ultimatum game
A game-theory experiment in which one player proposes a split of money and the other can accept (both get the proposed amounts) or reject (both get nothing), used to study fairness and self-interest.
As defined in 189 | Brian Klaas on Power and the Temptation of Corruption
Other definitions
An experiment where one player proposes a split of money and the other can accept it or reject it, in which case both get nothing—used to study fairness and punishment.
Twenty Years of Freakonomics (with Stephen Dubner)
Where it comes up · 8
- 164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality3 claims
- Jordan Peterson | Hierarchies, Inequality, BIG 52 claims
- Chris Blattman on Why We Fight2 claims
- 128 | Joseph Henrich on the Weirdness of the West2 claims
- Joseph Henrich1 claim
- Twenty Years of Freakonomics (with Stephen Dubner)1 claim
- 189 | Brian Klaas on Power and the Temptation of Corruption1 claim
- 337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 13Search all claims for “ultimatum game” →
- Objections that ultimatum-game results are artifacts of trivial stakes are wrong: when poor farmers earning about $300 a month play for $900-1000, nothing changes—they still reject offers worth roughly a month's wages.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- In the ultimatum game, self-interest predicts the proposer offers one dollar and the responder accepts, but across societies worldwide (Boston, Palo Alto, Peruvian jungle, Mongolian highlands, African jungle) the most common offer is half, and offers of $3 or less are commonly rejected because responders derive more satisfaction from punishing unfairness than from the cash—demonstrating humans are not self-interested and like to hurt those who treat them unfairly.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- In a 16-country MacArthur-funded study, people took the values of their own society into laboratory games even under complete anonymity, behaving the same way they do in their societies; cooperative whale-hunting cultures like Lamalera even made 'hyper-fair' offers of $8 out of $10 and rejected offers that were too generous, proving that values genuinely matter.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- In the one-shot ultimatum game, industrialized and WEIRD populations show modal offers around 50% and frequently reject low offers, but mean offers range across societies from about 25% to near 50%; in some societies people will accept almost any positive offer, showing that fairness norms and willingness to punish unfairness are culturally variable rather than universal.128 | Joseph Henrich on the Weirdness of the West
- The Ultimatum Game shows that the bloodless-rationality prediction—that a proposer offers a penny and the responder accepts anything—fails because people sacrifice money to punish unfairness, and the willingness to do so scales with stakes (you might reject 30 of 100 but accept 3 million of 10 million), letting researchers quantify preferences for fairness and revenge.337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning
- Real field data, even small and hand-curated like the bagel man's, has value because it carries context, whereas decontextualized experimental data (e.g., a Dictator Game subject refusing money because the experimenter wore torn jeans) can be deeply misleading if the reason behind the recorded behavior is unknown.Twenty Years of Freakonomics (with Stephen Dubner)
- The reason people reject low offers in the ultimatum game is because they're playing a lifetime of iterative games, not a one-off game; the right strategy for lifetime trading is to not settle for less than 50%, which establishes reciprocal norms that benefit you long-term.Jordan Peterson | Hierarchies, Inequality, BIG 5
- In ultimatum-game experiments, normal people reach a breaking point around 70-30 and reject unfair offers out of a sense of justice, but psychopaths accept almost any offer because their response is anger without rejection — measured via skin conductance and FMRI — suggesting their willingness to act in pure self-interest helps them rise the corporate ladder where others refuse unfair deals on principle.189 | Brian Klaas on Power and the Temptation of Corruption
- In the ultimatum game, the classical economist's prediction is that the receiver should accept any amount because getting something is better than nothing; however, across cultures, people typically offer approximately 50% and reject low offers (poor people are more likely to reject than wealthy people).Jordan Peterson | Hierarchies, Inequality, BIG 5
- The fourth cause of war is stable, arguably rational preferences for things not captured in the material pie—status, vengeance, ideals, dignity, the extermination of a competing identity—and pursuing these is not irrational, just as a homeowner rationally rejecting a higher bid from a disrespectful buyer values dignity over money; when actors can only obtain such intangible goods through violence, it hijacks the normal incentive toward peace.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight