realism (in philosophy of science)
The epistemological position that scientific theories describe mind-independent reality and that entities postulated by successful theories (like electrons) actually exist, in contrast to anti-realism which treats theories as useful conventions without referential claims
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 76 Logical Positivism
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- G.E. Moore's influence on Ayer was significant not in terms of Moore's realism or phenomenalism but in Moore's emphasis on conceptual analysis rather than strictly logical analysis, which humanized the positivist approach by making it less rigidly tied to logical atomism.A History of Philosophy | 76 Logical Positivism
- Feyerabend adopts a conventionalist interpretation of science, arguing that scientific theories are merely conventional ways that scientists talk about things—an entirely relativistic view in which science does not tell us about reality (anti-realism in science).A History of Philosophy | 76 Logical Positivism