quasi-monopoly
A market structure in which a league or team faces little competition due to restricted entry and local territorial control, so incumbents face weak penalties for poor performance.
As defined in The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
Where it comes up · 1
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- Baseball's quasi-monopoly with restricted entry lets teams whose owners pursue non-winning goals, such as Al Davis using the Raiders for lawsuits or owners seeking stadium subsidies, persist, unlike in leagues with promotion and relegation where poor performers are replaced.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Owner approval is not the main barrier to a bad owner being replaced, since other owners would likely welcome a more aggrieved owner's replacement if the league's quality were not harmed; the restricted entry system, not the approval process, is the binding constraint.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Sports leagues face a tension between competition and protecting the monopoly: if all owners are sleepy and avoid competing for talent, the bidding for talent stays suppressed and owners benefit, but if the league is too sleepy it becomes boring and attendance falls across the league.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Russ Roberts challenged Sauer's claim that owner approval is the main constraint on sales: he argued that owners might like a mediocre, non-threatening owner because the league's voting members benefit, so the approval process may protect incumbents rather than block bad owners.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Changing owners in a sports franchise is hard because owners are in an exclusive club with non-monetary benefits, and owners must approve any sale, which restricts entry and reduces competitive pressure compared with normal businesses where a bad performer is driven out by a buyer.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006