What this covers

This is an April 15, 2020 interview in which a Convergent Trading host questions Jeff Snider of Alhambra Investment Partners about how the repo market works and why it matters for equities. It starts with mechanics. A cash lender cares less about the borrower's credit than about how easily the posted collateral can be sold, which is why Treasuries carry haircuts of around 2% and junk corporate bonds something closer to 7%. From there it moves to the 2007-2008 crisis, the March 2020 stock selloff, hedge fund involvement, global repo, and a closing Q&A.

The historical argument is the most contested part. Snider treats 2008 as a collapse of wholesale funding, with subprime securitization as the vehicle rather than the cause. He says there were two dollar shortages that year, separated by an apparent calm between Bear Stearns and Lehman, and he sees the same calm after March 2020. He reads the daily stock losses of February and March as the result of morning collateral calls forcing sales to raise Treasury bills. He also claims that Fed repo operations only supply bank reserves and so miss a collateral problem, that balance sheet expansion trails private-sector deficits, and that monetary scholarship effectively ended decades ago, leaving central banks signaling federal funds rates.

The wider range covers plumbing and geography. He explains how hedge funds usually pledge assets to a dealer bank that repledges them, which builds leverage through reuse, and he discusses rehypothecation and the spikes in repo fails. He describes a global dollar system) in which most activity happens offshore. As an example of collateral transformation, he describes Argentina turning eurobonds into Treasury collateral through securities lending. He compares today's junk-bond exposure to the mortgage collateral of 2007-2008. He also argues that other forward-looking markets are pricing a second-wave risk that equities are ignoring.

Sharpest takeaway

Snider argues the repo market's collateral system, not cash liquidity, is the critical mechanism of the global dollar system, and widespread collateral transformation and rehypothecation create fragile interconnections that the Federal Reserve fundamentally misunderstands, leading to ineffective policy responses to dollar shortages.

  • Repo market breakdown in 2007-2008 and March 2020 was driven by collateral shortages and haircut adjustments, not cash insufficiency
  • Federal Reserve operates with a 1950s view of monetary policy, treating dollar shortages as cash problems when they are collateral problems
  • Collateral transformation, repledging, and rehypothecation create a shadow money system that multiplies leverage and failure points across global financial markets

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0.78

In February-March 2020, every morning collateral calls forced cash borrowers to secure Treasury bills (the most liquid collateral), causing daily asset fire sales across risky markets including stocks; six days of severe stock market losses corresponded directly with daily Treasury bill liquidity crises driven by collateral calls and unwinding repo transactions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“every morning as the repo yesterday's repo transactions were on being unwound collateral calls were happening you'd see the markets hi everybody just pile into Treasury bills and those who are unable to secure Treasury bills they had to fire sale their assets and so that's what happened over was a six days this the six worst days in the US stock market or back in February March as I've shown you here you saw the same thing every day you've got everybody piling into Treasury bills which was the collateral call or the tell-tale sign and indirect sign the collateral call and liquidations across all of these markets including stocks”

0.78

Fed repo operations during crises are not true repo transactions but rather mimicked repo where the Fed provides bank reserves (cash) to primary dealers, but they do not address the underlying problem (collateral shortage) and have minimal impact because participants without acceptable collateral cannot bid.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“these repo operations aren't actually repo operations they're just called repo operations because the Fed is mimicking a repo transaction with the primary dealers so that's that's number one number two what it's doing is has nothing to do with what the Fed is doing has nothing to do with the collateral side of things which is why these repro operations ended up not doing what any good in fact during the worst parts of the crisis you saw zero bids for the feds repo operations because nobody had any collateral to post”

0.78

The Fed expanding its balance sheet is a sign that the monetary system is already in a massive deficit, meaning the Fed is always behind the curve and expanding balance sheet only because the private system is already deficient; the deficit precedes Fed action, not the reverse.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“when you see the Fed expand its balance sheet or any central bank including the Bank of Japan or ECB or anybody when they're expanding their balance sheet it's because the monetary system itself is already in a massive deficit so even if we counted the feds bent a bank reserves and money printing as money printing they're already behind the curve because the deficit is already preceding that what the Fed is doing”

0.78

The 2007-2008 financial crisis was fundamentally about a breakdown in the repo market's collateral side, not about subprime mortgages per se; subprime MBS were the vehicle through which collateral quality collapsed, but the real failure was wholesale funding market collapse.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“everybody thought 2007-2008 the great financial crisis was about subprime mortgages when in real life excuse me when in reality it was a breakdown of the repo market”

0.78

The modern global monetary system evolved over 50+ years without the Federal Reserve's guidance or understanding; central banks did not construct this system, and it now operates largely outside their direct control or awareness.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“the monetary system this whole say a way of doing things and in fact the fact that it goes throughout the rest of the globe the monetary system evolved without the Federal Reserve behind it the Federal Reserve is nothing more than a domestic bank Authority yet everybody thinks it's think of it as a central bank”

0.74

In practice, many hedge funds do not directly participate in repo markets themselves but instead pledge collateral to dealer banks, which custody those securities and often repledge them into the repo market on behalf of the hedge fund, removing the ultimate owner one step away from the marketplace and creating leverage through collateral reuse.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“so what it will do is it will contract with a dealer bank who does operate in the repo market and it will pledge it's five hundred ten dollars and 20 cents in US Treasuries to the dealer bank now what the dealer bank will do is custody those Treasuries and perform all sorts of custodial operations on behalf of the hedge fund but by and large oftentimes what happens is the dealer bank will offer also offer a better rate for funding these this portfolio of securities because if the hedge fund allows the dealer bank to repledge those same securities into the repo market so that's what ends up happening a lot of cases”

0.74

The repo market and wholesale dollar funding mechanisms are not primarily domestic but rather global, with most repo activity and dollar transactions occurring outside US boundaries through global banks, governments, and foreign financial institutions, creating systemic vulnerabilities across the entire global dollar system.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“this repo market in u.s. dollars this interbank wholesale funding mechanism actually is a global marketplace and most of it takes place outside the US u.s. boundary so you have this you have all these global financial participants whether they're global banks global governments local foreign overseas banks all of these people that are that are transacting in this this wholesale marketplace to fund these various positions and financial goals and financial aims”

0.72

Monetary scholarship ended in the 1970s-1980s; central banks stopped being able to define money and therefore adopted a 'puppet show' approach of signaling federal funds rates to banks rather than directly controlling monetary supply, which has been ineffective in managing systemic crises.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“monetary scholarship ended really in the 1970s and 1980s and for 20 years everybody thought well Alan Greenspan boosts the federal funds rate around a quarter point here and there that must be everything there is to know about money when in fact Alan Greenspan admitted throughout the 1990s the reason they did that was because back in the 70s they could no longer define money at all so therefore if your central bank how do you operate monetary policy where you can't even define money well they came up with what was essentially a magic trick or as I call it a puppet show they moved the federal funds rate around and said well well signal to banks what we think they should be doing and we'll let the bank's sort out the details inside the monetary system”

0.71

Securitization in the housing crisis was designed to create repo-eligible collateral; the origination of RMBS and MBS was driven by a desire to maximize leverage through the cheapest form of funding available (overnight repo), necessitating the creation of liquid markets for those securities.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“you've got the point exactly in fact the hold that's the whole point behind securitization in the first place was to create a repo level security because we're really talking about is funding leveraged what is the cheapest form of funding one of the things that probably should have gone over back at the beginning from look from the cash borrower side the reason you want to do and on a secured loan rather than an unsecured loan is that a secured loan is a cheaper loan because if you're putting up securities anybody knows who borrows using collateral you're gonna be giving a better rate because it's perceived to be much safer from the perspective of the cash lender so if you're doing overnight repo it is the absolute cheapest form of funding imaginable and so if you're getting it to you know RMBS and subprime mortgages even prime mortgages back during the housing bubble era that's exactly what was going on everybody wanted the maximum amount of leverage possible which meant you had to create securities in a liquid market for those securities so that way they would become acceptable repo collateral”

0.69

The reason the spreads between repo rates and Treasury rates are not massive (despite the apparent leverage and risk) is that the volume of transactions is so large (trillions of dollars) that even tiny spreads generate profitable revenue for dealer banks.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“the spreads here are not massive they're not huge and so that's why you see Morgan Stanley you're half a trillion and repledge collateral because on the cash side because Morgan Stanley's also lending cash into the repo market they have to do a large volume of transactions to make it economical”

0.69

Similar collateral transformation and leverage problems exist today with corporate bonds, particularly junk corporate bonds, as existed in 2007-2008 with mortgage-backed securities; the same systemic vulnerabilities persist with different collateral.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“unfortunately not a lot was learned from episode in a lot of ways we have the same faults we have the same potential failure points except we're no longer talking about you know subprime mortgages now we're talking about corporates and junk corporate bonds it's really kind of the same process”

0.69

In 2008, there were two separate banking crises or dollar shortages, not one; between Bear Stearns (March 2008) and Lehman/AIG (September 2008) there was a period of apparent calm where it looked like the Fed's interventions had fixed the problem, but underneath the rot was worsening, just as the situation appears today after March 2020.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“in fact that's what we saw in 2008 it wasn't actually one banking crisis or dollar shortage there were two of them and in between them there was a period of calm very much like today where everybody thought well the Fed printed a bunch of money and everything's fine and everything's fixed between the time Bear Stearns failed in the summer of 2008 it really did look like things were moving in the right direction at least at least on the surface or outwardly when in fact when he looked underneath the rot was getting more rotten everything was going in the wrong direction”

0.68

The Federal Reserve has a 1950s-era understanding of monetary policy and operates with a view that the monetary system is primarily domestic and cash-based; this outdated mental model led it to misdiagnose the March 2020 crisis as a cash shortage rather than a collateral shortage.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“the Fed is you know the Fed is you have to understand way behind the monetary curve they have a 1950s view of the monetary system”

0.68

Rehypothecation is when a dealer bank uses collateral pledged by a client both to secure funding for that client AND to fund the bank's own proprietary activities, effectively creating additional collateral out of thin air; this practice was particularly problematic in 2008-2009 and remains controversial as to whether it occurs systematically today.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“now this is kind of a controversial subject so I'm not going to spend too much time on it all over hi provocation is is something like double dipping so the dealer Bank is using those pledged Treasuries on behalf of the hedge fund to borrow funds from the repo market to fund the hedge funds positions what rehypothecation says is that they'll also use those treasures to fund some of their own activities and so they're sort of like recreating or creating additional Treasuries out of thin air now again it's a controversial subject some people claim it doesn't happen I tend to believe it happens more than people want to think and it was a big problem back in 2008 and 2009”

0.68

US Treasury bonds, notes, and bills are the most pristine form of collateral in repo markets because they have essentially no credit risk; haircuts on Treasuries are very low (around 2%) because the market for Treasuries is deep and liquid and prices are highly predictable on a daily basis.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“the most pristine form of collateral the one that's best that's most widely accepted on the most reasonable terms are US Treasury bonds US Treasury notes and actually US Treasury bills the reason is because there's basically no credit risk I know people will argue with that point and say that the government is especially lately is doing everything you possibly can to create credit risk by you know borrowing as much as it possibly can but as far as the market is concerned these these large governments are Treasury bonds and Treasury notes and especially Treasury bills are essentially free of credit risk”

0.66

When collateral transformation and securities lending haircuts increase during stress, borrowers seeking alternative collateral face the same constraints as direct repo borrowers; increased haircuts on the transformation channel cannot rescue borrowers experiencing collateral calls because dealers are equally risk-averse on both channels.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“it might go through the the other channel which is through the transformation which means it'll increase the amount of it depends upon the dealer Bank for collateral transformation which also depends upon the insurance company being willing to lend US Treasuries to the dealer bank and usually in that situation what happens is the haircuts applied in the transformation to because the dealer bank isn't stupid either and it understands the risks of what's going on in the corporate junk and junk our market”

0.66

Money market funds are probably the largest cash lenders in the repo market and are critical participants, along with insurance companies, pension funds, and hedge funds, making the repo market dependent on the liquidity provision of shadow banking and non-bank financial institutions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“any of the big dealer banks some of the hedge funds do their own repos we'll get into on our own I mean insurance companies money market funds money market funds are a big cash lender in the repo market in fact the probably the largest cash lender there's all sorts of these you know shadow bank players that that are really responsible for how the repo market operates”

0.66

Repo fails, where collateral or cash is not returned as expected, are hundreds of billions of dollars every week and represent a normal part of the marketplace, not a warning sign; however, in stress periods repo fails spike to trillions (5 trillion in Sept-Oct 2008), indicating complete collateral system shutdown.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“there are repo defaults that are absolutely regular I mean we're talking about hundreds of billions of reap where to call repo fails that take place every week every week it's a natural part of the market where the collateral in the cash get all mixed up and screwed up... in September and October 2008 for example the level of repo fails got up into five trillion which meant that the collateral system is effectively just shut down”

0.65

In 2007-2008, every monetary program the Fed implemented failed because the Fed did not understand that the crisis was a global dollar system collapse, not a domestic dollar system problem, and the global nature of the dollar system was not addressed.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“that ain't gonna work I mean 2007-2008 we get a breakdown in the repo market and there's nothing to fight can do about it that's why every every monetary program that they came up with in that time period none of it worked we had a global financial crisis now by the way it's a global financial crisis this is a global dollar system not a domestic dollar system so to get back to your question”

0.64

Haircuts vary by asset class based on liquidity characteristics: junk corporate bonds might have 7% haircuts while US Treasuries have 2% haircuts, because corporate junk markets can move more overnight and may become harder to liquidate, so cash lenders demand more over-collateralization to protect against losses from forced sales.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“the care cuts are going to be different for every asset class because again what we care about is the liquidity profile of the collateral that's being posted so for my example here if you're trying to post instead of US Treasury some form of corporate junk bond or even just a corporate bond of even investment grade the haircuts going to be a little bit higher it's gonna be adjusted based on the perceived liquidity profile of the collateral that's being added so for you know my hypothetical stylized example here if you're trying to use junk corporates instead of US Treasuries let's say the haircuts seven percent”

0.61

The Federal Reserve's own Open Market Committee minutes acknowledged that in March 2020 there was a problem in the Treasury market with the distinction between on-the-run and off-the-run collateral, indicating that even the Fed recognized collateral bifurcation was occurring.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“it even got to be a point you were so bad as I as I pointed out before where the Treasury market itself became bifurcated as to what was acceptable collateral that even the people in the Federal Reserve the Federal Open Market Committee minutes make mentions of how there was a problem in the Treasury market in terms of this distinction on the run and office Iran and if the Federal Reserve figures out that there's a problem in this distinct it with this distinction you know it must have been bad”

0.59

The stock market is much more enthusiastic about recovery prospects than other forward-looking markets (bond markets, futures, WTI oil, yield curves), which are signaling that the risk of a second wave of crisis is very high.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“the stock market is much more enthusiastic about the prospects of it being over where as you look at the bond market you're at all the futures other kinds of markets out there you sure's curve for example WTI they're all saying that no the risk of a second wave coming are really really high”

0.56

Argentina's government and local banks sought US dollars by floating eurobonds (offshore US dollar-denominated debt), then used those eurobonds as collateral for dealer banks to transform into US Treasuries through securities lending, allowing Argentina to access the global dollar repo market by disguising risky Argentine debt as pristine Treasury collateral.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“the governor of Argentina intends to raise US dollars so it goes to a local Argentinian bank and says we want you to raise US dollars on their behalf by floating a euro baht in the government the Argentinian Bank which I denote as Bank a will use those real euro bonds in the euro bond is simply an offshore US dollar denominated debt so the Argentine Bank a uses the euro bond as collateral to transform it with global dealer Bank B which is the same as the hedge fund examples we used before where the dealer Bank contacts with the insurance company to borrow US Treasuries so that argentine bank a can then have US Treasuries to pledge in the in the in the global US dollar repo market so from the perspective of the repo market all it sees is that there's US Treasuries being pledged when in fact there are these very risky argentine eurobonds that are below the surface or behind the scenes or in the shadows that are infecting and multiplying the collateral part of the system globally”

0.53

In repo markets, the cash lender's primary concern is not the credit quality of the borrower or collateral but rather the liquidity characteristics of the collateral being posted, because the cash lender must be able to sell that collateral on the market to recover cash in case of borrower default.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“however when you're when you're when you're a cash lender in the repo market and you're putting up you're getting security and return financial securities in return for lending cash that creates some other factors that you have to consider primarily the biggest one is the security itself... you have to be aware of the liquidity characteristics of the collateral you're accepting in fact this is the the biggest factor this is the you know the primarily the thing that drives the repo market more than anything is the liquidity characteristics of the collateral”

0.53

Gold price crashes during collateral crises occur because leveraged repo participants turn to gold as collateral of last resort, depressing gold prices as it is liquidated; conversely, as collateral pressure eases (past seasonal bottlenecks), gold prices can skyrocket.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“what I saw up until the middle of March was that created a heightened pressure and what was already a bad situation but once the system got past that collateral that that calendar seasonal low point things started to loosen up so that's why you've seen gold be able to skyrocket because gold is also a one of the things that leveraged participants in the repo market turned to is sort of a collateral of last resort and that depresses the price of gold as it's being used which is why our everyday you saw those fire sale liquidations gold would go down as TV bill prices went up”

0.49

Resolving the dollar shortage crisis requires first conducting an exhaustive study of the actual structure of the global dollar system, including collateral transformation mechanics and exotic derivatives, to understand the system's true size and failure points before any meaningful policy solutions can be developed.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“the first thing we got to do is we kind of catch yourself back up to where the monetary system was ten years ago let alone start to figure out where we can go from here we need more information what I'm trying to say we need to we need an actual exhaustive sample and study of the way the system actually works to go into the nitty-gritty details which I didn't do in this presentation behind all of this collateral transformation stuff all of this weird and exotic derivatives that take place that count as money in the modern monetary system only then when we have a handle on how this thing really is and how big it is can we start to figure out where the failure points are where there really are and what to do about them”

0.45

Nothing has fundamentally changed in the collateral shortage since March 2020 except that the system passed through the seasonal quarter-end pressure point; the same vulnerability patterns remain and systemic risks are elevated.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“there's a tremendous risk moving forward of a repeat or a second wave of what would be global financial crisis number two in fact that's what we saw in 2008... we got past that but especially the collateral site of repo they remain and so there's a tremendous risk moving forward of a repeat or a second wave... we're I think in the same position where you know the stock market is much more enthusiastic”

0.45

Morgan Stanley alone had more than $500 billion in repledged collateral in recent 10-K filings, demonstrating that repledging of collateral is massive in scale and creates systemic leverage through collateral reuse across the wholesale funding system.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“I'm showing you here the last ten Q or 10k from Morgan Stanley just one of the dealer banks and they tell you that they had you know more than half a trillion half a trillion from one bank of Reap ledged collateral that was that was used in the repo market”

0.37

Fed repo operations accept any bid from primary dealers at the set rate and quantity, which means the Fed has de facto removed the interest rate price discovery mechanism in the repo market and is instead signaling unlimited willingness to supply bank reserves.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Convergence host

“New York Fed accepts all 11 point 1 billion in overnight repo bids backed by Treasuries at a stop out rate of 0.1 percent that sounds almost like a flight pattern codes or something you know can you can you describe what's happening here why I've noticed that whatever is being bid whatever amount dollar amounts being bid it seems to be 100 percent accepted by the Fed currently what what is that all about”

0.32

The federal funds market originated around 1920 when two banks in Cleveland or nearby resolved a reserve deficiency by exchanging checks, with one bank's check cleared immediately on reserves while the other's cleared the next day, establishing a wholesale market for banks to manage reserve requirements.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“back in 1920 you know this is whether this is an apocryphal story or not there was a couple banks I believe in Cleveland going off the top of my head where one bank was short of its reserve requirement for a day because you know customers in that Bank just you know more customers showed up to withdraw cash than they anticipated just through a regular course of business and they got together with another Bank on the other side of town or even across the street I think is the story I heard and they decided you know the bank across the street had excess reserves and they decided the way that they would clear the one banks deficiency was by exchanging checks”

0.29

The federal funds market collapsed during the Great Depression and 1930s-1940s but experienced a roaring comeback in the 1950s with a structural transformation: it shifted from purely managing reserve requirements to becoming a broader funding mechanism for all types of financial players, which created pressure to add collateral security to unsecured lending.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“this whole federal funds market and the idea of wholesale money kind of took a step back in fact it it practically disappeared in the 1930s in the nineteen forties because of the Great Depression the collapse in banking but made a roaring comeback in the 1950s but when it came back in the 1950s it had changed and it transformed a bit it was no longer strictly about banks trying to manage their reserve requirement Reserve profile it became a mechanism for all sorts of financial players to begin funding positions”