the hard problem
Chalmers's term for the apparent difficulty of explaining why and how physical processing in the brain is accompanied by subjective experience at all, even after all functions are explained.
As defined in 168 | Anil Seth on Emergence, Information, and Consciousness
Where it comes up · 5
- Micheal Pollan On The Mystery Of Consciousness.5 claims
- 168 | Anil Seth on Emergence, Information, and Consciousness4 claims
- 113 - Consciousness And The Self2 claims
- 339 | Ned Block on Whether Consciousness Requires Biology2 claims
- AMA | May 20251 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 14Search all claims for “the hard problem” →
- Many Worlds and panpsychism share a structural appeal: Many Worlds avoids hidden variables and observers (just Schrödinger), while panpsychism's 'consciousness all the way down' avoids dualism and arbitrary brain-complexity justifications (just experience), suggesting fundamental consciousness might be the cost of explaining the hard problem just as branching universes is the cost of Many Worlds.AMA | May 2025
- Even granting that philosophical zombies are nomologically and conceptually impossible, the hard problem retains force for Harris because explanations of consciousness do not seem to promise the same intuitive closure as other scientific explanations: everything about life except conscious experience can be defined in extrinsic functional relations among parts, but adding 'there is something it is like to be this process' appears to be a brute correlation rather than an illuminating explanation.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- Conceivability arguments for philosophical zombies are weak because the more we understand about how a brain or system actually works (the easy problem), the harder it becomes to genuinely conceive of a functionally identical system with no experience — analogous to how the more one learns about aerodynamics, the harder it is to imagine a 747 flying backwards.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- Before concluding that consciousness cannot arise from neural activity, we must exhaust the possibilities of what very complicated systems of billions of neurons can do under sufficiently rich interpretation; the hard-problem intuition that you'll never reach consciousness by thinking about neurons may simply reflect our not yet having learned to think about all the things complex neural systems can do.168 | Anil Seth on Emergence, Information, and Consciousness
- Block holds that expanding one's ontology does not help solve the hard problem: dualism merely introduces mystery or religion without solving it, and panpsychism just replaces the hard problem with the combination problem of how many slightly-conscious things combine into a unified conscious human.339 | Ned Block on Whether Consciousness Requires Biology
- The hard problem of consciousness is often framed as an issue of subjectivity—the subjective first-person nature of experience—which third-person objective science cannot access; but if consciousness can exist without a self, then subjectivity is not essential to consciousness, making the problem potentially more tractable by removing the 'subject' requirement.Micheal Pollan On The Mystery Of Consciousness.
- Dave Chalmers reframed the hard problem by asking 'how does the water of brain chemistry turn into the wine of consciousness,' but the more fundamental question should be 'if at all'—asking whether the transition is possible rather than presuming it and asking how.Micheal Pollan On The Mystery Of Consciousness.
- Panpsychism is an easy get-out that just builds consciousness in from the ground up rather than explaining it, and idealism is just as bad, merely inverting the problem into how you get matter from mind; the better move is to start practically from the fact that conscious experiences exist and try to relate them to objective physical reality.168 | Anil Seth on Emergence, Information, and Consciousness
- The likely route to progress on the hard problem of consciousness is to focus on the easy problems; accumulating enough information about the easy problems may eventually trigger an idea about the hard problem, though solving it will ultimately require some real breakthrough.339 | Ned Block on Whether Consciousness Requires Biology
- Rather than attacking the hard problem head-on, the 'real problem' approach explains why conscious experiences are the way they are in terms of mechanisms in brains and bodies, with the expectation that the deep metaphysical hows and whys will become less mysterious—analogous to how the mystery of life dissolved once people explained how living systems work.168 | Anil Seth on Emergence, Information, and Consciousness