on-base percentage
A baseball statistic measuring how often a hitter reaches base, including via walks—not just hits—argued to be the metric most closely correlated with scoring runs.
As defined in Michael Lewis on the Hidden Economics of Baseball and Football 1/29/2007
Where it comes up · 2
- The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/20066 claims
- Michael Lewis on the Hidden Economics of Baseball and Football 1/29/20073 claims
Most important claims · 9 of 9Search all claims for “on-base percentage” →
- On-base percentage—which includes the ability to draw walks—was the single statistic most closely correlated with scoring runs, yet it was undervalued because historically drawing walks was seen as something pitchers did rather than a hitter's skill; the A's exploited this by acquiring players with high OBP but ordinary batting averages and little power, since conventionally attractive stats were already properly priced.Michael Lewis on the Hidden Economics of Baseball and Football 1/29/2007
- On-base percentage was undervalued in the baseball labor market relative to its contribution to winning games, while slugging (extra-base hits and home runs) was overvalued, and Sauer and Hakes found the Moneyball claim held up to statistical testing.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- On-base percentage was empirically undervalued before 2002, but after Moneyball was published the market corrected the inefficiency through competition—by some accounts OBP became overvalued—forcing Beane to seek new arbitrage opportunities such as superior measurement of defensive ability.Michael Lewis on the Hidden Economics of Baseball and Football 1/29/2007
- The undervaluation of on-base percentage was not constant: the A's were at or near the top of the league in drawing walks every year in the early period, but by the last year of the study period the anomaly disappeared and offensive skills were priced in line with their contribution to winning, as expected in an efficient labor market.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Defensive ability metrics are a more durable arbitrage edge than on-base percentage because they are harder to copy and more proprietary—reliable defensive measurement is more of an art, requires more time and energy, and yields a smaller per-player benefit, so the market will be slower to catch up.Michael Lewis on the Hidden Economics of Baseball and Football 1/29/2007
- Lots of sluggers like Mike Schmidt were undervalued because they walked a lot and hit for power but had low batting averages; Schmidt's on-base percentage was around .350 to .400, so fans and pundits underrated him relative to his real contribution.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- The A's success came from getting on base cheaply: the on-base skill they were concentrated on was acquired inexpensively, which is the other half of the Moneyball hypothesis.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Fan awareness of advanced statistics has changed dramatically because USA Today and daily newspapers now list on-base percentage among league leaders, which Sauer thinks has put pressure on general managers to pay attention to it.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006
- Lewis's claim that the Oakland A's gained an edge by focusing on an underappreciated aspect of offense is that avoiding outs is critical, and on-base percentage measures the ability to avoid making outs and reach base.The Economics of Moneyball with Skip Sauer 10/23/2006