long-termism
The view, associated with effective altruism, that positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority
As defined in AMA | December 2022
Other definitions
A philosophical and ideological position that prioritizes potential existential risks and opportunities in the far future as more important than present-day problems and suffering.
Authors of "THE AI CON" discussing the problematic hype about AI & what those working tech should do
Where it comes up · 8
- 361 - Sam Bankman-fried Effective Altruism3 claims
- Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics3 claims
- 305 - Moral Knowledge2 claims
- 385 - Ai Utopia2 claims
- 321 - Reckoning With Parfit2 claims
- 262 | Eric Schwitzgebel on the Weirdness of the World2 claims
- 323 - Science Survival1 claim
- AMA | December 20221 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 16Search all claims for “long-termism” →
- Infinite ethics is practically relevant, not just theoretical, because we should have non-zero credence that we live in an infinite universe; many common ethical theories break when applied to infinite worlds, and for an expected-value reasoner even a tiny credence in being able to do an infinite thing dominates or breaks the entire expected-value calculation, undermining standard arguments for long-termism.Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
- Parfit influenced the effective altruism movement by insisting that the Giving What We Can pledge allow donations to causes benefiting future people—existential risk, climate change—rather than only present development and global health, effectively making him the godfather of long-termism; the movement changed its pledge as a result.321 - Reckoning With Parfit
- Long-termism actually argues against the risk-taking seen at FTX, because the argument that one should take more risk with philanthropic money applies much less strongly to long-termism than to global health, since global health and development can absorb huge amounts of money without cost effectiveness declining (the final $5 still buys a bed net).361 - Sam Bankman-fried Effective Altruism
- Long-termists typically assume human extinction would be bad for future history, but we are radically ignorant about whether currently available actions have good or bad very-long-term effects; for instance, if humanity is a violent, technological species likely to destroy itself explosively (ruining Earth for others), peacefully bowing out now—as antinatalists suggest—might leave Earth in better shape for non-technological species like dolphins to flourish for a billion years, so it is very hard to know what is objectively good over a billion-year horizon.262 | Eric Schwitzgebel on the Weirdness of the World
- The Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) holds you should think it more likely you exist in worlds where people with your evidence form a larger fraction of your reference class; this generates the Doomsday Argument, where being born in the 21st century updates you hard toward humanity going extinct soon, which matters greatly because long-termism depends on the future being large in expectation.Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
- It is hard to appropriately value small-probability events with massive potential outcomes, and ordinary expected-value calculations become irrational or paralyzing; in long-termism this lets one prioritize trillions of hypothetical future lives over all present concerns, which the EA movement itself recognizes as the problem of 'fanaticism.'305 - Moral Knowledge
- We bear immense moral responsibility either way: we must not behave so recklessly that the human future fails to arrive, and if we assume it will arrive we, more than anyone, will determine its character—because making the world 1% better or worse each year compounds into a vastly better or hellish world for those who inherit it.321 - Reckoning With Parfit
- MacAskill defends only a weak form of long-termism, that positively impacting the long-term future is a moral priority of our time but not the only one nor of overwhelming importance, and rejects the mode of thinking that a present catastrophe is nothing compared to future good as having a bad track record.361 - Sam Bankman-fried Effective Altruism
- There is no established philosophical toolkit for reasoning about scenarios where the credence of an outcome is incredibly tiny but the consequences are incredibly large (e.g., an LHC black hole eating the world at one in ten billion, or AI extinction risk), and our intuitions lose their grip on magnitudes above about a trillion; one proposed approach is 'Nicolausian discounting,' where below a low enough credence (e.g., 10^-30) one simply ignores the possibility, but this remains contested.262 | Eric Schwitzgebel on the Weirdness of the World
- Critics within EA argued that risks from advanced AI, even AGI, are arriving in the next decade or two, and the scale of risk imposed on the 8 billion people alive today is more than enough to make AI a top problem without appealing to future generations at all, a perspective MacAskill says has become increasingly vindicated.361 - Sam Bankman-fried Effective Altruism