the Vienna Circle
Group of logical positivist philosophers and philosophers of science centered in Vienna in the 1920s-1930s (including Carnap, Schlick, Ayer, Wittgenstein); they developed strict versions of positivism emphasizing logical analysis and the elimination of metaphysics.
As defined in Comte and the Origins of Sociology
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- The problems of method (unifying the sciences around one common method and object of inquiry) and the elimination of metaphysics are among the most important tendencies in the philosophy of science since Comte, notably in the Vienna Circle's concept of unified science.Comte and the Origins of Sociology
- Unlike later Vienna Circle reductionists, Comte does not reduce all disciplines to physics; rather, he holds that each discipline must develop its own canons of reasoning and procedures for developing legitimate knowledge, though all study the same reality and have logical and ontological divisions corresponding to natural kinds.Comte and the Origins of Sociology
- The Vienna Circle's positivists (Schlick, Carnap, Ayer) are the Achilles heel of naturalism and positivism regarding their moral theory; Schlick's book on the problems of morality from a positivist perspective is unconvincing, uninspiring, and represents the weakness of naturalistic approaches to philosophy.Comte and the Origins of Sociology