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Jargonphilosophy of mind· 2 claims· 1 episode

mental representation

An internal state of a mind that stands for or represents a goal or worldly state of affairs.

As defined in 281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution


Where it comes up · 1
  • 281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution2 claims

Most important claims · 2 of 2Search all claims for “mental representation” →
  • On Dennett's early intentional-stance view, there is no fact of the matter about whether a creature has intentional states like beliefs or desires; the only question is whether it is heuristically useful to treat it that way, making it a 'fool's errand' to seek a distinction in nature between real intentionality and the 'as if' variety.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution
  • Most or all organisms engage in goal-directed behavior in a weak sense—such as a bacterium swimming up an oxygen gradient and stopping when it has enough—without necessarily having a mental representation of the goal, so conscious goal-directedness with mental representation may have evolved from this simpler teleonomic goal-directedness.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution