transitivity of preferences
An axiom of rational choice stating that if you prefer A to B and B to C, you must prefer A to C, so preferences do not form circles.
As defined in 94 | Stuart Russell on Making Artificial Intelligence Compatible with Humans
Other definitions
A basic axiom in rational choice theory stating that if you prefer A to B and B to C, then you must prefer A to C; violation of this is considered irrational, though Taleb argues nature intentionally violates it for evolutionary reasons
Nassim Taleb — Meditations on Extremistan
Where it comes up · 2
- Nassim Taleb — Meditations on Extremistan2 claims
- 94 | Stuart Russell on Making Artificial Intelligence Compatible with Humans2 claims
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “transitivity of preferences” →
- The Von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem shows that from a set of hard-to-dispute axioms about rational preferences (such as transitivity, where intransitive preferences would let someone money-pump you in a circle), it follows that a rational agent's behavior can be described as if it is maximizing a utility function—though the agent need not actually perform any such calculation, as with the reflexive eye-blink that protects the eye without any expected-utility computation.94 | Stuart Russell on Making Artificial Intelligence Compatible with Humans
- Behavioral economics' claim that preferences violate transitivity (you prefer apples to pies, pies to bananas, but bananas to apples) is not evidence of irrationality, but rather evidence that nature evolved preference cycling to encourage dietary variation and reduce stress on the environment, making cyclic preferences evolutionarily rational and survival-optimal.Nassim Taleb — Meditations on Extremistan
- Transitivity of preferences (if I prefer A to B and B to C, I should prefer A to C) is not a necessary criterion for rationality; nature may randomize preferences to protect itself and reduce stress on the environment, making preference cycles optimal from a survival standpoint.Nassim Taleb — Meditations on Extremistan
- If human preferences are genuinely inconsistent—for example intransitive, going around in circles—then no AI system or any discipline could satisfy them, because whatever option is offered the person prefers another in an endless loop; the AI can still guarantee giving you some pizza rather than letting you starve, since you prefer some pizza to none.94 | Stuart Russell on Making Artificial Intelligence Compatible with Humans