
George Friedman: Trump, Putin and Changing Global Realities
What this covers
This is a conversation between George Friedman, chairman of Geopolitical Futures, and Christian Smith, host of Talking Geopolitics. It was recorded about a month into Donald Trump's second term. Smith asks what the United States wants from its negotiations with Russia and whether the turbulence in foreign policy is a new normal. Friedman answers that the US is not changing its worldview so much as noticing that the world has changed. He grounds that claim in a view of Geopolitics as ruthless, driven by what states must and can do rather than by morality. He cites Vietnam as a case in which victims were a cost of power competition.
The range is wide. Friedman calls the liberal international order an Ideology of one segment of Western society, never truly global, and says the eighty-year Bipolar World System is now being replaced, historically through war. He treats NATO as obsolete because it was built to contain Soviet power, and says Europe is reverting to competing nation-states. His evidence includes a French proposal that Poland rejected, and a Germany that matters only economically.
On China, he argues that it cannot cross the Taiwan Strait under American surveillance and submarines. He also holds that it was never a real ally of Russia, pointing to the 1969 Usuri River clash and China's abstention at the UN. He compares Nixon's 1972 opening to China with a possible reversed realignment now. The most contested claims are that Russia's three-year failure in Ukraine ended its status as a peer competitor, that the war was a stalemate the US rationally walked away from, and that European panic over American withdrawal shows Pax Americana is not over. The thesis also points to Saudi Arabia as a pivot, but the statements supplied say less about it than about Russia, China and Europe.
Friedman argues that the post-WWII international order is obsolete and being replaced by a multipolar system where the US must negotiate from changed geopolitical realities—particularly Russia's failed Ukraine invasion and China's economic weakness—rather than Cold War assumptions, with Saudi Arabia emerging as a critical pivot point for regional stability.
- Russia's failure to conquer Ukraine fundamentally altered the balance of power and invalidated NATO's founding rationale as a Soviet containment structure
- The US is not ending leadership but restructuring it around new realities: Russia is weakened, China is economically declining, and the Middle East is the actual geopolitical priority
- Saudi Arabia's role in this emerging order signals a shift from European-centric to multipolar great-power coordination where regional powers manage their own spheres
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The liberal international order is an ideology shared by a segment of Western society designed to legitimize their well-being, not a universal system; the liberal system emerged from WWII and was made possible by the Cold War (alliance of non-communist nations called 'liberal'), but it was never actually global—China, Russia, and Africa were not liberal.
“the question of the liberal unit is an ideology shared by a certain segment of Western Society it gave them a platform which to consider themselves able to maximize their well-being by manipulating certain minor systems...the liberal system emerged out of a terrible reality World War II it created a political structure what made liberal democ the liberal system possible was the Cold War it was the alliance of non-communist Nations and they called themselves liberal well there wasn't a liberal World China wasn't liberal uh didn't care and Russia didn't follow a liberal policy and Africa was certainly not liberal the idea of the liberal world order was a fantasy that was useful to some but not reality”
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and failure to defeat it—a nearly third-world country—for three years represents a massive failure that fundamentally changed the world, demonstrating that Russia is no longer a peer competitor to the US and invalidating the post-Cold War assumption that Russia was a superpower threat.
“Russia lost the war in Ukraine the Russian army the Red Army could not defeat what is nearly a third world country for three years it failed this is a massive failure by the Russians this Chang is the fundamental anchor of the world the United States and Russia are not the same now”
China was never truly aligned with Russia ideologically or strategically; the two are historic enemies (Usuri River conflict, 1969), and China's abstention rather than support for Russia in the Ukraine UN vote demonstrates China does not see Russia as an ally.
“China and Russia have a very complex marriage their historic enemies bound together by an ideology which if anybody watched carefully X abandoned last week...Ukraine war in the United Nations they abstained did not vote for it didn't vote against it”
China cannot invade Taiwan because it would require 10 hours for landing craft to cross the Taiwan Strait, during which American satellites would detect the operation and American submarines and missiles would block it; China does not have the military capability to secure the strait against US opposition.
“China did not invade Taiwan because they couldn't it takes 10 hours for landing craft to cross the Straits American satellites would have seen them submarines and missiles would have blocked it the Chinese n must control the Seas they don't otherwise they're fighting India or someone else”
The transition from one international order to another typically occurs through war, not peacefully—as seen with World War I, World War II, and the Napoleonic Wars—and the world is now in such a transitional period.
“and usually it goes through a war uh World War I World War II the Napoleonic Wars we're not peaceful in this process so we are now in the period where the World War II postor War II model is obsolete”
Wars end in either victory or stalemate, not negotiation; the US recognized that the Ukraine war was a stalemate where Russia could not overrun Ukraine and Ukraine could not defeat Russia, so the rational choice was to cease supporting Ukraine indefinitely and refocus on broader geopolitical priorities.
“well Wars end in Victory not negotiations or in stalemate and not nego and negotiations what the US realized this war was a stalemate the Russians were not going to overrun Ukraine Ukraine could not defeat”
China did not invade Taiwan because it lacks the military capability to do so; taking Taiwan would require crossing the Taiwan Strait in landing craft under US surveillance and would face US submarine and missile opposition, which China cannot overcome.
“China did not invade Taiwan because they couldn't it takes 10 hours for landing craft to cross the Straits American satellites would have seen them submarines and missiles would have blocked it the Chinese n must control the Seas they don't otherwise they're fighting India or someone else”
Nixon's visit to China in 1972 was catalyzed by Russia attacking the Usuri River border, demonstrating that great powers shift alliances when strategic conditions change, and a similar flexibility should apply to current US-Russia relations.
“well when Nixon went to Russia to China Russia attacked usuri River the border between Russia and China China and Russia have a very complex marriage their historic enemies bound together by an ideology”
Russia is historically viewed as an enemy of China (not an ally), which is why China did not endorse Russia's Ukraine invasion; China-Russia relations are complex and marked by historical hostility, bound together only by opposition to the West during the Cold War.
“the Chinese were never really aligned with the Russians there was hostility between Russia and China always and the ukrainians did not endorse the E the Ukraine war in the United Nations they abstained did not vote for it didn't vote against it”
Russia's position in Europe is now up in the air, and Russia itself is up in the air, meaning the foundational assumptions of European security and global stability have been destabilized.
“Russia's position in Europe is up in the air Russia itself is up in the air that means the world has changed”
The post-WWII bipolar order is now obsolete and being replaced; historically, such transitions occur through war (Napoleonic Wars, WWI, WWII), and the world is currently undergoing this reorganization period where old norms are breaking on all levels and countries are experiencing internal crises because the organizing principles no longer work.
“It is now undergo and usually it goes through a war uh World War I World War II the Napoleonic Wars we're not peaceful in this process so we are now in the period where the World War II postor War II model is obsolete is not relevant to the world that's considered the norm it cannot sustain the world cannot organized the world NATO Russia is different other countries are rising India and so on so the world is reorganizing itself what occurs in this place is that each country has an internal crisis because the Norms are being broken on all levels”
The US and West continued supporting Ukraine not because of interest in Ukraine itself, but because NATO members (particularly Europeans) benefited from the conflict blocking Russian expansion in Europe; once Russia's inability to take Ukraine was clear, the strategic rationale for continued support evaporated.
“Wars end in Victory not negotiations or in stalemate and not nego and negotiations what the US realized this war was a stalemate the Russians were not going to overrun Ukraine Ukraine could not defeat only the Europeans thought that it was valuable because it helped the Europeans block the Russians”
For 80 years, the world was organized by two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—with all other countries choosing alignment (American, Russian, or neutral), creating clear categories for foreign policy across the entire international system.
“since for 80 years two great Powers dominated the world the United States and the Soviet Union each country plotted its course with the consideration ISM I am with the Americans I with the Russians I'm neutral these were the categories and foreign policy of all these countries were clear”
The US did not care about Vietnam morally; the US fought Vietnam to stop communism and signal that it would not back down from any commitment, accepting the cost to maximize deterrence credibility; victims like Vietnam are the consequence of geopolitical power competition, not moral consideration.
“individuals are the consequences of geopolitics is power it is not what you want to do or what you think is moral is what you must do and what you can do and so in this particular case as in many cases where nations were victimized by geopolitics like Vietnam which we fought not because we cared about Vietnam but because we wanted to stop communism and signal that we would not stop at anything to do it”
Geopolitics is ruthless and driven by power and necessity, not morality; what states must do and what they can do determine policy, not what they want to do or what they think is moral.
“is the fate of Ukraine then a matter of geopolitics at its most fundamental neutral core history is ruthless it's not filled with pity individuals are the consequences of geopolitics is power it is not what you want to do or what you think is moral is what you must do and what you can do”
The wars that have occurred during the period of liberal internationalism (Cold War and post-Cold War eras) have been massive, yet received little interest from liberal elites; the Balkan Wars are an example of wars during the liberal era that were downplayed by liberal leadership.
“the wars that have raged During the period of this have been massive the lack of interest in these wars by the liberal Elite as a massive the Balan Wars for example”
Nixon's visit to China occurred when Russia had attacked along the Usuri River border, forcing China to seek an American alliance; the current situation resembles this dynamic in reverse—a Chinese recalculation forced by American-Russian alignment.
“when Nixon went to Russia to China Russia attacked usuri River the border between Russia and China China and Russia have a very complex marriage their historic enemies bound together by an ideology which if anybody watched carefully X abandoned last week”
The US is not changing how it sees the world differently; rather, the world itself has fundamentally changed, and the US is responding by taking note of new realities rather than imposing new preferences.
“the USA is not seeing the world differently the world is different and the US is taking note of it”
NATO is obsolete because it was built solely to contain Soviet/Russian power; now that Russia has failed in Ukraine and cannot invade Europe, NATO's fundamental purpose is invalidated.
“the Americans looked at the war and said look who are our allies NATO is obsolete there is no functioning in it the Europeans are reverting to the pre-old war model of nation states competing against each other China is a problem and must be isolated but not so much of a problem they asked the question what is the fundamental issue between the United States and Russia it was Europe that question is settled by the fact they can't invade Europe if they can't take Ukraine now is the time not to deal about Ukraine per se”
China must have access to US markets and investments for its economy to function; by cutting investments and sanctions, the US has effectively ended any US-China confrontation by making China weaker and economically dependent rather than by direct military conflict.
“the major reason the Chinese rose was the United States American imports from China investment in China China must have those Investments some come from Europe but that's of the key so in a way the Chinese American confrontation ended when the US stopped investing and cut Investments and the Chinese have been loose now”
Germany matters only economically in Europe and is not a military power; if it undergoes a massive government change, it will take a decade to stabilize, and therefore countries that were geopolitical pivots 10 years ago are now irrelevant.
“Germany matters in Europe for economic reasons it's not a military power if it has a massive change of government it will take a decade to stabilize Germany if this government remains is already so stable it can't move therefore the countries that 10 years ago were pivots are now irrelevant they don't realize it yet but they are so a German election used to be important it's important to the French and it's important to the polls and not important to us”
The United States is still the strongest military and economic power in the world; the fact that Europeans are panicking over US withdrawal is evidence that Pax Americana is not over—rather, the old world order is ending and a new one is emerging with the US still in the lead.
“the United States is by far the strongest military power it is by far the strongest economic power China made a good try but didn't quite get there so the idea that the United States PX americ is over means that no one wants access to the American Market no one wants American Investment no one wants an alliance the reason we know the American ER is not over is the Europeans are panicking over the fact that the United States is not there”
Russia is now economically weak and regionally limited but still exists as a power; the US wants normalized relations with Russia (not alliance, not enmity) because Russia is no longer a strategic competitor for global dominance.
“what do we want for each other Russia wanted Europe it failed to get Europe let's do business...Russia will not decline it will decline but not lose its power...the idea that Russia is a fixed figure as a threat declined the American perception of the world changed as a result...if Russia is not a military threat the NATO is IR relevant”
Europe is reverting to pre-Cold War model of competing nation-states; the French declared a summit and deployment of forces while Poland rejected it ('go to hell'), demonstrating there is no functioning European unity or military capacity.
“the Europeans are reverting to the pre-old war model of nation states competing against each other...the Europeans don't want the World to Change they're looking at the world and saying look not let's we're doing everything differently...there is no Europe that's a huge change in the world”
Europe cannot lead the world; though Europeans could potentially build an army and economy (and maybe even a unified nation), they do not have the global reach or resources that the US possesses, and they cannot match American leadership.
“we don't want to be leaders of the world it costs too much it puts to responsibility we had to be leaders of the world because the rest of the world was in shambles now the Europeans can lead the world they can build an army they can build an economy they can might even build a nation you know European nation but they can't lead the point is the United States is leading it is leading in a direction that shocks everybody”
The Israel-Arab conflict in the Middle East threatens to draw in the United States and used to threaten to draw in Russia during the 1973 War, making the Middle East a space where great powers clash and a critical arena for managing global stability.
“the world is ignoring there's an other war going on in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs which threatens to draw in the United States and used to threaten to draw the Russians during the 1973 War”
Russia is not a fixed geopolitical threat; it is a variable power whose threat capacity changes with circumstances—Ukraine demonstrated limits that were not previously observable.
“Russia is not a military threat the NATO is IR relevant Europe is different so the war there and the war in the midle East changed an understanding in the International System the idea that Russia is a fixed figure as a threat declined the American perception of the world changed as a result the European perception of the world did not they did not realize that the Russian threat the Cold War ended in Ukraine in Ukraine Russia demonstrated his limits”
China is struggling and made a play for greatness but will not achieve great power status—it will remain a significant regional and economic actor but not a superpower.
“China is struggling it made a play for greatness and it's not going to be serious but not great”
China's economy is in shambles and declining; a Russian-American alignment is China's worst-case scenario because it leaves China isolated, potentially facing both powers and unable to leverage their competition for advantage.
“the Chinese economy is in shambles and the major reason the Chinese rose was the United States...China is now terrified a Russian American anant is the worst thing that could possibly happen to China”
China abstained (rather than voting for or against) Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the UN, which was a strategic signal that China does not want to be aligned with Russia and is attempting to preserve its flexibility in the emerging geopolitical order.
“the ukrainians did not endorse the E the Ukraine war in the United Nations they abstained did not vote for it didn't vote against it so we have to look at China as it is it is a vast country undergrow growing traditional stresses with a government that has failed to Surge the economy forward”
During the Cold War, wars occurred regularly (Balkans, Middle East conflicts) while Western elites claimed to believe in liberal order—the disconnect shows liberals were indifferent to actual suffering outside their sphere of concern.
“the wars that have raged During the period of this have been massive the lack of interest in these wars by the liberal Elite as a massive the Balan Wars for example”
People resist accepting geopolitical change and mistakenly try to preserve the pieces on the chessboard with their old power values rather than understanding that power itself has shifted, which is the fundamental mechanism of geopolitical transformation.
“the problem is that people cannot understand change they keep the pieces on the chessboard with the same power the same thing but in geopolitics power changes and there's been a massive shift in power due to Ukraine”
China's military is powerful in its region but not against the United States, and this power imbalance means Sino-American confrontation will not happen.
“it's military is powerful in the region but not against the United States that's not going to happen”
All countries are experiencing internal crises because the old norms that organized international behavior are breaking down—nations can no longer answer simple questions like 'can we be friends with Russia?' or understand their historical alliances.
“so we are in the period where people are appalled because it's not what they used to and all countries are going through this the English British are certainly thinking what happened to our American friends they know what happened to the French friends but what Germany now do they all the old questions are rising”
The 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arabs threatened to become a direct US-Soviet confrontation and represents the historical pattern of Middle Eastern conflicts threatening to draw superpowers into direct conflict.
“it used to threaten to draw the Russians during the 1973 War it was a russian-american war now the Russian can't play”
Saudi Arabia is central to the new great power order because it is a massive oil producer and the arbiter of stability in the Middle East, which is the real root of future war; the US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia sitting at the same table constitutes the essential triad of the new world order.
“the world is ignoring there's an other war going on in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs which threatens to draw in the United States...the country that did not involve itself in this war in Middle East was the most powerful country it was Saudi Arabia...the real question that should be asked the Real Horror that happened was in the Middle East and is always in the Middle East”
Trump's proposal that the US would take control of Gaza was a bluff used in negotiations to signal to Saudi Arabia that if Saudi Arabia does not take responsibility for managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US will step in; the purpose is to make Saudi Arabia the lead stakeholder in Middle East stability.
“the Saudis want to be the dominant power in the Middle East they need to be sponsored in this role let Saudi Arabia be responsible for Gaza so the whole Gaza play was Bluff of course because these are negotiations and you Bluff we're going to take Gaza like crazy we're not GNA take Gaza we're telling the Saudis somebody's got to stop this if it's got to be us it's got to be us but then you're going to be junior to us how's about you taking the lead reaching an understanding with Israel and being responsible for the Palestinians”
Europe is fragmenting back into competing nation-states rather than maintaining EU cohesion; Poland rejected French military deployments and Germany is paralyzed politically, indicating the European unified project is reversing toward pre-WWI nationalist competition.
“now the European have the French declared a summit and a deployment of forces Poland said go to hell so Europe there is no Europe that's a huge change in the world”
Liberal internationalism is an ideology and fantasy, not reality; the 'liberal world order' claimed to be universal, but China, Russia, and Africa never adhered to liberal principles, so the post-WWII claim of a unified liberal system was merely a useful platform for Western elites to project power.
“the liberal system emerged out of a terrible reality World War II it created a political structure what made liberal democ the liberal system possible was the Cold War it was the alliance of non-communist Nations and they called themselves liberal well there wasn't a liberal World China wasn't liberal uh didn't care and Russia didn't follow a liberal policy and Africa was certainly not liberal the idea of the liberal world order was a fantasy that was useful to some but not reality”
Americans across the political spectrum are 'loathed at all times'—political division is the foundation of American democracy where 'money talks and excrement works'—and Trump fits this pattern of a contentious president, not a break from it.
“American presidents are always loathed at all times that is the foundation of American democracy the division so there's the wording In America which is essentially money talks and excrement works if I may put it that way”
European nations want to be involved in managing Ukraine (and feel morally superior for their restraint in not sending troops) while avoiding casualties, which makes them irrelevant to the outcome because real power requires accepting costs and risk.
“they want to be in Ukraine but not take casualties therefore they're irrelevant they themselves IR relevant and much of the rest of the world feels morally Superior because they don't have to dirty their hands with the transition and that's what's going on in the public especially with the elite who's committed to the post Cold War postwar order first World II order to Nato to the European Union to all sorts of conceptions of how the world works and this looks obscene to them”
A three-way summit between the United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia is extraordinarily significant because it represents negotiation among the only three entities that Friedman considers true great powers, establishing a new tripolar framework replacing the defunct Cold War bipolarity.
“this Summit is a very important Summit between not just us and Russia but Saudi Arabia the Russ the three great Powers the great power of the Middle East the great power Russia the great power America are sitting down the same table and discussing the world”
The post-WWII international order, which was organized around two great powers (the US and Soviet Union) with all nations choosing alignment based on this bipolar structure, is now obsolete because geopolitical realities have fundamentally shifted and the world is reorganizing itself.
“since for 80 years two great Powers dominated the world the United States and the Soviet Union each country plotted its course with the consideration ISM I am with the Americans I with the Russians I'm neutral these were the categories and foreign policy of all these countries were clear it's now 80 years since this system was in power it's almost a century in these systems shift as the realities of nation states and the reality of the world shifts it is now undergo”
History is not erectable; historical systems (empires, orders) always set like the sun, but societies and states persist and new systems emerge; those who believe a system is permanent (like the belief that 'the sun never sets' on the British Empire) will be surprised when change occurs.
“those who believe that this era any era is erectable the British Empire the sun cannot set on it well it's set and history goes on but at these moments people get nervous”
Ukraine is a sideshow that doesn't matter for great-power strategy; it was a stage on which the ballet was played out, and now the next act is occurring. Ukraine's ultimate fate will likely involve a division or negotiated settlement where some form of Russia retains territory.
“Ukraine is a sideshow that doesn't matter it was a stage on which the ballet was played out and now the next ACT the stage well the Russians don't really care they like it we don't care the polls May care but the great powers that are left...and I suppose it will end with a division of Ukraine of Ukraine in some way uh some forces in Ukraine”
The claim that 'Pax Americana is over' has been made repeatedly since Vietnam and is merely wishful thinking; the US remains by far the strongest military and economic power, and the panic of European allies demonstrates they still depend on American power despite rhetorical claims of independence.
“they have been saying that since Vietnam it's wishful thinking the United States is by far the strongest military power it is by far the strongest economic power China made a good try but didn't quite get there so the idea that the United States PX americ is over means that no one wants access to the American Market no one wants American Investment no one wants an alliance the reason we know the American ER is not over is the Europeans are panicking over the fact that the United States is not there”
Germany is economically important but not militarily consequential; any major change in German government will take a decade to stabilize, making German elections irrelevant to the US and great-power calculations even if significant to regional European actors.
“with that I would simply say what does Germany matter Germany matters in Europe for economic reasons it's not a military power if it has a massive change of government it will take a decade to stabilize Germany if this government remains is already so stable it can't move”
Trump's surprising policies and apparent chaos in foreign policy are not disruption he created but rational responses to the fact that he inherited a disrupted world; Trump is attempting to construct a new stable order based on recognizing changed geopolitical realities rather than clinging to Cold War structures.
“it is not Trump disrupting the world he came into presidency with a disrupted world and his child tried to make sense of it and his personality is not the most Charming so you know but roselt wasn't either he was considered a sley rich guy who is doing this as a hobby”
Russia's failure to defeat Ukraine—a country that is 'nearly a third world country' and that Russia could not overrun despite three years of war—is a 'massive failure' that fundamentally changed the position of Russia globally and invalidated its status as a superpower equivalent to the US.
“Russia lost the war in Ukraine the Russian army the Red Army could not defeat what is nearly a third world country for three years it failed this is a massive failure by the Russians this Chang is the fundamental anchor of the world the United States and Russia are not the same now”
Ukraine is a 'sideshow that doesn't matter' in the larger context of great-power competition; it was 'a stage on which the ballet was played out' to determine the real balance of power, and now that Russia's military limits are proven, Ukraine's final political status is secondary to the great powers' interests.
“I'll be ruthless Ukraine is a sideshow that doesn't matter it was a stage on which the ballet was played out and now the next ACT the stage well the Russians don't really care they like it we don't care the polls May care but the great powers that are left”
China is not a genuine great power despite its size because it cannot challenge the US militarily, its economy is in decline rather than growing, and it lacks the ability to project power globally—it can only defend regional interests or fight India.
“The Chinese economy is in shambles and the major reason the Chinese rose was the United States American imports from China investment in China China must have those Investments some come from Europe but that's of the key so in a way the Chinese American confrontation ended when the US stopped investing and cut Investments and the Chinese have been loose”
China's recent pivot toward capitalism and private-sector-led development, announced by Xi Jinping, signals Chinese leadership's panic about the economy and represents a major ideological shift acknowledging that communist central planning has failed.
“China made a play for greatness and it's not going to be serious but not great the Middle East has to be organized it is the real root of war the real question that should be asked the Real Horror that happened was in the Middle East and is always in the Middle East and this is an economically vital area”
The fundamental US-China conflict will end with US investment and trade restrictions because China's rise was entirely dependent on American economic engagement; without access to US markets and capital, China's economy will continue to decline regardless of US military posture.
“so in a way the Chinese American confrontation ended when the US stopped investing and cut Investments and the Chinese have been loose”
Regarding whether the US should deal with Russia on Gaza and other issues: the US should recognize that Putin's Ukraine failure creates internal vulnerability that might enable regime change, but this requires keeping lines of negotiation open rather than closing them.
“can put survive after this defeat I mean everybody is talking about the power of Russia this proved the Empower of Russia and the lack of Prudence by Putin now if you want regime change in Russia this is the moment there are many people who don't like Putin there was an attempt at couet during the war against Putin”
Trump invented the Abraham Accords, which created an alliance framework in the Middle East; now the Trump Administration wants to create a NATO-like military alliance in the Middle East, which would be very different from the European NATO.
“Saudi Arabia is part of the Abraham Alliance which by the way Trump invented and now aaban wants the War join and everything and he wants to create a nato in the place where NATO matters the Middle East not Europe now NATO would be very different and not the same”
Trump did not disrupt the world; he inherited a world that was already disrupted by Russia's failure in Ukraine and is attempting to make sense of it and construct a new stable order reflecting the changed realities, though his personality makes this appear more chaotic than the substantive reorientation warrants.
“it is not Trump disrupting the world he came into presidency with a disrupted world and his child tried to make sense of it and his personality is not the most Charming so you know but roselt wasn't either he was considered a sley rich guy who is doing this as a hobby”
Lyndon Johnson faced a similar situation to Putin: he committed his country to a war (Vietnam) it could not win, and this did not end well for him personally, though the regime eventually stabilized; Putin may face pressure or internal challenge, but will likely survive.
“can put survive after this defeat I mean everybody is talking about the power of Russia this proved the Empower of Russia and the lack of Prudence by Putin now if you want regime change in Russia this is the moment there are many people who don't like Putin there was an attempt at couet during the war against Putin so this is not a leader who's in a firm position because he committed his country to a war he couldn't win lynon Johnson did the same thing and this did not end well for him but the regime's stabilized okay but what are the Russians going to stabilize on”
The World Economic Forum and similar institutions represent an elite attempt to use the liberal system framework to maximize their well-being by manipulating international systems, not a genuine pursuit of universal liberal values.
“World economic Forum was a meeting of those who wanted the world liberal system but the liberal system emerged out of a terrible reality World War II it created a political structure”
British elites and policy makers are committed to the post-Cold War, post-WWII order (NATO, EU) and find current US policy 'obscene' because it violates the fundamental assumptions they've built their world view around for 80 years.
“much of the rest of the world feels morally Superior because they don't have to dirty their hands with the transition and that's what's going on in the public especially with the elite who's committed to the post Cold War postwar order first World II order to Nato to the European Union to all sorts of conceptions of how the world works and this looks obscene to them”
The old Cold War assumption that the US could be friends with Germany and Japan after WWII (after defeating them militarily) proves that reconciliation with Russia is similarly possible and ethical—previous enemies have become allies, so the notion that current dealings with Russia are unprecedented is false.
“well there wasn't a liberal World China wasn't liberal uh didn't care and Russia didn't follow a liberal policy and Africa was certainly not liberal the idea of the liberal world order was a fantasy that was useful to some but not reality let's talk about Saudi Arabia in some ways George you think they are Central to all this the question of course in some people's minds are why are these negotiations taking place there why are they there what Saudi Arabia is is a massive oil producer but but they why there why not Hungary or somewhere else well Hungary would have been the logical place because Victor Orban was close to Putin close to Trump and I thought it would be in Budapest but the fact is the world is ignoring there's an other war going on in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs which threatens to draw in the United States and used to threaten to draw the Russians during the 1973 War it was a russian-american war now the Russian can't play the threat to take Gaza was insane it appeared but it really was the announcement this can't go on this region cannot every 5 10 years spasm the country that did not involve itself in this war in Middle East was the most powerful country it was Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia needs this stop it's part of the Abraham Alliance which by the way Trump invented and now aaban wants the War join and everything and he wants to create a nato in the place where NATO matters the Middle East not Europe now NATO would be very different and not the same so I just use that name so the how will the world look well Russia will not decline it will decline but not lose its power China is struggling it made a play for greatness and it's not going to be serious but not great the Middle East has to be organized it is the real root of war the real question that should be asked the Real Horror that happened was in the Middle East and is always in the Middle East and this is an economically vital area so so the Russians are going to be talking and Americans will be talking about more than Ukraine they'll be talking about the Middle East and they'll be talking about they how these Royal Powers but really great Powers still are going to handle the Middle East and Saudi Arabia has to be at that table because if you see a new model of the world it's American power Russia still a major power and Saudi Arabia the garden in the Middle East the United States wants to stop the war in the Middle East perhaps more than it wants to stop the war Ukraine and what do the Saudis want there Saudis want to be the dominant power in the Middle East they need to be sponsored in this role let Saudi Arabia be responsible for Gaza so the whole Gaza play was Bluff of course because these are negotiations and you Bluff we're going to take Gaza like crazy we're not GNA take Gaza we're telling the Saudis somebody's got to stop this if it's got to be us it's got to be us but then you're going to be junior to us how's about you taking the lead reaching an understanding with Israel and being responsible for the Palestinians and this is what's going to be discussed that's why it's surprised me terribly that he decided to hold the meetings in Riad why Riad s you know Geneva yeah okay Riad because this is more than just a discussion of Ukraine this is the discussion of the new world order in which new nations will emerge and other nations will decline attacking back to Russia then and of course a major oil producer itself what does the US want with Russia going forward nothing economic relations look the Cold War didn't end with the fall of the Communists Russia remained Russia and was trying to reassert itself without the ideology of Communism but with the power of Russia having demonstrated that Russia's power is limited but still there in some form Russia Now does not represent a threat we formed NATO for one reason Russia was a threat if Russia is not a military threat the NATO is IR relevant Europe is different so the war there and the war in the midle East changed an understanding in the International System the idea that Russia is a fixed figure as a threat declined the American perception of the world changed as a result the European perception of the world did not they did not realize that the Russian threat the Cold War ended in Ukraine in Ukraine Russia demonstrated his limits and so the organizations the concepts that were built around the Cold War are not there anymore conceptions Die Hard Trump for all its bizarreness grasped that and he wanted to construct a new world stable order in which the United States and Russia have no real re what what do we want for each other Russia wanted Europe it failed to get Europe let's do business uh Saudi Arabia doesn't care about Israel so why you supporting these Palestinian movements let's do business Trump is trying to reform the world around reality the world is not yet accepted as a new reality so everything seems obscene to them Israelis will go crazy by the way oh yeah I I would certainly expect that unconscious of time George so to finish I want to we could talk about Israel on a whole another podcast in that sense I think but we want to talk about China to wrap up in particular obviously the Trump Administration sees China as the main threat to the US you've written as well though that uh China's far far from being well is is not what you would consider a great power given what's going given what's going on with Russia giving what how the Trump Administration see this how does this impact China I mean some people have suggested that what's going on is that Nixon visits China moment but in Reverse I mean how do you see it well when Nixon went to Russia to China Russia attacked usuri River the border between Russia and China China and Russia have a very complex marriage their historic enemies bound together by an ideology which if anybody watched carefully X abandoned last week calling on that China did not invade Taiwan because they couldn't it takes 10 hours for landing craft to cross the Straits American satellites would have seen them submarines and missiles would have blocked it the Chinese n must control the Seas they don't otherwise they're fighting India or someone else the Chinese economy is in shambles and the major reason the Chinese rose was the United States American imports from China investment in China China must have those Investments some come from Europe but that's of the key so in a way the Chinese American confrontation ended when the US stopped investing and cut Investments and the Chinese have been loose now the Chinese were never really aligned with the Russians there was hostility between Russia and China always and the ukrainians did not endorse the E the Ukraine war in the United Nations they abstained did not vote for it didn't vote against it so we have to look at China as it is it is a vast country undergrow growing traditional stresses with a government that has failed to Surge the economy forward the economy is actually declining it's military is powerful in the region but not against the United States that's not going to happen so China is now terrified a Russian American anant is the worst thing that could possibly happen to China it's old enemy Russia back the SARS back in a way uh the Americans back what will they do well the Americans will do nothing we don't want to invade China the Russians don't want to invade China but now there's the possibility that China will reform internally and that was the signal sent when they said that it's the economic future of China to be a capitalist country it's the private sector will drive it so look everywhere for internal changes in their understanding of the world and external relations changing those who believe that this era any era is erectable the British Empire the sun cannot set on it well it's set and history goes on but at these moments people get nervous Music George uh I'm sitting in London and the Sun is setting and I think we better wrap it up there uh thank you very much for coming on the geopolitical Futures podcast I'm sitting in Texas where the sun is just Rising see you soon overly bye bye Music bye talking geopolitics is brought to you by geopolitical Futures your source for geopolitical forecast testing and Analysis Music”
The US does not want to be the leader of the world because leadership is costly and creates too much responsibility; the US was forced into leadership after WWII when the rest of the world was in shambles, but now other powers are capable of leadership.
“we don't want to be leaders of the world it costs too much it puts to responsibility we had to be leaders of the world because the rest of the world was in shambles now the Europeans can lead the world they can build an army they can build an economy they can might even build a nation you know European nation”
Saudi Arabia is the central player in the emerging geopolitical order because it is the most powerful nation in the Middle East, the real locus of ongoing great-power conflict and wars that threaten to engulf the US and other powers more than European issues do.
“the world is ignoring there's an other war going on in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs which threatens to draw in the United States and used to threaten to draw the Russians during the 1973 War it was a russian-american war now the Russian can't play the threat to take Gaza was insane it appeared but it really was the announcement this can't go on this region cannot every 5 10 years spasm the country that did not involve itself in this war in Middle East was the most powerful country it was Saudi Arabia”
China is now terrified of a US-Russia alignment because it eliminates China's historical strategy of playing off the two superpowers against each other, leaving it vulnerable to a two-front confrontation with enemies that historically have opposed Chinese expansion.
“China is now terrified a Russian American anant is the worst thing that could possibly happen to China it's old enemy Russia back the SARS back in a way uh the Americans back what will they do”
The US does not want to be the leader of the world because it costs too much responsibility; the US 'had to be' leader after WWII because the rest of the world was in shambles, but now the Europeans have the capacity to lead if they chose to, though they lack the will and ability to actually do so.
“we don't want to be leaders of the world it costs too much it puts to responsibility we had to be leaders of the world because the rest of the world was in shambles now the Europeans can lead the world they can build an army they can build an economy they can might even build a nation you know European nation but they can't lead”
The US threat to take Gaza is a bluff—the US will not actually occupy Gaza—but it is a negotiating tool to convince Saudi Arabia to accept leadership over Palestinian-Israeli relations and demonstrate that responsibility is required to lead in the Middle East.
“let Saudi Arabia be responsible for Gaza so the whole Gaza play was Bluff of course because these are negotiations and you Bluff we're going to take Gaza like crazy we're not GNA take Gaza we're telling the Saudis somebody's got to stop this”
Victor Orban in Hungary was historically close to Putin and Trump, and Budapest would have been the logical location for US-Russia negotiations, but the choice of Riyadh signals the negotiation is about more than Ukraine—it is about restructuring the entire global order including the Middle East.
“well Hungary would have been the logical place because Victor Orban was close to Putin close to Trump and I thought it would be in Budapest but the fact is the world is ignoring there's an other war going on in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs which threatens to draw in the United States”
Europe wants to participate in Ukraine but without taking casualties, making them irrelevant because military commitment requires accepting risks. The elite are committed to the post-Cold War order and feel morally superior because they don't have to 'dirty their hands' with the transition.
“the Poles May care but the great powers that are left the United States is the superpower truly this time and they Ecuador triggered this the affair...Europe they want to be in Ukraine but not take casualties therefore they're irrelevant they themselves IR relevant and much of the rest of the world feels morally Superior because they don't have to dirty their hands with the transition”
The concept of 'British sentiment' toward Ukraine is real but politically toothless; sentiment is not sufficient to mobilize Britain's substantial military resources, proving that in reality 'money talks and excrement works'—i.e., material interests override moral sentiment.
“does it really matter to Britain what happens to Ukraine I I think it doesn't the sense of being someone who's settting in London I think that there is a significant sentiment towards Ukraine here has been since since the war started yes but there not enough sentiment to mobilize the British army which is substantial the British Navy which still matters and go to war so money talks and extra War”
The United States is not trying to see the world differently; rather, the world itself has objectively changed, and the US is responding to that changed reality rather than imposing ideological preferences on it.
“the USA is not seeing the world differently the world is different and the US is taking note of it”
The Trump administration likely views stopping the Middle East war as more strategically important than settling Ukraine, because the Middle East is economically vital and the real source of global destabilization.
“the United States wants to stop the war in the Middle East perhaps more than it wants to stop the war Ukraine”
Xi Jinping's recent speech calling on the private sector to drive China's economic future represents an abandonment of communism and signals panic on the part of the Chinese government about economic stagnation.
“X made a speech last week saying that it is the private sector that must drive China essentially abandoning communism now that represents Panic on the part of China”
The US will not attempt to invade China nor will Russia, but both will now pressure China to undergo internal economic reform and regime change—China's response will be observable in further capitalist policy shifts.
“the Americans will do nothing we don't want to invade China the Russians don't want to invade China but now there's the possibility that China will reform internally and that was the signal sent when they said that it's the economic future of China to be a capitalist country it's the private sector will drive it so look everywhere for internal changes in their understanding of the world and external relations changing”
Trump did not invent the Abraham Accords—the question is whether they will be expanded into a NATO-like framework for the Middle East that includes Saudi Arabia and focuses on stabilizing the region.
“Saudi Arabia is part of the Abraham Alliance which by the way Trump invented and now aaban wants the War join and everything and he wants to create a nato in the place where NATO matters the Middle East not Europe now NATO would be very different and not the same so I just use that name”
European reluctance to accept that Russia can be engaged like Japan and Germany were after WWII reflects European denial about the changed nature of Russian power and inability to adapt to post-Cold War realities.
“the Europeans don't want the World to Change they're looking at the world and saying look not let's we're doing everything differently and say you can't make peace with Russia well if you can make peace with Germany you certainly can make peace with Russia”
What the US and Russia will do about China is nothing—neither wants to invade China—but the possibility that China will internally reform its understanding of the world is now present, signaled by China's announcement that private capitalism is its economic future.
“the Americans will do nothing we don't want to invade China the Russians don't want to invade China but now there's the possibility that China will reform internally and that was the signal sent when they said that it's the economic future of China to be a capitalist country it's the private sector will drive it”
The British are not willing to mobilize their army and navy to go to war over Ukraine; sentiment in Britain toward Ukraine exists but is insufficient to generate military commitment, confirming the realist principle that 'money talks and excrement works'—material interest governs behavior.
“I think it doesn't the sense of being someone who's settting in London I think that there is a significant sentiment towards Ukraine here has been since since the war started yes but there not enough sentiment to mobilize the British army which is substantial the British Navy which still matters and go to war so money talks and extra War”
The US wants nothing economically from Russia going forward; economic relations are irrelevant. The US formed NATO because Russia was a military threat; now that Russia is not a military threat, NATO is irrelevant.
“what does the US want with Russia going forward nothing economic relations look the Cold War didn't end with the fall of the Communists Russia remained Russia and was trying to reassert itself without the ideology of Communism but with the power of Russia...Russia Now does not represent a threat we formed NATO for one reason Russia was a threat if Russia is not a military threat the NATO is IR relevant”
Hungary would have been the logical location for Russia-US negotiations because Victor Orban is close to both Putin and Trump, but the summit location in Riyadh indicates the focus is on larger issues than just Europe.
“Hungary would have been the logical place because Victor Orban was close to Putin close to Trump and I thought it would be in Budapest but the fact is the world is ignoring”
Wars end in victory or stalemate followed by renegotiation; they do not end through negotiations aimed at compromise. The US recognized the Ukraine war was a stalemate, so the correct strategy is to shift focus to other priorities—not to continue supplying Ukraine indefinitely.
“Wars end in Victory not negotiations or in stalemate and not nego and negotiations what the US realized this war was a stalemate the Russians were not going to overrun Ukraine Ukraine could not defeat”
Geopolitical outcomes are determined by power and what nations can do, not by morality or ethical preference; Ukraine is a victim of geopolitical change, like Vietnam, where nations are sacrificed when the international system reorganizes itself.
“is the fate of Ukraine then a matter of geopolitics at its most fundamental neutral core history is ruthless it's not filled with pity individuals are the consequences of geopolitics is power it is not what you want to do or what you think is moral is what you must do and what you can do and so in this particular case as in many cases where nations were victimized by geopolitics like Vietnam which we fought not because we cared about Vietnam but because we wanted to stop communism and signal that we would not stop at anything to do it so there are victims when systems change and mercilessly Ukraine is the”
The US has no meaningful economic interests in Russia; Cold War economic relationships are not relevant because the Cold War ideological premise is gone, and the only basis for US-Russia relations now is strategic necessity.
“what do we want with Russia going forward nothing economic relations look the Cold War didn't end with the fall of the Communists Russia remained Russia and was trying to reassert itself without the ideology of Communism but with the power of Russia”
Empires end (British Empire) and historical continuity is not guaranteed—eras that seem permanent (like the post-WWII order) end and successor systems emerge.
“those who believe that this era any era is erectable the British Empire the sun cannot set on it well it's set and history goes on but at these moments people get nervous”
Saudi Arabia has no interest in supporting Palestinian movements and will abandon this concern to accommodate Israeli interests if compensated with regional dominance sponsorship from the United States.
“Saudi Arabia doesn't care about Israel so why you supporting these Palestinian movements let's do business”
Ukraine will likely end in a division where some Ukrainian territory remains independent while Russian forces occupy portions, with European nations providing monitoring forces to prevent Russian further advances but unwilling to fight major battles.
“and I suppose it will end with a division of Ukraine of Ukraine in some way uh some forces in Ukraine and you know will send British forces to monitor the borders and fight any Russian intrusions take casualties”
People are appalled and cannot understand the shift from the old norms (friendship with Russia, Germany, Japan) because they are accustomed to the Cold War categories and have not yet accepted that the world has objectively changed.
“so we are in the period where people are appalled because it's not what they used to and all countries are going through this...people cannot understand change they keep the pieces on the chessboard with the same power the same thing but in geopolitics power changes”
American presidents are always loathed at all times because division and money-based politics ('money talks and excrement works') is the foundation of American democracy; therefore, Trump's unpopularity is not exceptional—it reflects the structure of American politics.
“American presidents are always loathed at all times that is the foundation of American democracy the division so there's the wording In America which is essentially money talks and excrement works if I may put it that way”
The British are panicking because they have lost their American friends and are now uncertain what role Britain plays in a world where the US is no longer underwriting European security.
“the English British are certainly thinking what happened to our American friends they know what happened to the French friends but what Germany now do they all the old questions are rising but the new questions aren't being faced”