paradox of phenomenal judgment
The puzzle that a non-conscious zombie twin would make all the same judgments and statements about consciousness as a conscious being, implying physical processes alone drive consciousness-talk.
As defined in 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation
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- Chalmers concedes the strongest objection to the zombie hypothesis is the paradox of phenomenal judgment: a zombie twin says and writes exactly the same things about consciousness (even a word-for-word identical book arguing consciousness is irreducible), so the same physical processes that drive our talk about consciousness exist in a being lacking it—forcing the question of whether our own conviction of being conscious is reliable.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation