substrate-independence thesis
The view that consciousness depends on the structure of a computation being performed rather than on any specific physical material such as carbon.
As defined in 111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 2 of 2Search all claims for “substrate-independence thesis” →
- An ancestor-simulation need not reproduce every microscopic detail or serve as a perfect predictive model; the success criterion is only that an embedded mind couldn't tell from the inside whether it was simulated, which would require capturing mental phenomena at a computational level (e.g. neurons and synapses represented by modestly sized vectors) rather than tracking every atom—making atomic-resolution simulation vast overkill.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation
- The simulation argument assumes substrate independence—the thesis, widely held among philosophers of mind, computer scientists, and physicists, that consciousness depends not on a specific material like carbon but on a certain structure of computation being performed—so a sufficiently faithful computational simulation of a brain would be conscious.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation