multi-level selection
The view that natural selection can act simultaneously at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy (genes, individuals, groups).
As defined in 281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution
Where it comes up · 3
- 281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution2 claims
- 204 - A Conversation With Jonathan Haidt1 claim
- 49 | Nicholas Christakis on Humanity, Biology, and What Makes Us Good1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “multi-level selection” →
- Human social networks exhibit degree assortativity—highly connected people preferentially befriend other highly connected people (opposite of dis-assortative airport hub networks)—and this property confers relative immunity to epidemics, because a randomly seeded infection stays localized within sparsely connected regions and only spreads widely if it happens to strike a high-degree node, slowing transmission; this is plausibly not coincidental but shaped by natural selection.49 | Nicholas Christakis on Humanity, Biology, and What Makes Us Good
- For a long time the received view rejected group-level selection of altruism as implausible because early models assumed individual turnover was much faster than group turnover, so individual-level selection acted faster and quickly drove groups to be selfish-dominated—group-level variation was unlikely to arise because the individual process undermined it.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution
- Human nature is best understood through multi-level selection: most of our nature is a product of individual-versus-individual competition (like Dawkins's selfish-gene account), but a few hundred thousand years of group-versus-group competition gave us a 'hive switch' to merge into groups, making us metaphorically 90 percent chimp and 10 percent bee.204 - A Conversation With Jonathan Haidt
- More recently, opinion has shifted such that the idea of multi-level selection now has enthusiastic advocates, despite earlier models dismissing group-level selection as implausible.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution