social rationality
Gintis's term for moral, group-oriented choices that go beyond individual self-interested rationality, such as voting for the good of society or one's group.
As defined in 164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
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- A Kantian equilibrium is a moral equilibrium where each chooses the strategy that, if everyone chose it, would make everyone best off; voting exemplifies it because no rational self-interested or even altruistic actor should vote (no large election has ever been decided by one vote), yet people vote and care, obeying a deep moral principle—'behave so that if everybody behaved that way we'd all be better off'—without even knowing they obey it.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- Treating voters as self-interested is inconsistent because a self-interested person would not vote at all; voting for your social group—e.g., a union member voting the union line—is a form of social rationality, not selfishness.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- Humans uniquely evolved both a private persona—going about daily business without evaluating the impact on the wider world—and a public persona that enters a Kantian frame to judge what is right, who to support, and what values to accept, supporting social rationality rather than individual rationality; people switch between these, and crucially humans can act on the rules of the game, not just play within them.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality