relational contracts
Flexible contracts that grant discretion to those who possess local knowledge, rather than specifying every contingency, enabling efficient use of dispersed knowledge but inviting opportunism.
As defined in David Rose on the Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior
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- Contracts inevitably leave much unspecified because it is too costly to specify everything and impossible to anticipate every contingency, so at some point exchange depends either on trust or on unpleasant, costly legal action—meaning more trust improves outcomes by avoiding the complexities and costs of legal enforcement.David Rose on the Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior
- Third-degree opportunism occurs when a person with local knowledge knows of a profitable-but-not-most-profitable action that superiors cannot know about, and chooses the merely good-enough action; because no one else can know the optimal counterfactual, the cheater can never be caught, making this an inescapable problem that worsens as firms grow.David Rose on the Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior