unsecured creditor
A lender or bondholder whose claim on a firm is not backed by specific collateral, so they bear more downside risk and are supposed to impose market discipline.
As defined in Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
Where it comes up · 1
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- The FDIC imposed haircuts on unsecured creditors in the Washington Mutual resolution while the Fed-facilitated Wachovia resolution repaid unsecured creditors fully on the same weekend, because the FDIC's statutory mandate is least-cost resolution to protect the Insurance Fund, whereas the Fed and Treasury operate under broad financial-stability mandates—showing that which regulator you call determines the outcome.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
- Protecting unsecured creditors at 100 cents on the dollar dilutes market discipline because unsecured creditors are the entities supposed to discipline risk-taking; they are rewarded doubly—earning a risk premium for lending to risky firms while being paid off by government in the bad state of nature—creating a 'heads I win, tails you lose' dynamic.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
- Crisis managers framed the choice as a false dichotomy—either the Fed wisely intervenes to provide liquidity or the system collapses into barter and chaos—which deliberately directs attention away from the middle options, such as providing direct sweeteners to JP Morgan without setting the precedent of lending to a non-bank, or imposing haircuts on unsecured creditors.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
- Bear Stearns was not bailed out in the sense of being saved as a firm—it was married off to JP Morgan and its equity holders took heavy losses—but its unsecured creditors, the people who care most about downside risk, were rescued at 100 cents on the dollar, sending a signal to the world that unsecured creditors need not be careful.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011
- Government intervention does not stop runs or speculation; instead, because the standard playbook is to protect unsecured creditors and wipe out equity, it hands investors a clear trade—short the equity and buy the unsecured debt of the next likely intervention target—so the very existence of a standing rescue blueprint invites speculation against the next weakest firm.Vincent Reinhart on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the Financial Crisis 03/28/2011