reference class problem
The difficulty of specifying which set of observers (all life, only conscious beings, AIs, hive minds, etc.) you are supposed to be typical within when applying the principle of typicality.
As defined in 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
Where it comes up · 2
- L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation3 claims
- 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse2 claims
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- The principle of typicality (also called the principle of mediocrity or Copernican principle), holding that we should reason as if we are typical observers in some reference class, is more or less consensus among multiverse cosmologists, but Carroll argues it is not well-defined and not a good idea, partly because it is obviously false that he is a typical observer (most people lack podcasts) and partly because the reference class is undefined.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- Normally we fine-grain average-value evidence by imaginatively projecting how we would respond to a situation, but in transformative experiences this is impossible because we lack the experiential information needed to perform that projection, so we cannot fix the reference class or individualize the data.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- The reference class problem—knowing that evidence about others actually applies to people like you—takes on special significance in life-changing decisions because so many idiosyncratic variables beyond standard demographics matter, and because the high stakes mean getting the reference class wrong has severe consequences.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- The fact that college graduates earn more than non-graduates does not necessarily mean a non-graduate who enrolls will do as well economically, because the two populations are not the same—a classic selection problem in applying average evidence to an individual.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- Hartle and Srednicki proposed escaping the Boltzmann brain problem with a xerographic distribution that simply assigns zero probability to being a Boltzmann brain by fiat, declaring 'I am not one of them'; Carroll argues this is illegitimate cheating because there is no principled reason to exclude such observers, and a slightly more careful concept of the problem (Boltzmann yous, not Boltzmann brains) shows the distribution fails.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse