institutions
In North's economics, the 'rules of the game' that structure economic and social interaction and may be more or less conducive to growth.
As defined in Morten Jerven on African Economic Growth
Where it comes up · 3
- Morten Jerven on African Economic Growth2 claims
- Michael Munger on Obedience to the Unenforceable1 claim
- 287 | Jean-Paul Faguet on Institutions and the Legacy of History1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “institutions” →
- The fundamental human social problem is the design or maintenance of institutions—the rules of the game, whether formal laws or emergent norms—that make self-interested individual action not inconsistent with the welfare of the collective.Michael Munger on Obedience to the Unenforceable
- The intuition that institutions matter is almost universally agreed upon, but reducing institutions to a 0-to-5 scale (Germany 4.8, Tanzania 1.2) destroys the original North-derived insight that institutions are part of a particular political process suited to local conditions and not exportable; a policymaker reading those scores concludes 'make our institutions more German,' which is the exact opposite of the intuition.Morten Jerven on African Economic Growth
- Institutions written in identical black-and-white rules (e.g., constitutions copied from the US by Latin American republics, or shared French/British administrative structures left to African colonies) produce radically different outcomes when transferred across cultural contexts, demonstrating that formal rules alone do not determine institutional behavior.287 | Jean-Paul Faguet on Institutions and the Legacy of History
- Institutions were defined by Nobel laureate Douglass North as the 'rules of the game' that may or may not be conducive to economic growth, and Acemoglu and Robinson built on the intuition that not only capital and labor matter but also how society is organized.Morten Jerven on African Economic Growth