non-standard models
Mathematical structures that satisfy the same axioms (e.g. Peano arithmetic) as the intended structure but differ from it, showing the axioms don't uniquely pin down one model.
As defined in 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
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- Our intuition that the natural numbers form one definite intended thing (0,1,2,... and no more) while groups are a broad class is not a real distinction, because Peano arithmetic admits many non-standard models and pinning down 'and no more' is nontrivial—so numbers are no more uniquely picked out than groups.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
- Gödelian incompleteness by itself only shows that for some statement P, neither P nor not-P is derivable from a recursively enumerable axiom system; concluding that there are determinate truths we cannot access requires the additional move of assuming a standard model or interpreting the introduced truth predicate a particular way—it is a stipulation, not a forced result.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real