particular
In Platonic metaphysics, an individual, changing, temporal thing in the material world that exemplifies or participates in one or more eternal forms; particulars are objects of opinion rather than knowledge.
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
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- Particulars participate in forms: a particular human participates in the form of humanness, and particular just acts participate in the form of justice. Participation is a fundamental explanatory relation in Platonism, though the concept is somewhat tautological since a particular is by definition a 'participator.'A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- A fundamental problem with forms is that a form cannot itself be both like and unlike; a form must be a principle of unity for a whole class of things. Since a form is indivisible and not a mix, it cannot possess contradictory properties, whereas particulars can because they are divided and composite.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- A third problem is the extent of forms: are there forms of everything, or only of certain things? Socrates questions whether there are forms of trivial or undignified things (hair, mud, dirt, excrement), or only of morally significant and beautiful forms.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- Theories of universals have profound implications for mathematics: a mathematical point is an ideal entity with location but no dimension (and thus does not physically exist); a line has length but no breadth (and thus is not a physical particular); mathematics is fundamentally about ideal entities rather than physical SpaceTime objects.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- A fifth problem with forms is the participation problem: if a particular is like a form, we need not only a conception of the particular and a conception of the form, but also a third conception of what binds them together in similarity, leading to infinite regress—the Third Man argument.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- The term 'idea' (from Greek 'eidos') is better translated as 'form' to avoid confusion with mental ideas or notions; a Platonic form is an archetypal pattern or ideal—a model that particulars participate in or exemplify.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- Forms are immaterial entities, distinct from physical particulars; just as God and the human soul are immaterial beings in Judeo-Christian tradition, forms are non-material entities that nonetheless have real existence.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- Universals are essences—each form is the essential nature shared by all members of a class. Medieval theologians used the concept of universals and essences to resolve trinitarian doctrine: God is one in essence (universal) but three in personal subsistence (particulars), applying Greek metaphysical vocabulary to Christian theology.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- Nominalism is the metaphysical view that there are no universals—only particular entities exist; a nominalistic aesthetics of music composition would treat every ingredient of a composition as a particular, unrelated physical event rather than as instantiations of universal musical structures.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms
- Knowledge is certain and rationally grounded, whereas opinion is relative and changeable because it is based on experience of changing particulars and temporal processes—making experience an unreliable source of knowledge, though experience may work for practical purposes.A History of Philosophy | 05 Plato's Theory of Forms