information problem
Hayek's idea that knowledge of what people want is dispersed and hard for any central planner to know, making decentralized price-based allocation valuable.
As defined in Canice Prendergast on How Prices Can Improve a Food Fight (and Help the Poor)
Where it comes up · 2
- Does Market Failure Justify Government Intervention? (with Michael Munger)3 claims
- Canice Prendergast on How Prices Can Improve a Food Fight (and Help the Poor)1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “information problem” →
- The Bergson-style welfare program assumes individual indifference functions are known, but they cannot be known—neither the government nor even the individual reliably knows how much they value one good versus another, so allocating output to maximize aggregate happiness is meaningless from the start.Does Market Failure Justify Government Intervention? (with Michael Munger)
- To understand an economic system you must look with 'two eyes'—incentives and information—and the central question is whether using both can generate a better outcome than markets, which already generate information through prices.Does Market Failure Justify Government Intervention? (with Michael Munger)
- The food bank reform is an application of what Hayek called the information problem—the difficulty of knowing what people actually want—which connects to debates about in-kind welfare versus giving cash, as argued by Milton Friedman and increasingly adopted in international development.Canice Prendergast on How Prices Can Improve a Food Fight (and Help the Poor)
- A.C. Pigou in 1912 already recognized that state authorities are liable to ignorance (information), sectional pressure (democracy), and corruption by private interest (incentives)—making him effectively the first Public Choice theorist, decades before Buchanan and Tullock.Does Market Failure Justify Government Intervention? (with Michael Munger)