time-consistency problem
The problem that a policy optimal when announced becomes tempting to abandon later—here, an unbacked-money issuer who promises stability has an incentive to renege and overissue for profit.
As defined in Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
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- Bitcoin's significance for a monetary constitution is that a publicly observable program predetermines the quantity path with no central authority able to change it, solving the time-consistency problem that haunts Hayek's proposed private unbacked currencies—the temptation of a profit-maximizing issuer, when nominal expansion is costless, to take a one-shot seignorage profit through hyperinflationary overissue.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
- The reason we have never seen private firms issuing unbacked money may not be legal prohibition (as Hayek thought) but the trust problem: a private issuer with no contractual commitment to keep purchasing power stable makes a profit on every additional unit issued, so there is a temptation to hyperinflate, and a model shows that one-shot profit looks nearly infinite—so users cannot trust the issuer, and people prefer commodity money.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions