moral realist
Someone who holds that there are objective moral truths independent of human attitudes; Greene rejects this stance for practical purposes.
As defined in 176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems
Where it comes up · 3
- Elijah Millgram1 claim
- Jonathan Haidt on the Righteous Mind1 claim
- 176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems1 claim
Most important claims · 3 of 3Search all claims for “moral realist” →
- Moral truths are not non-anthropocentric facts (like 'Earth is the third planet from the sun') but emergent truths analogous to market values like gold's worth—they become genuinely true given how we live and trade, so 'women should have equal political rights' is really true now even though it was not an eternal truth for our distant ancestors.Jonathan Haidt on the Righteous Mind
- Twentieth-century metaethics offered only two camps—moral realism (values are facts out there to which you must respond) and noncognitivism (evaluations are mere expressions of feeling)—and both mythologize the abdication of responsibility, whereas Nietzsche's proposal that we self-consciously invent values is an invitation to assume the responsibility philosophy has gone out of its way to slough off.Elijah Millgram
- There probably is no universal objective moral truth, but even if there is, we have no reliable access to it; therefore for practical purposes we must be pragmatic and are not moral realists, working only with what we can observe.176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems