potentialism
The view that the universe of mathematical objects is unfinished or incomplete — you can always have more objects but never a completed totality; recently generalized to be about unfinishedness rather than infinity specifically.
As defined in 282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 5 of 5Search all claims for “potentialism” →
- For millennia almost all mathematicians were explicitly potentialists about infinity (holding that you can always have more but never a completed totality), but around the late 19th century the consensus shifted so that nowadays almost all mathematicians are actualists who accept completed actual infinities, reversing the historical default.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- Galileo argued against the potentialist point of view by noting that a potentialist, in holding that infinitely many further things are always possible, is thereby committed to an actual infinity of possibilities — turning the potentialist's own position into a covert acceptance of actual infinity.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- The most recent work severs potentialism from infinity: the core idea of potentialism is that the universe of mathematical objects might be unfinished, not that it is infinite — even fragments with actual infinities inside them (e.g. chopping the cumulative set-theoretic hierarchy at a high ordinal) can be treated potentialistically, so potentialism is really about whether the universe is completed.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- There is a coherent non-standard form of potentialism in which not all smaller numbers are presupposed when you have a large number: because a typical number less than a googolplex has about a googol random digits and could not be described or recited even at a million digits per second since the Big Bang, such numbers cannot be held as objects of thought, so some numbers (those with simple descriptions) can 'come into existence' earlier than most smaller numbers.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- A philosophical question (like the nature of potentialism, going back to Aristotle) can give rise to a rich mathematical theory (the modal logics of possibility such as S4.2 and S4.3), which in turn feeds back to refine the original philosophical understanding by revealing distinct conceptions — exemplifying a virtuous cycle between philosophy and mathematics.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity