seignorage
The profit a money issuer gains from creating money at a cost below its face value—historically by debasing coins, modernly by issuing currency cheaply.
As defined in Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
Where it comes up · 1
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- Bitcoin's significance for a monetary constitution is that a publicly observable program predetermines the quantity path with no central authority able to change it, solving the time-consistency problem that haunts Hayek's proposed private unbacked currencies—the temptation of a profit-maximizing issuer, when nominal expansion is costless, to take a one-shot seignorage profit through hyperinflationary overissue.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
- The reason we have never seen private firms issuing unbacked money may not be legal prohibition (as Hayek thought) but the trust problem: a private issuer with no contractual commitment to keep purchasing power stable makes a profit on every additional unit issued, so there is a temptation to hyperinflate, and a model shows that one-shot profit looks nearly infinite—so users cannot trust the issuer, and people prefer commodity money.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
- Governments monopolized coinage not to improve quality but for a fiscal motive: the historical evidence shows governments notoriously debased coins while private mints had a good track record because their business depended on coins being reliable, and a monopoly with legal compulsion can debase without losing customers.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions
- In the Middle Ages and during wartimes, sometimes two-thirds of the sovereign's revenue came from the Mint—you could call in old coins, remove half the silver, reissue new coins, and thereby gain half the silver to spend.Lawrence H. White on Monetary Constitutions