is-ought distinction
The philosophical principle (associated with Hume) that one cannot logically derive normative conclusions (what one ought to do) purely from descriptive facts (what is the case).
As defined in 50 | Patricia Churchland on Conscience, Morality, and the Brain
Where it comes up · 2
- 50 | Patricia Churchland on Conscience, Morality, and the Brain2 claims
- 48 - What Is Moral Progress1 claim
Most important claims · 3 of 3Search all claims for “is-ought distinction” →
- Our biological constraints limit which moral rules can make sense to us: a rule like 'all first-born babies should be boiled and eaten' cannot work because people are biologically incapable of it, so science can rule out certain proposed rules even though it cannot derive ought from is.50 | Patricia Churchland on Conscience, Morality, and the Brain
- The is-ought dichotomy is uninteresting because you cannot arrive at any description of what is without already obeying certain oughts — logical intuitions and the value of evidence are not self-justifying but are brute epistemological facts we use without apology; therefore moral intuitions like 'reducing pointless agony is good' are no different in kind from the intuition that 2+2=4.48 - What Is Moral Progress
- Neuroscience cannot derive a moral system from facts about the brain—it cannot show that utilitarianism is the way to go—so claims (such as Sam Harris's) that science endorses utilitarianism are mistaken; what science can do is bring facts to the table without those facts counting for more simply because a scientist offers them.50 | Patricia Churchland on Conscience, Morality, and the Brain