problem of induction
The philosophical problem of justifying inferences from observed cases to general laws or future cases, central to discussions of Popper's philosophy of science.
As defined in Conversations With Tyler 2021 Retrospective
Where it comes up · 11
- 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real2 claims
- 76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature2 claims
- Conversations With Tyler 2021 Retrospective1 claim
- David Deutsch1 claim
- Jim Manzi on Knowledge, Policy, and Uncontrolled1 claim
- Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability1 claim
- 272 | Leslie Valiant on Learning and Educability in Computers and People1 claim
- 38 | Alan Lightman on Transcendence, Science, and a Naturalist's Sense of Meaning1 claim
and 3 more
Most important claims · 10 of 13Search all claims for “problem of induction” →
- Hume's problem of induction holds that extrapolating from limited data requires a background assumption that nature is uniform, but that assumption is itself an empirical claim; if every empirical claim must be backed by empirical data while the very process of substantiation presupposes uniformity, the justification runs in a circle, so induction cannot be grounded as rational reasoning—though we must do it anyway.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- The philosophical problem of induction, which goes back to the Greeks and which philosophers abandoned without resolving, has been solved by computer science in the specific, understandable sense in which the problem is meant—the PAC framework gives a rigorous meaning to when inductive generalization is justified.272 | Leslie Valiant on Learning and Educability in Computers and People
- Rather than Bayesianism being dressed-up induction, Popperian falsificationism is dressed-down Bayesianism: Bayes' rule is a mathematical theorem, and Bayesian reasoning assigns prior credences to propositions and updates them with data so credences never reach zero—solving Hume's problem of induction without claiming metaphysical certainty—whereas falsificationism is just a crude approximation that pretends to assign no credences when in reality we always implicitly do, favoring simpler theories with higher priors.AMA | September 2021
- Following Popper, there are no positive arguments for a conjecture and no authorities or justifications; an argument consists of a conjecture and a criticism — you advance a conjecture that lacks the flaws of opposing conjectures and remain ready to abandon it, never claiming something must be true because of an authority.David Deutsch
- Some philosophers like David Armstrong argue that unless laws possess genuine power or force, induction is irrational and we should expect nothing about the future beyond 'something will happen'; thus attributing real necessity to laws may provide a positive justification for extrapolation that mere regularity cannot.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- The assumption that the universe is lawful is better understood not as faith but as a prior probability in a Bayesian sense that could be updated if new data came in, which is a substantive difference from religious faith because most religious people would not allow their faith to be updated.38 | Alan Lightman on Transcendence, Science, and a Naturalist's Sense of Meaning
- Hume's problem of induction shows there is no way to proceed logically (by reason) from experience to the celebrated general theories of the Enlightenment such as Newton's, undercutting the Enlightenment idea that reason was the route to understanding nature.Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability
- There is an odd feature whereby Popperian philosophy, like Misesianism, attracts many dogmatists despite emphasizing fallibility and refutation; Deutsch defended Popper weakly, suggesting much hot air lies behind Popper and that even a sentence or two could have shown higher depth if it existed.Conversations With Tyler 2021 Retrospective
- Per Hume's problem of induction, we cannot rationally justify the expectation that the regular laws of physics will continue to hold, which can prompt a sense of surprise or gratitude at the apparent continuity of existence; nonetheless the predictive success of physics is not undermined by the absence of such a deductive justification.AMA | February 2024
- The hankering for a principled guarantee that the laws of physics will hold tomorrow as they did yesterday is essentially the desire to solve the problem of induction, and no such guarantee is available.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real