heraclitus all right here's the the prescribed philosopher to like change and becoming said that all is flux well bergson is someone who's interested not in the static but in the dynamic not in the fixed but in the changeable and in some respects his whole philosophy is homage to becoming”
Bergson illustrates the gap between analysis and intuition through the example of Paris: photographs and representations of Paris, no matter how many, are forced into a Procrustean mold that does not do justice to the living reality of Paris; only the direct, immediate experience of going to Paris captures what Paris truly is.
“let's think of going to paris the direct or okay you've been there it's a wonderful city to go to paris is a fundamentally different experience from being shown all the possible photographs of paris from every possible perspective supposed to give you a tremendous stack of photos of paris well if you think of those photos as representing paris as it is rip as it is indicated by concepts they become flat and two-dimensional and square well they are forced into a procrusten mold which does not do justice to the living reality of paris”
William James and Bergson, while not personal friends, were in agreement with each other's work; James's 'stream of consciousness' concept provides a conceptual parallel to Bergson's intuition and durée.
“any of you know william james and who know the stream of consciousness will feel very much at home with barracks and barracks and and james were if not i don't believe they're personal friends but they're very happy with each other's work”
Whitehead's process philosophy—the idea that process connects religion and science, and that fixity of the world and its linguistic representations must be overcome—parallels Bergson's concerns with undoing the spatialization of time and fixed conceptual categories.
“and whitehead those of you who know whitehead's work the idea that process connects religion and science well the idea of process of undoing the fixed nature of the world and the fixed nature of the language which refers to it is going to be an important concern both for whitehead's conception of process and for bergson's”
Bergson calls the direct, lived experience of time 'durée' (duration); this is fundamentally different from clock time and involves experiencing moments not as uniform units but as qualitatively distinct, flowing continuities—like sugar dissolving in tea rather than a clock hand rotating.
“bergson calls it duret and he says this experience of time is very different from clock time he says somewhat enigmatically and quite poetically it's a reason of proust time is to take duret is the is the experience is the experience of time when it when sugar is dissolving in my tea right it's one thing to take out a stopwatch and watch the hand go around but while that may be happening simultaneously with the duration of my tea getting its sugar the point is that one is describing time and experience of the world from the inside the other from the outside”
Collingwood distinguishes between the 'inside' and 'outside' of an event: the inside is the perspective of the agent; the outside is that of an external observer; intuition involves adopting the agent's perspective and empathetically understanding their activity from the inside—a concept parallel to Bergson's notion of intuition.
“we've had various problems with intuitions before because we found at least in some cases that it can be quite subjective quite nebulous very difficult to articulate we might want to connect it with the work of r.g collingwood those of you who know professor stalloff's lecture on collingwood's idea of history know that collingwood makes the distinction between the inside of an event and the outside of an event between looking at an activity from the perspective of the agent or from the perspective of someone on the outside and when we look at it from the perspective of the agent we are changing our perspective changing the way we look at it and we are adopting a common human perspective that uh that collingwood calls empathy or intuition”
Zeno's paradox of the arrow demonstrates an internal contradiction in scientific conceptions of motion: at each instant in flight, the arrow occupies a space exactly its own size; it cannot change location in any instant; therefore motion is impossible according to logical rigor applied to spatially-mapped time.
“let's think about zeno's paradox and here i'm talking about the paradox of xeno and the arrow think about it this way at each instant in the flight of an arrow it is occupying a space exactly the size of the arrow all right at no none of these instance can it occupy a space larger than its size so there is no instant at which it can change location so zeno draws the inference that motion is impossible right”
Bergson argues that the solution to Zeno's paradoxes is to undo the space-time continuum: space and time are fundamentally different; all objects in the world are connected in time but separated in space; time is heterogeneous, irreversible, irreplaceable, and unique whereas space is homogeneous, reversible, replaceable, and not unique.
“so barracks and says let's move into our direct experience of space and time leaving science by the wayside bracket that for a while if it will go back and use science for whatever it turns out to be handy for but it's a sure thing that space and time are very different definitely different things and the way we experience them is different and when we try and treat space and time as a continuous whole we end up with the paradoxes of xeno so the way he wants to get out of the paradoxes of zeno is to undo the space time continuum and says that space and time are fundamentally different space uh all objects in the world are connected in time but they're separated in space time is heterogeneous whereas space is homogeneous time is irreversible space is reversible time is irreplaceable space is replaceable time is unique uh space is not unique time is dynamic space is static”
Two Sources of Morality and Religion distinguishes intuitive from analytical approaches to morality and religion, with the intuitive approach yielding 'open' and 'creative' morality and religion (valued by Bergson) versus analytical approaches yielding 'dead, stultifying, static' forms.
“the final or the most important of his great books is called two sources of morality and religion and here he's trying to distinguish the intuitive as opposed to the analytical approach to religion and morals one leads to dead stultifying static morality and religion the other leads towards something else which he describes as open and creative which is of course for bergson yeah his way of saying that he really likes something anything that's open and creative for a thinker like bergson that means that it's a very praiseworthy sort of endeavor so open religion creative morality that's the kind of thing barristan will approve of”
Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, provides a methodological parallel to Bergson: both move from conceptual clarity into myth, bringing together disparate intellectual elements not on the basis of logical coherence but because they serve a unifying function in their outlook.
“a platynus the founder of neoplatonism the thinker who created a sort of gooey melange between christianity and the more mystical elements in platonism bergson has often been compared to platinus because of the fact that he has the same tendency to to move from unclarity off into myth itself and to bring together various kind of eclectic intellectual elements which he rounds together or brings together not on the basis of some logical coherence but rather because they serve a certain function they give a certain wholeness to his outlook on the world”
The essence of all comedy is things that are not material (spirit, élan vital) acting like matter; when you slip on a banana peel and fall flat on your buttocks, it's funny because you act as if you are purely an object—spirit forgetting itself and acting mechanically like wood.
“a second observation about comedy is that what makes this banana peel and the fall funny is that it's human beings or spirit or alan vitale forgetting itself and acting like matter in other words he says the essence of all comedy is things that are not material alan vitale acting like wood in other words when you fall flat on your butt that's funny because you are acting as if you are purely an object right so that in other words things that are not objects people acting like objects is what comedy is about”
Comedy works the opposite way from tragedy: it does not end in death (individuation) but in marriage/sex (collectivization); the comic hero is reintegrated back into society to reproduce, not separated and punished; comedy gestures toward collectivity while tragedy gestures toward individuality.
“comedy does not end in death on the whole comedy ends in marriage perhaps sex and death of the two sex and death of the two poles of human life and i would be inclined to say that marriage is symbolic sex so what comedy does when the comic hero is married and at the end of the comedy he is reintegrated back into society so instead of being killed off and individuated exactly the opposite happens he gets collectivized he gets thrown back into the mix so that he can have sex and then produce more little comic heroes and they can get thrown back into the mix right so comedy gestures at collectivity tragedy gestures at individuality”
Within language, some comedy is untranslatable because it depends on the grammatical structure of a particular language (e.g., 'Take my wife, please' relies on English grammar and may not translate into Arabic); other verbal comedy is translatable because it depends on logical misinterpretation rather than linguistic structure.
“beyond this verb bexson also analyzes verbal comedy and he says that within language or that there's verbal company within language and then just merely expressed in language let me give you some examples um within language comedy is usually untranslatable think about something like the old uh the old joke take my wife please well unless you have exactly the grammar of english it might be very hard to translate that into arabic right take my wife please may not get big laughs in arabic it hardly gets any laughs now right he said there's a lamest joke i mean it's a prehistoric joke but it has to do with the structure of the english language itself he says that's one kind of verbal comedy the other kind of verbal comedy is the kind that is merely expressed in the language which means that in principle it is translatable”
Comedy is never about specific individuals but always about kinds or types of people: Molière's 'The Miser' is about miserliness as a type, not about Joe the miserly man; 'The Misanthrope' is about misanthropy in general, not specific individuals—comedy refers to generalities, not particulars.
“he's so sensitive and smart he says comedy works exactly the opposite way it's deep comedy does not end in death on the whole comedy ends in marriage perhaps sex and death of the two sex and death of the two poles of human life and i would be inclined to say that marriage is symbolic sex so what comedy does when the comic hero is married and at the end of the comedy he is reintegrated back into society so instead of being killed off and individuated exactly the opposite happens he gets collectivized he gets thrown back into the mix so that he can have sex and then produce more little comic heroes and they can get thrown back into the mix right so comedy gestures at collectivity tragedy gestures at individuality it's a deep argument it goes even further he says not only that but comedy is never about individual people corresponds to the comic hero comedy is always about kinds or types of people think of moliere the miser not joe the miserly man rather the miser he's a type of person imagine the misanthrope we're not talking about someone that doesn't like other people we're talking about misanthropy in general right comedy refers to types to generalities it doesn't refer to specific individuals which is connected to the way comedy and tragedy finish up and their function in society it's a very very deep argument”
Bergson seeks to remove the 'cellophane of conceptual interpretation' imposed on the world in order to access the primary substance of phenomenological experience—the ur-stuff of direct personal apprehension prior to conceptualization.
“he's looking at the or he's trying to remove the cellophane of conceptual interpretation that we impose on the world that we think constitutes the world itself and look back at the ur stuff the kind of the the substance of phenomenological experience of immediate personal apprehension”
All scientific conceptions of time are literalizations of spatialized metaphors; for example, we measure time by watching clock hands move through space, thereby judging time by motion through space, imposing spatial metaphors onto temporal reality.
“as far as bergson is concerned all of our scientific conceptions of time are really the literalization of spatialized metaphors for example if i get out of stopwatch and i click it so that the hands begin to move how do i know when 10 minutes are up well when the hand has moved a particular portion across the dial so in other words what we're doing is judging time by motion of something through space right but barracks's point is that space and time are very different”
Comic words (utterances that are funny) produce laughter directed at the speaker, while witty words (utterances that are clever) produce laughter directed at a third party or oneself; Bergson offers an elaborate taxonomy of the ways comedy works in language.
“and then he makes the decision in comic words and witty words comic words you laugh at the utterer right when somebody says something that's comic you laugh at the person that's making the utterance when somebody says something that's witty you're either laughing at a third person or you're laughing at yourself he has a fairly elaborate taxonomy of the ways in which comedy might work and i think that it's not quite a substitute for aristotle but it's clearly about as good an encyclopedic treatment as i've ever seen”
Reciprocity is a third structural rule of comedy: misconnected series of events and ambiguities lead to misinterpretation; in Oscar Wilde's plays, different series of events interfere with each other and people talk past one another, creating comic confusion through the interplay of distinct causal sequences.
“a third structural rule of comedy is reciprocity in other words we have to have the reciprocal influence of series what it means is something like this we make a we create a mistaken connection between two unrelated series of events and some sort of ambiguity makes us misinterpret that if you've read any of the plays of oscar wilde right the importance of being earnest everybody's talking past everybody else what we get is the interference of different series of events which are misinterpreted people that really don't know what's going on so that's going to be important in the structural rules of comedy as well”
The banana peel joke is funny only if nobody gets hurt; we must feel no real harm for the comic to work because the comic hero is like us and we need empathy to find humor—harm breaks empathy and produces pity instead of laughter.
“bergson asks the interesting question why what's funny about that when we all laugh we all think it's kind of funny to get to slip on a banana peel why is it we find that humorous and he says first of all that we only find it humorous if nobody gets hurt if someone falls and breaks their leg we don't find that funny we think that's pathetic so first things first we have to make sure there's no real harm right because then we have to have a certain sense of empathy with the comic hero because it turns out the comic hero is just like us we don't want bad things to happen to them”
Bergson discerned in nature a force called élan vital—the life force that opposes mere matter—characterized by creativity and dynamism rather than static being, serving as an anti-reductive reading of Darwinism.
“what he thought he discerned in nature and in the world around us is something called elan vital which we might describe as the life force something that is the opposite of mere matter uh a thing that has a creativity dynamism if not direction at least motion it is not static but dynamic and it is the essence of all living things it is a sort of anti-reductive or anti-naturalistic reading of darwin”
Reading a novel (e.g., Goethe's Sorrows of Young Werther) and experiencing its hero directly is fundamentally different from analytical concepts like protagonist, genre, and psychological states; no description can replace the direct apprehension of the character.
“the idea of a hero of a novel all right it's one thing to read a novel say the sorrows of young verter by goethe write in and to feel and to find out what verter is really like another thing to have me tell you about the novel right i'll use some concepts like uh i don't know a protagonist or antagonist i'll use concepts like the novel i'll talk about the genre i'll talk about his dispositions in his psychic states and his behaviors none of those descriptions of verter will be like your direct apprehension of what verter is like when you experience that work of art”
Bergson appears to want to have his cake and eat it too: he is impressed by Darwinian naturalism and evolutionary theory, feeling human condition has been fundamentally changed by Darwinism; yet he refuses to accept the consequence that human freedom, novelty, and interiority must be eliminated if humans are completely naturalized.
“oftentimes it seems that what bergston is trying to do is have his cake and eat it too it seems like he's very impressed with darwinian naturalism and he's very impressed with the theory of evolution feels that the human condition has been fundamentally changed by the advent of darwinism now after he has his cake then he wants to eat it too he says we don't want to be completely rejoined with the natural world if the price of rejoining the natural world is to eliminate freedom eliminate novelty and eliminate the interiority that makes human beings human”
Bergson wrote a philosophical treatise on laughter and comedy that is arguably the best philosophical treatment of comedy ever written, a remarkable achievement given the absence of an Aristotelian foundational work on comedy (we have only Aristotle's Poetics on tragedy).
“he wrote a book on laughter which is arguably the best philosophical treatment of comedy ever written and that in some ways suggests the richness and depth of this of bergson's outlook there are very few people who concern themselves with such a wide variety of topics as bergson did and those of you who've ever seriously thought about the problem of comedy i will believe will agree with me that it is a particularly difficult genre to write about it is particularly resistant to facile generalizations and especially because we don't have aristotle's foundational work on comedy all we have is the part of the poetics that refers to tragedy we don't have much of a classical connection with the theory of tr of comedy so bergson's contribution along those lines is that much more important i think it's the best book ever written on comedy”
An important stimulus to Bergson's critique of science is his conviction that science does not maintain fidelity to the facts of human experience; to justify this critique, he returned to the pre-Socratics, particularly Zeno and his paradoxes, to show that scientific conceptions of space and time are inadequate to actual experience.
“an important stimulus to bergson's thought and an important reason or important source of his questioning his doubting of the status of science is that it he felt that it didn't maintain fidelity to the facts of human experience and he went back to the pre-socratics particularly to zeno and his paradoxes in order to show that our scientific conceptions of space and time are inadequate and do not live up to our actual experience of space and time”
Despite Bergson's poetry, haziness, and metaphorical quality, dismissing him would throw 'the baby out with the bathwater' because his insights in aesthetics are valuable; he demonstrates great subtlety of mind, though his strength is aesthetic insight rather than rigorous reasoning.
“as can be seen from the wide variety of the topics that barricksen pursues the the great subtlety and poetry and also haziness of his ideas and the the generally how can i put it generally metaphorical or can i put an aesthetic quality to his writings mean that on the one hand we might be tempted to dismiss him out of hand but it seems that if we do that we will be throwing the baby out with the bath water because we will be losing the insights that he offers us within the domain that is his strong point which is aesthetics in other words he's a very poetic kind of a figure bergson berrickson has a great subtlety of mind i don't know that rationality or reasoning is his strong point but he is able to discern things underlying for example the structure of comedy which most of us would have had a real hard time with”
Comedy is morally instructive and didactic: it holds up generalized human vices (like miserliness) to ridicule to make them appear foolish, thereby serving a moral corrective function analogous to static religion's moral regulation.
“he says then comedy is about generalities it is morally instructive and didactic the point of the miser is to hold miserliness or stinginess up to ridicule by making it appear as foolish as it in fact is it is morally didactic as well”
I have a direct intuition of my own consciousness and existence that requires no symbolic mediation; one does not need to ask others for confirmation of one's own being, unlike analytic theories of the psyche that fragment the self into components.
“the self i have a direct intuition of my own existence of my own consciousness and i don't have to have symbols mediate that for me in other words i don't have to go to anyone and ask them do i exist am i a self i know that directly i apprehend that directly compare that to the analytic parsing of the self that we get in various psychoanalytic theories maybe i have an id maybe i don't maybe i have a super ego maybe i don't but the whole set of parsings the whole set of concepts which one would hope in a kind of general theory of the psyche would account for the various modes of human uh activity moods feelings sentiments all that all of those theoretical constructs cannot replace the direct intuition of being me or being you”
Laughter is a function of intelligence because only people laugh (not dogs); this connects laughter to the unique human capacity for intelligibility and suggests laughter serves a universal moral function and explains why all societies have invented comedy.
“he says that laughter strangely enough is a function of intelligence since after all only people laugh you never see dogs laughing no point in telling them a joke so only people laugh and it has something to do with the fact that people are intelligent and in addition perhaps this is again the kind of genial or attractive element in embarrassing he says that laughter and comedy serve a moral function and that's why society invented them and also that's why they're universal amazingly enough there's no society that hasn't invented the joke which suggests perhaps there is some commonality underlying our various cultural experiences”
Tragedy individuates: the tragic hero dies as a specific individual (e.g., Hamlet dies as Hamlet, not as a type); death pulls the tragic hero away from society and offers appropriate agony for their specific sins and flaws; tragedy is always about individuals and their particular moral deformities.
“tragedy individuates in other words think about something like hamlet when hamlet dies at the end of hamlet he is specifically dead on account of hamlet's tragic flaws right he has these edible feelings towards his mother and he's very indecisive and he thinks too much but hamlet is specifically hamlet every tragedy or tragedy generally ends in death and death always individuates pulls the tragic hero away from society makes the tragic hero separate makes him an epitome of his sins and offers him the appropriate agony for his sins or his transgressions his flaws what's interesting about tragedy is that it's always about individuals”
Bergson is unique in 20th-century thought for being optimistic rather than pessimistic, respectful of science without being worshipful, and combining the strongest and weakest points of French high culture.
“my feeling then is that bergson is unique in the 20th century domi in the domain of 20th century thought he's optimistic for the most part rather than pessimistic he is respectful of science without being worshipful towards science and he brings together the strongest and weakest points of french high culture in the 20th century its tendency to undo the distinction between poetry and philosophy which leads us to persuasive images and powerful metaphors if not logical certainty and apodictic truth”
Bergson's argument for dynamic religion and open morality suffers from a lack of historical specificity: he makes grand claims about transformation from static to dynamic religion but provides few actual people, places, dates, and events showing this transformation, making the argument largely impressionistic.
“one might imagine that i mean having said i mean it made such great claims that bergson would go on and try and argue this very carefully in some sort of historical sense in other words he ought i would expect being a historian to give us the actual people and places the dates and times and events which show us this transformation and he's awfully light on that uh the specifics are never barristan's strong point”
Repetition is a structural rule of comedy: the Abbott and Costello 'Who's on First' routine repeats the same misunderstanding endlessly, and we find it amusing because the character acts like wood, like a dummy, not catching on—failing to exercise intelligence.
“there are certain structural rules for comedy which is a very interesting thought first of all things like repetition uh remember that old uh abbott and costello gag who's on first what's on second i don't know is on third right what they do is they repeat things endlessly and it's the frustration that we see the person who's not understanding the dialogue go through that we find amusing why because he's not catching on he's acting like meat like wood he's acting not like a person but like a dummy i might as well be talking to the wall who's on first what's on second there's no communication really going on the repetition is key to comedy”
Inversion is a second structural rule of comedy: when roles reverse (e.g., Indiana Jones going from prey to predator by shooting a sword-wielding attacker), the comic effect arises from the sudden swap of positions.
“a second structural element in comedy according to bergston is inversion this is the inversion of roles uh if you know that indiana jones movie where some guy with a sword comes out and confronts indiana jones and he's waving the sword around and threatening him and it looks like it's bad for indiana and indiana says he just takes it he's going to shoot him says forget it inversion of roles for second indiana jones was the prey then he turns into the predator that's funny because it's an inversion of roles barrickson is really onto something here”
Intuition enters into its object absolutely (without external mediation) while analysis moves around its object relatively (from external perspectives); intuition provides unmediated apprehension not requiring symbols or concepts, whereas analysis imposes conceptual frameworks that mediate and distort.
“and in contrast to analysis which moves around its object and is relative intuition enters into its object and it's absolute so here's where the collingwoodian element comes in now what what bergson says is something along these lines is why intuition is so important to him that intuition is an entering into an object which does not need to be mediated by symbols”
Bergson links closed morality to static religion: both derive from human needs for community and require legal rules, moral regulation, and analytical rigidity for their effectiveness; closed morality is the system of moral imperatives necessary for holding society together.
“and corresponding to this static religion bergson thinks this is something called closed morality and closed morality is that system of imperatives that system of moral rules which is connected to static religion and which it derives from the same source of static religion the simple need for human community which requires laws which requires regulation which requires analysis and rigidity for its effectiveness to become manifest”
Within dynamic religion, great mystics are spiritual pioneers who break through old static, stultifying forms of religion toward new, higher, finer intuitions; examples include St. Paul and St. Francis, who transcended established religious bounds through mystical insight.
“and here's where bergson makes his homage or kind of a makes his uh affirmation of mysticism he says that within dynamic religion and this is true not just within the western tradition of religion but in all the world's religions that all the great mystics are something like spiritual pioneers who break through the old static stultifying forms of religion towards some new higher and finer intuition his idea of the great and mystics who broke through the established bounds of religion are people like st paul saint francis”
Scientists attempt to recoup the loss from Zeno's paradox by constructing the calculus and the concept of continuity, which solves some but not all logical paradoxes about instantaneous motion and temporal flow.
“now we try and recoup that loss by constructing the calculus and the idea of continuity and we managed to solve some of these paradoxes that come from uh xeno and come from this idea of instantaneous motion”
Henri Bergson won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 as an exemplar of the connection between philosophy and poetry in French high culture.
“henry bergson who won the nobel prize for literature in 1927 was one of the great exemplars of this connection between philosophy and poetry in french culture”
Bergson's major works include Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), Creative Evolution, a book on laughter, and Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which collectively span approximately 30 years and represent his most influential contributions.
“maxson produced a wide variety of books over 30 years and three or four of them stand out as being extremely influential the first of his books that got a great deal of attention was published in 1903 it was called the introduction of metaphysics”