What this covers

This episode of Excess Returns pairs host commentary with Tobias Carlisle, who responds to clips from earlier guests. The clips come from Cliff Asness, Scott McBride, Aswath Damodaran, Rob Arnott, Dan Rasmussen, and others. It follows a pattern: a clip on one theme, then Carlisle's reaction. It begins with the value spread, which Asness describes as holding between roughly 3x and 6x from 1950 to 1998 before jumping to about 10x in the dot-com bubble and staying elevated. From there it asks why value has struggled since 2012 and whether the break is structural.

The middle of the conversation is about how value can work without help from the market. McBride argues that a stock needs no catalyst if valuation, business quality, and management alignment are right. Carlisle builds on this with a framework of reinvestment and shareholder yield, designed to produce returns without multiple expansion. He concedes the standard criticism that value's historical returns lean on expectations being disappointed. He also argues for flow metrics such as operating income over book value in a world of intangibles, and for simple metrics over elaborate DCF) models, on the grounds that extra information raises confidence but not accuracy.

The later sections are more contentious. Damodaran's claim that factor screens offer no edge, since anyone can run them in minutes, is flagged as disputed. Arnott describes indexing as moving roughly $20 of every $100 from non-members to members. Carlisle says that since 2020, large-cap earnings have risen while small-cap earnings have fallen, so multiple compression there is not a mystery. On mean reversion, he expects even the Magnificent 7 to face lower returns eventually, though on a longer curve. The closing segments use a late-1990s analogy, in which early bubble callers lost credibility for years before being vindicated, to frame the case for international stocks and for keeping conviction through long underperformance.

Sharpest takeaway

Value investing remains viable despite prolonged underperformance, but investors must focus on fundamental earnings power and reinvestment returns rather than relying on multiple expansion, and must recognize that market conditions have shifted due to indexation flows and technological disruption.

  • Value stocks can generate returns through reinvestment and shareholder yield without multiple expansion, making earnings quality more important than valuation multiples alone
  • Indexation flows have created structural advantages for large-cap stocks and disadvantages for small-cap and international stocks that independent analysis suggests are undervalued
  • Mean reversion still exists but operates on a longer and different curve for mega-cap technology companies due to scale and market dominance

The claims · ranked115 claims · weighted by value

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0.84

If management recognizes that a stock is trading at a low multiple despite quality, they can take advantage by paying substantial dividends and buying back shares, which can drive earnings growth faster than otherwise possible, without requiring external catalysts or multiple expansion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Scott McBride

“if the market doesn't recognize what you recognize the management team also recognizes it management team can take advantage of that low multiple they can pay you a huge dividend they can buy back a lot of shares every year so earnings grow every year if the multiple goes down further they can buy back more shares so the earnings grow even faster”

0.80

Value investing is fundamentally a risk-averse strategy focused on getting more reward than risk (not value than price), with the goal of surviving downturns and positioning to benefit from mean reversion cycles.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“value itself is a risk averse strategy we're trying to get more you know it some people say we're trying to get more value than price but the way I think of it is we're trying to get more reward than risk we're trading off risk units for reward units because there are these down legs that happen and you want to survive to the other side of the down leg”

0.80

Complicated valuation methodologies (like DCFs) contain hidden behavioral biases and cognitive errors that are harder to detect in complex models, so simpler metrics allow value investors to see and control their biases better.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the reason that I don't like those particularly complicated valuation methodologies is because there's a lot of Behavioral bias and cognitive error that can be built into any valuation and it's just harder to see when you have a complex spreadsheet”

0.80

Research shows that collecting more information increases investor confidence but does not improve actual forecast accuracy, so building elaborate DCFs with extensive data points makes you *feel* more correct without actually improving decisions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“one of them was that the more information you collect the more confident you become but your competence doesn't improve at all your guessing competence doesn't move from the first bit of information that you select”

0.80

When indexing flows increase, money is reallocated from non-index members to index members because the index spans approximately 80% of the market, so every $100 flowing into index funds reallocates roughly $20 from non-members to members, pushing up index valuations and down non-index valuations.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Rob Arnott

“if money goes from non-indexed portfolios to index portfolios uh much of the money doesn't move because the index owns the market but it really doesn't it owns most of the market so what happens is that the nonmembers in the index get sold and the members in the index get bought so every $100 that goes into an index fund about $80 stays more or less where it is because the index spans 80% of the market and about 20% of the portfolio moves from non-members to members”

0.80

Great investors recognized the tech bubble in 1995-1997, but when markets kept rising 25%+ annually for 3-4 years afterward, they lost credibility for being cautious, becoming a 'boy who cried wolf' or 'Cassandra,' and only vindicated when the bubble finally burst in 2000.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Rasmus

“you know if you're living through a bubble can you identify it to people know um and and what what I found is that I think it was Rayo um called the tech bubble um in 1995 I think uh I know I'm going to misquote the years but you're going to get it roughly right I think you know Howard marks called the tech bubble in 96 Seth claran in 97... everybody knew it was a bubble the problem was they figured it out that it was a bubble too early... if you come out in 95 or 96 or 97 and you say this the US Equity Market's a bubble... you were the boy who cried wolf”

0.75

Since 2020, large-cap earnings have grown significantly while mid-cap earnings have gone sideways and small-cap earnings have declined, explaining why large-cap multiples have expanded while small-cap and value multiples have compressed, rather than indicating market mistakes.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“when I look at the you can break down the market into size so you can look at the biggest companies have continued to do very well their earnings are up since 2020 if you look at the midcap and the small cap midc Cap's gone sideways small cap is down so there's no mystery why their multiples would be compressed too because they just haven't performed well as a group”

0.74

An efficient market is not one where markets never make mistakes (that's a straw man), but rather one where investors cannot consistently exploit mistakes to earn excess returns; achieving this is 'really really really difficult' in current market conditions.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“an efficient market is one that it's not one where markets don't make mistakes that's the straw man that people like to use markets make of course they make mistake they make does it's can you take advantage of those mistakes to earn more than you would have in an index fund and the answer is it's really really really difficult”

0.74

For a stock to work as an investment, you need to be right about three things: valuation, the quality and future earnings of the business, and management/governance alignment with shareholders, and you don't need a catalyst if you get these three things right.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Scott McBride

“what you need for a stock to work is you a few things you need to be right about the valuation and you need to be right about the kind of the quality and the future of the earnings I mean those two go hand in hand but you need to be right about that...if you get that right and then you get the governance right meaning management team is aligned with you then you don't really need anything else to to go right”

0.74

Across 200 years of market history, there are definite periods of technological advancement (telegraph, steam ships, electronics in the 1960s, dot-com boom in the 1990s, social media and AI in the 2020s) where investor focus shifts from current earnings to future technological potential; after these periods normalize, the technology becomes table stakes and the premium to valuation multiples disappears.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“we can see if we go back 200 years we have these like definite periods of technological advancement and the telegraph was one steam ships was another the electronics bman 60s was another and then the Tom boom in the &39;90s was another and then whatever we've gone through in the 2020s the social media or AO I don't know how this period will be defined but there's some technological boom where people focus on the technology in the future more than they focus on the current earnings and um after a while it all sort of becomes normalized”

0.73

Value investors must continually return to first principles and rebuild their investment approach from the ground up because conditions change, and it is important to consider the possibility that long-working strategies have truly broken down rather than assuming they will revert.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“you have to go back and visit first principles and rebuild from the bottom up and I've done that a few times now because it's it's hard to imagine that something that has worked for so long has completely broken down but you've got to consider the possibilties that that is true”

0.71

To generate value returns without multiple expansion, investors should look at two components of returns: reinvestment (new capital invested in the business) and shareholder yield (capital returned via dividends, buybacks, or capital returns), and design portfolios that work on the basis of these flows alone.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's a reinvestment and so that portion that is reinvested in the business attracts you you could assume the same multiple as it currently trades on let's assume no multiple expansion so you're going to get some reinvestment in the business and that reinvestment is going to attract some return as well and then you're going to have some portion that's not reinvested and that's going to flow through to investors either as BuyBacks or dividends or returns of capital”

0.69

A minor S&P indexing error (adding a stock that shouldn't be in a niche dividend index, then correcting it days later) caused the stock to jump 7%+ and then fall back, demonstrating the power of index membership and the mechanical impact of indexing flows.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“S&P made a um uh a blunder they um reported a uh list of Holdings for a a narrow Niche dividend index... that added that they added a stock to the list that wasn't supposed to be there and then uh couple days later they realized their mistake and they took it out well the stock qu from 84 to 90 and then back down to 84 that's a 7 plus% move for a little niche index strictly because the stock was added and then dropped”

0.69

Research by O'Shaughnessy shows that value portfolio returns come from the fact that poorly expected businesses do better than expected (not as badly), which generates multiple expansion, while quality businesses underperform expectations and suffer multiple compression - making value's returns partially dependent on mean reversion in expectations.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's some good analysis done by o shoresy where they take value portfolios and they say and they devolve the returns of value portfolios and they say what generates what generates the return and it everybody expects these businesses to do worse than they actually end up doing because that's that's why they're cheap and so your Returns come from they don't do quite as badly as everybody expects and uh as a result they do have this multiple expansion”

0.69

From 1950 to 1998, value spreads (the ratio of top 30% stocks to bottom 30% stocks on a valuation metric) behaved consistently, varying between 3x and 6x, but in the dot-com bubble exploded to around 10x, representing a structural break in historical patterns.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Cliff Asness

“from 1950 to 1998 it had looked like a very well-behaved series either the straight series or the five-year moving average that you refer to looked for an economic series fairly well behaved it varied between about three and six which meaning means the top 30% of stocks was at the most about six times more expensive on this scale than the bottom third 30% and at the tightest was only about three times more expensive and then in the com bubble it exploded to I don't know I don't remember exactly but 10 something”

0.69

Abnormal earnings growth reverts faster on the negative side than the positive side because when companies have negative growth, capacity is shut down and supply exits, accelerating reversion, while positive growth attracts competition more gradually.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Larry Swedroe

“the negative earnings growth when happens companies exit the industry capacity get shut down earning and the negative earning the negative side tends to revert even faster than the positive”

0.69

The small-cap premium, defined as the outperformance of small cap stocks relative to large cap stocks, has not existed since 1981, despite strong historical data from 1927-1977 showing small caps outperforming by 3.5-5% annually; this represents a structural break in a factor that had worked reliably for 50 years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Value Had One of Its Worst Periods in History | What Data T… [-sAArD4QrnA]

“small cap premium do you know there hasn't been a small cap premium since 1981 I'm going to add that on as a data set next to I'm going to let you pick the starting point and the ending point for the data and I'm going to put up the data from 1927 to 2023 over the entire period small cap stocks have earned about 3 and a half% more than the than large cap stocks maybe even more four 5% more”

0.69

When a management team recognizes that their stock is trading at a low multiple relative to intrinsic value, they can take advantage of this mismatch by executing large share buybacks and paying dividends, which allows them to grow earnings per share even if the underlying business earnings are flat, creating shareholder returns independent of multiple expansion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Scott McBride

“if the market doesn't recognize what you recognize the management team also recognizes it management team can take advantage of that low multiple they can pay you a huge dividend they can buy back a lot of shares every year so earnings grow every year if the multiple goes down further they can buy back more shares so the earnings grow even faster”

0.69

Large cap companies have had earnings increases since 2020, while mid-cap earnings have gone sideways and small-cap earnings have declined, which explains why their multiples have compressed without any mystery; the market is accurately pricing current earnings trends.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“when I look at the you can break down the market into size so you can look at the biggest companies have continued to do very well their earnings are up since 2020 if you look at the midcap and the small cap midc Cap's gone sideways small cap is down so there's no mystery why their multiples would be compressed too because they just haven't performed well as a group”

0.69

The traditional criticism that value investors rely on multiple expansion is valid; research by O'Shaughnessy shows that value portfolios generate returns because markets expect value companies to perform worse than they actually do, resulting in multiple expansion as negative expectations are disappointed; to address this, investors can construct portfolios that return satisfactory results without relying on multiple expansion by focusing on reinvestment returns and shareholder yields.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's some good analysis done by o shoresy where they take value portfolios and they say and they devolve the returns of value portfolios and they say what generates what generates the return and it everybody expects these businesses to do worse than they actually end up doing because that's that's why they're cheap and so your Returns come from they don't do quite as badly as everybody expects and uh as a result they do have this multiple expansion that's how they generate the returns”

0.69

Due to money flowing into index funds, approximately $80 out of every $100 flowing into index funds stays in the same stocks (because the index covers ~80% of the market), while ~$20 is reallocated from non-index stocks to index stocks; this creates a persistent flow advantage for index members and a relative disadvantage for non-members.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“if money goes from non-indexed portfolios to index portfolios uh much of the money doesn't move because the index owns the market but it really doesn't it owns most of the market so what happens is that the nonmembers in the index get sold and the members in the index get bought so every $100 that goes into an index fund about $80 stays more or less where it is because the index spans 80% of the market and about 20% of the portfolio moves from non-members to members”

0.69

Value spreads were relatively stable from 1950 to 1998, varying between 3x and 6x (meaning the top 30% of stocks were at most 6 times more expensive than the bottom 30%), but exploded to approximately 10x during the dot-com bubble and have remained severely elevated since, reaching extreme levels in recent years with the 5-year moving average showing progressively longer periods above median levels.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Cliff Asness

“from 1950 to 1998 it had looked like a very well-behaved series either the straight series or the five-year moving average that you refer to looked looked for an economic series fairly well behaved it varied between about three and six which meaning means the top 30% of stocks was at the most about six times more expensive on this scale than the bottom third 30% and at the tightest was only about three times more expensive and then in the com bubble it exploded to I don't know I don't remember exactly but 10 something”

0.69

Great investors identified the dot-com bubble in real time (Soros in 1995, Marks in 1996, Sedarty in 1997) but were vindicated only 3-4 years later when the bubble collapsed; during the 1995-1999 period when they were correctly identifying a bubble, they appeared to be wrong and lost credibility ('the boy who cried wolf'), illustrating the challenge of calling tops.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dan Ramasamy

“I think it was Rayo um called the tech bubble um in 1995 I think uh I know I'm going to misquote the years but you're going to get it roughly right I think you know Howard marks called the tech bubble in 96 Seth claran in 97 so uh you know everybody knew it was a bubble the problem was they figured it out that it was a bubble too early”

0.68

Value has underperformed significantly since 2012, potentially because massive inflows to value strategies (particularly from AQR's large allocations) have compressed the valuations that made the strategy attractive, reducing the cheapness advantage that historically drove value returns.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“value really hasn't worked particularly well since 2012 and you know maybe Cliff is part of that because aqr is a very big firm Cliff is a real DieHard value investor they put a lot of money into the into that value leg of that spread and they short that growth leg of that spread in some of their portfolios and that might be just representative of the amount of money that has gone in Cliff's a very very bright guy he's a billionaire he knows what he's doing has that then changed the structure of the market”

0.68

The US has a unique business psychology and environment where Americans are more forgiving of failure and willing to take chances on new ideas compared to the rest of the world, and this cultural difference explains US market outperformance and dominance.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the US has a unique business environment and a unique business psychology in that Americans are much more forgiving of failure and much more willing to take a chance on a new idea than really the rest of the world is... that's the ethos in America is that we're just going to figure out how to do impossible things and then we're going to go and do them and that is permeates all of the business culture here and so that's why America's been such a business Powerhouse”

0.68

Intrinsic value = Book Value + Intangible Value, and if investors only focus on tangible book value and ignore intangibles (as many value investors do), they will systematically underweight and miss the best-performing companies like Google, Microsoft, and Apple.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Host)

“intrinsic value equals Book Value Plus or tangible Value Plus intangible value and if you go back to you know the 1930s when Ben G wrot security analysis um you know which was um you know an industrial time that made sense right... we fast forward to today and you know Apple Nvidia Google it's really the intangible assets the intangible side of the balance sheet that matter um and so going to your point if you're an investor who focuses only on that first half the equation right just just the term that is the tangible and ignore intangible assets to the extent that intangible assets are priced um that there is some value there you're going to be systematically short and underweight Innovative companies”

0.68

Three major global shifts have reduced the effectiveness of mean reversion and factor investing: (1) the global economy is no longer US-centric, (2) technology disruption destroys mean reversion (unlike historical mean-reverting businesses like steel), and (3) globalization increases competition and disrupts traditional competitive dynamics.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“what's changed about the market first the global economy is not us-centric and 50 years ago the US economy was a center of the global economy now it is a big part of the global economy but it is not 50% of the global economy second you got disruption technology and globalization all playing Havoc with what used to be mean reversion mean reversion used to be that steel company and your your margins Dro they would revert back to what they used to be well that might or might not be the case when you have disruption and globalization”

0.68

Factor investing cannot reliably deliver excess returns because screening for factors (small-cap, low price-to-book, etc.) requires no unique skill or effort—anyone with a computer and database can run the same screens in 3 minutes, so unless you bring additional insight beyond the factor, you should not expect outperformance.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I have a very simple saying I use in my investment philosophy class if you don't bring something to the table you should not expect to take something away I mean what are you doing in Factor investing you you're basically screening right you're screening for small cap stocks low price to book stocks whatever your factor is 50 years ago that took a lot of work you had to go collect the raw data you had to put in the screens often run them by hand today I can run the screens on Capital IQ across the global universes talks it takes me 3 minutes to do what makes you think that screening for factors entitles you to special status to earn excesss an index fund an ETF can do exactly the same thing”

0.66

Accounting is an imperfect method of determining economic reality; different accounting treatments (capitalization vs. expensing) can make identical businesses appear to have different metrics, so value investors must normalize and adjust for these accounting decisions.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“accounting is an imperfect method of determining what's actually the economic reality of a business that's that's the first idea and all fundamental investment is trying to normalize for the different decisions that management makes in the business and so you can have two identical businesses one where they're capitalizing expenses and one where they're expensing them and they will have different metrics”

0.66

Value investing requires three core elements: correct valuation analysis, correct assessment of business quality and future earnings, and correct alignment of management incentives with shareholders; if an investor gets these three things right, they do not need catalysts or multiple expansion to succeed.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Scott McBride

“what you need for a stock to work is you a few things you need to be right about the valuation and you need to be right about the kind of the quality and the future of the earnings I mean those two go hand in hand but you need to be right about that like hey I'm buying it at X and I think earnings are going to be this over time if you get that right and then you get the governance right meaning management team is aligned with you then you don't really need anything else to to go right”

0.65

Periods of technological transformation (telegraph, steam ships, electronics boom of 1960s, dot-com boom of 1990s, current social media/AI era) feature persistent overvaluation of the transformative technology because people focus on the future more than current earnings, until the technology normalizes into table stakes.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“we can see if we go back 200 years we have these like definite periods of technological advancement and the telegraph was one steam ships was another the electronics bman 60s was another and then the Tom boom in the 90s was another and then whatever we've gone through in the 2020s... there's some technological boom where people focus on the technology in the future more than they focus on the current earnings... after a while it all sort of becomes normalized”

0.64

Every sector is cheaper internationally when controlled for composition, and when controlling for all sector adjustments, international markets remain dramatically cheaper than U.S. markets, with the exception of healthcare where Europe has some quality companies like Novo Nordisk.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dan Ramasamy

“every sector International is cheaper um and it's not just um uh you know yes there's other than Healthcare okay yeah Europe has some good Healthcare stocks Nova Nordisk Etc um so that's fine but um but every sector is cheaper um every Market is cheaper if you control for all of these factors it's still dramatically cheaper”

0.63

Value investing has not worked particularly well since 2012, and much of the recent underperformance may be attributable to the amount of capital deployed into value strategies (particularly by large firms like AQR) changing the market structure such that value stocks don't get as cheap as they historically did, eliminating the cheapness that drove historical returns.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“value really hasn't worked particularly well since 2012 and you know maybe Cliff is part of that because aqr is a very big firm Cliff is a real DieHard value investor they put a lot of money into the into that value leg of that spread and they short that growth leg of that spread in some of their portfolios and that might be just representative of the amount of money that has gone in”

0.63

Supply and demand dynamics in commodity industries tend to create cyclical mean reversion patterns: when supply is tight, prices spike, which attracts new production capacity; the regulatory and permitting process (e.g., for new mines) takes 5-10 years, after which new supply comes online and prices collapse back to equilibrium.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Larry Swedrowski

“think about any mining stuff what happened if you know some mineral uh is in short supply well it takes a war P to open a mine get regulatory approval you know may take five or 10 years before you get the ore out of it around but then all of a sudden prices go up and up and then all of a sudden the supply comes on board and the prices go cation down because you got new Supply so the earnings revert to the meat”

0.62

International equities are uniformly cheaper than US equities across all sectors (even health care) and by all metrics, suggesting international stocks offer better value than US stocks, though advocates have been consistently wrong on this for years.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dan Rasmus

“every sector International is cheaper um and it's not just um uh you know yes there's other than Healthcare okay yeah Europe has some good Healthcare stocks Nova Nordisk Etc um so that's fine but um but every sector is cheaper um every Market is cheaper if you control for all of these factors it's still dramatically cheaper”

0.62

Critics of value investing argue that relying on multiple expansion means value investors are essentially price investors betting on a 'greater fool' to pay more for inferior businesses, rather than conducting genuine fundamental analysis.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the criticism of value at that time was value guys are relying on multiple expansion doesn't doesn't that just mean you're like price investor like you're hardly doing a valuation here if your outcome is you're just hoping for a greater fool to pay a little bit more for this junky business that you own”

0.62

The fundamental investment dilemma for investors today is choosing between valuation metrics (which suggest international equities at 4-5% dividend yields and 15x P/E are more attractive) and price dynamics (where flows continue favoring U.S. 1-2% yield and 25x P/E stocks), with equivalent growth forecast rates between the two.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dan Ramasamy

“do you believe that I should buy something that yields you know basically the universe of things are yielding div dividend yields of four or 5% or one or two% things that trade at 25 times PE or 15 times PE uh uh you know which all by the way have roughly equivalent forecast growth rates going forward um um and I think that the uh the these price Dynamics competing with the valuation or quantitative metrics is the sort of fundamental dilemma that investors face today”

0.61

Quality investors who bought quality stocks cheaply between 2010-2015 were rewarded with strong returns from 2015-2020, demonstrating that strategic rotation from value to quality when spreads compress is the correct approach.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the returns from somewhere in that 2010 2015 period until I would say 2020 um really rewarded the quality investors who had bought quality cheaply”

0.61

Technology and modern companies like Google often expense software development costs (engineer salaries) rather than capitalizing them, understating the value of their intangible assets on financial statements compared to companies that capitalize such expenses.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the tech companies have tended to capitalize their investment in software and amortize that capitalized investment over a period of time rather or or the reverse sorry the way they they tend to expense it in the year because it's you know what does it take to build software it takes salaries paid to software engineers and those are expense in the year that they're um they they're built”

0.61

Small-cap stocks have not earned a premium over large-cap stocks since 1981 (43+ years), despite earning a ~3-5% premium from 1927-1977, demonstrating that historical factors can stop working and that 'the world has shifted under us.'

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“small cap premium do you know there hasn't been a small cap premium since 1981 I'm going to add that on as a data set next to I'm going to let you pick the starting point and the ending point for the data and I'm going to put up the data from 1927 to 2023... starting in 1977 there's been no small cap reing”

0.61

Factor investors can earn excess returns if they add something beyond mechanical screening, such as quality overlay (e.g., AQR's small-cap value strategy that adds quality criteria beyond size and value), making the strategy unique rather than purely mechanical.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“you might add something to the mix That Makes You Different Makes You Makes You unique I know aqr had this quality small caps they said we want small cap companies with quality in addition to small capitalization maybe the qualitative maybe there's a qualitative component to that quality we look at management look at what they're doing now I can see the reason why you might be able to earn excess returns”

0.61

Trading is uncomfortable and the gains come from periods of high emotional intensity when the market is volatile and confusing, creating a selection mechanism that favors those with high pain tolerance over necessarily high skill.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I love investing through those periods even though it's extremely uncomfortable doing it like it's it's one of those times when you really get the the adrenaline flows every time I open up the the market screen gluton for f”

0.61

Jake Taylor published an article in ~2015 warning that value spreads were tight and predicting the worst value returns in 25 years, which was accurate, demonstrating that monitoring spreads was the correct early warning signal.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the funny thing is is that my co-host on my podcast Jake Taylor wrote an article saying hey the value spreads really tight here and we're setting up for the worst Ford returns in 25 years and that came out in 2015 something like that”

0.61

Building a DCF model is like 'staring out into the universe with a telescope'—small tweaks to inputs dramatically change the output, creating extreme sensitivity, which makes DCFs unreliable for decision-making.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“they I think they say that you know build building a DCF is like you've got a telescope staring out into the universe and if you just tweak it just a tiny little bit you're staring at a different galaxy and that's true of a DCF like if you make a tiny little tweak in various places of the DCF you're looking at a totally different beast”

0.61

Growth stocks underperform long-term because investors and analysts persistently overestimate the ability of companies to sustain abnormal earnings growth, and abnormal growth reverts to the mean at approximately 40% per annum according to research.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Larry Swedroe

“the re by far that growth stocks tend to underperform in the long term is that investors persistently including analysts overestimate the ability for abnormal earnings growth to pered yes... abnormal earnings growth both positive and negative tend to revert to the mean at a rate of about 40% per amet”

0.61

We may not need to abandon base rates for large-cap stocks even though they have defied historical patterns, because 70 years of data would be needed to properly eliminate size as a factor, so current evidence is insufficient to declare it dead.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think we need 70 years of data to properly do away with it as a factor so that's not happening anytime soon”

0.61

The Motley Fool once illustrated that Tootsie Roll (a cheap, stable business) significantly outperformed IBM (an expensive, popular business) over a long period, demonstrating that quality at cheap prices outperforms quality at expensive prices.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the mly fool used to run these great ads where they said his two businesses one was IBM which at the time was sort of the most sexy name around and look at what IBM has done over the last 20 or 30 years had this incredible run then they contrasted it with Tootsie Roll the little um candies and they said look at what Tootsie Roll has done and Tootsie Roll had massively outperformed IBM”

0.61

McDonald's has done so many share buybacks that it has negative shareholder equity, making price-to-book valuation irrelevant for the company because there is no book value to reference.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“one is McDonald's which is done so many BuyBacks that they've no no shareholder Equity left and so price the book doesn't work in that kind of scenario because there's no book there's a negative book”

0.61

Technology companies often expense rather than capitalize software development costs (because they are paid as salaries to engineers in the year incurred), resulting in an understated asset value on balance sheets, while other companies like McDonald's have conducted such aggressive buybacks that they have negative or near-zero shareholder equity; these accounting treatment differences mean that traditional metrics like price-to-book are unreliable across different industries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“McDonald's which is done so many BuyBacks that they've no no shareholder Equity left and so price the book doesn't work in that kind of scenario because there's no book there's a negative book and then you have other companies like the tech companies have tended to capitalize their investment in software and amortize that capitalized investment over a period of time rather or or the reverse sorry the way they they tend to expense it in the year because it's you know what does it take to build software it takes salaries paid to software engineers and those are expense in the year that they're um they they're built”

0.61

Research cited by Tobias shows that the more information investors collect about a decision, the more confident they become in their judgment; however, their actual accuracy does not improve—they remain at the same competence level as when they had only the first pieces of information, making information accumulation a source of overconfidence bias.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the research that I discussed in quantitative value one of them was that the more information you collect the more confident you become but your competence doesn't improve at all your guessing competence doesn't move from the first bit of information that you select”

0.61

Intrinsic value can be decomposed as the sum of tangible value (book value of physical and financial assets) and intangible value (intellectual property, network effects, brand); investors who ignore intangible assets will systematically underweight innovative companies like Google, Apple, and Nvidia, making them structurally unable to invest successfully in modern tech-dominated markets.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Value Had One of Its Worst Periods in History | What Data T… [-sAArD4QrnA]

“I like to think of it as basically being intrinsic value equals Book Value Plus or tangible Value Plus intangible value and if you go back to you know the 1930s when Ben G wrot security analysis um you know which was um you know an industrial time that made sense right that was pretty much the entire game um we fast forward to today and you know Apple Nvidia Google it's really the intangible assets the intangible side of the balance sheet that matter”

0.60

Price-to-Book is not an effective value metric because book values are highly variable in quality; a dollar of book value in a tech company's equity is worth more than a dollar in a commodity-heavy business, so book-based metrics systematically misprice across sectors.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“price to book we've known for a long time that that's not the best value metric because they're they're books aren't equal this you know you of course you'd rather have Teck Equity then you'd rather have you know a CD Factory and they they can have the same Book value”

0.60

Value investors must regularly return to first principles when their strategy underperforms, questioning whether the market has changed structurally or whether their assumptions remain valid; this iterative process of examining failure has led to the evolution of value investing methodologies.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“you have to go back and visit first principles and rebuild from the bottom up and I've done that a few times now because it's it's hard to imagine that something that has worked for so long has completely broken down but you've got to consider the possibilties that that is true”

0.60

Stocks that appear to be the best things to own (Mag Seven, expensive growth) are priced for perfection where numerous things must go exactly right; conversely, beaten-down stocks only require one-foot hurdles (surviving until tomorrow) to succeed, making them better risk-adjusted investments.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“you don't want to you don't want what is priced for Perfection you want something that is priced for or you know if it if it survives until tomorrow it's a great success and that that's that's my investment basis if it gets up out of bed tomorrow great success you know and the market will reward it for that th you know one foot hurdles rather than seven foot hurdles”

0.60

Price reflects what has already happened (how we got here), not what will happen in the future; therefore, the current price distribution (with certain stocks cheap and others expensive) provides no information about future returns, but the valuation levels do provide information about what needs to happen for returns to occur.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the price reflects how we got here not what's going to happen in the future what's happening in the future is something that nobody can really foresee and so you want to make a bet if you you know I I love the way Dan frames it up Dan will say if you don't know what the future holds which none of us do take the part that assumes the least and the randomization of the earnings from here”

0.57

U.S. equity valuations have reached levels not seen since the 1990s (specifically most recently like 2021), with widespread speculative mania around meme stocks paralleling the tech mania of that era; conversely, international equities trade at approximately 50% of U.S. valuations across nearly all sectors after controlling for sector composition.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Dan Ramasamy

“us equities are are reaching valuation levels that we haven't seen since the 90s um it feels a like most recently it feels like 2021 um uh in terms of uh Mania around memes um uh and uh conversely you go internationally um and the minute you step outside the US border the minute you step off a US listed exchange valuations plummet about 50%”

0.57

The Mag Seven represents a unique phenomenon concentrated in the U.S. market; when the Mag Seven is removed from the U.S. index, the remaining market looks like Europe, Asia Pacific, and other developed markets; the outperformance of U.S. equities is primarily driven by these seven companies, not by U.S. market structure broadly.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the mag 7 is a phenomena or a phenomenon that's unique to the US and it's the mag 7 that has really pulled away from the rest of the market if you take out the mag 7 the rest of the US market looks like Europe looks like the rest of the world and so it is really just that handful of you know big consumer discretionary companies that the rest of the world can't make”

0.57

The divergence between fundamental valuations and prices driven by flows may become so extreme that a great rotation into international and value equities becomes inevitable at some point, though this prediction has been wrong repeatedly before.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dan Rasmussen

“at some point the Divergence with the fundamentals between the fundamentals and where the flows are driving valuations become so fast and I think we're clearly there today um that uh that that the Great rotation is coming it's it's it it almost has to be”

0.57

Europe's relationship to artificial intelligence is regulatory rather than innovative; while America pursues AGI development, Europe's primary role is regulatory oversight, demonstrating a fundamental difference in business orientation and risk tolerance.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“America is going to create the AGI it's going to create that um that artificial intelligence that runs everything and Europe's contribution to that is it's going to regulate it so I don't know I think that that's sort of emblematic of everything that happens it's just harder to do business in Europe than it is in America”

0.56

The Mag Seven stocks (Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Nvidia, etc.) have defied long-established mean reversion base rates by sustaining growth rates well beyond what historical patterns would predict; however, even these companies will eventually experience mean reversion as they deploy $300 billion in capital for AI, making it mathematically difficult to achieve historical returns on such massive incremental investment.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“certainly Amazon Google Microsoft and some of the mag s are defying those wellestablished base rats and I I I would say Michael M um used to produce and I think he still does under a different group but he used to produce this Bas rates book where he would show like when you get to this scale you're almost inevitably going to see this very serious mean reversion um we those handful of businesses clearly have but if you look at those growth rates they are still mean reverting over time”

0.56

Value investing is fundamentally a risk-averse strategy focused on earning more reward than risk by trading risk units for reward units, which allows investors to survive down legs in market cycles and capture mean reversion benefits on the other side.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“value itself is a risk averse strategy we're trying to get more you know it some people say we're trying to get more value than price but the way I think of it is we're trying to get more reward than risk we're trading off risk units for reward units because there are these down legs that happen and you want to survive to the other side of the down leg”

0.55

By 1999 or 2000, value investors recommending non-tech stocks looked like 'the worst investor in the world,' but by 2003-2004, their patience was vindicated and the value index had dramatically outperformed the Nasdaq; this 3-4 year period of extreme underperformance tested investor discipline before vindication came.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Dan Ramasamy

“by 99 you looked like a complete idiot for not buying the NASDAQ for owning anything else for owning International stocks for owning value stocks you were the worst investor in the world by 1999 or 2000 um but the the the the bubble uh deflated so quickly and so dramatically um and then the market the money flowed into these other sectors so rapidly that you came out ahead only two or three years later”

0.55

An efficient market is not one in which markets never make mistakes, but rather one in which it is very difficult to consistently exploit those mistakes to earn returns above an index fund; despite market inefficiencies, it is becoming increasingly difficult for factor-based investing strategies to deliver excess returns because these factors are mechanical and can be automated.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Value Had One of Its Worst Periods in History | What Data T… [-sAArD4QrnA]

“an efficient market is one that it's not one where markets don't make mistakes that's the straw man that people like to use markets make of course they make mistake they make does it's can you take advantage of those mistakes to earn more than you would have in an index fund and the answer is it's really really really difficult”

0.55

The global economy is no longer U.S.-centric as it was 50 years ago, when the U.S. represented nearly 50% of global economic output; additionally, disruption, technology, and globalization have undermined mean reversion patterns that historically operated in industries like steel, where margin compression was expected to revert.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Value Had One of Its Worst Periods in History | What Data T… [-sAArD4QrnA]

“the global economy is not us-centric and 50 years ago the US economy was a center of the global economy now it is a big part of the global economy but it is not 50% of the global economy second you got disruption technology and globalization all playing Havoc with what used to be mean reversion mean reversion used to be that steel company and your your margins Dro they would revert back to what they used to be well that might or might not be the case when you have disruption and globalization”

0.55

When S&P made an error adding a stock to a narrow dividend-focused index and then removing it days later, the stock experienced a 7% price swing solely due to the indexation decision, demonstrating that membership effects are economically significant even in niche indexes.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“S&P made a um uh a blunder they um reported a uh list of Holdings for a a narrow Niche dividend index that they maintain that didn't include one of the stocks that's supposed to be in the index and so the index trackers for that strategy and these aren't big index trackers because it's a niche index um uh actually it was the other way around added that they added a stock to the list that wasn't supposed to be there and then uh couple days later they realized their mistake and they took it out well the stock qu from 84 to 90 and then back down to 84 that's a 7 plus% move”

0.55

Every market cycle exhibits the same pattern: the biggest companies attract the most flows, pushing them up until a break occurs where investors question whether valuations are justified; at that point, there is a reordering of investor thinking and the market finds new leaders among the more undervalued, better-quality businesses.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“every every every cycle has looked the same the biggest companies get the most flows that's what pushes them up until there's some event where everybody just say who is it this is just too expensive we're not getting enough return here and there's the little collapse there's a reordering of thinking and the market continues on with with new leaders”

0.55

Growth stocks tend to underperform in the long term because investors systematically overestimate the duration of abnormal earnings growth; research by Fama and French (approximately 26-28 years ago, or around 1998) found that abnormal earnings growth—both positive and negative—reverts to the mean at approximately 40% per annum.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Larry Swedrowski

“the re by far that growth stocks tend to underperform in the long term is that investors persistently including analysts overestimate the ability for abnormal earnings growth to pered yes that's this Airbnb argument if you will that Dad Darin is made so let's say that typically earnings are growing at 6% a year okay so 3% real 3% inflation and you're growing at 26% so you're growing 20% fast farmer and French wrote a paper long ago I think about 20 years ago or so maybe maybe even 90 the8 or 26 years ago now which found that abnormal earnings growth both positive and negative tend to revert to the mean at a rate of about 40% per amet”

0.54

By 2003-2004, value investors who had maintained their positions during years of underperformance came out way ahead of those who bought the NASDAQ at its peak, but only after enduring a long period of looking like complete idiots, which is the real test of value investing discipline.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Dan Rasmus

“but the interesting thing is that by 2003 or 2004 um uh actually if you bought the value index you came out way ahead of of you bought the NASDAQ because the up was so high yes and by 99 you looked like a complete idiot for not buying the NASDAQ for owning anything else for owning International stocks for owning value stocks you were the worst investor in the world by 1999 or 2000 um but the the the the bubble uh deflated so quickly and so dramatically um and then the market the money flowed into these other sectors so rapidly that you came out ahead only two or three years later”

0.54

The value spread is now incredibly wide and continuing to widen, but rather than closing (as it did 2000-2010), it keeps expanding, creating a frustrating environment where even clearly undervalued portfolios fail to generate positive returns due to continued multiple compression.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“we're now back to a situation where that spread is incredibly wide and the craziness is that it just doesn't seem to be closing it gets wider”

0.53

You should invest in things that are priced for extreme pessimism (one-foot hurdles) rather than things priced for perfection (seven-foot hurdles), because the downside is protected by low expectations while the upside comes from any reasonable performance.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“you don't want to you don't want what is priced for Perfection you want something that is priced for or you know if it if it survives until tomorrow it's a great success and that that's that's my investment basis if it gets up out of bed tomorrow great success you know and the market will reward it for that th you know one foot hurdles rather than seven foot hurdles”

0.52

We are not at the beginning of a cycle but at the apex, where best-case scenarios are already priced in, so the market is not positioned to handle positive surprises, making it time to prefer cheaper, beaten-down assets over the already-priced perfection.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think that we're right now kind of at the Apex of what is achievable... you don't want what is priced for Perfection you want something that is priced for or you know if it if it survives until tomorrow it's a great success and that that's that's my investment basis if it gets up out of bed tomorrow great success”

0.52

As cycles mature, the early part of recovery (small/value) is driven by the fact that 'everything sucks but at least this isn't a disaster,' and later stories become fun and investors get excited, making it hard to shake out holders, extending the cycle and delaying mean reversion.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I like to think about it is that stories get fun again like the original part of the rebound is like everything sucks but at least this isn't a disaster but then it's fun to tell stories and it's hard to get shaken out of that tree”

0.52

The valuation spread between index members and non-members is in the 30-50% range by Arnott's measures, meaning membership has privileges and investors pay a significant premium for being in the index.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rob Arnott

“the spread in valuation for members versus non-members of the big indexes like the S&P and the Russell is much bigger uh by our measure it's in the 30 to 50% range membership has it privileges you're worth more if you're a member”

0.52

The fundamental dilemma for investors is choosing between quantitative valuation metrics (30% dividend yields + 15x PE internationally vs. 1-2% yields + 25x PE for US) which favor international, and price momentum/performance history which favors US.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Rasmus

“do you believe that I should buy something that yields you know basically the universe of things are yielding div dividend yields of four or 5% or one or two% things that trade at 25 times PE or 15 times PE uh uh you know which all by the way have roughly equivalent forecast growth rates going forward um um and I think that the uh the these price Dynamics competing with the valuation or quantitative metrics is the sort of fundamental dilemma that investors face today”

0.52

The strong outperformance of price-to-book over other metrics when value investing was underperforming is actually evidence of how bad price-to-book is as a metric, not evidence of price-to-book working well, reflecting Cliff Asness's observation.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the outperformance of book over that period of time when value wasn't working very well was by merely and I think this is a cliff assness idea that this was just a reflection of how bad book was as a value metric rather than book sort of doing particularly well”

0.52

Flow-based metrics like operating income on total assets are superior to price-to-book because they reflect actual investment in the business and penalize companies with watered-down goodwill on the books, providing a more accurate picture of true business quality.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I've always favored the flow metrics I like I like to look at operating income I look at I look at it on the assets on the total assets in the business because I think that that it really does reflect some investment in the business whether it's been Goodwill or at some point that money has been spent and so if they're overpaying and they've got a whole lot of watered kind of Goodwill on the book then they should be penalized for that”

0.52

The compression and passive hammering of big companies happens in every cycle until some event where everyone says the valuations are too expensive, then there's a market reordering and new leaders emerge, creating a rotation to better-valued businesses.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“that expansion and that sort of passive hammering of those big companies happens until we get a break in the market and it's the every every every cycle has looked the same the biggest companies get the most flows that's what pushes them up until there's some event where everybody just say who is it this is just too expensive we're not getting enough return here and there's the little collapse there's a reordering of thinking and the market continues on with with new leaders”

0.52

Trees don't grow to the sky; what can't go on forever doesn't go on forever—the market's assumption that current winners will always win and current losers will always lose will eventually break, creating opportunity for those positioned for mean reversion.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“that's how you end up with a nifty50 you buy these stocks at any price mag 7 you buy these stocks at any price you'd be fine they'll outgrow it it's not true you have to find the it's a discounting handicapping uh event that rewards a little bit of insight into what happens now this is the price reflects how we got here not what's going to happen in the future what's happening in the future is something that nobody can really foresee and so you want to make a bet if you you know I I love the way Dan frames it up Dan will say if you don't know what the future holds which none of us do take the part that assumes the least and the randomization of the earnings from here”

0.51

The Acquirers Multiple (Operating Income on Enterprise Value) is a simple value metric that encourages buying undervalued companies, reflects incremental growth potential, accounts for quality (the ability to reinvest), and avoids explicit multiple expansion assumptions.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I like the acquir is multiple because it's operating income on Enterprise Value and if you think about that in terms of incremental growth that would be operating income on total assets and so you're just looking at the ability of the company to reinvest some portion of the operating income pay out some portion of the operating income... it still encourages you to buy undervalued companies because... you're still trying to buy cheap operating income”

0.51

The margin of safety in a value portfolio comes not from multiple expansion assumptions but from asking whether 3-5 years of compounding of reinvestment and flows will drive the stock to significantly outperform the market, creating a margin where even if multiple compression occurs, returns still exceed the index.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“it forces you to look a little bit more at the quality of the business is this a business that can reinvest is this a business that can get some reasonable Returns on the that it's reinvesting if we do that for 3 to 5 years of compounding does this get us to a place where we're going to widely outperform the market so that would be the margin of safety”

0.51

Value investors should use a minimalist approach, identifying the 5-6 key data points that actually drive investment decisions and ignoring everything else as narrative noise.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“it's a minimalist approach to find the five or six bits of data that really do move the needle and then to ignore everything else beyond that as sort of being narrative”

0.51

Market speculation and gambling have become pervasive through meme stocks, gambling apps, and speculative tech businesses, creating a conditioning effect where sober fundamental analysis of undervalued businesses appears to be a waste of time, even though this conditioning represents the psychological setup for value's eventual return.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's an enormous amount of gamble in the market with the meme coins gambling all the time all of those little Tech businesses are gambling and then literally gambling itself the apps are just ubiquitous everybody's gambling all the time so I think that there's a conditioning in the market which means that sober analysis of these undervalued better businesses is kind of that's a waste of time why would you do that it hadn't worked for so long”

0.51

The unfairly wide current value spread has been driven by conditioning response to decades of growth outperformance, and this conditioning is setting up very good returns for value investors from the current point forward.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think that the spread is unfairly wide and the reason it's so has got wider is a conditioning response and setting up for pretty good returns for Value from here”

0.50

Between 2010 and 2015, value itself became overvalued and expensive, with value spreads so tight that quality investors would have been better off buying quality cheaply during that period rather than continuing as a pure value investor, and this period from 2015-2020 rewarded quality investors who had bought quality stocks at cheap prices.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“between 2010 and 2015 value itself got overvalued and I think that that was reflected in the fact that the spread got so tight and when that happens there are other factors that you can consider quality might be one”

0.50

An exception to the failure of pure factor investing would be if a factor is combined with qualitative analysis, such as AQR's quality small caps strategy which screens for small size and then adds qualitative assessment of management quality; in that case, the addition of non-mechanical analysis could justify excess return expectations.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Value Had One of Its Worst Periods in History | What Data T… [-sAArD4QrnA]

“you might add something to the mix That Makes You Different Makes You Makes You unique I know aqr had this quality small caps they said we want small cap companies with quality in addition to small capitalization maybe the qualitative maybe there's a qualitative component to that quality we look at management look at what they're doing now I can see the reason why you might be able to earn excess returns”

0.49

The Acquirers Multiple (operating income on enterprise value) is a superior valuation metric for identifying value opportunities because it naturally encourages buying undervalued companies (cheap operating income), forces analysis of business quality and reinvestment capability, and avoids the cognitive biases introduced by more complex valuation models.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I like the acquir is multiple because it's operating income on Enterprise Value and if you think about that in terms of incremental growth that would be operating income on total assets and so you're just looking at the ability of the company to reinvest some portion of the operating income pay out some portion of the operating income it it still encourages you to buy undervalued companies because if you think about it from the First Step you're still trying to buy cheap operating income”

0.49

Market conditioning from the long period of growth outperformance has created psychological resistance to value investing, with speculation and gambling (meme coins, gambling apps) becoming ubiquitous, making sober analysis of undervalued businesses feel like a waste of time.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's an enormous amount of gamble in the market with the meme coins gambling all the time all of those little Tech businesses are gambling and then literally gambling itself the apps are just ubiquitous everybody's gambling all the time so I think that there's a conditioning in the market which means that sober analysis of these undervalued better businesses is kind of that's a waste of time”

0.49

The Mag 7 phenomenon is unique to the US market, and if you remove the Mag 7 from US returns, the rest of the US market looks like Europe and the rest of the world, performing identically to other developed markets.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the mag 7 is a phenomena or a phenomenon that's unique to the US and it's the mag 7 that has really pulled away from the rest of the market if you take out the mag 7 the rest of the US market looks like Europe looks like the rest of the world”

0.49

The Mag 7 are planning $300 billion in AI capex, and it is hard to see how they can achieve historical return rates on that scale of investment relative to the global economy, suggesting either the capex will be lower than planned or returns will be lower than historical, both of which represent mean reversion.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“these companies the mag 7 have got $300 billion that they're preparing to invest into Ai... it's hard to see how they're going to get those returns that they've had historically on that volume of capex being spent... they're sort of bumping up against the edges of the the economy and particularly if you if you take this forward 10 years the numbers don't really work”

0.48

The U.S. has a unique business environment and psychology that is more forgiving of failure and more willing to take risks on new ideas than other parts of the world; this American business psychology is exemplified by the Apollo program and creates a Powerhouse business culture that other countries like Europe lack.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“The US has a unique business environment and a unique business psychology in that Americans are much more forgiving of failure and much more willing to take a chance on a new idea than really the rest of the world is and I say this as someone who grew up in Australia I've come from a different country into America and I find the American business psychology quite inspiring like you know some point somebody said we well J JFK said we're going to thick a on the moon and you know then they went and did that”

0.48

During late 2021 to early-to-mid 2022, value and small-cap stocks had a significant spike in performance that resembled the pattern of other commodity spikes during the post-lockdown period (like lumber), suggesting value's gains were part of temporary sector rotation rather than durable market repricing.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“this was this period from this brief little period from late 2021 I think to sort of early to mid 2022 when value really spiked small value had this great run and I think that if anything at the time I thought well this is deserved this is exactly what should happen but now reflecting on it I think it was probably just another part of that you know every Lumber ran and then came back to Earth everything had this little Spike and then returned to Earth and I think that value again got a little bit ahead of itself”

0.47

Value spreads may become expensive (too tight) after a good run, and value investors must recognize this and rotate to quality, but this is difficult to identify in real-time, as Carlisle acknowledges he missed this transition in 2010-2015.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the value guy also says that there's a point in time when those spreads get narrow and you wished you would have changed too you would have realized what's weird was quality was cheap here no longer value I got that right right you did I and I missed that at the time”

0.47

Mean reversion still exists in the data and continues to apply to the Mag 7 stocks, but these mega-cap companies have altered the curve of mean reversion, meaning they take longer to revert and do so at different rates than historical base cases.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“we can still see the mean reversion in the data so it still exists... in a handful of instances the um certainly Amazon Google Microsoft and some of the mag s are defying those wellestablished base rats... if you look at those growth rates they are still mean reverting over time... we have sort of slightly changed the the shape of the mean reversion curve for these very big companies”

0.47

The outperformance of small-value stocks is better explained as a value effect (picking up cheap companies) rather than a pure size effect, since the cheapest companies tend to be small as a byproduct of how markets price them.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I don't look at those big companies enough to see the uh you know the ones that I'm looking at are for the most part pretty econom I Ally sensitive and so mean reversion for them is is less visible than just the cycle the cycle is is the thing that really drives those guys... a side effect I I don't look at those big companies... that's just I'm buying small companies that tend to be smaller businesses too because for a variety of reasons they fall out of indexes”

0.45

The Tootsie Roll vs IBM historical example illustrates that cheap, steady, share-buyback-focused companies can dramatically outperform popular, expensive companies over decades despite appearing to underperform during the growth company's popularity; this suggests current mega-cap tech stocks (which are expensive) might be analogous to IBM (which appeared great but underperformed cheaper alternatives).

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the mly fool used to run these great ads where they said his two businesses one was IBM which at the time was sort of the most sexy name around and look at what IBM has done over the last 20 or 30 years had this incredible run then they contrasted it with Tootsie Roll the little um candies and they said look at what Tootsie Roll has done and Tootsie Roll had massively outperformed IBM”

0.45

Tobias disagrees that factor investing cannot work: momentum is a simple factor (what was up most over the last 12 months minus what happened in the last month) that has worked very well and has consistently generated good risk-adjusted returns without requiring complexity; the underperformance of simple value factors relative to momentum appears to be cyclical rather than structural.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“no I don't but I think that there are big musle movements in the market and momentum has worked you know momentum worked very very well through to 2009 and then momentum had its worst 20089 momentum was down 90% through that period of time... momentum is not a complicated strategy momentum is you know there's various different versions of it but what is up the most over the last 12 months minus what happened over the last month that's a pretty pretty simple momentum portfolio”

0.45

Value investors can benefit from index flows by identifying and buying undervalued stocks outside indices; these stocks have not benefited from passive flows and are cheaper, allowing value investors to 'pick the pocket' of index funds by capturing the fundamental value while others chase index membership.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“this is uh this is Michael Green's idea and I think that he is accurately describing what is happening in the market right now that there are the flows are going to these bigger companies the flows go to the companies on a market capitalization float adjusted basis so the ones that have the most free floating market capitalization attract The Lion Share of the blow and maybe that pushes them up more and as a result they it's this sort of uh virtuous cycle where they keep on the more they get the more they get and it just pushes them up forever but there must be another side to that and that the value investor in me says well if there are these undervalued companies that aren't attracting these flows but they're ultimately still still good businesses like aren't I just picking the pocket of the index funds by picking these things up”

0.45

Dan Ramasamy's thesis on international equities has been chronically wrong for many years, and predicting international rotation has cost him and other advocates real money relative to holding the U.S. index; this makes him an unreliable guide despite the logical appeal of his valuation argument.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dan Ramasamy

“the challenge with this thesis the fundamental challenge with this thesis is that the people that have been saying it today uh me for example have been wrong on this point I was wrong last year I was wrong the year before I was wrong the year before that in fact I've been wrong about International equities basically as long as I can remember”

0.44

Risk-adjusted returns to momentum are currently better than risk-adjusted returns to value, and this was also true coming into the 2007-2009 period, yet momentum crashed afterward; therefore, current momentum outperformance does not prove it will persist, and value may stage a reversal.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the risk adjusted returns to momentum are better than value at at this point in time anyway and that was true coming into 20 78 9 as well and just that momentum collapse”

0.43

The intangible asset problem is a matter of degree, not kind; it's not fundamentally different from historical asset quality issues, and should be addressed through analyst judgment and careful fundamental analysis rather than abandoning simple metrics entirely.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I do think that it's an issue and I do think that an analyst has to deal with it but I also think that it's not it's a difference in uhg gree rather than kind”

0.43

Momentum is not a complicated strategy - it can be implemented as simply as buying what's up the most over the last 12 months minus what happened over the last month - yet it remains one of the best risk-adjusted strategies, suggesting complexity is not the key driver of returns.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“momentum is not a complicated strategy momentum is you know there's various different versions of it but what is up the most over the last 12 months minus what happened over the last month that's a pretty pretty simple momentum portfolio...the returns have still been very good to momentum and nobody would say that momentum is a complicated strategy”

0.43

The Mag 7 outperformance will eventually revert, and when it does, the rest of the market (including Europe, Asia-Pacific, and international) will have a strong run as market leadership and earnings distribution normalizes.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“there's some little mean reversion that occurs where at some point they come back to the market a little bit and the rest of the market has a pretty good run and the rest of the market will include Europe and the Asia Pacific and the rest of the world”

0.43

Tobias has adopted a two-valuation approach: first, a traditional DCF that may include multiple expansion assumptions; second, a conservative valuation that assumes no multiple expansion and relies only on reinvestment returns and shareholder yields, allowing him to assess whether a position would work even in an unfavorable scenario.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I have sort of two valuations I assume let's you know a DCF is sort of an implicit you You're expect you can build into it some multiple expansion because that's your exit multiple with this you're assuming no multiple expansion and then you you can look at the two together and say if I don't get the multiple expansion will this still be a satisfactory investment”

0.43

Tobias prefers simple valuation metrics over complex ones not because simple metrics are inherently more powerful, but because simplicity reduces the opportunity for behavioral bias and cognitive error to be embedded in the valuation model; complex spreadsheet models create the illusion of precision while actually introducing more sources of subjective judgment.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the reason that I don't like those particularly complicated valuation methodologies is because there's a lot of Behavioral bias and cognitive error that can be built into any valuation and it's just harder to see when you have a complex spreadsheet where you're building in your own got discretion about a lot”

0.43

If you are looking for truly undervalued companies, you will tend to find them in the micro-cap and small-cap segments rather than large-cap, because two businesses with identical earnings but different valuations will have different market capitalizations simply due to the valuation difference; therefore, size itself is not a reliable factor but rather a side effect of finding undervalued opportunities.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the reality is that if you're looking for really undervalued companies you tend to be right at the very bottom of the market cap scale so my Zig is midcap large cap Zig is clustered right on according to Morning Star Zig is a small value fund even it's defin defined as midcap it's just that it if something's undervalued now if you're paying if some two if there are two businesses that each have $100 million in earnings and one is on a three multiple and one is on a 20 multiple three multiple is a $300 million market cap and that's a micro cap and the 20 multiples a $2 billion and maybe maybe that's a small cap”

0.42

The unfairly wide value spreads are due to conditioning (investor psychology) rather than fundamental changes in markets, and this conditioning creates an opportunity for value returns going forward.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think that the spread is unfairly wide and the reason it's so has got wider is a conditioning response and setting up for pretty good returns for Value from here”

0.39

The current portfolio of value companies is incredibly high-quality and very cheap versus both the broader market and the growth leg, which are stretched and lower-quality, creating a favorable asymmetry despite momentum and market conditioning favoring expensive growth.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“we're back to that situation now where it looks to me like the portfolio of value companies are incredibly high quality and very very cheap versus the the market or the the growth leg or the expensive leg which look to me like they are really stretched and lower quality”

0.39

We are in a similar phase now (as of recording) as the peak of tech bubble years (1998-2000), with US equities at valuation levels not seen since the 1990s, mania around memes similar to 1999-2000, and international equities trading at 50% discount to US equivalents.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dan Rasmus

“now I would argue that we're in a similar phase here where us equities are are reaching valuation levels that we haven't seen since the 90s um it feels a like most recently it feels like 2021 um uh in terms of uh Mania around memes um uh and uh conversely you go internationally um and the minute you step outside the US border the minute you step off a US listed exchange valuations plummet about 50%”

0.39

A brief spike in value returns occurred from late 2021 to early-mid 2022 when small value rallied sharply, but this spike was probably a false signal similar to other commodity spikes during post-COVID disruption, and value subsequently reverted to underperformance.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“was this period from this brief little period from late 2021 I think to sort of early to mid 2022 when value really spiked small value had this great run and I think that if anything at the time I thought well this is deserved this is exactly what should happen but now reflecting on it I think it was probably just another part of that you know every Lumber ran and then came back to Earth”

0.39

Mean reversion still exists in stock returns, but the shape of the mean reversion curve for very large companies (Microsoft, Google, Netflix) has slightly changed compared to smaller companies, reflecting their unique interface with the market and structural advantages.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think mean reversion still exists it's just that we have sort of slightly Chang the the shape of the mean reversion curve for these very big companies”

0.38

Tobias's portfolio compression in recent years (where value multiples have continued compressing even as absolute valuations have become more extreme) has been driven by multiple compression rather than underlying business performance improvement; at some point, a market break or revaluation event will force recognition that undervalued businesses are more attractive, triggering a rotation.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the compression in those values the compression in those multiples is what has driven the returns rather than the underlying performance of those businesses they just keep on getting cheaper and cheaper and so the Ford returns get better and better and at some point the market will recognize that”

0.35

European financial stocks have rallied this year from single-digit price-to-earnings ratios to still relatively low multiples, suggesting they continue to offer attractive return opportunities with low embedded expectations.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Host)

“European financials have been Off to the Races to start this year and they were coming from single digit P's something really stupid and I think there's still single digit P's after this rally”

0.35

European financial stocks have been trading at single-digit P/E multiples for years despite fundamental performance, and even after substantial rallies to start 2025, they remain at single-digit P/E ratios, suggesting either that the market is correctly discounting poor prospects or that there is significant embedded upside if fundamentals stabilize.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Tobias Carlisle

“they do keep getting out of bed like European financials have been Off to the Races to start this year and they were coming from single digit P&'s something really stupid and I think there's still single digit P&'s after this rally”

0.29

The problem of intangible assets and accounting treatment differences is not new, and has been understood since Buffett's observation that book values are not created equal; however, it has become more pronounced because technology—which exhibits these accounting characteristics—has become such a large part of the market and has been the best-performing sector.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“I think that price to book we've known for a long time that that's not the best value metric because they're they're books books aren't equal this you know you of course you'd rather have Teck Equity then you'd rather have you know a CD Factory and they they can have the same Book value you know this is not a new idea this is Buffet's idea that book value is not created equal”

0.20

The largest companies in Tobias's portfolio are relatively economically sensitive, and the index comprises mostly economically sensitive small and mid-cap companies; for these businesses, cyclical mean reversion is more visible and more predictable than for large-cap mega-companies.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Tobias Carlisle

“the ones that I'm looking at are for the most part pretty econom I Ally sensitive and so mean reversion for them is is less visible than just the cycle the cycle is is the thing that really drives those guys”