possible world
A complete and consistent way that reality (or one's corner of it) could have been; used in philosophy to analyze possibility, necessity, and counterfactuals.
As defined in 76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
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- Possible-world talk clarifies ambiguities ordinary language blurs—for example 'I could have been taller' is false on a reading requiring a world where Ned is taller than himself but true on a reading where Ned in another world has a greater height than Ned in the actual world.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- A possible world is intuitively a way reality (or our corner of it) could have been—best understood as a complete and consistent story about the world, where completeness means the story answers any question we might pose and is so full that any addition would render it inconsistent.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- Because the Humean treats laws as mere summaries of the actual world, comparing it to other possible worlds requires stipulating which statements count as laws; the anti-Humean worries this stipulation is governed by what is useful to us, whereas what is genuinely explanatory should not depend on our purposes and interests.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- To say one event caused another (e.g., bad sushi caused getting sick) is to compare our world to another possible world where the cause is absent, but not just any such world—comparing to a world with a different but similarly harmful cause (bad chicken wings) won't do—so the central difficulty of causation lies in determining which possible worlds to compare and how.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- Consider a world of two Newtonian particles in circular orbit due to mutual gravity versus a world where each particle independently follows a simple law of perpetual circular motion; Humeans see these as identical descriptions of the same facts, while anti-Humeans insist they differ because they make different predictions about what would happen if a third particle were introduced.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- David Lewis argued for modal realism: that possible worlds are not mere useful devices or stories but literally concrete chunks of reality, each a separate region bearing no spatiotemporal relation to ours, motivated by the demand to analyze possibility and necessity into non-modal terms rather than leaving an unanalyzed notion of consistency at rock bottom.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature