principal-agent problems
Situations where one party (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal) but has different incentives or information, creating the need for rules to align their interests.
As defined in Michael Munger on Obedience to the Unenforceable
Where it comes up · 2
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- Although religious belief itself may be a non-rational leap of faith, churches operate in a world of scarcity—a pastor has only 24 hours a day and limited monetary and volunteer resources—so they must make allocation decisions like any entrepreneur, making economic analysis applicable to religious organizations even if not to theology.Anthony Gill on Religion
- The principal-agent / mechanism-design view that we can simply design and impose a set of rules to optimize outcomes is probably wrong, because there is no unified 'we,' and we do not know enough to know the mapping from institutions into outcomes; we must instead rely on emergent norms (Buchanan's 'relatively absolute absolutes,' Smith's 'sense of propriety').Michael Munger on Obedience to the Unenforceable