self-locating probability
The probability assigned to where (which branch or copy) you are located, central to deriving the Born rule in many-worlds.
As defined in AMA | December 2020
Where it comes up · 2
- 36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds4 claims
- AMA | December 20201 claim
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- The doomsday argument fails because the assumption that we are typical observers within the population of all humans is a bad assumption; you should favor theories in which it is more likely that you specifically come into existence rather than weighting prior probabilities by the raw number of observers, which would create complications in many-worlds with differently-weighted branches.AMA | December 2020
- The crucial disanalogy that cripples Everettian probability is that self-locating probabilities attach not to physical configurations of the world but to where one finds oneself among identical branches; since all candidate probability theories agree completely on the physical configuration, no experiment can confirm or disconfirm them universally, leaving only an a priori argument that, if rejected, leaves physics with no empirical recourse.36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds
- The Sebens-Carroll approach proposes that during the interval after a measurement is completed but before the observer looks, the observer knows the physical state of the world completely yet is genuinely uncertain which branch they are now in, providing self-locating uncertainty into which ordinary chance can get a foothold.36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds
- The a priori principle of indifference — that perfect symmetry in one's epistemic situation between two possibilities requires assigning each 50% probability — is suspect because in classical statistical mechanics it is used to derive substantive empirical facts (like heat flowing from hot to cold bodies) seemingly for free from 'I have no clue,' when an equally symmetry-respecting and more honest response is simply to refuse to assign any probabilities at all.36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds
- When a branching experiment is repeated, there will always be a real branch whose observer saw frequencies confirming any given probabilistic theory; the only way an Everettian can claim a theory is confirmed is in a purely, irreducibly indexical sense ('confirmed for me'), and taking such irreducibly indexical facts into fundamental physics is metaphysically puzzling and undesirable since other interpretations solve the measurement problem without them.36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds